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TO  DR.  MEAD. 
81% 
TO  intrude in this  manner upon your  time, 
80 usefully einployed  in  the duties  of  your profession, 
would expose me in some measure to blame, were it up- 
on a less important occasion, than that of recommending 
the following work to your genervrte protection.  The 
dignity of the subject, which, handled by other pens, has 
been thought wor~hy  of being inscribed  to the most il- 
lustrious personages of the last and present age,urill plead, 
I hope, some  excuse for  an address,  which is  designed 
not so much to interrupt  your  occupations,  as to avaiI 
itself of  the  sanction  of  your Same in introducing this 
work to the public.  And indeed a nobler subject I could 
not select for the favar of  your  acceptance,  than that, 
which so nearly relates  to the moral duties of  life, and 
the foundation of human contentment and happiness ;  a 
subject moreover illustrated by one of the ablest m:isters 
of  the present age, whose extraordinary ability and skill 
in curing the  disorders of  the mind,  may be  campared 
very aptly to yours in removing those of the body.  One 
of the principal encouragements I had to this address is 
the near relation between the fallowing work and those 
elevated sentiments,  with  which  you have been always 
inspired.  Such an admirable system of moral precepts, iv  DEDICATION. 
such noble maxims  of  true Christian  policy,  and  such 
excellent rules for  the government of  our lives,  cannot 
but be  acceptable  to a  gentleman,  who, in the  whole 
tenor of his conduct,  h~s  been an illustrious example of 
those rules and maxirns,  which are here most judicious- 
ly established.  A very good opportunity this of  enter- 
ing upon the encomium of  those vir~ues,  which have so 
eminently distin~uishecl  you at th'e hezd of your profes-  P.  sioil ; but  the  ilitle  value any  commendation  of  mine 
would have, the ap2rehension I should be under of  be- 
ing suspected  of  adulation,  and  the danger I should in- 
cur of offending your modesty, obliges me to wave ally 
attempt of this nature.  Houcver, 1 cannot help taking 
notice of that true magnificecce,  with  which  you  have 
at all times contributed to the acivai~ce!nent  of learning, 
and whereby ynu have justly acquired the title of patron 
and protector of ietters.  In fact, the extensive blessings, 
that  fortune  has  bestowed  ~zpon  ~OLI,  have  been  em- 
ployed,  not as  instrurnenta  cd  private  luxury,  but  as 
means of  promoting those arts, which  have received an 
additional lustre, since they have sho:le  so conspciuous- 
Ij.  in your person.  Your  friendship  and  correspond- 
ence have been courted by the greatest men of the pres- 
ent age ;  and your house, like thzt of Atticus, has been 
open to the learned  of all orders and ranks, who unzni- 
mously  respect  you,  not only  as a  supreme  judge  of 
learning and wit, but  moreover  as an  arbiter  ekegantia- 
rwn, aild master of finished urbanity.  Your collectibb 
of valuable curiosities  and books,  wherein you have ri- 
valled the ~liagnificence  of sovereigns,  is the admiration 
and talk of all  Europe, and will be  a lasting monument 
of your  love  of  literature.  The polite  reception  you 
have always given to the learned of  foreign nations has 
rendered your name so respectable abroad, that you are 
never mentioned  but with expressions denoting the high 
idea they entertain of your singular munificence.  These, 
Sir, are not particular sentiments of mine ;  they are the 
sentiments of the public,  whose voice I utter ;  they are 
DEDICATION.  V 
the sentiments of your learned  friends  abroad, which I 
have been desired to repeat to you upon a late occ~sion, 
together with their compii~nents  of thanks for the marks, 
they have received of your great and disinterested civil- 
it  It is with pleasure  1  embrace this oppcrtunity of 
executicg my commission, and of declaring in  this public 
manner  the profound  esteem,  with which  T have  the 
honor of  subscribing myself,  Sir, 
your most humble and 
obedient  servant, 
THOMAS NUGENT, 
Gray's Inn, Julie  4,  I 745. TRANSLATOR 
READER. 
THE  author  the following  work,  M. J.  J.  BurIfi 
mapui, was descended from  one  qm  those  nobie fanrilies 
ef Lucca, which, on  their entbracir~g  the Protestant religion, 
were obliged about two centuries ago  to  take shelter in  Ge- 
Reva.  His father  was cozlnsellor and secretary of state ; 
bonors,  which  are freque~ztly conferred in that city upon 
such, as acquit thenzselves worthily of  a prafessorship in the 
academy, particularfy that of  law, the jttest  mitbout doubt 
to form  able judges,  nzagistmta, and statesmen.  The  son, 
on  his returi~  from  his travels, was inz?tzedintcly nominated 
professor of  this science, in which post  he  continued a con- 
siderable number of years, till  the republic thought proper 
fa  rentunerate his long and enzinent services, by  raising him 
bo  the same dignity, as his father.  The great reputation, 
be acquired in his profe.ssorship, was less  owing to  his im- 
mense erudition, in which he equalled if not excelled allhis 
predecessors,  than to  the  puickness  of his understanding, 
the clearness of his ideas, his sound and judicious  views zn 
the study of jurisprudence,  and  especially to the solidity of 
his Principles on  natural law and civil governnzent.  With 
regard to the  occasion  of his  publishing  these Principles, 
be  observes  himself  in  the preface,  that  it was in some 
nteusure to conzply with the  inportunity of his friends,  but 
g&$y  topregent  his reputation from  being  injured  6y  d 
precipitate impressicn  front  any of  those inqerfect and sur- 
reptlti~~s  copies, which had been handed about by  his pupil$. 
Tile public  indeed  had Jlattered  thenzselves  a  long  time 
with the hopes of  seeing a conzplete course ofthe law of  na- 
pure  and nations  from this enzinent hand ;  but his occupa- 
tions  and infirmity obliged  him  to frustrate  their  expecta- 
tions.  However, as a good  introduction to this science was 
extrendy  wanied, he thought proper, till he could publish 
his larger wotk, to favor  us  with the  followi~g   principle^. 
being convinced that in this as in every other branch of learn- 
ing,  tfie me:t  essenriai part  ir  $he laying of a proper  and 
rolrdfoundation.  In fact, we daily obscrve, that most error$ 
in life proceed  rather  fro?tt wrong pri7~ciple.r~  than  from ill- 
drawn consepaences. 
M.  Burlamaqui  is so nzodest, us tu consider these prin- 
ciples as calculated only for  young people,  who trre desirous 
of being  initiated into  the study of natural law ;  and yet 
we  may venture to ufirmit or  LZ  performance  of general 
utility, but  specially to  such,  as have had the misfortune 
of neglecting this science in thzir younger  days.  It  is a per- 
formance,  that must  c~rtaEi!!y  be allowed to have the merit 
Bf  a12  original underhzking, by  our  author's  ascending al- 
ways to thejrst  principles, by  his illuJZrating and  extend- 
ing them, by  his  connecting them with each other,  and  by 
exhibiting them  frequently  in a new light.  But his singu- 
lar beauty confists in the alliance, he so  carejiully points out 
between ethics and jurisprudence,  religion and politics,  af- 
ter the example of Plato and Tully, and the other illustri- 
ous  nzasters of antiquity.  In efict these  science^  have the 
sanze  basis, alzd tend to the sa?ze end; their business is to 
unravel the system of humanity,  or  the plan  of providence 
with regard to nzan ;  and since  thz unity of  this systenz  i~ 
an  unquestionable point,  so soon  as  writers asccnd  to the 
principles,  in order  to  view and contenplate the zuhole, it 
is impossible but they all should meet. 
924s author's  method /h  nothing  of the scholastic izn, viii  TO  THE READER. 
Instead of  starting new djficulties, hz ~revcnts  then2  the 
manner  laying his th&s ;  i~$ead of dfizlting,  he rec- 
onciles.  Far fro2z  purjlirig  any  idle  or too subtle  idcas, 
he  fo/iows  reature step  by step,  and derives his argulnel~ts 
fro??ij?{e  aand  exl/erie?zce.  His thoughts he  unfolds with 
the greatest perjpiculty  and order ;  rtnd his style  is pure, 
clear, and  agreeable,  such as properly  becomes n didactic 
work.  6zjze  hr" has the holzor  of  preprving the chnrac- 
ter of  a Cb;rt/tinn pbil@ppher,  inculcating  the  valuz we 
o~ght  to  fit  upcn the light f  revelation, a light, which fi 
advanrdgccxJy  afi~ts  the  feeble glininlerings of reajn  in the 
high and important concerns ofour sivilnnd religiow duties. 
AUTHOR'S 
ADVERTISEMEMT. 
I;IIS treatise on  the  Principles of  Natural Law is on 
introduction to a larger work, or  to a complete syftem of the law of 
nature and nations, which so=e  time or  other I proposed  to  publish. 
But having met  with several obstructions in my  attempt, through n 
variety of occupations, and pritzcipnl'ly from  my  indferrnt state of 
health,  I  had  almost  lost  sight  of  my  original  hip.  Be- 
ing informed however, that some  manuscript  copies f  the paprrs  I 
had drawn up for  my  own private use, .~vh~,'  rgave /ectrdres of+- 
rjsprudmce, were multiplied and got  into a number  cf  hands, I be- 
gan to  apprehend, lest this work should  be  published  against my  &/[ 
in a  very in~pevfrct  cnd  mangled  conditicn.  This induced  me  at 
length to jield  to the sohitations of several of  myfriendj, by  cGm- 
municating the following essay  to  the public.  Dubi:us whether  1 
shall ever be  able  to filrish  the work, Ihave endeavoured to give such 
an extent to  these Principles, as may  render them in Jome  rneajz/rP 
serviceable to such, as arc desirous of being initiated  into the ktzowl- 
edge of the law of  nature.  As  for  thosc, who are masters ?f  thiis 
~ubect,  the  present  work  is  720t  designedfir :hem ;  my  ziew zcrili 
be  ~u$;cientl,jlld,  fit shoufd prove  of any  utility to  young  GP- 
ginners in the study  of  this itnprtant science. CONTENTS.  d 
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CHAP.  I. 
@F  the Nature of Man, considered with regard  to Right ;  of  the 
Understanding, and whatever is  relative to this faulty. 
1. MY  design is to inquire into those rules,  which na-  Design of  this work 3 
ture alone prescribes to man, in  order to conduct him safely to What is 
the end,  which  every  one has, and  indeed ought to  have,  in mesa by 
view, namely,  true and solid happiness.  The  system or assem- :it.ra' 
blage of  these rules, considered  as so  many laws, imposed  by 
God on man,  is generally distinguished by the name  of  Natu- 
ral Law.  This science includes the most important principles 
of morality, jurisprudence,  and politics j that is,  whatever is most 
interesting  in respect as well to man, as to society.  There can 
be nothing therefore moredeserving of the application of a rational 
being,  of a being,  that has its  perfection  and  felicity seriously 
at heart.  A just knowledge of the maxims, we ought to follow 
in the course of  life, is the principal object of  wisdom ;  and vir- 
tue consists in putting them constantly in practice, without being 
ever diverted from so noble  A  a  pursuit. 2  THE PRINCIPLES OF  NATURAL  LAW. 
LVe muat  11.  The idea of  rkhf,  and much more that of natrtual right, 
deduce the . 
prlnclp,ea  1s  undoubtedly  relative to the narure of man.  It is from this 
of  thls sci- nature therefore, from the constitution and state of man,  that we 
ence  from 
the nature  are to deduce the principles of  this science. 
and state  The word right  (dvoit")  in  its original sig~lification, comes 
from the verb dirigo, which implies to conduct a person to some 
certain end by  the shortest road.  Right therefore,  in its proper 
and most general sense, and that, to which all the others must be 
reduced,  is whatever directs, or is properly directed.  This being 
premised,  the first thing we have to examine  is whether man is 
susceptible of  direction and rule in respect to his actions.  That 
we may attempt this with a greater probability of success, we are 
to trace matters to their very origin, and ascending as high, as the 
nature and constitution of man, we must there unravel the princi- 
ple of his actions, and the several states,  that properly belong to 
him, in order to demonstrate afterwards  in what manner,  and 
how far, he is susceptible of  direction in his conduct.  This is 
the only method of knowing  what is right, and what is not. 
Defin~tion  111.  Man is an animal, endowed  with understanding and rea- 
O*  m~  i  son ;  a being, composed of an organized body and a rational soul.  whdt hls 
nature  With regard to his body, he is pretty similar to other animals, 
having the same organs, properties, and wants.  This is a living 
body,organized  and composed of severalparts; a body, that moves 
of itself, and, feeble in the  commencement, increases grduaHy in 
its progress by the help of  nourishment,  till it arrives to a cer- 
tain  period,  in  which  if  appears  in  its  flower  and  vigour, 
whence it  insensibly declines to old age,  which conducts  it at 
length to dissolution,  This is the ardinary course of human life, 
unless it happens to be  abridged by some malady or accident. 
But man,  besides  the msrvellous disposition of his body, has 
likewise a mtional soul, which eminently discriminates him from 
brutes.  It is !~y  tI~is  noSe part of  himself that he thinks,  and 
is capable of furming just ideas of  the different objects,  that oc- 
cur to him ;  oi  conlgaring  them  together ;  of  inferring from 
known principle3 ~lnkiroww  trutl~s  ;  of passing a solid judgment 
on the mutual fitness or agreement of  things,  as well as on the 
*  The etymology given here by the author was illtended anly for the Frenck 
word Drort. 
they bear to us;  of  deliberating on what is proper or 
impropes to be clone ;  and of  determining  consequently to act 
one way  or other,  The mind  recollects what  is past, joins  it 
with the present, and extends its views to futurity.  It is capable 
of  penetrating into  the  causes,  progress,  and consequences of 
things,  and of  discovering,  as it were at one  glance,  the intire 
course of life, which enables it to lay in a store of  such  things, as 
are necessary for making a happy career.  Besides,  in all this,  it 
is not subject to a constant series of  uniform and invariable op- 
eration% but finds itself at liberty to act or not to act, t6 suspend 
its actions and motions, to direct and manage them as it thinks 
proper. 
IV.  Such is the general idea, we  are to form of  the nature D;E,,,,& 
of man.  What rssults  from  it  is,  that  there  are  several actions  man.  of 
sons of  human actions ; some are purely spiritual,  as  to think,  which are 
to  reflect,  to  doubt,  &c.  others  xre  merely  corporeal,  S  to fhose,that  are the ob- 
breathe,  to grow.  &c.  and some  there  are that may be called  ject of 
mixt,  in which the soul and body have both a share, being pro-  f 
duced by their joint concurrence, in consequence of  the union, 
which God has established between these two constituent parts 
af man ;  such as to speak, to work,  &c. 
Those actions,  which  either in  their origin  or direction de- 
pend on  the soul,  are called human or voluntary ;  all the rest 
are termed merely physical,  The soul is therefore the princi- 
ple of  human actions ;  aud these actmns  cannot  be the object 
of  rule,  but  inasmuch as  they are produced and ciirectecl  by 
those noble f~culties,  with which man has been enriched by his 
Crc'xtcr.  Hence  it  is ncGessdrg to  enter into a particular in- 
quiry concerning  this subject, and  to examine  closely into the 
faculties  and operations of  the  soul,  in order  to  discover  in 
what manner they concur to the production  of  human actions. 
This  will help us,  zt the same  time,  to unfold  the  nature of 
these actions,  to assure  ourselves  whether  they  are really  sus- 
ceptible of  rule,  and how far they are  subject  to human com- 
mand. 
V.  Let man reflect but  ever so  little o:: himself,  sense  principal 
experience w~ll  soon inform him, that his soul is an agent, whose  the  facultleg  soul. 
activity displays itself by a series of diKcrent operations;  which THE PRINCIP1,ES OF  NATURAL  LAW.  s 
having been distinguished by separate names, are likewise attri- 
buted to  difftrcnt faculties.  'l'he  chief  of  these faculties are 
the understanding,  will,  and  liberty.  The soul  is  indeed  a 
simp!e  M.1;  ;  but this does not  hinder us,  when we attend to 
its diFerent ways of  operating, from considering it as a subject, 
in kvkich  different  powers  of  acting reside,  and from  giving 
differ~nt  c!enominntions  to  these powers.  If  we  consider the 
thing in this manner, we  shall  find it will give  a  greater  ex- 
actness  and  perspicuity  to  o1.r  ideas.  Let  us  remember 
therefore, that  these faculties  i:3;1:i11g  else, but the different 
powers of  acting inhz-c:.t  in the mind,  by means of  which  it 
performs all its operztions. 
Theunder-  VI.  The principal faculty of the soul, that which constitutes 
standing ; 
h  the fundamental  part of  its being,  and serves,  as  it \:,'ere,  for 
its intrinsic light, is the understanding.  We  may define it that 
faculty or power, by which the mind perceives, a:d  forrns ideas 
of  things,  in order to come at the inoviledge of  truth.  Truth 
may be taken here in two  sipnificrtioxls; either for  the nature, 
state, and mutual relations of thicgs ;  or for the ideas agreeable 
to  this  nature,  stnt"  and  relatior,~.  To  liClve a  knowlelige 
therefore of  truth is  to perceive things  such, as  they  are  in 
themselves,  and to form idcss concerililrg  them confl~rmable  to 
Prinr<p!c. 
The  under- 




VII.  IVe  must  therefore set  out  with acknowledging, as  .  . a 
fixt and incontestable  principle, that the  human  understanding 
is naturally  right, and has  within itself  a strength suficient to 
arrive at the knowledge of  truth, and to distinguish it from er- 
ror ;  especially in things,  wherein our respective duties are con- 
cerned,  and which  are  requisite  to  form man  for a  virtuous, 
honorable,  and quiet life ;  ~rovided, however, he employs  all 
the care and attention, that lies in his power. 
Sense and experience concur to  convince us of the truth  of 
this principle ; which is  the hinge,  as  it  were,  whereon  the 
whole system of  humanity turns.  It cannot be  called  in ques- 
tion,  without  sapping  the foundation,  and  intirely subverting 
the whole structure of  society ;  because this would be  annull- 
ing all manner of  distinction between truth  and error,  and be- 
tween good  and evil ;  and,,by  a natural  consequence  of  this 
subversion,  we  should  find  ourselves  rcdpced  to  the ncccr- 
sity of  doubting of  every thing ; which  is the highest pitch of 
human extravagance. 
Those who pretend,  that reason and its faculties are depraved 
in such a  manner,  as to be no longer  capable  of  serving as a 
sllre and faithful guide to man,  either in  respect to his duties, or 
with regard  to reiigion,  do not reflect,  that they have 
adopted  for the basis of  their system, a principle destructive of 
211  truth, and conseq~ently  of  religion.  Thus we  see that the 
sacred scripture,  far from establishing any such maxim,  assures 
us,  that when the Gentiles, zvLicb  have not  the lazo,  do  by  nature 
the things contained  in the l~inu  ; the,  having not  the Innu,  are a 
Znw  to themselve~.  Which shenu  the work of the lnzv,  u'ritten in 
their  hearts, their CO~JC~P~IC~  nlso benring ~uitnes~." 
'True it is,  that a bad education, vicious habits,  and irregular 
~assions,  may ofl'uscate the mind ;  and that neglect, levity,  and 
prejudic~s,  precipitate men freqcently into the grossest errors in 
point of  religion  and morals.  But  this proves  only that men 
may m~ke  a bad use of  their reason,  and  not  that the  natural 
rectitude of  the faculties is  subverted.  What we have still to 
say, concerning this point,  will help  to set it in a c!el:rer  light. 
VIII.  Let us proceed now to  a closer inquiry into the  ope-  I,  h, 
P  rations of  rhe  understanding.  The perception,  or  view  and manner 
knowiedge of  things,  is commonly formed  by the concurrence perception, 
attention  of  two  actions ; one  from  the  object,  and  is the impression and exa- 
which  this  object  niakes on us ;  the other from the  mind,  and 
is properly a glance, or simple view of the soul,  on the object it  is 
desirous of knowing. But, as a first  view is not always sufficient,it 
is necessary,  that the mind should apply itself for some time to a 
seriotis consideration of  the object, to the end it may  acquire a 
just  knowledge of  things, and forni thereof exact ideas.  This 
app!icatioc,  with w5ich the soul continues to view tlle  object in 
order to know it well, is called  attention ;  and, if  it turnsitself 
different ways, to consider the object on all sides,  this is termed 
examen or inquiry.  We may therefore  affirm,  :hnt  the  per- 
ception or knowledge of  things depends intirely,  in respect  to 
the mind,  on its natural vigor  and attention. 
IS.  It  is by thcse  helps,  drawn  from his  own  f~~t~d,  that Evidence 
ProbabE-  man  attains at lenyth a clear and distinct l-c~v!cd~v  ~f  things, ,,, 
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and their relations ;  as also of ideas, and the conformity of those 
ideas to their originals;  in short,  that he  acquires  the knowl- 
edge af  truth.  We  give the  name  ol evidence,  to  this clear 
and distinct view of  things,  +nd of  their  mutual relations ;  a 
point to  which we should  be  particularly  attentive.  For this 
evidence being the essential  characteristic of  truth, or the sure 
mark whereby  one cannot  help  distinguishing  it,  the  conse- 
quence is,  that it necessarily  produces  such an internal  convic- 
tion,  as  forms the highest degree of  certainty.  It is  true that 
all  objects do not present themselves with so strong a light,  and 
that  notwithstdnding the great care and application a man may 
use,  all that he is frequently able to attain, is only a glimmering 
light, which, according to  its  strength  or weakness,  produces 
different degrees of  probability and  seeming  truth.  But  this 
must be absolutely the case of  every being,  whose faculties are 
limited ;  it  is  suflicient  that man,  in respect to his destination 
and state, is capable of knowing with certainty those things which 
concern his perfection and happiness ;  and moreover,tk~t  he is a- 
ble t~ distinguis!~  between  and evidence,  as also be- 
tween the dicerent degrees of probability,  in order to proportion 
his assent to thwst: Jifferences.  Now a  person need  hut enter 
never  so  little into himself,  and reflect  on the operations of his 
mind, to be convinced, beyond any possibility  of  doubt, that man 
is really possessed of  this discernment. 
of the sen-  X. The senses,  taken  from the  sensitive faculty,  the imagi- 
ses,  the  nation also,  and the memory, must be all reduced to the under- 
imagina- 
tion and  standiug.  (In fact,  the senses,  considered in  this manner,  are 
memory.  nothing else hut the undexstanding itself,  as it makes use of the 
senses  and organs of  the  body,  to perceive corporeal  objects. 
The imagiilation likewise is  ~lothing  bat the  understanding,  as 
it perceives absent objects,  not in themselves, but by their images 
formed in the br&.  The memory,  in  fine, is  no  more than 
the understanding,  conside~ed  as  possessed  of  the  faculty  of 
retaining the ideas, it forms of things, and czpable of represent- 
ing tbm  to itself,  whenever there is occ2sion;  advantages that 
principally depend on the  care  we take in  repezting  frequently 
those ideas. 
XI.  From what has been hitherto said with regard to  the un- z:,","if 
derstanding,  it  follows, that the object  of  this  faculty of  the the under- 
soul is truth,  with all the acts and means,  that lead  us  to  it. standing 
consists in 
Upon  this  supposition,  the  perfection  of  the  understanding the knowl., 
in  the knowledge  of  truth,  this  being the  end,  for edge of' 
truth. 
which it is designed. 
There are two things,  among others,  opposite to this ~erfec-  Two obsta- 
cles to this  tion, ignorance and  error,  which are two  maladies,  as it were,  perfection, 
of the mind.  Ignorance is no more than a ~rivation  of  ideas ignorance 
or knowledge ;  but error is a nonconformity or opposition of our 
ideas to the nature and state of  things.  Error being therefore 
the subversion of  truth, is much more opposite to it, than igno- 
rance, which is a kind of  medium between truth and  error. 
It is to be observed here,  that we do  not  speak of  the  un- 
derstanding, truth, ignorance,  and  error, purely to know what 
these things are in themselves ; our main  design  is  to consid- 
er them as principles of  our  actions.  In this light  ignorance 
and  error,  though  naturally  distinct  from  one another,  are 
generally  mist,  as it were,  and confounded ;  inssmuch,  that 
whatever is said  of one ought equally to be applied to the oth- 
er.  Ignorance is frequently the  cause of  error ;  but whether 
joined  or sep~rate,  they follow the same rules, and produce the 
same efict by  the  influence,  they have over our sctions or o- 
missions.  Perhaps,  were we  to examine into thi:lgs  exactly, 
error only,  properly speaking,  can be looked  upon as a principle 
of action, and not simple ignorance, which, being nothing more 
of  itself  than a privation of ideas,  cannot be productive  of  any 
thing. 
XII.  There are several  sorts of  ignorance,  and error, whose ~;fr~,,~~ 
diff'erent divisions it is proper  for us to observe.  I. Error, con-  Sorts of er- 
rors. I. Er-  sidered in  respect to its  object,  is either of  the law  or  of  the  the 
fact.  2. With regard to its  origin,  ignorance  is  voluntary  or  law, and of 
the fact.  involuntary, error is vincible or invincible.  3. In relation to the ,,  Volunta- 
influence of  the  error on a particular  affair  or action,  i't  is es-  ry and in- 
teemed essential or  accidental.  voluntary.  3. Essential 
Error is of  the law or fact according as people are mistaken  and acci- 
-* 
either in respect to the  disposition of  the law,  or in r~gdrd  to d2"ta'' 
a fact,  that is not sufficiently  known.  For instance,  it  would 8  THE PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURAL LAW. 
be an error of  the law,  were a prince to suppose himself  iati- 
tled to declare war against a'neighbouring  state,  on:y  because it 
insensibly increases in strength and power.  Such was likewise 
the error so common formerly among the Greeks and Romans, 
that it was allowable for parents to expose their children.  *On 
the contrary,  the  idea  Abimelech had  of  Sarah, the  wife  of 
Abraham, by taking her for an unmarried person, was an error of 
the fact. 
The ignorance a person lies under through his own fatilt, or 
an error,  contracted by  neglect,  and  which  might have been 
avoided by using all possible care and  attention,  is a  voluntary 
ignorance, or  a  vincible  and  surmountable  error.  Thus the 
polytheism of  the Pagans  was a  vincible  error ;  for  they had 
only to make a right use of  their reason,  in order to be convinc- 
ed,  that  there was  no necessity  for  supposing  a  plurality of 
gods.  The same may be said of an opinion,  established among 
most of  the ancients, that piracy was lawful against those, with 
whom there was no treaty subsisting, and that it was allowable 
to consider them as  enemies.  Ignorance  is  involuntary,  and 
error invincible, when they are such as could neither have been 
prevented  nor removed,  even by  all the  care and  endeavours, 
that are morally  possible ; th'1.t  is, judging  of  them according 
to  the  constitution  of  human  things,  and  of  common  life. 
Thus the ignorance  of  the christian religion,  under which  the 
people of  America  labored,  before they had  any communica- 
tion with the Europeans, was an involuntary and  invincible  ig- 
norance. 
In fine we understand  by an essential error, that, whosy ob- 
ject is some necessary circumstance in the affair, and which for 
this very  reason has  a direct  influence  on  the action,  doce in 
consequence thereof;  insomuch,  that, were it not for this error, 
the action would never have been done.  Hence this is  denom- 
inated likewise an eficacious error.  By necessary circumstances, 
we are to understand  those,  which are necessarily required,  ei-  .  - 
ther by  the very nature of  the thing, or by the intention of  the 
agent, formed at the proper  time,  and made known by suitable 
indications.  It was thus,  for instance,  an essential error in the 
* See another example in St. Matthew, chap. xv. 4,s. 
Trojans, at the taking of  their t~wn,  tc c\oot  tk;r  i?arfs ?r[ainst 
their own people,  mistaking thein  for enemies,  Stc.:*l$t.  of  their 
being armed after the Greek manner.  Again ;  a person Ear- 
ries  another man's  wife,  supposing  1l.r  to be  a miid, or  not 
knowing that her husband is stiil  living ;  this r~gdrds  the very 
nature of  the thing, and is of  course an essentidl error. 
On the contrary an accidental error is that, which has no ne- 
cessary connexio~l  of itself with the affair, and consequently can- 
llot be considered,  as the real cause  of  the action.  A  person 
&uses  or insults another, taking  him for somebody else, or be- 
cause he supposes the prince is dead, as it had been groundless- 
ly  reported,  &c.  These  are errors  merely  accidental, which 
subsist  indeed in the mind of the agent, and have  accompanied 
him in the actio!~, but cannot be considered, as its real cause. 
It is likewise observable,  that  t5ese different  qualities of ig- 
norance or error may concur,  and may be found united in  the 
same case.  It  is thus an error of  the fact  may  be  either es- 
sential or accidental;  and both  the ofie and the  other  may be 
either voluntary,  or involuntary ;  vincible or  invincibl*.  So 
much  may suffice for what regards the understanding.  Let  us 
proceed  now to examine into the other  faculties  of  the  soul, 
which concur also to the production of human actions. 
CHAP. 11. 
Continuation of  the princ+les,  relative to  the nature of  man.  Of 
will and liberty. 
I.  IT  was not suflicient, pursuant to the views of the Creator,  me  will. 
What  hap  that the  human  mind  should  be  possessed of  the  faculty  of  pinessand 
knwing things,  and of  forming thereof  ideas ;  it was likewise  good  con- 
requisite,  it should be endowed with an activs principle  to  set sist In' 
it in motion, and with a power  whereby man, after knowing the 
objects, that occur to him,  should be capable of determining to 
act,  or not to act, according, as he judges proper.  This facul- 
ty is what we call tile will. 
The will is therefore nothing else but that power of the soul, 
by which  it  is determined  of  itself, and by virtue of an active 
principle inherent in its nature,  to seek for what is  agreeable to 
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it, to act after a certain manner, and to do or to omit an  action 
with a view  of  happiness. 
By Hap>irzess we  are  to understand the i~iternal  satisfaction 
of the mind,  arising from the possession of good ;  and by good, 
whatever is suitable  or agreeable to  man  for  his preserv~tion, 
perfection, conveniency,  or pleasure.  The idea  of  good  de- 
termines that of  evil, which, in  its most  general  signification, 
implies whatever  is opposite to the preservation,  perfection, con- 
veniency,  or  p!easure  of  inan. 
Instincts,  11.  Instincts,  inclinations,  and passions, are  reducible to the 
inrlina- 
tions,  will.  Instincts are sentiments, excited in the soul by the wants 
siona.  of  the body,  which determine it to provide immediately against 
them.  Such are  hunger,  thirst,  aversion  for  whatever  is 
hurtful  &c.  Inclinations  are  propensities  of  the  will, 
which leads it rather toward some sorts of objects,  than others, 
but in an even,  tranquil ~nznner  ;  a manner so proportioned to 
all its operations, that, instead of  obstructing or interrupting, it 
generally facilitates them.  As  for the  passions, they  are  in- 
deed in  the  same manner,  as the inclinations,  motions of  the 
will towards certain objects, but motions of  a more  impetuous 
and turbulent kind, motions, that dispossess the soul of its natural 
tranquility, and hinder it from directing properly its  operations. 
'I'hen  it is  that  the passions  become  most dangerous distem- 
pas.  The cnuse of the passions  is  generally  the allurement 
of  some sensible good,  which solicits the  soul,  and  impels  it 
with too violent an impression. 
It is easy to  conceive, by what has been  here said, that the 
i::clin~tioi~j.,  passions,  and  instincts,  have  a very great  afinity 
widl one another.  They are  all alike propensities or motions, 
which hjve  frequentiy the same objects ;  but there is this  dif- 
fcrence between these  cpccies  of  emotions,  that  instincts  are 
necessarily the same in  all men,  by  a  natural  consequence  of 
their constitution,  and of  the union  between the body  and the 
soul j  whereas tile inclinations and ~assions,  particularly consid- 
ered, have nothing necessary in their nature,  and are surprising- 
ly different in difierent lneil. 
Let us make an 0bservatio:l  here,  which falls  in very natur- 
ally ;  it is,  that we often give the name  of  Hmi-t  to  the will, 
#onsidered as susceptible of  the forementioned  emotions ;  and 
the reason of this  in a11  probdbiiit~ is, because these emoticns 
were supposed to have their seat in the heart. 
111.  Such  is  the  nature of  the soul, that  the will not only Liberty; 
acts always spontaneously, that is,  of  its own proper motioa,  of  ~~~~~.mit 
its own accord,  and by  an internal principle ;  but likear;sc, that 
its determinations are generally accompanied with liberty. 
We  give the name  of  liberty to that force  or  power of  the 
soul, whereby it modifies and regulates its operations as it pleps- 
es,  so as  to  be able to  suspend, continue,  or alter its deliber- 
ations and  actions ;  in a word,  so an  to be  able to  determine 
and act with choice,  according as it thinks prop.  It  is by this 
excellent faculty, that man 113s a kind of  command over himself 
and his actions;  and as he is hrrcby  rendered also  capable of 
tonforming to rule, and answerable for his conduct,  it is  there- 
fore necessary to give a further explication of  the nature of  this 
faculty. 
Will and liberty being faculties of  the soul, they  cannot  be 
blind or destiture of trlmvlc~lgo  ;  but necessarily suppose the op- 
eration of the understanding.  How is ~t possible in fact to de- 
termine, suspend,  or alter our resolutions, finless we know what 
is proper for us to choose ?  It is  contrary  to  the nature of  an 
intelligent  and rational being to act without intellection and rea- 
son.  This reason may be  either superficial  or bad ;  yet it has 
some appearance at least,  some glimmering, that makes us give 
it a momentary  approbation.  Wherever there is  election or 
choice, there must be a comparison;  and a comparison implies 
at least a confused  reflection,  a kind  of deliberation, though  of 
a quick  and  almost  imperceptible  nature,  on  the  subject  be- 
iore us. 
The end of  our deliberations is  to procure  us  some advan- 
tage.  For the will tends generally towards  good,  th2t  is,  tp 
whatsoever is really or apparently proper for rendering us happy ; 
insomuch,  that all actions  depending on man,  and that are any 
way relatlve to his cad, are for this  very reason  subject  to the 
will.  And  as truth, or the knowledge of  things,  is agreenl.!e 
to man ;  and in this signification truth is also a good, it follows 
&at truth  fornu one of  the principnl  objects oi the will. THE  PRINCIPLES  OF 
Liberty, like the wiil,  has gcodness and  truth for its object; 
but it hds less extent with reg~rd  to actions ;  for it does not ex- 
ercise itself  in all the acrts of  the will, but only in  those,  which 
the soul has a power of  suspending or altering, as she pleases. 
Use of  lib-  IV.  But  if  zny  one  should inquire,  which  are  those acts, 
erty In our  whcrein liberty displays itself? We  answer, that they are easily 
in rsspects  known  by  attending to what pzsses within us, and to the man- 
to truth.  ner, in  which the mind conducts itself in the several cases, that 
daily occur ;  as, in the first place,  in  our judgments concernink 
true acd fdlse ; secondly,  in  our determinations in  relation to 
good  and evii ;  and finally  in indifferent  matters.  These par- 
ticulars are necessary,  in order to be acquainted with the nature, 
use,  anrl ext:nt  of liberty. 
With regard to truth  we are  formed in such a manner, that, 
so  scon as cvidence str~kes  the mind, we are no longer at liber- 
ty to suspend ourj~dgment.  Vain would be the attempt to re- 
sist this  sp2ikl;qs  Iig!?t ;  it absolutely foxces our assent.  Who, 
for ~l:a-~~;i:c,  cotild pretend to deny that the whole is greater than 
a DX~,  or tkar harmotly 2nd  peace are prefera%Ie, either in a fam- 
ily or state,  discord,  tumults,  ancl  war ? 
The same can~iot  be  afiirmed  in regard  to  things,  that have 
less perspicu~ty  and evidence ; for  in these the  use of  liberty 
disi~lays  itself in its full extect.  It  is  true  our mind inclines 
 natural!^ to that side, which seems the most probable ;  but this 
does cot debar it from suspending its assent,  in order to seek for 
new proofs,  or to refer the whole inquiry to another opportuni- 
ty.  The obscurer things are, the more we are at liberty to hes- 
itate,  to suspend,  or defer our determination.  This is  a point 
sufficiently evinced by  experience.  Every  day,  and  at every 
step as it were,  disputes arise, in which the arguments on both 
sides leave us, by reason of  our limited  capacity,  in  a kind  of 
doubt and eqaillbrium,  which permits us to suspend  our judg- 
ment, to examine the thing anew, and to incline the balance  at 
length to one side rather than to the other.  We  find, for exam- 
ple,  that the mind  can hesitate a long time,  and forbear  deter- 
mining itself,  even after a matuxe inquiry,  in respect to the fol- 
lowing questions.  Whether an oath,  extorted  by  violence,  is 
obligatory ?  Whether  the  murder  of  Czesar  was  lawful I 
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Whether the Roman senate could with justice refuse to  confirm 
the promise,  made by the Consuls to the Samnites, in order to 
extricate themselves from the  Caudine Fcrks ;  or whether they 
ought to have ratified and given it the force of  a public treaty ? 
%c.  --  - 
V.  Though there is no exercise of  liberty in our judgment,  Liberty 
when  things  present themselves to  us in  a  clear and  distinct 
lias its ex- 
ercise, eve. 
manner ;  still we must not imagine,  that the intire use of  this  in regard ta 
faculty ceases in respect to things,  that are evident.  For, in the are evident.  that 
first place, it is always in our power to  apply our minds to the 
consfderation  of  those  things,  -or  else  to  divert them thence, 
by transfering  somewhere else our attention.  This first deter- 
mination  of  the will,  by  which it  is  led to consider  or not to 
consider the objects,  that occur to us,  merits  particular notice, 
because  of  the natural  influence it must have  on the determi- 
nation, by which  we  conclude to  act or not  to  act, in conse- 
quence of  our reflection  and  judgment.  Secondly,  we have 
it likewise in our power to create, as it were, evidence in  some 
cases, by dint of  attention and inquiry  3  whereas,  at first  sit- 
ting out, we had only  some glimmering% insufficient to give us 
an adequate knowledge of  the state of  things.  In fine,  when 
we have  attained  this evidence, we are  still at liberty  to dwell 
more or  less on  the consideration  thereof;  which  is  also  of 
great consequenceJ because  on this depends its greater or  less 
degree of  impression. 
These remarks lead us to an important reflection, which may objdoo. 
serve for answer to an objection,  raised  against liberty.  '' It is 
"  r.ot  in our power (say they) to perceive things otherwise, than 
a  as they ofir themselves to our mind ;  now our judgments are 
"  formed on this perception of  things;  and it is by these judg- 
"  ments, that the will is determined; the whole is therefore ne- 
"  cessary and independent of liberty." 
But this difficulty  carries  little more with it, than an empty ~nswa. 
appearance.  Let people say what they will,  we are always at 
liberty to  open, or to shut our  eyes to the  light;  to exert,  or 
relax our  attention.  Experience  shows,  that when we view 
an object  in different lights,  and determine to search into  the 
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first  sight.  This is sufficient to prove,  that there is an exercise 
of  liberty  in the  opperations of  the  understanding as well,  as 
in the several actions thereon  depending. 
Use of  lib-  VI.  The second question,  we  have to examine, is  whether 
arty with 
regard to  we are equally free in our detern~inations  in regard to good and 
good and  evil. 
r  vil .  To  decide this point,  we need not stir out of  ourselves;  for 
here also  by  facts,  and  even  by  our  internal  experience, the 
question may be  determined.  Certain it is, that in respect to 
good  and evil, considered  in general,  and  as such, we cannot 
properly  speaking exercise our  liberty, by  reason  that we feel 
ourselves  drawn  towards  the one  by an invincible propensity, 
and estranged from the other by a natural and insuperable aver- 
sion.  Thus it has been  ordered by the  Author of  our  being, 
whilst man has no power  in this respect to change his  nature. 
We  are formed in such a manner,  that good of necessity allures 
us ;  whereas evil, by  an  opposite eff-ct, repels us,  as it -.vere, 
and deters us from attempting to pursue it. 
But  this strong  tendency  to  good, and natural aversion  to 
evil  in general  does  not debar US from belng perfectly free in 
respect  to good and evil,  particularly  considered ; and  though 
we cannot help being  sensible of  the  first  impressions,  which 
the objects make on  us,  yet this does  not invincibly  determine 
us to  pursue,  or shun those objects.  Let the most beautiful and 
most fragrant  fruit,  replenished  with  exquisite  and  delicious 
juice, be  unexpectedly  set before a person,  oppressed with thirst 
and heat ;  he  will  find  himself  instantly  inclinet!  to  seize on 
the blessing offered  to  him,  and  to  ease  his inquietude by a 
salutary  refreshment.  But he can  also stop and suspend  his 
action,  in order  to examine whether  the good,  he proposes to 
himself, by eating this fruit, will not be attended with evil ;  in 
short,  he is at liberty to weigh and deliberate,  in  order to em- 
brace the safest side of the question.  Besides,  we  are  not only 
able, with the assistance of reason, to deprive ourselves of a thing, 
whose flattering idea invites us ;  but moreover we  are able  to 
expose  ourselves to  a chagrin  or pain,  which wre  dread,  and 
would wilGngly avoid,  were we  not induced  by superior con- 
siderations to support it.  Can any one desire a stroilger prod 
of  liberty ? 
VII.  'Srue  it is notwithstanding,  that  the  exercise of this with  re- 
faculty never disp1:iys  itself  more,  than in indifferent things.  I $$rL:n* 
find,  for instance,  that it depends intirely  on myself  to stretch things. 
out, or draw back  my hand ;  to sit down or to walk,  to direct 
steps to the right or  left,  &c.  On  these occasions,  where 
the soul is left intirely to itself, either for want of  external mo- 
tives,  or by reason  of  the opposition,  and as it were  equilib- 
rium  of  motives,  if  it  determine on one  side,  this may  be 
said  to  be the  pure  effect of  its pleasure  and good  will, and 
of  the command it has over its own actions. 
VIII.  Let  us  stop here awhile  to inquire, how comes  it Why the 
that the exercisc of this power  is limited to particular goods and exercise of 
liberty  is  nonevide~lt  truths,  without  extending itself to good in general,  restrained 
or to such truths, as arc perfectly clear.  Should we happen to t'o nonevi- 
dent truths,  dixover the redson  thereof,  it will furnish us with a new rea-  and  partic- 
son to admire the wisdom  of  the  Creator in  the  constitution lar goods. 
of  mail,  and  with the means  at  the same time of being better 
acquaicted with the  end and true use of  liberty. 
And first we hope there  is nobody but will admit,  that  the 
end of  God ill crezting man was to render hi13 happy.  Upon 
this supposition it will  be soon agreed, that man cannot attain 
to happiness any other way, than by  the linowledge of truth, and 
by the  possession  of  real good.  This  is evidently the result 
of  the notions above  given  of  good  and  happiness.  Let us 
therefore direct our rcflectians  towards  this prospect.  When 
things,  that arc the object of  our researches,  present themselves 
to our minds ~ith  a feeble light,  and are not  accon~panied  with 
that splendor and  clearness,  which  enables us to know  them 
pefl~tly,  and to judge  of  them with full certainty;  it isprop- 
er and even necessary for us to  be  invested  with  a  power  of 
suspending  our  judgment ;  to the end  that, being  necessarily 
determined  to acquiesce  in the  first impression,  we  should be 
still at liberty to carry on our inquiry, till we arrive to a higher 
degree of  certainty, and, if  possible, as far,  as  evidence  itself. 
Were not this the case, we should be exposed every moment to 
error, withont  any possibility  of  being  undeceived.  It was 
therefore exzemely  usefill  and necessary  to  man,  that  under 
such circun~stances  he should have the use  and  exercise of  his 
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But when we  happen to  have a  clear and  distinct view  of 
things and  their relations,  that  is  when-evidence  strikes  us,  it 
would be of  no inanner of  signification  to have the use of  lib- 
erty, in order to suspend our judgment.  For certainty  being 
then in its very highest degree, what benefit should we reap by 
a new  examen or inquiry,  were it in our power ?  We have 
no longer occasion to consult a guide,  when  we see distinctIy 
the end,  we are tending to,  and the road,  we are to take.  It is 
therefore an advantage to man to be unable to refuse his assent 
to evidence. 
IX.  Let us reason pretty near in the same inanner on the use 
of  liberty with respect to  good  and evil.  Man,  designed  for 
happiness, should certainly have been formed in such a manner, 
as to find himself  under an absolute necessity of  desiring  and 
pursuing good, and of  shunning on the contrary evil in general. 
Were the nature of  these  faculties such, as to  leave him  in a 
state of  indifference,  so as to be  at liberty  in  this  respect to 
suspend or alter his desires,  plain  it is,  that this  would be es- 
teemed a  very  great  imperfection  in  him ;  an imperfection, 
that would inlplr a want  of  wisdom in the Author of  his be- 
ing, as a thing directly opposite to the end,  he proposed, in giv- 
ing him life. 
No less  an inconveniency  would  it be,  on the other hand, 
were the nccessitjr, which man is under,  of  pursuing good and 
avoiding evil to be such, as would insuperably determine him to 
act, or not to act, in consequence of  the impressions,  made  on 
him by each object.  Such is the state of human things,  that we 
are frequently deceived by appearances ;  it is very rare that good 
or evil presents  itself  to  us pure  and  without  mixture ;  but 
there is zlmost always a favordble,  and an adverse  side,  an in- 
conveniency mixt with utility.  In order to act therefore  with 
safety, and not to be mistaken in our account, it is generally in- 
cumbent  on  us  to  suspend  our  first  motions,  to  examine 
more closely into things, to make distinctions,  calculations, and 
compensations;  all  which  require  the  use of  liberty.  Lib- 
erty is therefore,  as it were,  a subsidiary faculty,  which supplies 
the deficiencies of the other powers,  and whose office ceaseth as 
soon, as it has retlresscd them. 
FIe~lce  let us conclude, that man is provided  with a11  the IF- 
cessary clean3 for attaining LO the end for which he is desigl:~  :  ; 
?nd that in this,  as in every other respect, tie  Creator has acLb?d 
with  wonderful wisdom. 
X.  After what has been said concerning the nature,  opera-  The proof 
of  Ilbert)., 
tions,  ~nd  use of  liberty,  it may  seein pe:haps  unn-cessary  drdrvn 
attempt here to prove that man is  incieed .' free agent,  2nd thdt  from our 
inward 
we are as really invested with this, as with any &er  fzculty.  ,,,,,,  ,,,, 
Nevertheless, as it is  an essential  principIe,  and one of  the  perlor to 
the  any  orher,  fundam~nt~l  supports  of  our edifice,  it is proper to make 
reader sensible of  the indubitable  procjf,  w,rh  wh;ch  we  are 
furnished by daily experience.  Let us therefore COL su!t  uLj!y 
ourselves.  Every one finds that he  is master,  for inst lnce,  to 
walk or sit: i to speak, or hold his  tongue.  Do we  not  2!so 
experience  continually,  that it depends intirely on ourselves  to 
suspend our judgment,  in order to proceed to  a new ii1qui.y  ? 
Can any one  seriously deny,  that,  in  the choice of  good  asd 
evil, our resolutions are unconstrained  ?  'That,  notwithstanding 
the first impression,  wc  have it in our power to stop of  a sud- 
den, to weigh the arguments on both sides,  and  to do in short 
wh~tever  can be expected from the freest agent ?  Were I in- 
vincibly drawn towzrds one particular good  rather than  anoth- 
er,  I should  feel then  the same impression,  as that,  which in- 
clines me  to do good  in  general,  that  is, an i~nprcsc~o  1,  that 
wmld necessarily drag  me .,long,  an  impression,  which there 
would be no possibilitjr  of  resisting.  Now experience  makes 
me feel no such violence with  respect to  any particuiar  good. 
I find I can abstain from it;  I cai~  defer using it ;  I can  pre- 
fer something else to it ;  I can hesitate in my cho~ce  ;  in short, 
I am my own master to choose ;  or,  which  is  the same thing, 
I am  free. 
Should we be  asked, how domes  it,  that,  not being free in 
respect to good in general,  yet we are at liberty with reg4rd to 
particular goods ?  My answer is,  that the natural desire of hap- 
piness  does  not  insuperably  draw  us  towads sny prticn!ar 
good,  because  no part~cnlar  good  includes  that happiness,  for 
which W,-  have a necessary  inclinGL:ion. 
Scasible proofs,  like these, are superior to all objcctiom,  and 
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productive of  the most  inward conviction,  by reason it is  im- 
possibie, that,  when the soul is modified after a certain manner, 
it should not feel this modification,  and the state,  which conse- 
cluertly attends it.  What  other certainty  have we of  our ex- 
istence ?  And  how is  ir,  we know that we think,  we act,  but 
by our inward sense ? 
This sense of  liberty  is so much the less equivocal,  as  it is 
not momentary or transient.  It is a  sense,  that  never  leaves 
US, and of which we have a daily and a continual experience. 
'fllus  we see there is nothing better established in life,  than 
the strong persuasion,  which all mankind  have of  liberty.  Let 
us co:lsider  the system of  humanity,  either in  general or par- 
ticular, we shall find that the whole is built up011 this principle. 
Kefiections,  deliberations,  researches,  actions  judgments,  a11 
s!Jypose the use of  liberty.  Hence the ideas of  good and evil, 
of  vice and virtue.  Hence,  as a  natural consequence,  arises 
praise or blame,  the censure or approbation of our own, or other 
peo;>le's conduct.  The same may be said of  the agections  and 
narnral sentiments of  men  towards  one another,  as  friendship, 
benevolence,  gratitude, hatred,  anger, complaints, and reproach- 
es.  None  of  these  sentiments  could  take  pl~ce,  unless  we 
were to admit of liberty.  In fi:le,  as this prerog~tivc  is in some 
measure the key  of  the human system, he,  who does not allow 
it to man, subverts all order,  and introduces general confusion. 
Him-  XI.  It is natural  here to  inquire,  how  it was ever possible 
comes it 
t.1~  llherty for any body s:riouslg  to  doubt, whether mn  is master of  his 
hxsbeell  actions, whether he is free ?  I should be  less surprized at this 
c!oubt,  were it concerning a  strange or  remote  fact;  a  fact, 
t:int  was not transacted  within ourselves.  But the question is 
i!l  regard  to a thing, of which we have  an internal,  immediate 
fding, a constant and d~ily  experience.  Strange, that any one 
should call  in question a f,tculty  of  the soul ! may  nat we as 
well doubt of  rho  understanding and will,  as of  the liberty of 
1n3n ?  For, if  we  are  content  to abide by our  inward sense, 
there is no inore  room  to dispute of  one, than  of  the  other. 
But some too subtle philosophers,  by consiLering this subject in 
1 metaphysical  ligh~,  have  stript it,  ns  it were, of  its nature ; 
r.ccl,  finding thelnselves at a lus:, to  so!^^ a feu. difficulti:~, they 
hwe  @ven a  greater attention to these  difficulties,  than to the 
proofs of  the thing ;  which insensibly led them to im- 
agine,  that the  notion of  liberty was  all an  illusion.  I  own 
it is necessary,  in the research of  truth, to consider ar. object on 
every  side, and to balance equlllg the argumellts for and against ; 
*evertheless  we ti~ust  take care, we do not give to those objec- 
tions more than their real weight.  We are  informed  by  ex- 
perience,  that  ill several things,  which  in respect to us are in- 
vested with  the  highest  degree  of  certainty,  there are many 
diffculties notwithstanding, which we  are incapable of  resolv- 
ing to our satisfaction ;  and this  is  a natural  conseqllence  of 
the limits of  the mind.  Let us conclude  therefore that whcn 
a truth is su&ciently evinced by solid reasons,  whatever can be 
objected against it ought not to stxgger or  weaken our convic- 
tion,  so lo~g  as they are such difficulties only,  as embarrass or 
puzzle  tl~e  mind,  without invalidating the proofs  themselvc" 
This rule is so very  useful  in the study  of  the  sciences,  that 
one shculd keep  it always  in sight.*  Let us resume now :ire 
thread of  our reflections. 
XII.  The  denomination of  voluntary  or human  actions in Actions 
general is given to all t!;ose,  that depend on the will ;  and that tary,  vOIYn'  and 
of  free,  to  such,  as come  within  the  jurisdiction  of  liberty,  invollintn- 
which the soul can suspend or turn as it pleases.  The oppssite 
of  vol~ntary  is involuntary ;  and the coptrary of  free is neces-  and con- 
sary,  or whatevcr  is done by force or cn:,strrint.  All human strained. 
actions are  voluntary,  inasmuch  as there are none,  but  what 
proceed  from  olirselves, and  of  which  we  arc  the  authors. 
But if violence, used by an external force, which we are unable to 
resist, hiiiders us from acting, or makes us act without the con- 
sent of  our  wiil ;  as  when  a  perso?  strmger  tllan oursel~c? 
lays hold of  our  arm to strike  or wound another  person,  tllc 
action  thence  resulting,  being  iilvoluntary,  is  not  properly 
" There is a wide difference between seeing that  a thing is absurd,  and  not 
knowing all, that regards it ;  between an  unanswerable ?uestion  in  relation to 
a truth,  and an una~iswrrable  object~on  against it ;  though  a  great  many con- 
found these two s:>rts cf diKcultlcs. Those only oithelatter orler  areabletoprove, 
that what was taken fcr a li~,own  trcth cannot be true,  L-8 i:li3c  otherwise  scr.1'. 
absurdity  must  ensue.  Ubt  the 0th-rs  prove nothing.  Llit the ignorlllcd 
are under  in  relatim  to ~~veral  thinas,  thn:  lepd  a know-1:  truth.  IlilhL',  1.. 
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speaking our deed or action, but that of  the agent, from whom 
we suffer this violence. 
The same cd!nlot  be said of actions, that are forced and con- 
strained,  only ;is we  are  determined  to  commit them, through 
fear of a great dnd imminent evil, with which we are menaced ; 
as for instance, were dn  unjust and cruel prince to oblige a judge 
to condemn an  innocent person,  by  menici!ig  to  put  him to 
cleath if  he  did  not  obey  his  orders.  Actlons  of  this  sort, 
tiAough  forced in some sense, because we comalit  them with re- 
lc~rarlcy,  and would never consent to them, were it not for a very 
y;.rr.~il1g.  necessity ; such acttons, I say, are ranked nevertheless 
a:->org  11.e  number of voluntary actions, because,  after all,  they 
ayc. ~roc~uced  by a dclibera~icn  of  the will which chuscs between 
two inevitahlv ev:ls,  and determines to  prefer  the  ]vast  to the 
grcntest.  Tt,is will become more intelligible by a few exzmples. 
A peison  gives alms to a poor  man,  who exposes his wants 
an2 misery to him ;  this action is at tE;  same time both volunta- 
ry aycl free.  But suppose a man who travels alone 2nd unarmed, 
falls Into the bards of  robbers, and that these miscreants menace 
him with instant deaill,  unless he  gives  them  all  he has ;  the 
surrender,  which this traveller  makes of  his money  in  order to 
save his life,  is inrleed a voluntary action, bu~  constrained at the 
same time,  and void  of liberty.  For  which  reason  there  are 
somc, that distinguish these actions by the name  of  mixt,*  as 
partaking of  the voluntary and involuntxy.  They are voluntary 
because the principle, that produces them if  in the agent  itself, 
and the will determi;ies to commit them as the least of two evils. 
But they  partake of  the involuntary, because  the will  executes 
them contrary to  its  inclination,  which  it  would never  do, 
could it find any other expedient to clear itself of the dilemma. 
Another  necessary  elucidation  is,  that  we  are  to suppose 
that the  evil,  with  which we are  menaced,  is  considerable e- 
nough to  make a reasonable  impression  on  a  prudent or wise 
man, so far as to intimidate him ;  and besides, that the person, 
wllo compels us, has no  right  to  restrair,  our  liberty ;  inso- 
puch that we  do not lie under  an  obligation  of  bearing with 
any hardship or  inconveniency, rather than displease him.  Un- 
t See PoKendorf on the law of  nature and nations, book i. chap. iv.  p. 
der these  circumstacces,  reason would have  us  determine  to 
sl:ifer  the less evil, supposing at least, that they are both inevit- 
able.  This kind of  constraint lays us under what  is  called a 
r.43ral  necessity ;  whcreas, when we  are  absolutely compelled 
to act without being able, in any shape whatsoever,  to avoid it, 
this is termed a physical necessity. 
It is therefore a necessary poitlt of  exactness to 
distinguish berween voluntary and  free.  In fact it is easy  to 
comprehend, by  what  has  been now said,  that all free actions 
are indeed  voluntary,  but  all  voluntary actions are  not  free. 
Neverthelss,  the common and vulgar way of  speaking frequent- 
ly confounds those two terms, of  which we ought to take par- 
ticular notice,  in order to avoid all ambiguity. 
We  give likewise the name  of  manners  sometimes to free 
acticns, inasmuch as the mind considers them as susceptible of 
rule.  Hence are call  morality  the  art, which teaches the rules 
of  co~dcct,  and the method of conforming our actions to those 
rules. 
XIII.  We  shal  finish  what relates to  the  faculties  of  the 
soul by  some rernvks, which will  help us to understand better 
thcir nature 2nd  use. 
I.  8i1r  faculties  assist one another in their operations, and,  Our facul-  ties help 
when they arc all united in the  same  subject, they act  always ,,,,  ,,,h, 
jcir.tly.  We  have a:ready  observed  that the will supposes the er  call  recipro.  y. 
unierst.~i~din~,  and that the light of  reason  serves  for a guide 
to liberty.  Thus the understanding,  the will, and liberty ;  the 
senses, the imagination, and rr,emory ;  the instincts, inclinaticns, 
acd passions ;  are like so many dicerent springs, which concur 
all to  a particular effect ;  and it is by  this united con- 
currence we attain at length to the knowledge of truth,  and the 
possession of  solid good,  on which our perfection  and  happi- 
ness depends. 
XIV.  2.  But in order to procure  to ourselves those advan-  of  reason 
tages, it is not only necessary that our faculties be well cansti-  and 
tuted in themselves,  but  moreover  we  ought to make a  good 
use of  them, and  maintain the natural subordination,  t!lcrc  is 
between them and the different motions, which lead us towards, 
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to know the common and  natural  state  of  our  faculties,  we 
should likewise be acquainted with their state of perfection, and 
know in what their real use  consists.  Now truth being,  as we 
have seen, the proper object of  the understanding,  the  pert'ec- 
tion of  this faculty is to  have  a distilict knowledge  of  truth ; 
at least of  those important truths, which concern our duty and 
happiness.  For such a purpose, this faculty should be  formed 
to close attention,  a just discernment,  and solid reasoning.  The 
understanding thus perfected, and considered as having  actual- 
ly the principles,  which enable  us to  know and  to  distinguish 
the true and  useful,  js  what  is  properly  called  reason ;  and 
hence it is that we are apt to speak of  reason,  as of  a light  of 
the mind, and a3  of  a rule, by which  we  ought always  to be 
directed, in our judgments and actions. 
If we consider in like manner the will in its state of  perfec- 
tio:~, we shall find it consists in the  force  and habit  of  deter- 
mining always right, that is,  not to desire any thing, but what 
reason dictates,  and not to make use of  our liberty,  but in  or- 
der to chuse the best.  This sage direction of the will  is prop- 
erly called Virtue, and sometin~es  goes by the name of  Reason. 
And, as the perfection of  the soul depends on  the mutual suc- 
cours, which the faculties, considered in their most perfect state, 
lend to one another,  we cuderstand likewise sometimcs by rea- 
son, taken in a more vague, and more  extensive sense,  the soul 
itself,  co~sidered  with  all its faculties, and as making  actually 
a good use of  them.  Thus  the term  reasoft  carries  with  it 
always an idea of perfection, which is sometimes applied  to the 
soul in general, and at other times  to some of  the faculties  in 
particular. 
Causes of  XV.  3.  The faculties,  of which we were treating,  are com- 
the diver- 
sity we ob-  mon to all mankind ;  but they are no:  found always in the same 
serve in the  degree,  neither  are  they determined  after the same  manner. 
conduct of 
men.  &sides,  they have their periods in every man ;  that is, their in- 
crease, perfection,  infpebling, and  decay, in  the same  manner 
alinost as the organs of  the body.  Thcp vary likewise exceed- 
ingly in different  men.  One h~ls  a  brighter  understanding ; 
another a quicker  sensation;  this  man has  a  strong  imagina- 
tion;  while  another is  s~vnyed  by  violent  passions.  And  all 
this is combined and diversified in an infinite tluii~b~'  of  ways, 
to the difference of  temperaments,  education, eram- 
pies, and  occasions,  that  furnish  opportunities  for exercising 
certain faculties or inclinations, rather than others ;  for it is the 
exercise,  that  strengthens  them  more  or  less.  Such  is  the 
source of that prodigious variety of  geniuses,  tastes,  and habits, 
which constitutes what we call the characters and manners  of 
men ;  a variety,  which,  considered  in general,  very far  from 
being unserviceable,  is of  great use in the views of providence. 
XVI. But, whatever strength may be attributed to the inclina-  Reason har 
ehat it always  tions,  passions,  and habits,  still it is  necessary to observe,  her 
they have never enough  to impel man invincibly to 2ct contra-  power to 
ry to reason.  Reason  has  it always in her power to preserve ~~~~~SI 
her superiority and rights.  She is able, with care and applica- 
tion,  to correct vicious dispositions,  to prevent and even  to ex- 
tirpate bad habits;  to  bridle the most  unruly passions by sage 
precautions,  to weaken them by degrees, and finally to destroy 
them entirely,  OS  to  reduce them  within their proper bounds. 
This is  sufficiently proved by  the  inward feeling,  that  every 
man has of  the liberty, with which he determines to fo!low  this 
sort of  impressions 5  proved by the secret reproaches, we make 
to ourselves,  when  we have  been  too much swayed by them ; 
prcvzi', in tine,  by an infinite variety of examples.  True it is, 
that there  is  some difficulty in  surmounting these  obstacles ; 
but this is  richly compensated by  the glory attending so  noble 
a victory,  ancl by the solid advantages thence arising. 
CHAP.  111. 
That man,  thus cocstituted, is a creature capable of  moral direction, 
and accountable for hi.r  actions. 
I.  AFTER having  seen  the  nature  of  man,  considered  Mm is ca- 
pable of di-  in respect to right, the  result  is,  that he is a  creature  really  ,,,,ion  in 
susceptible of  choice and direction in his conduct.  For, since  regard  to 
his  cm-  he is capable,  by means of his faculties,  of  knowi~lg  the nature ducts 
and state of things, and of judging from this knowledge ;  since 
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several offers, made to him ;  in fine,  since, with the assistance 
of  liberty,  he  is able in certJn case3 to susp?d,  or  contiaa+ 
his  actions,  as  he judges  propcr;  it  evidently follows,  tnat 
he is master of  his own  actions,  alld thii he exercises  a kind 
of  authority  and  command over  hem,  by  virtae  of  wni& 
he can  direct and turn them  which way  !l:  plc *in,.  dtlznce 
it appears  how  necessary  it  WIS  far  US  to  set orlc,  a,  we 
have done,  with inquir~ng  previously  into the nature and fa3.d- 
ties of  man.  For how could we have discovered tile rul:s,  ay 
which  he  is  to  square  his  conduct,  unless  we  antecedently 
know in what  manner he acts,  and what  are  the springs, as it 
were,  that put him  in motion ? 
He  is ae-  11.  Another remark,  which is a  consequence of  thc forego- 
countable  ing, is,  that,  since man is the im.nediate  adhor of  ilis actions, 
for his ac- 
ion  he is accountable for them ;  and in justice and reason they can 
they canbe  be imputed to him.  Tnis  is a  poilt,  of  which  we  thiilk  it 
imputed to 
hirn,  necessary to give here a short explication. 
Ttle term imputing  is borrowed  of  arithmetic,  and signifies 
properiy to set  a sum dow:i  to sainebody'a accou:lt.  To lm- 
pute an action therefore to a person  ic to attribute it to him, as 
to its real author ;  to set it down as it were to his account and 
make him answerable for it.  Now it  is evidently an  essentiaI 
quality of  human actions, as produced and directed by the un- 
derstanding and will,  to be susceptible of  imputation;  that is, 
it is plain that man can be justly  considered,  as the author and 
productive cause of  those actions,  and that for this very reason 
it is right to make  him accountable  for  them,  and  lay to his 
charge the effects,  that arise from them,  as natural consequen- 
ces.  In fact,  the true reason,  why a person cannot  complain 
of  being made answerable for an action,  is that he has produc- 
ed it  himsolf  knowingly  and willingly.  Every  thing  almost, 
that is said and done in human society,  supposes this  principle 
generally received,  and every body acquiesces  in it from an in- 
ward conviction. 
Principle  111.  We  must therefore  lay  down,  as an incontestable  and 
ofimputa- fundamental principle  of  the  imputability  of  human  actions, 
We  that every voluntary  action is  susceptible of  imputation  or ts  must not 
confound  express the  same  thing  in  other  terms,  that every action  or 
emission, subject to the direction  of  man, can  be  charged  to itwith im-  putation. 
the accoullt of  the person, in  whose power  it was to do  it or 
let it alone ; and on  the  contrary  every action,  whose exist- 
ence or nonexistellce does  not  depend  on  our  will,  cannot be 
imputed to us.  Observe  here,  that  omissior~  are  ranked by 
civilizns and moralists among the number  of  actions ;  because 
they apprehend  them,  as  the effect  of  a voluntary  suspension 
of  the exercise of  our faculties. 
Such is the foundation of  imputability,  and the true reason, 
why an action or omission is of  an imputable nature.  But  we 
must take particular  notice,  that, though  an action is imputable 
it  does  not  ensue  from  that  only,  that  it  merits  actually 
to be  imputed.  Imputability and  imputation are  two things, 
vhich  we  should  carefully  distinguish.  The  latter  sup- 
poses, besides the  imputabi!ity,  some 111oral  necessity  of  acting 
or not after a certain manner ;  or, which amounts to the salne, 
some obligation,  that  requires a thing to be  done,  or  omitted, 
that can be really done or omitted. 
PuEendorf * does not seem to have sufficiently distinguished 
between these two ideas.  It is enough for our plesent purpose 
to point out the distinction,  deferillg to treat of  actual imputa- 
tion, and to establish principles  thereof,  till we have  explained 
the nature of  obligation,  and shown that man is actually oblig- 
ed to conform his actions to rule. 
What has been hitherto advanced, properly regards  the na- 
ture of  the human mind ;  or the internal faculties of  man,  as 
they render him capable of  moral direction.  But in  ordx to 
complete our knowledge of  human nature,  we should view  it 
lik-wise  in its extrinsic  condition,  in its wants  and dependan- 
cies, and in the various relations,  wherein it is placed ;  in fine, 
in  what we nlay call the different states of man.  For it is our 
situation in life, that decides the use, we ought to make of our 
faculties. 
* See the Law of nature and nations, book  i, chap. v.  5 5, and  the  Duties 4 
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CHAP.  IV. 
$u?nrt&r  inquiry into quht  rel.ztes  to  human nature,  b  considering 
the dyj%reitt  Jtates of man. 
Definition.  1.  I FIE  different  states  of  man  are  nothing more  than 
Divisi*".  the situation, wherein he finds  hin~wjf  in regard to the brings, 
th~:  surround him wit11 relations, thence resultilig. 
We shall be satisfied  with taking  here a  cursory  view  of 
some of  the principal  states,  and to  render them  distinpisha- 
ble by their essential  characteristics,  without  entering  into an 
exact inquiry,  which should naturally  take place,  when treat- 
ing in particular  of  each state. 
All these  digerent states may  be ranged under  two general 
classes ;  some are  primitive  and origi~lal  ;  others  adventitious. 
Primitive  11.  Primitive  and original  states  are those,  in  which  man 
finds himscf  placed by the very hand of  God,  inde~eildent  of 
a1  states. 
any human action. 
1 state  OF  Such is, in the first place,  the state oi man  with  regard  to 
n133  with  Cod ;  which is a state  of  absolute  dependnnce.  For  let  us  regard to 
 d.  make but never  SO small  a use of our  faculties,  and entcr  into 
the study of  ourselves,  it will evidently  appear,  that it is from 
this first Being we hold our life, reason,  and all other  concom- 
itant advantages;  and that  in this and every  other respect we 
experience daily,  in the most sensible manner, the efects of the 
power and goodness of  the Creator. 
2. state of  111.  Another  primitive and  original  state  is  that,  wherein 
mcietr.  men find theinselves in respect to nne  another.  They are  all 
inhabitants of  the same globe,  placed in  a kind of  viciuity to 
each other ;  have all one common  nature,  the  same  fdculties, 
same inclinations, wants, and desires.  They cannot  c10  with- 
out one another;  and it is only by  mutual assistance,  they are 
capable of  attaining to a state of  ease and tranquility.  Ilence 
we observe a natural inclination  in mankind,  that  draws  them 
towards each other,  and establishes 2 commerce of services and 
beaerolence between them,  whence  results  the common good 
of  the whole, and thc particular adrantage of  individu,lls.  'l'he 
natural state therefore of  Inell 2rnor.g  themselves is a state  of 
union and society ;  society being  nothing more than the union 
of  several persons for their cornmoll advautage.  Besides,  it is 
evident that tliis must be a pri,xitive state, because it is nat  the 
work of  mm, but  eseatlislled  by  divine  institution.  Natural 
society is r state of  equality and liberty ; a state,  in which all 
men enjoy th: same  prerogatives,  and an  intire  independence 
on any o:hcr  power  bat  God.  For  every  man  is  naturally 
m.ls:er  of  hilliself,  arid equ:il with his fellow creatures, SO  long 
as he docs  not  subject  himself  to  another  person's  authority 
by a pxticnl~  convention. 
IV.  'rile o~~olite  state  10 th~t  of  society is solitude ;  that  3.  solitude.  stateof 
is,  the cz~i~ti~ion,  in w:~kh  W,-  imagine inan would f r,~  himself,  4. Peace : 
tvere he to I:ve  absoiutely a!o:le,  abandoned to his own thoughts,  war. 
and desti:~:::  of  ;,l1  commerce wih those o.f  his  own sp-cies. 
L:t  US sullpose :i m211 arrivxt zt rhe age  OF  maturity,  u~ithout 
llaring k~d  the aciv~ili~gc  ui education or any correspondencs 
with the rest cf  m.inkind,  and col~se~uentl~  without ally other 
knowledge th:,n  t:i~t, w!?ich  he has of  liimself  acquired ;  such 
2 m,\n  woii:ct  be ~l:ic!oubicdly the most !l~iserable  of  all animals. 
UTe  s!.du:J  r!i,cover  nothing in  him  but weakzess,  snvagcr,ess, 
and ig,lorafice ;  scarce .ci2u:d  he be able to  satisfy  the wants 
of  his  body, espo;:d,  poor  wretch, to  perish with Ilunger  or 
cold, or by  the ravenous :eeth  of  wild beasts.  Whax  a  vast 
difyes,.nce b::~xcen  such a state 21:d  tht of  society,  which by 
t]le 11211t~di  EuCcours, that  men  rcceive from one another,  pro- 
cmcs t!lem  all the kiiowledge,  conveniency, and ease, that forin 
ehe security, pleasure,  and 1r:ppiness of  life ?  True it is,  that 
all these adv~ntagcs  suppose th;rt men, far from pr2judicing  one 
another,  lice in !l,.ralony  2nd csncord, and entert'~in  this union 
by murull &ood oifices.  l'ji;r  is wli~t  we  call a state of  pmce, 
urhereas those who endeavour to do harm, and those also, who 
find themselves  obligod  to  guard  against  it,  arc  in  a state of 
wFdr ;  a state of  violence,  tliametrically  oppo~itc  to  thnt of 'oa- 
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State of  V.  Let us observe,  in the next place, that man finds himself 
man with  regard to  naturally sttaclied to the eart11,from whose bosom he draws what- 
the goods  ever is necessary for  tIic preservation  and conveniences of  life. 
the  This situation produces  another primitive state  of  man, which  earth. 
is likewise deserving ~f our zttention. 
Such in effect is tile naturd constitution ol the 11umarl body, 
that it cannot subsist intirdy olC  itself,  and by the sole force of 
its temperament.  nlan, a.:  all ;.p,  stands in  need of  several 
external succours  for his ~:ouri:l;mciit,  ss well  as for repairing 
his strength, and  keepin?;  liis faculties in propr order.  For 
this  reason our Creator has  sown  plentifully  around us  such 
things,  as are necessary for our wants,  ai~d  has implanted in us 
at the ssme titlie tile instincts and qualiGcltions, proper for ap- 
plying these things to our aclvantagc.  'l'lle  natural state there- 
fore of  man, considered in this light, 2nd in respect to the goods 
of  the earth,  is a stare of  indigence and incessant wants, against 
which he wo:il~l be incapable of  providing  in a  suitable  man- 
ner,  were he  not  to  c.;ercise  his industry  by constant labor. 
Such are the principal of  those stxtes,  that are cal!:d  primitive 
and original, 
Adventiti-  VI.  But man,  being  ~~aturally  a  free  ngent,  is  capable  of 
OUB  I, Fan,ily,  state.  making great ~nodificntions  in his primitive state,  ar:d  of givirg, 
2.  Marri-  by a  vnriety  cf  estnbli::hments,  a new  face  to  Eumarl  life. 
We*  Hence these ~.ilrent:ti~us  states are rormed,  whic.11 are properly 
the work of man, wherein he finds hirnzelf !~?2r.t.:!  'nv his own act 
anll in consequence or'estzl;ii!~n-.n:s, wlmereof  FY  i.imseli  is the 
author.  Let us take a iur5ory view 05  the principal of  these 
states. 
The first, that presents itself  to us,  is the  st:.te  of  families. 
This is the most nztural  and  ancient of  all  societies, and  the 
very foundation of  that,  which is  called natio~lal  ;  for a pcople 
or nation is only an assemblage  or composition of several fam- 
ilies. 
Families begin by marriaze ;  and it is  nature itself,  that in- 
v!tes  men to this union.  Hence children arise, who by perpet- 
uating the several families,  prevent the extinction  of human so- 
cieties,  and repair  the breaches,  made every day by death. 
The family state is productive of various relations ;  as those 
of husband,  wife, father,.mother,  children,  brothers, sisters,  and 
the other degrees of  kindred, which are the first  tie  of  hu-  3.  Weak- 
nesss of mar 
man society.  at his birth. 
VJI.  Man, considered in  his birth,  is weakness  and impo-  4.  Natural  rt  dependance 
tency itself;  in  regard as well to  the body as to the soul.  of  childrev 
is  even  remarkable, that  the state  of  weakness  and  infancy  on their pm 
lasts longer in man, thail in any other animal.  He  is beset and 
pressed  on  ail  sides by  a  thousand  wants,  and  destitute  of 
knowledge,  as well  :,S  strength, finds himself in an absolute  in- 
capwity of  relieving them ;  he is therefore under a  particular 
necessity  of  recurring to external  assistance.  Providence for 
this :leacon has  inspired  parents  with  that  instinct or  natural 
tenderness,  which  prompts them  so eagerly  to delight  in  the 
most troublesome cares  for the preservatio~l  and  of  those, 
wlioin they have brcug;l:  into the world.  It is likewise in con- 
seciuence of  tiiis  state of  weakness  and  ignorlnce,  in  which 
children are born,  that they are  naturally  subject  to their  pa- 
rents ;  whom  natu;e  has  invested with  all  the authority and 
power  necessary  for  governing those,  whose  advantage  they 
are to stccly and procure. 
VIII.  'I'ile nroperty of goods  is another very  important es- The 
tablidmen:,  wi~ich  produces  a  new  adventitious  state.  It 
tY. 
modifies  the  right,  which  all  men  had  originally  to earthly 
good.; ;  an:!,  distinguishing carefully what belongs to individu- 
als,  enstlres the quiet and  peaceable  enjoyment  of  wliat  they 
possess;  by  :vhich  means  it  contributes to  the maintenance 
of  pcace a!id  1.armong anlong mankind.  But,  since all men ha& 
orig;nz!ly  a right to a  common  use of whatever tllc earth pro- 
duces for tlieir several wants,  it  is evident  that,  if  this natural 
power is actually restrained and limited  in divers respects,  this 
mu.:  necessarily arise fron~  some  human act ;  and consequent- 
ly tile  state of  yroperty, which is the cause of those limitations, 
ought to be ranked among the adventitious states. 
IX.  But, among all the states,  estab!ished  by the act of man, Civil 
and gov- 
there is none more considerable,  than the civil state,  or that of ernmen, 
civil society and government.  The essential  character  of  this 
society, which distinguishes it from the  forementioned  society 
of nature, is the subordination to a supreme authority,  exclusive 
of equality and independence.  Mankind were originally  tiivid- 
ed into families only,  and  not  into  nations.  Those  families THE PRINCIPLES  OF 
lived under the paternal  government  of  tlcpersoi~,  who was 
their  chief,  a3  their father or  gra~ldfather.  But,  when  they 
cam? ;fterv:ards  to  incr:2se  anll unitc  far  :heir  ConlnlGil  tic- 
fence, they composeJ a national body,  governed  by thc will of 
him,  or of  those G:I  whorn  they  hacl  conferred  the authority. 
This is the origin of  :vha:  we call civil go?;ei.nmcnt,  and of  the 
distinctic~l  cf  sovereign and  subjects. 
me  civil  X.  civil sc:,tc  :.ad  Fropzrty of  goods  produced  several 
atate and  other establishments,  wIiich form the  beauty and  ornan~ent of  property of 
goods  society,  and from which inany ~dventitious  states arise ;  such as 
rise to sev-  :he  dicerefit  posts  or ofices cf  those,  who have any share  in  era1 other 
rdventiti-  the government ;  as magistrates, judges,  state officers, ministers 
*usftateo*  of  religion,  physiciafis,  &c.  To  \vhich  may be added the po- 
litc arts, trades agricuiture,  navigation,  commerce,  with  their 
several dcpendences, whereby  hunlan  life  is so agreeably  and 
advantageously diversified. 
True idea  XI.  Such are the principal stat:s,  produced by  human con- 
ef  the  sent.  And yet,  as these  different modificdtio!?~  oi the  primi- 
nral state 
.faan.  live state of  man are the cffcct of  his narural liberty, the  new 
relations and differect states  :hence  arising  may  be  very  well 
considered, as so  many natural states ;  provided  however  that 
the use, which men make oi their 1ibert)-, iri  this  respect,  hns 
rothing in it unconformable to their natur,!l  constitution,  that is, 
to reason and the state of  society. 
It is therefore proper :o  o\servc,  in  rdation to this  subject, 
that when we speak  or'  the  natural  state  of  man,  we  arc. to 
understand  not only thnt na:cral  and  primitive stzte  in which 
he is placed,  ss it were,  by thc  Lands  of  ndture heyself ;  but 
moreover all those,  into which n:m  enters by hi? oivn  act and 
agreement, and that are conformable irl tile m;:in  to !)is  nature, 
and contail? ilothing, but  whzt is  agrce.abl3  to !:is  cl?nstitution 
and the end,  for wllich he: w~s  formcd.  For since  rndn  him- 
self, as a free and intelligent bcing,  is able to see  and know his 
situation,as also to discover his ultimate end, and in consequellce 
thereof  to take the riglit  mcasures to attain  it;  it is  yroptrly 
in this light we should consider his natural state,  to form there- 
of  a just idea.  That is,  the natural state of  nnn is, generalIy 
slv~king,  that, which is conformable to his nzture, constitution, 
az,l reason,  2s well as the good use of  his faculties,  cc~isidcrcd 
in their fuil maturity and perlection.  We  shall be  pnrticul;~rIy 
to this remark,  tile  importance of  which  will  appear 
more sensibly by the  applicatio~l  and  use,  that may  be  made 
thereof  on severa!  occasions. 
XI. Let us not  fo~gtt  to observe likewise,  th~t  there is this  =itrrrencq 
difference between  the primitive and adventitious states, that the  between 
original  former being annexed as it were, to the nature and constitution  ad,,,- 
0:  man, such zs he l~as  received  them from  God, are for  this  titioue 
very reason,  cornmoll to all mankind.  'rhe same c~nnot  be said 
of  ill2 adver~titicuz  stntes ;  which,  supposing an human act or 
agreement,  cannot of  themselves be inditrerently  suitable to all 
men,  but to time only,  tvllo contrived  and procured thcm. 
Lct  US  adcl, in fine, that several of  those states may be found 
combined  and ullitcd  in  the same person,  provided  they  have 
notliiilg  incompatible  in their nature.  Thus the same person 
]nay be fatl~er  of  a family,  judge,  minister of  state,  &c. all at 
the same time. 
Such are the ideas, we arc to forin of  the nature and differ- 
ent stat? oi man ;  and it is of  all these parts united  and  com- 
pacted together,  that tile intire system of  humanity  is  formed. 
These ay,\ I~he  so many  wheels  of  the  sainc machine,  which, 
.<L! and nia~~zged  by a dcxtcrous hand, conspire all to the 
sal-.if: cnd ;  and, on the contrary,  unskilfully  directed,  embar- 
rass and destroy each other.  But how man,  in fine, is enabled 
to conduct himself  in this prudent  mmner, and  what rule he 
is to observe in order to attain  this happy end,  is what we have 
atill to inquire, and forms the subject of the following chapters. 
CHAP. V. 
That man ought  to Jqunre  hi^  conduct by  rulc ;  the method  offid- 
irrg  out thir rule ;  and the  foundutions  of  right in general. 
LET  us begin  wit!,  an  explication of  the  terms.  A Definitim 
~ule,  in its proper signification,  is  an  instrument,  by means of  of  a ruk, 
which  vrc  drdw  the shortest line from  one point  to  another, 
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In a figurative and moral sense, a rule imports  nothing else, 
but a principle,  or  maxim,  which  furnishes man with  a surq 
md  concise method of attaining  to the end, he proposes. 
Et  is not  11.  The first  thing we are to inquire in regard  to  this sab- 
convenient 
that man  ject'  is, whether it is really agreeable to the nature of  mh  to 
lhoufd  submit his actions to a fixt and invariable rule  ?  Or whether, 
a  on the contrary,  he is allowed to  abandon himself  indifferently  hie, 
to all the motions of his will,  and thus to enjoy,  without either 
limit or impediment, the extreme facility,  with  wilich this fac- 
ulty turns itself  on all sides,  in consequence  of  its ~latural  dex- 
ibility  ? 
The reflections,  we have given in the preceding chapters, are 
of  themselves,  and independent of  any other argumer.t,  a suf- 
ficient and convincing proof,  that the natare and conscitutioil of 
man requires the  establishment of  some rule.  Every thing in 
nature  has its  destination  and  end ;  and  ccnseque:ltly,  e~ch 
creature is conducted to its end by  a propei princip:e  of  direc- 
tion.  Man, who holds a  considerable  rall~  among the beings 
that  surround  him,  participates  undoubtedly  of  this  fi~t  and 
universal  order.  And,  whether  we ~vll>iJt.~  him  in  himself 
as an intelligent and rational lleing,  or view him as  a member 
of  society,  or  whether  in fine  we  regard 'him  as  the ha:ldy 
work of  God, and deriving from  this first  Being his  faculties, 
state, and existence ;  all  these circumstances evidently indicate 
an end,  a destination, and consequently imply the  necessity  of 
a rule.  Had man been created to live at random  without anr 
fixt and determinate  view,  without  know;ng  whither he  is  to 
direct his course, or what road he ought to take ;  it is  evident 
that his noblest faculties would be of  no manner of  use to him. 
Wherefore,  waving  all  disquisitions  concerning  the  necessity 
of  a rule,  let us  endeavor  rather to discover what this rule is 
which alone, by enlightning  the understanding,  and  directing 
our actions to an end worthy of him,  is capable of  farming the 
order and beauty of  human life. 
A ~lemp-  111.  Qlen we speak of a rule in relation to humnn actions, 
poses  an 
end, an  two things are manifestly supposed ;  the first, that humari co13- 
rim.  * Sec  Puffendorf,  hw  of nature and  natioor, took ii, chap. ib 
duct is snsceptible of  direction,  as we have already proved ;  the 
second, that man in  a11  his steps and actions  propases to him- 
self  a scope or end, which he is desirous to attaiq. 
IV.  Mow let  man reflect  but never  so little on  himself, he The ulti-  mate end 
will soon perceive,  that every  thing he does  is wiih a  view of  of ,,,,  ;, 
happiness, and thnt this  is the  ultimate end  he proposes in all  happiness. 
his actions,  or the last term,  to which he reduces them.  This 
is a first truth, of  which  we have  a continu,~l  conviction from 
our internal sense.  Such in etiect is the nature  of  man,  that 
he necessarily  loves himself;  that he seeks in  every thing  and 
every where his own advantage,  and can never be diverted from 
this pursuit.  We naturally desire,  and  necessarily  wish  for 
good.  This desire anticipates  all our reflections,  and is not in 
our  own  election;  it  predominates  in  us,  and becomes the 
primurn mobile  of  all our  determinations ;  our  hearts  being 
never inclined towards any particular good,  but by  the  natural 
impression, which determines us to good in general.  It is not 
in our power to change this bent of  the will, which the  Crea- 
tor himself  has implanted in us. 
V.  This system of  providence extends to all beings,  endow-  It is the 
ed with sense and knowledge.  Even brute animals have a like  F~~~~''~ 
instinct;  for they all love themselves, endeavouring at self-pre- 
servation by all sorts of means, eagerly pursuing whatever seems 
good  or useful  to  them,  and turning  on the  contrary,  from 
whatever  appears  prejudicial  or  bad.  The same  propensity 
shews  itself  in  man,  not only as  an instinct,  but  moreov- 
er as  a rational inclination  approved  and  strengthened  by re- 
flection.  Hence, whatsoever presents itself  to us, as an object 
proper to promote our happiness, must of  necessity please us ; 
and every  thing, that appears opposite to our felicity, becomes 
of  course the  object of  our  aversion.  'rhe  more  we study 
man, the more we are convinced, that  here in  reality  lies the 
source of  ill our tastes ;  here the  grand spring, which sets us 
in motion. 
VI.  And indeed,  if  it  be  natural  to every  intelligent  and  The  desire 
rational being to act  always with  a  fixt view and  determinate  ,O:,?,P$; 
end, it is  no less evident,  that  this view or end  must be ulti-  cential to 
mately reduced to himself ;  and  consequently  to his own  ad- 
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from rea-  vantage  and  happiness.  The desire  therefore  of  happiness  son.  is  as essential to a man,  and as  inseparable  from  his  nature, 
as  reason  itself;  for  reason,  as  the  very  etymology  of  the 
word implies, is nothing more  than a calculation  and account. 
To  reason is to calcul;tte,  and to  drzw  up  an  account,  after 
balancing every thing,  in order to see on which side the advan- 
tage lies.  It would therefgre  imply a contradictio~r  to suppow 
a rational being,  (hat  could absolutely forego its interest, or be 
indifferent with regard  to its own  felicity. 
self-love  is  VII-  We  must therefore take care not to  coilsider self-love 
a  principle^  and that sense or inclioa:iue,  wlrich  fines  us so strongly to our 
that has 
lathing  happiness, as a principle naturally vicious,  and a frcit of  hunran 
vicious in  depravation.  This would  be  accusing tile Author of  our ex- 
itself. 
istence,  and converting his noblest gifts into poison.  Wiiatcv- 
er comes from a  Being supremely  perfect  is  in  itself  good ; 
and were we to  condemn  the sense or  inclination of self-love 
as bad in  itself,  under a  pretence  that, by  a  misconstructi~n 
and wrong use thereof,  it is the source  of  an infinite number 
of  disorders,  we should for the very same motives be obliged to 
condemn reason ;  because it  is from the abuse of  this faculty, 
that the grossest errors and most  e:itravagant  irregularities  of 
men proceed. 
It may appear surprising to some, that we silould have stopt 
here to investigate and explain the truth of  a  principle,  wllich 
one would imagine is obvious to every body,  to the  learned  as 
well as the vulgar.  And yet it was absolutely necessary ;  because 
this is a  truth of  the very last importance, which  gives us the 
key,  as it were, of the human system.  It is true, that all ethic- 
al writers agree,  that man  is  made  for happiness, and  natur- 
ally desires  it;  (for how is  it possib!e  not to hear the voice of 
nature,  which rises from the very bottom of the heart  ?  )  But 
a great many,  after acknowledging this  principle, seem to lose 
sight of  it,  and,  not  attending  to  the consequences, that flow 
from  it,  erect their systems oil  different,  and sometimes  quite 
opposite foundations. 
Mancan-  VIII.  But if  it be true,  that man does nothing but with  a 
not attain  ,,  happi-  view of  happiness,  it is no less certain, that reason  is the only 
meas  but by  WAY he has to attain it. 
111 order  to  establish  this second  proposition or  truth, we the help of 
have  only to  attend  to  the  very  idea  of  llappiness,  and  toreason' 
the  notion  we have  of  good  and  evil.  Happiness  is  that 
internal  satisfaction  of  the soul which  arises  from  the  ~OS- 
session of  gccd ;  good is whatever is agreeable to man, for his 
preservation,  perfection,  entertainment, and pleasure.  Evil  is 
the opposite of  good. 
Man incessantly  experiences,  that there are some things con- 
venient,  and  otllers inconvenient  to him ;  that  the former are 
not all equally convenient, but some more than others ;  in fine, 
that this  conveniency depends,  for the most  part, on the use, 
he knows how  to  make of  things,  and  that  the  same  thing, 
which may  suit him, using it after a certain manner and meas- 
ure,  becomes  unsuitable,  when :his  use exceeds  its  limits.  It 
is  only  therefore  by  investigatiiig  the  natute  of  things,  as 
also the relations,  they have between  t11en:selves  and  with US, 
that we are capable of  discovering their iitness or disagreelne~lt 
with our felicity,  of  discerning good  from evil,  of  ranging er- 
cry thing in its proper order, of  setting a  right value on  each, 
and of  regulating conseqcently our researches nnd desires. 
But is there any other method of  acquiring this discernment, 
but by  forminb; just ideas of  things and their relations, and by 
deducing  from  these  first  ideas  the  consequences,  that flow 
from them by  exact and close argumentations ?  Now it is rea- 
son  alone,  that  directs  all  these  operations.  Yet  this  is 
not all ;  for as,  in order to  arrive  at happiness,  it is not  suffi- 
cient :o  form just ideas of  the nature and state of  things,  but 
it is  also necessary,  that  the will should  be  directed  by those 
ideas ar~d  judgments in the serics of our conduct ;  so it is cer- 
tain, that nothing  but reason can  communicate and support  in 
man the necessary  strength for making a  right  use of  liberty, 
and for determining in all  cases  according  to the light of  his 
understanding, in spite of  all  the impressions and motions that 
may lead him to a contrary pursuit. 
IX.  Reason  is therefore the  only mean,  in  every  respect,  Reason is 
that man has Left to  attain  to happiness,  and the princlpd end, :k;zi- 
for which he has received  it.  All the ficulties  of the SOU],  its tive rule .f 
instincts,  inclinations, and even the pasliio;?~,  aye  re!.:tive  to this "lan. THE  PRINCIPLES OF  NA'I'URAL LAW. 
end ;  and consequently it is this same reason,  that is capable of 
pointing out the true rule of  human :~ctions, or, if YOU \vi:l,  she 
herself is this primitive i-ule.  . In fdct, wzre it not for this faitIlful 
guide,  man would lead a random  lik,  ignorant even  of  wllat 
regards himself,  unacquainted  with his owl1 origin and destina- 
tion, and with the use he ought to mate of whatever  surrounds 
him ; stumbling like a blind  man,  at every  step ;  lost in fine 
and bewildered in an inextricable Iabjriiltll. 
What is  X. Thus we are conducted  nnturaliy  to the first  idea of  the 
word RigAf, which in its most genoral sense, and that, to which  general ? 
all the  particuiar  sigrnificdtiona be3r  solnc  rcla:ioti,  is nothing 
else but whatever reason certainly acknowledges, as a sure and 
concise mean of  attaining happiness,  and al)Froves a.;  such. 
This definition is the result  of  the priilciplcs  hitherto estab: 
lishcd.  In order to be convinced  of  its exactness,  we  have 
only to draw  these  principles ;,>gether, aid unite them under 
one prospect.  In  fact,  since  right  (duoit)  in its  primary  no- 
tion signifies whatever directs,  or i.;  we!l  directed ;  since direc- 
tion supposes a  scope and an cl:d,  to which we are desi-93s of 
attaining;  since the  ultimate  end of  man  is happiness ; znd, 
in fine, since  he cannot aciai:~  to lizppincss but  by  the help of 
reason ;  does  it not evidently follow,  that Right  in gener~l  is 
whatever reason approves,  as a  sure  and concise  meail of  ac- 
quiring  happiness  ?  It  is  likawise  in  co.ls.quence  of  t!lese 
principles,  th3t reason,  giving  in approbation to itself,  when 
it happens to be properly  cultivz,t?d, a:qd  arrived to that state of 
perfection,  in which  it  kncws  how to use  all  its discernrncnt, 
bears, by way of preference or excellencc, the appellation of  right 
reason,  as being the first and surest meail of  direction, where- 
by  man is enabled to ac.luire felicity. 
That we may not forget  any thing in the analysis  of  these 
first ideas, it is proper to observe  here,  that the L,ltiils express 
what we call Right by  the ward jlcs,  which properly  signifies an 
order or precept."  Tiles::  diiferent deno~ninations  undoubted- 
ly proceeded  from this,  that  reason  seems  to colnina~ld  with 
authority whatever  it avows to  be  a  rig!lt  ar.d  sure meat1  of 
* JUJ  a  jubcndo ;  Jura  enim veteres Jura vel Jusra  vocabant.  Festus ;  jurn, 
Yura. 
pron~oting  our felicity.  And as  we  have  only  to  seek  for 
what  is right,  in order  to  know  what  reason  commands us, 
her:ce  the nat~!ral contlection  or' these two  ideas arose  in res- 
pect to the rulcs of  right  rcason.  In a  word,  of  two  ideas 
natur'tlly  connected,  the Latins have followed oile,  and  we the 
other. 
CHAP.  VZ. 
Grneral rules oj' ctrrduct, prrsci.ibed  by  renson.  Of the nature and 
jrsl fsundatior~s f  obligation. 
I. 1  .T is alrczdy  a great  point  gained,  to  have  discorcred  Reason 
the primitive rule of  human  nctioils, and to l~now  this faithful ~:y";,"~y 
guiile,  wIlic11  is to direct  the steps of  man,  and whose direc-  rules of 
tions and cou~isels  he  may follow  with  an  intire  confidence. 
But let  us r~ot  stop here ;  and,  since  experience  informs  us, 
that wt.  :Ire  frequently  mistzlien in  our judgincnts  concerning 
good and evil,  ancl  that  thcse  erroneous judgments  throw  us 
into iilost  dnngerous irrcgularitics,  let us consult therefore our 
guide,  and lcarli mliich arc the characters of  rcal good  and  e- 
vil,  in ortlc~  to know iil what  true felicity  consists,  and  what 
rozd  ure ;ire to take ill order to attain i:. 
11.  'I'hough  thc gcnxal notion of  gocd ant1 evil  be fixed in  First rule. 
To make a  itself,  a:ld  inva:.i,iLlt~,  still  there iue  various  sorts of  particular  dis- 
goods aiid c~ils,  or of  t!i;iig::,  that pass  for such in  tlie  minds  tinction  of 
of  men.  good and 
evil. 
I.  Tlic first counsel  therclore,  that  reason  gives us,  is  to 
esamine well into the  ilaturc of  good and evil, and  to observe 
carefully  tl~rir  scvcrnl  diGrellces,  ill  ordcr to set upoil  each 
thing its pieoper  va:ue. 
This distinction is  easily made.  A very slight attention  to 
what  we  coiltinually experience informs us,  that,  man being 
composed of  body  and soul, thae  are  consequently two  sorts 
of  goods and evils,  spiyitual and corporeal.  The 5rst are those, 
that proceed only from our  thouglits;  the  second  r.;.:.~  from 
thc inlpressions of  external objects on our  senscs.  Thus, tlie 
sensible  pleasure,  resulting  from the  discovery  of  an  impor- THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  NRi'URrlL  LAW. 
tant truth,  or the self approbation,  arising from a consciousness 
of  having discharged our duty, &c. are  goods purely spiritual ; 
as the chagrin of  a geometrician for being unable to  find out a 
demonstration,  or the remorse a  person  feels  for  having  com- 
mitted a bad action,  &c.  are mere spiritual pains.  With  rc- 
gard to corporeal goods and evils, they  are sufficiently  known ; 
on one side,  they are health,  strength,  beauty ;  on  th2  other, 
sickness,  weakness,  pain,  &c.  These two sorts  of  goods and 
evils are interesting to man, and cannot be reckoned indifferent, 
by reason  that,  inan being  compo;ed  of  body  and soul, it  is 
plain his perfection and  happiness depend on the good st.lte of 
these two parts. 
2.  We  likewise observe, that a1,pcarances  frequently deceive 
us, and what at first sight carries with it the face of good proves 
to be a  real evil, whilst an apparent evil oftentimes conceals an 
extraordinary good. We  should therefore make a distinction Le- 
tween real goods and evils,  and those,  that are false and  appar- 
ent.  Or, which amounts to pretty near the same thing, there 
is sometincs a pure good and a pure evil, and  sometimes there 
is a mixturc of  both,  which does  not  obstruct our  discerning 
what part it is,  that prevai!~, and  whether the good or evil  be 
predominant. 
3.  A third differellce regards their duration.  In this respect 
goods and evils  have not  all the same nature ;  some are solid 
and durable,  others  transitory  and  inconstant.  Whereto we 
may add,  that there  are goods and evils of  which we are mas- 
ters,  as it  were, and  which depend  in such  a manner on our- 
selves, that we are able  to  fix  the  one,  in  order  to  have a 
eonstant enjoyment of them, and to shun or get rid of the others. 
But they are not all of this  kind ;  some  goods  there are,  that 
escape our most eager pursuits,  whilst  some evilo overtake  us, 
notwithstanding our most solicitous efforts to avoid them. 
4.  There are at present  goods and evils,  which we actually 
feel ;  and future goods and evils,  which are the objects of our 
hopes or fears. 
S.  There are particular  goods  and evils,  which  affect or~ly 
some individuals ;  and others,  that are common  and  universal, 
of  which all the  members  of  the society partake.  The good 
of  the whole is the  real good ;  that of  one of  the parts,  opp* 
site to the good  of  the whole,  is  only an  apparent  good,  and 
coriseque~ltly  a real evil. 
6. From  all  these remarks  we may in  fine conclude, that, 
goods and evils not being all of  the same species, there are con- 
seciuently some  differences amongst  them,  and that, compred 
together, we find there are some goods more excellent than 0th- 
ers,  ancl evils more or less incommodious.  It happens likewise, 
that a good compared with an evil, may be either equal, or  great- 
er, or less ;  whence  sevcral differences or gradations arise, that 
are worthy of  special notice. 
These  particulars  3re sufficient  to show  the  utility of  the 
principal rule, we have given, and how essential it is to out hap- 
piness  to make a just  distinction of  goods and evils.  But this 
is not the only counsel,  that reason gives us ; we are going to 
paint out some others, that are not of  less importance. 
111.  2.  True happiness cannot consist in things,  that are in-  second 
consistent with the nature and state of  man.  This is another rule.  Tme 
happiness  principle,  which naturally  flows, from the very notion of  good  ,,, 
and evil.  For whatsoever  is inconsistent  with the nature of  a fistinthhg. 
that are In-  being tends for this very reason to degrade or destroy it,  to car- 
rupt or alter its constitution ;  which, being directly opposite to nature  with the  and 
the preservation, perfection,  and  good of  this being,  subverts  of 
the foundation  of  its  felicity.  Wherefore,  reason  being  the man. 
noblest  part  of  man,  and  constituting  his  principal  essence, 
whatever  is inconsistent with reason cannot form his happiness. 
TO  which I add,  that whatever is incompatible with the state of 
man cannot  contribute  to his felicity ;  and  this  is a point as 
clear, as evidence can make it.  Every  being,  that  by its con- 
stitution has essential relations  to other beings,  which it cannot 
shake off, ought not to be considered merely as to itself, but as 
constituting a part of  the whole,  to which it  is related.  And 
it is sufficiently manifest, that it is on its situation in regard  to 
the beings that surround it, and on the relations  of  agreement 
or opposition  it has with them, that  its good  or bad  state,  its 
happiness or miscry, must in a great measure depend. 
IV.  3.  In order  procure for ourselves a solid  happiness, it Third rule, 
is not sufficient to be attentive to the present good and evil,  we To coa- THE PRINCIPLES  BP  NATURAL LAW. 
pare the  must li!:e~~!sc examine  their  natural  CO~C~~UCIICES,  t3 the end 
present and  that, co;n?aring  the present with the futu1.2, and b~inncin; one 
the future 
tonether.  wi:h  the o:hes,  we may know beforeiinnd what m~;t  be thc n.lt- 
U:~LI rc.,dt. 
~ourth  4.  It is  thzrcfore coiitr~ry  to relson,  to pursuc a goo3,  that 
rule. 
mu:t  certainly be zttended with  a more cxisider~ble  evil.* 
lafth  5. But,  on the contrary,  nothing is more reL~s9rl?b!e  than to 
re 7ive  to  bear with an evil,  from \vhich a 2rz.ttcr  gootl must 
cer:~iniy zrise. 
Tli~ti~\th  and importanceof these rnaxi~lls  ~;csclfoSvions. Good 
and evil bclng two opposites,  the cExt of  o:le 2estrqs t!~at of 
the otIler ;  that is  to say, the  pass,-ssion oT  a  gad,  attenclod 
with  'a greater evil,  renders  U;  really  uil!l.lppy  j  and, o:~  the 
contrary, a slight  evil, which procures  U;  a morl: col~~iderable 
good,  does ilot hinder us fro'n being h~ppy.  Wherefore, eve- 
ry thing well considered, the first ought to be avoiJ~d,  as a real 
evil, and the second should be courted, as  a real good. 
The nature of  human things requires us  to bc attentive  to 
t!lese  principles.  Were each of our actiotis restrnil~ed  ill such 
a manner, and limited within itself,  as not  to be  attended with 
ally co:lsec,uence, we shou!d  not be so  ofteil  mistaken  in our 
choice, but s!iould  be alnlost sure cf grasping  the good.  But, 
informed as wc arc by expe:-ience, th~t  things  hue frequently 
very dih'crcnt egects,  front wht  i!ley  seen1.d  to promise, inso- 
much that the most pleasing objcc'is are attended with bitter con- 
sequences, arid on the contrary a real and solid good is purchased 
with labour  and  pain:,  prudence  does not  allow us to fis our 
whole attention on the present.  We  should  ektend our views 
to futurity, and equally  weigh  and  consicier  the  one  and the 
other, in order to pass a solid  judgment  on them, a  judgment 
sufficient to fix properly our resolutions. 
Sixth  V. 6. For the same reason,  we ought to prefer  a greater to a 
TO  give  ~ESS  good ;  we  ought always  to aspire  to  the  noblest  goods, 
the goods, 
that  tllat suit us, and proportion our desires and pursuits to the  na- 
most the  ture and merit of  each good.  This rule  is so evident,  that it 
preference.  would be losing time to pretend to prove it. 
* See the third note of Mons. Barheyrac on  the duties of  nun  and a  ckizem, 
book i, chap.  I. $  xi. 
VI. 7.  It is not necessary to have an entire  certainty in re-  seventh 
rule.  In  gard  to  considerable  goods and  evils ; mere  possibility,  and ,,,,  C,, 
h~uch  more so probability,  is  sufficient to induce a  reasonable possibilitt 
only, and  person to deprive himself  of  some  trifling good,  and  even  to by a much 
suffer some slight  evil, with a design of  acquiricg a  far greater stronger 
reason  good, and avoiding a more troublesome evil.  probability, 
This rule is a  consequexice of  the foregoing ones ;  and we ought to 
may affirm, that  the  ordinary conduct of  men shows, they are "y:rmia* 
sensibly convinced  of  the prudence and necessity thereof.  In 
effect,  what  is  the  aim  of  all  this  tumult  of  business,  into 
which they hurry themselves  ?  To  what end and purpose are all 
the labors they undertake, all the pains and fatigues they endure, 
all the perils, to which they constantly expose themselves ? Their 
intent is to acquire some  advantages,  which they imagine they 
do not purchase too dear;  though these advantages are neither 
present,  nor so  certain,  as the sacrifices,  they  must make in 
order to obtain them. 
This is a very rational manner of acting.  Reason requires, 
that,  in default of  certainty,  we should  take up with probabili- 
ty, as the rule of  our judgment and determination ;  for proba- 
Lility in that case is the only  light  and guide we have.  And, 
unless  it is more eligible to wander in  uncertainty,  than to fol- 
low a guide ;  unless we are of  opinion, that our lamp ought to 
be extinguished, when we are deprived of  the light of the sun ; 
it is reasonable to be directed by probability,  when we are inca- 
pable of  coming at evidence.  It is easier  to attain our aim by 
help of  a faint or glimmering light, than by continuing in dark- 
ness.* 
In  the ordinary course of  life, we aregenerally obliged  to be determined by 
probability, for it is not always in our  power to attain to a complete  evidence. 
Seneca, the philosopher, has beautifully established and  explained  this maxim : 
I'  Huic respondebimus, nunquam expectare nos  certissimam rerum  romprehen- 
sionem ;  quoniam in arduo est veri exploratio ; sed cb ire, qua  ducit veri sim- 
'' ilitudo.  OMNE  UAC  VIA  PROCEDIT  OPPICIUY.  Sic serimus, sic  navigamus, 
"  sic militamus, sic uxores ducimus, sic liberos tollimus ;  quum ornnium  horum 
"  incertus sit eventus.  Ad ea accedimua, de quibus bene  sperandum esse  credi- 
"  mus.  Quis enim polliceatur serenti  proventum,  naviganti  portum,  militanti 
victoriam, nlarito pudicam uxorem,  patri pios libcros ?  Sequimur  qub  ratio, 
g'  non qua veritas trahit. Exspecta,  ut nisi bene cessura non facias, et nisi comper- 
"  ta veritate n~hil  moveris ;  relicto omni actu vita consistit.  Dum versimilia me 
in hoc aut illud impellant, non verebor beneficium dare ei, quem vereimile erit 
gratum e~ee,"  Da  Bmef;c. lib. 4. c.  33. 
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Eighth  nI.  8.  we  should be solicitous to acquire a taste for  true 
rule.  To  have  a  rel- goods, insomuch that goods of an excellent nature, and ackuow- 
ish for aue edged as such, should excite our desires,  and  induce us to make 
all  the efforts,  necessary for getting  them into our possession. 
This last rule is a  natural consequence of  the others, ascer- 
taining their execution  and effects.  It is not suficient to have 
enlightened  the mind in  respect  to the  nature of  these  goods 
and evils,  that are capable of  rendering us redly happy or un- 
happy;  we should likewise give  activity  and efficacy to  these 
principles, by forming the will so,  as to determine itself by taste 
and habit,  pursuant to the coutlsels of enlightened  reason.  And 
let no one think  it impossible to change our inclinations,  or to 
reform our tastes.  It is with  the  taste of  the mind,  as with 
that of  the pdldte.  Experience shows,  that we may alter both, 
so as to find pleasure at length in things,  that before were dis- 
agreeable to us.  We begin  to do a  thing with pain,  and by 
an effort of  reason ;  afterwards we familiarize  ourselves  to  it 
by degrees ;  then a  frequency  of  acts  renders  it easier to us, 
the repugnance ceases, we view the thing in  a  different  light 
from what we did  before ;  and use at length makes  us  love  a 
thing, that before was the object of our aversion.  Such is the 
power of  habit ;  it makes us  insensibly feel so much ease and 
satisfaction in what we are accustomed  to,  that we find it diG- 
cult afterwards to abstain from it. 
Our mind  VIII.  These  are  the  principal  counsels,  we  receive  from 
acquiesces 
rlJturailyin reason.  They are in some measure a system of maxims, which, 
these max- drawn from the nature of things, and particularly from the nature 
ime;  they ought  and  and state of man, acquaint us with wha~  is  essenti~lly  suitable 
toinfluence to him,  and include the most necessary  rules for  his perfection 
Our con- 
duct.  and happiness. 
These general principles are of such a nature,  as to force, as 
it were,  our assent ;  insomuch  that a  clear and  cool  under- 
standing, disengaged from the prejudice and tumult of passions, 
cannot help achowledging their truth and  prudence.  Every 
one sees how useful it would be to man to havk these principles 
present always in  his mind, th3t by the  application and usc of 
them in particular cases,  they may  insensibly  become the uni- 
form and constant  rule 41 his inclinations and conduct. 
Maxims in fact, like these,  are not mere speculations ;  they 
should naturally influence our morals,  and  be of  service to us 
in practical life.  For to what purpose would it be to listen to 
the advise of  reason,  unless we intended  to  follow it  ?  Of 
what  signification are those ruIes of  conduct, which manifestly 
appear to us good and useful,  if we refuse to conform to them ? 
We  ourselves are  sensible, that  this light was given  US  to reg- 
ulate our steps and motions.  If  we deviate  from these max- 
ims,  we inwardly disapprove and condemn ourselves,  as we are 
apt to condemn any other person in a similar case.  But if we 
happen to conform to these  maxims,  it is a subject of  internal 
satisfaction, and we commend ourselves,  as we commend others, 
who have acted after this  manner.  These  sentiments  are  SO 
very natural,  that  it  is  not  ia our power to think  otherwise. 
We  are forced to respect these  principles,  as a  rule  agreeable 
to our nature, and on which our ,felicity depends. 
IX.  This agreeableness sufficientlg known implies a ilecessi-  tion  of  obliga-  gener 
ty of  squaring our conduct by it.  When we mention necessi-  ,lry  co,,;d, 
ty, it is plain  we do not mean a physical,  but  moral  necessity,  ered. 
consisting in the impression, made on us by some prticular mo- 
tives, which determine us to act after a certain manner, and do 
not permit us 'to act rationally the opposite way. 
Finding ourselves in these circumstances, we say we are un- 
der an obligation  of  doing or omitting a certain thing ;  that is, 
we are determined to it  by  solid reasons, and  engaged by co- 
gent motives,  which, like so many ties,  draw our  will  to  that 
side.  It' is in this  sense a  person  says  he is obliged.  For, 
whether we are determined by popular opinion,  or whether rve 
are directed by civilians and ethic writers,  we find that the one 
and the  other  make  obligation  properly  consist  in a  reason, 
which, being well understood  and approved,  determines us ab 
solutcly  to  act after a certain  manner  preferable  to  another, 
Hence it  follows,  that the  whole  force of  this  obligation  de- 
pends on  the judgment, by which we approve or  condemn  a 
particular manner of  acting.  For to approve is acknowledging 
we ought to do a thing ;  and to condemn is  OWII~II~  we ought 
not to do it.  Now  ought  and  to  be  oblij.rd  are  synonymous 
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We  have aIready hinted at the natural analogy  between  the 
proper and literal sense of  the word obltged,  and the  figurative 
signification of  this same term.  Obligation properly denotes a 
tie ;" a man  obliged  is therefore a person,  who is  tied.  And 
as a man, bound with cords or chains, cannot move or act with 
liberty,  so it is  very near the same case with a person,  who is 
obliged; with this diffzrence,  that, in the first case, it is an exter- 
nal and physicai impediment, which prevznts the ePect of  one's 
natural strength ;  but in the second,  it  IS only a moral tie ;  that 
is, the subjectiori of  liberty is produced by reason, which,  be- 
ing the primitive rule of man and his fatuities, directs  and ne- 
cessarily modifies his operations in a manner suitable to  theend, 
it  proposed. 
We  may therefore  define  obligation,  considered in  general 
and in its first origin,  a restriction  of  natural  liberty, produced 
by  reason ;  inasmuch  as the  counsels, which reason  gives us, 
areA  so many motives,  that determine man to act after a certain 
manner, preferable to another, 
aligatian  X.  Such is the nature of  primitive  and  original  obligation, 
may be  From this  it follows, that  this obligation may  be more  or less 
E:::-tl"o'ng.  strong, more or  less  rigorous;  according as the  reasons,  that 
establish  it, have more or less weight,  and consequently  as the 
motives, thence resulting, have more or less  impression  on the 
will.  For manifest  it is,  that the more  these  motives are CO- 
gent and efficacious, the more the necessity of  conforming  our 
actions to them becomes strong and indispensible. 
Dr,Cla&'s  XI.  I am  not ignorant, that this  explication of  the  nature 
opinion  and origin of  obligation  is  far from being adopted by all  civjl- 
the nature 
snd  origin  ians and ethic writers.  Some pretend,?  that the rintural jitness 
ot  obliga-  or  unJtness,  which ure  acknowledge in certain  aztims, is the  tvue 
tion. 
and originalfoundaiion of all obligation ;  that virtue has an intrin- 
~ic  beauty, which renders it arni,rble of  itself,  and  that vice  on  tbr 
contrary is  attended  with an intrinsic  dgormity,  which  ought  tr 
make  zu  detest  it ;  and fibis  antecedent  to and  independent  of  tha 
good  and  evil, of  the rewardr and  punishments,  which may  ari~e 
from  the practice  of  either. 
Obligatio a  ligardo. 
t See Dr. Clark on the evidence of mtural  and revealed religion. 
But this opinion methinks can be supported no farther,  than 
it is reduced  to that, which we have just now explained.  For 
to say that virtue has of  itself  a natural beauty,  which renders 
it worthy of  our love,  and  that vice,  on  the contrary,  merits 
our aversion,  is  not this  acknowledgil~g, in fact, that  we have 
reason to prefer one to the other ?  Now,  whatever this reason 
be,  it  certainly  can  never become a  motive  capable  of  deter- 
minining the will,  but inasmuch as it presents to us some good 
to acquire, or tends to make us avoid some evil ;  in  shcrt, on- 
ly as it is able to contribute to  our satisfaction,  and place us in 
a state of tranquillity and happiness.  Thus it is ordained by the 
very constitution of  man, and the nature of  human will.  For, 
as good  in general  is  the object of  the  will,  the only motive, 
capable of  setting it in motion, or of determining it to one side 
preferable to another, is the hope of obtaining this good.  To  ab- 
.stract therefore  from all interest  in respect  to man is depriving 
him of  all motive of  acting, that is, reducing him to a state of 
inaction and indicerence.  Besides,  what idea should we be a- 
ble to form of  the agreeableriess or  disagreeableness  of  human 
actions,  of  their beauty or turpitude, of  their proportion or  ir- 
regularity,  were  not  all  this refsrred  to man  himself,  and to 
what his destination,  his  perfection,  his welfare, and  in  short 
his true felicity requires ? 
XII.  hlost civilians  are of  a different opinion  from that of  Mondcnr 
Dr. Clark.  "  L They  establish, as a  pri~iciple  of  obligation,  ~~,";"o~'@ 
properly so called, the will of a superior being,  on whom de-  concerning 
pendence is acknowledged.  They pretend there is nothing but thi-~bjec" 
"  this will, or the orders of a being of this kind,  that can bridle 
"  our liberty, or prescribe particular rules to our actions,  They 
"  add, that neither the relations of  proportion nor disagreement, 
"  which we acknowledge in the things themselves,  nor the ap- 
"  probation they receive from reason, lay us under an indispensi- 
"  ble necessity of  following those  ideas,  as  the  rules  of our 
"  conduct.  That, our  reason being in reality nothing else but 
"  ourselves, nobody,  properly  speaking, can lay liirnself  under 
*  See the judgment  of an anonymous writer, &c.  S.  15. This ir a mall  work 
41 Mr. Lribnitz, 011 which Mr. Barbeyrac has made some remarh, and  which 
ii inserted in the Bfth edition of  his translation of the duties of  mm  and citizen. THE  PRINCIPLES OF  NATURAL  LAW. 
an obligatiot~.  Hence  they  conclude,  that  the maxims  of 
reason,  colisidered in themselves,  and independent of  the will 
of  a superior, have nothing obligatory in their nature." 
This manner of  explaining the nature,  and laying the foun- 
dation of  obligation,  appears to me insufficient, because it does 
not  ascend to the original  source, and real  principles.  True 
it is,  that the will of  a  superior obliges those,  who are his  de- 
pendent~;  yet this will cannot  have  such  an effect, but  inas- 
much as it meets  with  the  approbation  of  our  reason.  For 
this purpose it is  not only  necessary,  that the  superior's  wiU 
should contain nothing in itself opposite to the nature of  man ; 
but moreover it ought to bz proportioned  in such a manner  to 
his constitution  and ultimate end,  that we cannot help acknowl- 
edging it,  as the rule  of  our actions;  insomuch  that there  is 
no neglecting it without falling into a dangerous error ;  and, on 
the contrary, the only means  of  obtaining our end is to  be di- 
rected by it.  Otherwise if is inconceivable how man  can volun- 
tarily submit to the orders of a superior, or determine willingly 
to obey him.  Own indeed I must, that, according  to the Ian- 
guage of civilians, the idea of a superior, who commands, must 
intervene to establish an obligation,  such as  is  commonly con- 
sidered.  But, unless we trace things higher, by grounding even 
the authority of  this superior  on the approbation, he  receives 
from  reason,  it  will  produce  only  an  external  constraint, 
very different from obligation,  which hath  of itself a  power  of 
penetrating the will,  and moving it by an inward sense ;  inso- 
much that man is of his own accord, and without any restraint 
or violence,  inclined to obey. 
sorts  XIII.  From all these remarks we may conclude, that the dif- 
of obligy  ferences between the ~rinci~al  systems,concerning the nature and 
tions ;  m-  ,,,,  and  origin of obligation, are not so great, as they appear at first sight. 
utenaL.  Were we to make a closer  inquiry into these opinions,  by  as- 
cending to their primitive sources,  we should  find,  tjat  these 
different ideas, reduced to their exact value, far from being op- 
posite,  agree very well together,  and ought  eve11 to concur, in 
order to form a system,  connected  properly  with all its  essen- 
tial parts,  in relation to the nature and state of man.  This  is 
what we intend more particularly to perform hereafter.*  It  is 
proper at present to observe,  that there are two sorts of obliga- 
tions,  one internal,  and the other  external.  By internal  obli- 
gation I understand  that, which is  produced  only by  our own 
reason, considered  as the primitive rule of  conduct, and in con- 
sequence  of  the good or evil the action in itself contains.  By 
external obligation,  we mean that, whic!l  arises  from  the wiil 
of  a being,  on whom we allow ourselves dependent,  and who 
commands or prohibits some particular  things, under a commi- 
nation of  punishment.  Whereto we must add,  that these two 
obiigations,  far from being opposite to each other, have,  on the 
contrary, a perfect agreement.  For as  the external obligation 
is capable of  giving a new force  to the internal,  so the whole 
force of  the external obligation  ultimately depends on tAe  inter- 
nal ;  and it is froill the agreement and concurrence of  these two 
obligations,  that the  highest  degree of  moral  necessity  arises, 
as also the strongest tie,  or the properest  motive  to  make  im- 
~ression  011 man, in order to  deterinine him  to pursue steadily 
and never to deviate from some fixt rules of conduct ;  in a word, 
by this it is, that the most periect obligation is formed. 
CHAP.  VII. 
Cy  right, considered as aJucrdty,  and g  the abligation thereto  car- 
respondinp. 
0 
I.  BESIDES the general idea of  right, such as has been :,";?L: 
now explained,  considering it  as  the  primitive rule of  human ken in sev- 
actions,  this  term  is taken  in several  particular significations,  eral partic- 
ular senses,  which we must here point out.  which are 
But,  previous to every thing else,  we should  not  forget the d1  derive( 
from the  primitive  and general  notion,  we have  given  of  right.  For, general 
since it is from this notion,  as from its principle,  that the sub-  notion- 
ject of  this and the following chapters  is deduced, if  our rea- 
sonings are exact in themselves, and have a  necessary  connex- 
ion with  the principle,  this  will furnish  us  with a new argu- 
ment in its favor.  But if  unexpectedly it should turn out oth- 
See the second part, chap. vi. Z'HE  PRINCIPLES OF  NATURAL  LAW, 
&wise, we shall have  at least  the  advantage of  detecting  the 
error  in its very source, and of  being better  able to correct it. 
Such is the effect of  a just method ;  we are  convinced,  that  a 
general idea is exact, when the particular ideas are reducible to 
it, as different branches to their  trunk. 
Definition  11.  In the first place,  Right is  frequently taken from a per- 
'!ght  sond quality, for a  power of  acting or faculty.  It is thus we 
aons~dered 
as a facul-  say,  that every man has a right to attend  to his owl1 przservd- 
t):  tion ;  that a  parent has a right  to bring up his children ; that 
a sovereign  has a right  to levy troops for  the  defence  of  the 
state ;  &c. 
In this sense we must define Right  a p3wer,  that man hath 
to make use of  his liberty and strength in a particular  manner, 
either it1 regard to himself,  or in respect  to other men,  so  far 
as this exercise of  his strength and liberty  is approved by rea- 
son, 
Thus, when we say, that a father has a right to bring up his 
children, all that is meant hereby is,  that reason allows a fsther 
to make use of  his liberty and ilaturaI force in a manner suita- 
ble to the preservation of  his children, and  proper to cultivate 
their understsndings,  and to train them up in  the principles  of 
virtue.  In like manner,  as reasdn  gives its approbdtion to the 
sovereign in whatever is necessary for the preservation and wel- 
fare of  the state, it  particularly authorises him to raise  troops 
and  bring  armies into the field, in order to oppose an enemy ; 
and in consequence hereof  we say he has a right to do it.  But, 
on the contrary, we affirm, that a prince has no  right, without 
a particular necessity,  to drag the peasant from the plough,  or 
to force poor tradesmen from their families ;  that a  father  has 
no right  to expose his children, or  to put them to  death,  &c. 
because thes:  things, far  from being  approved,  are  expr~ssly 
condemned by reason. 
 emua at  111.  We  must  not therefore  confound  simple  power  with 
take care to 
distinguish  right.  A simple power is a physical quality;  it is a power of 
between  acting in the  full extent of  our natural strength  and  liberty ; 
rimple pow- 
culd  right. but the idea  of  right is  more confined.  This  includes a re- 
lation of  z!greeableness  to  a rule,  which modifies the 
power,  a:lct  directs its operations in  a manner  prop.:  to con- 
duct man to a  certain  end.  It is for this reason we  say  that 
right is 3 moral quality.  It  is true  there are some,  who rank 
power 2s  well as right among the n~mber  of  moral qualities ;  " 
but there is nothing in  this  essentially opposite to  our distinc- 
tion.  Those,  who rank these two ide~s  a:nong  moral entities, 
understand by power  pretty  near the same thing, as we  under- 
stand by right;  and custom seems to aut11o:ise  this confusion ; 
for we equally  use,  for  ir~stance,  paternul power,  and pntrrna! 
right, &c.  Be this  as it  will,  we  are  not to  dispute  about 
words.  The main  point is to distinguish between  ph~i~ai  and 
moral; and it seems that  th:  word right,  as PuiFendorf  himself 
insinuates, t is fitter of  itself thzn power  to express the  moral 
idea.  In short,  the use cf  our  faculties becomes a right  only 
so far, as it is approved  by  reason,  and is  found  agreeable to 
this primitive rule of  human  actions.  And  whatever  a  man 
can rensonably perform  becomes in reaard to him  a  right, be- 
cause season is the only rnean,  that can conduct him in a short 
and sure manner  to the end he proposes.  There  is  nothing 
therefore arbitrary ill these ideas ;  they are borrowed from  the 
very xiatuie of  things,  and,  if  we compare them with the fore- 
going principles,  we slxll find they flo~v  from them as necessary 
consequences. 
IV.  If  any one shoultI  afterwards inquire,  on what folirida-  Gtfierd 
fuundation  tion  it  is  that  reason  approves  a  p~rticular  exercise  of  cur of 
strength and lib er:^, In preference to ailother,  the answer is GJ-  rlshts d 
vious.  The  diKe~ei*ce  OS those judgmeLlts arks  froin the ycry 
nature of  things and this eifects.  Every e~ercise  of  our fic- 
ulties,  that  tends of  itsd to the perfection  nr,d  happiness  of 
man,  meets with the  approbaticn  of  reasol~,  wI;:ch  condemnc 
whatever leads to a contrary end. 
V.  Obligation answas to  right,  taken  in  a  manner  ahove  ~ight  pro. 
explained, and coilsidered  in its effects with  regard  to another  duc.es Obli* 
gztion-  person. 
* See Puffendorf  on the Law of  Nature and NatLons, book i. chap. i.  19.  t.  There seems to be this  difference between  the tcrtnspozvcr and tight; that 
the first does more  expressly  import the presence of  the sad quality, and does 
but obscurely denote the manner how any one acquired  it.  Whereas the word 
right does properly and clearly show, that the quni~ty  was  fairly got, and is now 
fairly  possessed.  Pufidorfon  tbr LGW  of Nature and Nations, book i.  chap. I. 
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What we have already said,  in the  preceding  chapter,  con- 
cerning obligation, is  sufficient to  convey a  general  notion  of 
the nature of  this moral quality.  But  in order to form a just 
idea of  that,  which comes  under  our present examination,  we. 
are to observe, that when reason allows a man to make a partic- 
ular use of  his strength and liberty, or, which is the same thing, 
when it acknowledges he has a  particular right, it  is requisite, 
by a very natural consequence, that in order to ensure this right 
to man, he  should acknowledge at the same  time,  that  other 
people ought not to employ their strength and liberty in resist- 
ing him in this point;  but  on the contrary,  that  they  should 
respect  his right,  and assist him in  the exercise  of  it, rather 
than do him any prejudice.  From  this the  idea of  obligation 
r~~turally  arises ;  which is nothing  more  thar? a  restriction of 
natural liberty  produced by  reason;  inasmuch  as  reason does 
not permit  an opposition to be  made to  those,  who  use their 
right, but on  the contrary it obliges every body to  favour  and 
abet such, as do nothing but what it authorises, rather than op- 
pose or traverse them in the execution of  their lawful designs. 
Right and  VI.  Right therefore  and ob1ig;ltion arc, as  logicians express 
obligation 
are ,,,  it, correllntive terms ;  one of these ideas necessarily supposes the 
relative  other ;  and we cannot conceive a right without a corresponding 
terms.  obligation.  How, for excimple,  could we attribute to a  father 
the right of  forming  his  children  to  wisdom  and  vhue by 
a  perfect education, without acknowledging at the same  time, 
that children ought to submit to paternal direction,and thzt they 
are not only obliged not to make any resistance in  this respect, 
but moreover to concur, by their docility and obedience, to the 
execution of  their parents  views ?  Were it  otherwise, reason 
would be  no longer  the  rule  of  human  actions ; it  would 
contradict itse!f,  and all  the rights  it grants  to man would be- 
come useless and of no  effect ;  which  is taking from him with 
one hand what it gives him with the other. 
At what  VII.  Such is the nature of right, taken for a faculty, and of 
time man 
is suscepti- the  ob!igation  thereto  corresponding.  It may  be 
bleofright affirmed, that man is susceptible of these two  qualities, as soon 
and obl~ga- 
rion.  as he begins to enjoy life and sense.  Yet we must make some 
diflerencc here,  between right and  obligation, in respect to the 
time,  in which these  qualities begin  to  unfold  themselves  in 
man.  The obligations a person contracts as  man,  do  not ac- 
tually display their virtue till he is arrived to the age of  reason 
discretion.  For,  in  order to discharge an  obligation,  we 
must be first acquainted with it ;  we must  know what we do, 
and be able  to square  our actions by a certain  rule.  But  as 
for those rights, that are capable of  procuring the advantage of 
a person without his  knowing any  thing  of  the  matter,  they 
date tlqir origin, and  are  in full force from the very first  mo- 
ment of  his existence, and  lay the rest  of  mankind  under  an 
obligation of  respecting them,  For example,  the right, which 
requires, that nobody should injure or offend us,  belongs as well 
to  children, and even to infants,  that are  still  in their  mothers 
wombs, 35 to adult persons. This is the foundation of that equita- 
ble rule of  the Roman law, which declares,"  That i~funts,  who 
are as yet  itt ihir mpthcrs wombs, are considered as already brought 
into the  wsrld, whenever the question relates to  any thing, that may 
turn to  thriv aLvLzntuge.  But we cannot with any exactness  af- 
firm, that an infant,  whcther already come or coming into  the 
world, is actual!y  s~bject  to any obligation with respect to other 
men.  This state does not properly commence, with respect to 
man,  till he has attained the  age of  knowledge and discretion. 
VIII.  Various are the distinctions of  rights and  obligations  v .  Several 
but it will be sufficient for  us to point out those only, that are sorts of 
most worthy of  notice.+  rights and 
obliption~ 
In the first place,  rights are natural,  or acquired.  The for- 
mer are such  as  appertain  originally  and  essentially to  man, 
such, as are inherent in his nature, and wliich he enjoys as man, 
independent of any particular act on his side.  Acquired rights, 
on the contrary,  are those, which he does not naturally  enjoy, 
but are owing  to his  own  procurement.  Thus the  right  of 
providing  for  our  preservation is a right natural to man;  but 
Qui h utero  est,  perindt  ac si in rebus  bumnnis essd, custod~tur,  quotirs dr commode 
+Jar  partis guaritur.  L. 7. de  statu hornin. 11b. I, tit. 3.  Another civilian es- 
tablishes this ru!e.  Itnque pati  guts injuriam, etiamri non stntiat, pottst; facrre  ntmo, 
nisi qui slit JC injurinm  f'ucert,  ctiam~i  ntsciaf cui faciat.  L.  3. S P. D, de ilrjuriis lib. 
47,tit. 10. 
t See Puffendrrf on the Law of Nature and Nations, book i. chap. i. 5  19.  and 
Grotlus of the Riglate of  War and Peace, book is  chap, i,  4,~,6,  7. with Dnr- 
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sovereignty, or the right of  commanding a society of  men, is a 
right acquired. 
Secondly, rights are  perfect,  or imperfect.  Perfect  rights 
are those, which may be asserted in rigour, even by  einploping 
force to obtain the execution, or to secure the  exercise thereof 
in opposition to all  those,  who should  attempt to resist or dis- 
turb us.  Thus reason would empower us to use force against 
any one, who would  make an alljust  attack on  our  lives,  our 
goods, or our liberty.  But, when reason does not allow  us to 
use forcib!~  methods, in order to  secure  the enj~yment  of  the 
lights, it grants us,  then these rights are called imperfect.  Thus, 
notwithstanding  reason authorises those, who of  themselves are 
Qstitute  of means of living to apply for succour to other men; 
yet they cannot,  in case of  refusal, insist  upon it  by force, or 
procure it by open  violence.  It Is  obvious, without  our  hav- 
ing  any  occasion  to mention  it h&e, that obligation  answers 
exactly to  right, and  is more  or less strong, perfect, or imper- 
lect, according as right  itself is perfect or imperfect. 
Thirdly,  another  diitinction,  warthy  of  our  attention,  is, 
that there  are  rights,  which  may be lawfully  renounced,  and 
others, that cannot.  A creditor far example may  forgive a sum 
due to him,  if  he pleases,  either in  the whole or part ;  but a 
fither cannot renounce the right, he has over $is children,  nor 
leave them in an intire independence.  The reason of  this dif- 
ference is, that there are rights, which of themselves have a nat- 
ural connection with our duties, and are given to man only,  as 
means ~6 perform them.  To  renounce this sort of  rights would, 
be  therefore  renouncing  our  duty,  which  is  never  allowed. 
But with respect to rights, that no way concern our duties,  the 
renunciation of  thm is licit,  and only a  matter  of  prudence. 
Let us illustrate this with another example.  Man canpot  ab- 
solutely, and without any manner of  reserve, renounce  his lib- 
erty ;  for this would be manifestly throwing himself into a ne- 
cessity of  doing wrong,  were he so commanded by the person, 
to  whom he has made this subjection.  But it is lawful for US 
to renounce a part  of  our  liberty, if  we find  ourselves better 
enabled thereby to discharge our. duties,  and  to  acquire  some 
certain  and reasonable advantage.  It is with  these  modifica- 
tions we must understand the common maxim,  That it is allow- 
&lejr every one  to retwunce his right. 
Fouithly,  Right in fine consitlered in respect to its different 
objects, may  be  reduced  to  four  principal  species.  I.  The 
right we have over our own persons and actions,which is called 
Liberty.  2.  The right we have over things or goods, that be- 
long to us, which  is called Property.  3.  The right  we have 
over the persons and actions of other men, which is distinguish- 
ed by  the name of  Empire or Authority.  4.  And in  fine the 
right one may have over other men's  things, of which there are 
several sorts.  It suffices, at present, to have given a general no- 
tion of  these different species of  right.  Their nature and ef- 
fects will be  explained,  when we come to  a particular inquiry 
into these matters. 
Such are ?he ideas we ought to have of right,  considered as 
a faculty.  But there  is  likewise  another  particular  significa- 
tion of  this  WO$,  by which it is taken for law ;  as whe'n  we 
say, that natural right is the  foundation of  morality  and  poli- 
tics ;  that it forbids us to break  our word ;  that it commands 
the reparation of  damage,  &c.  In all these cases, right  is ta- 
ken for  law.  And as this kind of  right agrees in a particular 
manner with man, it is therefore a matter of importance to clear 
and explain it well, which we shall endeavour to perform in the 
following chapters. 
CHAP.  VIII." 
Of  Law  in general. 
I. I  N  the researches hitherto made concerning the  rule of 
human actions, we have consulted  only the natur;  of  man, his 
essence,  and what belongs to his  internal part.  This  inquiry 
has shewn  us, that  man finds within  himself,  and in his own 
Reason,  the rule he ought  to follow ;  and since  the  counsels, 
which reason gives him,  point out the shortest and safest  road 
* See Puffendorf  on the Law ef  Nature and Nations, book i, chap. iv. THE  PRINCIPLES OF  NATURAL  LAW. 
to his perfection ancl  happiness, from  thence  arises a principle 
of  obligation, or a cogent motive to  square his  actions by  his 
primitive rule.  But, in order to  have an exact  knowledge  of 
the human system, we  must not  stop at  these first  considera- 
tions;  we should  likewise, pursuant  to  the  method  already 
pointed out in this work,"  transfer our attention to the differ- 
ent states of  man,  and  to  the relations, thence arising, which 
must absolutely produce some particular  modifications  in  the 
rules he is to follow.  For, as we have already observed, these 
rules ought not  only to be  conformable  to the nature of  man, 
but they should be proportionable moreover to his state and sit- 
uation. 
A( np  by  11.  Now among the primitive states of  man,  dependence is 
nature lea  one of  those,  which  merits  the  most attention,  ancl  ought  to  dependent 
bemg,the  have the greatest  influence on  the rule he  is to  observe.  111 
t;;;f:  fact, a being independent of  every body else has  no other rule 
ale  of his to pursue, but the counsels of  his  own reason ;  and in  conse- 
*ction8*  quence of  this independence he is freed from all subjection  to 
another's  will ;  in short, he is absolute master of  himself  and 
his actians.  But the case is not the same with a being, who is 
supposed to be dependent  on another,  as  on  his  superior and 
master.  The sense of  this dependence ought naturally to en- 
gage the inferior to take the will of  him, on whom he depends, 
for the rule of  his conduct ;  since the  subjection,  in which he 
finds himself,  does not permit  him to entertain the least redson- 
able hopes of  acquiring any solid happiness, independent of  the 
will of his superior,and of the views he may propose in relation to 
him.fUesides, this has more or lessextent and effect, in proportion 
as  the superiority of  the one, and the dependence of the other, is 
greater or less, absolute or limited.  It is obvious thst all these re- 
marks are in a particular manner applicable to man ;  so that, as soon 
as he  acknowledges a superior, to whose power and authority 
he is naturally  subject, in consequence  of  this state,  he must 
acknowledge likewise  the will  of  this superior  to be the  rulo 
of his actions.  This is the Right we call Law. 
Pt  is to be understood however, that this will of  the superior 
has nothing in it contrary to reason, the primitive rule of  man. 
For, were this the  case, it would  be impossible for us to obey 
him.  In order to render a  law the rule of  human  actions,  it 
should be  absolutely  agreeable  to the  nature  and constitution 
of  mzn, and  be  ultimately designed  for  his happiness, which 
reason makes him necessarily pursue.  These remarks,  though 
clear enough  of  themselves, will receive  a greater  light, when 
we have more particularly explained the nature of  law. 
111.  Law  I define  a  rule,  prescribed by the soveieign of  a  Definitioa 
society to his subjects, either im  order to lay an obligation upon  of law- 
them of doing or omitting certain things? under  the commina- 
tion of  punishment,  or to  leave  them at liberty  to  act or not 
in other things just  as they think proper, and to secure to them, 
in this respcct, the full enjoyment  of  their rights. 
By tllus defining law, we deviate a little from the definitions, 
given by  Grotius and Puffendorf.  But the definitions cf these 
authors are, methinks, somewhat too vape, and besides do not 
seein to agree with  law, considered  in  its  full  extent  This 
opinion of  mine will be  justified by the  particular explication, 
I a:n  gaing to  enter upon,  provided it  be  compared with the 
p-tssages here refered to." 
IV.  I say that law is a  ruiz,  to signify,  in  the  first  place,  why law 
is defined  whhdt  law has in comnton with counsel ;  which is, that they are  a rule pre- 
both rules of  conduct ;  and secondly,  to distinguish  law from  scribed. 
the transient  orders, which  may be given by a  superior,  and, 
not being  permanent  rules  of  the  subject's  conduct,  are not 
properly laws.  The idea of  rule inc!udes  principally these two 
things univz~*sality  and pevpet~~ity;  and both these characters be- 
ing essential to rule, generally considered,  help to discriminate 
law from any other particular will of  the sovereign. 
I add, that law is  o riiieprescri6t~1,  because a simple resolu- 
tion, confined within the sovereign's  mind, without  manifesting 
itself  by  some exterm1 sign, can never be a law.  It is requisite, 
that this  will be notified in a propcr manner to  the  subjects ; 
* See chap-iii,  of thin part,  3, 
t See chap, vi, 5 3. 
* See Grotius on the  Rights of  War  and Peace, boolt i.  chap.  i.  5  9.  And 
Puffendorf  on  the Law of  Nature and  Nations, book i, chap. vi, 5 4.  To which 
we may add Mons. Barbeyrac's notes. THE PRINCIPLES OF  NATURAL  LAW. 
so that they be acquainted with what  the sovereign requires of 
them,  and with the necessity of  squaring thereby their conduct, 
But in what  manner this  notification  is to be  made,  whether 
viva voce,  by writing, or otherwise,  is  a  matter of  mere indif- 
ference.  Sufficient it is, that the subjects be properly instruct- 
ed concerning the will of  the legislator. 
Whatisun-  V.  Idet  us finish the explication of the principal ideas,  that 
derstoodby enter into the definition of  law.  Law is prescribed by the sove-  a sovsrelgn, 
sovereign-  reigtz ;  this is what distinguishes it from  counsel, which comes 
*YJ and the from a friend or equal ;  who,  as such,  has no  power over us, 
right of 
conlmand-  and whose  advices  consequently peither have the  same  force, 
ing.  nor produce the same obligation as law,  which,  coming from a 
sovereign,  has for its support the  command and authority of a 
superior.*  Counsels are followed by reasons,  drawn from the 
nature of the thing ;  laws are  obeyed,  not  only on account of 
the reasons,  on which they are established, but likewise because 
of the authority of the  sovereign,  who prescribes  them.  The 
obligation arising from counsel is merely internal ;  that of  law 
is both internal and external.+ 
Society, as we have already  observed, is the union of  several 
porsons for a particular end, from which some common advan- 
tage arises.  'rhe end is the effect or advantage,  which  intelli- 
gent beings propose  to themselves,  and are willing to procure. 
The union of several persons is the concurrence of their will to 
procure the end,  they  aim  at  in common.  But,  though we 
make the idea of society enter into the definition of law, it must 
not thence b2 inferred,  that society is a condition absolutely es- 
sectial and necessary  to the enacting of laws.  Considering the 
thing exactly, we may very well form a conception oflaw, when 
the sovereign  has only a single person subject to his authority ; 
and it is only in order to  enter into the actual  state of  things, 
that we suppose a sovereign commanding a society of men.  We 
must nevertheIess  observe,  that the relation,  there  is  between 
the sovereign and  the subjects,  forms a society  between them, 
but of a particular kind, which we may call a society of  inequality, 
where the sovereign commands, and the subjects obey. 
* See the Law of Nature and Nations, book  i,  chap. vi.  h 
t See abpve. chap, vi.  13. 
The savereign is therefare he, who has a right to command 
in  the last  resort.  To command  is  directing the actions  of 
those,  who are subject  to us,  according  to  our  own  will,  and 
with  authority  or  the  power  of  constraint.  I say,  that the 
sovereign commands in the last resort,  to show that,  as lie has the 
first rank in society,  his will is superior to any other, and holds 
a11  the  meabers  of  the society  in  subjection.  In  fine the 
right of  commanding is nothing  more,  than  th~  power  of  di- 
recting the actions of  others with authority.  And,  as the pow- 
er of  exercising one's  force and  liberty is  no  farther  a  right, 
than as it is approved and authoris2d by reason, it is on this ap- 
probation of  reasoh, ss the last resort, that the right of com:iland 
is established. 
VI.  This leads us  to inquire more  particularly  into  the 
natural foundation of  empire or sovereignty ;  or, which amounts 
to the same  thing,  what  is  it,  that  confers  or  constitutes a 
right of  laying an obligation on  another person, and of requir- 
ing his submission  and  obedience.  This  is  a  very  imporcant 
question in itself;  important also in its erects.  For, the more 
we are  convinced  of  the  reasons,  which  establish  on the one 
hand authority, and dependence on the other, the more  we are 
inclined to make a  real  and voluntary  subrnissio~l  to those,  on 
whom we depend.  Besides, the diversity of sentiments,  in re- 
lation to the manner of  laying the foundation of  sovereignty,  is 
a sufficient poof, that this  subject  requires to  be treated with 
Care and attention. 
CHAP. IX. 
Of  tbefiunddtbn  .fsovertignty,  or  the rig& ofccmmonding. 
fa INQUIRING here into the  foundation of  the right of  f$%e 
kommand we consider the t!ling  only in a general and metaphys-  question is 
Ecal  manner.  The  question  is  to know  the  foundation of  a  in 'egard  to a neceo- 
neccessary  sovereig~~t~  and  de~endenfe;  that  is,  such,  2s  is  ,,,, 
founded on the very  nature of  things,  and  is a  aatural conse-  reigntl'. 
quence of  the constitution of  those beings, to whom it is attri- 
buted.  Let us therefor- wave whatever relates to a  particular 
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species of  sovereignty, in ordel. to ascend to the general icieas, 
from which the  first  principles are  derived.  But,  as  general 
principles,  when  just  and  well founded,  are  easily applied to 
particular cases,  it  follsws therefore,  that  the first  foundation 
~f  sovereignty,  or the reason$, on which it is established,  ought 
to be laid in such  a  manner,  as to  be  easily applicablt to the 
several  species,  that  fall  within our  knowledge.  By  this 
mean, as we observed before,  we can be fully satisfied with re- 
gard  to  the justnes-  of  the principlts,  or  distingnish,  whether 
they are defective. 
second re-  11.  Another general  and  preIiminary  remark  is,  t!zt  there 
is  can be neither  sovereignty nor  natural and  necessary  depend- 
neither s*  ence between beings,  which by their nature, faculties, and state, 
vereignty 
nor necesa-  have  SO perfect an equality, that nothing  can  be  attributed  to 
ry depend-  one,  which  is not alike applicable to the other.  In fact, in such 
ence be- 
tween be-  a supposition, there  could be no  reason, why one should arro- 
ingsper-  gate an authority over  the rest,  and subject  them to  a state of 
frct'y  dependence,  of  which the latter could not equally  avail  them- 
equal. 
selves against the former.  Bot, as this reduces the thing to an 
absurdity,  it follows, that such  an equality between several be- 
ings excludes all subordination, all empire and necessary depen- 
dence of  one on the other;  just as the equality of  two weights 
keeps the scale in a perfect equilibrium.  There must be there- 
fore in the very nature of those beings, who are supposed to bg 
subordinate one to  the  other,  an essential difference  of  quali- 
ties, on  which  the relation  of  superior  and  inferior  may  be 
founded.  But the sentiments of  writers are divided in the de- 
termination of those qualities. 
Different  111.  I. Some  pretend, that the  sole superiority  of  strength, 
opinlons on 
the  or,  as they express it,  an irresistible  power is the true and first 
andfcunda- foundation of the right of  imposing an obligation,  and prescrib- 
tion of sov-- 
cteignty.  mg  laws.  This  superiority  of  power  gives,  according  to 
"  them, a right of  reigning,  by  the  impossibility,  in  which it 
'c  places others, of resisting him,  who has so great an advantage 
a  over them."* 
2.  Others there are, who derive  the  origin  and  foundation 
of  sovereignty from the eminency or superior excellence of  na- 
See  HoLbes de Cive, cap.  IS. !j 5. 
hre ;  cc which  not only  renders  a  being  independent  of  ali 
those, who are of  an  inferior nature ;  but  moreover  causes 
the latter to be regarded,  as  made  for the former.  And of 
a  this,  say they,  we  have  a  proof  in the  very  constitution  of 
a  man,  where the soul governs, as being the noblest part ;  and 
"  it is  likewise  011 this  foundation,  that  the  empire of  man 
'g  over brutes is grounded."* 
3.  A  third opinion,  which deserves  also our notice,  is that 
of  Barbeyrac:t  According to this judiciaua author, 'c  there is, 
properly speaking, only one general foundation of aS!igation, 
''  to which all others may  be reduced,  and that is  our natural 
Cc  dependence on God, inasmuch as he has given US  being,  ant\ 
"  has consequently a right to require we should apply our fac- 
L'  ulties  to the use,  for which he has manifestly designed thern. 
"  An artist, he  continues,  as such, is master of  his own work, 
"  and can dispose of it as he pleases.  Were a  sculpture capa- 
6'  ble of making animated statues,  this alone would  entitle him 
to insist, that the marble,  shaped by his  own hands, and en- 
L'  dowed by him  with understanding, should be  subject  to his 
"  will.  But God is the author of  the matter and  form of the 
"  parts,  of  which  our being  is  composed,  and  he  has given 
them all  the  faculties,  with which they are  invested.  To 
these faculties therefore he has a right to prescribe what lim- 
"  its he pleases, and to require,  that men  use  them in sucll or 
such a manner,"  &c. 
IV.  Such are the principal systems, on the origin and foun-  Examenof  those opin- 
dation  of  sovereignty  and  dependence.  Let  us  examine ion,  ,. 
them thoroughly,  and, in order to pass  a right judgment,  let us The sole 
take care not to forget the distinction of physical and moral ne- ~~~~~~~ 
cessity,  nor the primitive notions of  right  and  obligation,  such insufficient 
as have been above  explained.$ 
right  to  found  of  a 
I.  This bdng premised, I affirm,  that those,  who found the command. 
right of  prescribing  laws on the sole superiority of  strength, or 
on an irresistible power,  establish an  insufficient  principle,  and 
*  See Puffendorf on the Law of Nature and Nations,bcck  i.chap. vi. 5  11. 
t  It is  found in the second note on section  12 of  Puffendorf  on  the  Law of 
Nature and Nations, book i. chap. 6 ;  and in the  third note on 5 5 of the Dutirs 
of  Man and a Citizen, book  i, chnp. 2. . 
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whic!l,  rigorously  considered,  is  absolutely  false.  In fact it 
does not fol'ow,  tbt  beczuse I am incapable of  resisting a per- 
son,  he 4as t!leref  m a rlght to command me,  that is, that I am 
bound  to submit to I .m by  virtue of  a  principle of  obligation, 
and cs ackcowledge his will,  as the universal  rule  of  my can- 
duct.  Ridit bang notking e!se  but  that,  which  reason ap- 
prove3,  it  is  t!~~  'lppr J~~tion  only, which reason  gives to him, 
who coinmands,  t;?-t is  cipable of  founding his  right,  and, by 
nece\3ary  conseqQe:?ce, prc~duces  that inward sense, which we 
distin,uish  by  thc name  of  Obligation,  and  inclines  us to a 
spontaneous  subm-scion.  Everv  obligation  therefore supposes 
so.ne particular reasons,  that infl7lence the conscience  and ben8 
the will,  insomuch  that, pursuant  to the l~ght  of  our own rea- 
son, we should  think  it criminal to resist,  were it  even in our 
power, and should co~~clude,  that we have therefore no right tb 
dd it.  Now a persm,  who  alleges no other reason, but a su. 
priority of  force,  does not propose .a  motive sufficient to oblige 
the wdl.  For  instance,  the power, which  may chime to re. 
side in a malignant being,  neither invests him with any right to 
command,  nor imposes any  obligation on  us to obey ;  because 
this is evidently repugnant to the very idea of  right and obliga- 
tion.  On the contrary, the first counsel,  which reason gives us 
in regard to a malignant  power,  is  to resist and, if possible, tb 
destroy  him.  NOW,  if  we have a right tb  resist,  this  right is 
consistent  with the  obligation of  obeying,  which  is  evidently 
thereby excluded.  True it is,  that,  if  we clearly  see that  all 
our effo~ts  will  bc  useless,  and  that our resistence  must  only 
subject us to a greater evil,  we should choose to submit, though 
with reluctance, for a while, rather than expose ourselves to tht 
attacks and  violence of  a  malignant  power.  But in this case 
we should be constrained, though not under an obligation.  We 
endure, in spite of  us,  the effects of a superior farce, and, whilst 
we make an external  submission,  ee  inwardly  feel  our nature 
rise and protest against it.  This leaves us  always a  full  right 
to attempt all sorts of  ways to shake off the unjust and oppress- 
ive yoke.  There is therefore, properly speaking,  no obligation 
in that case ;  now the  default of obligation  implies  the default 
of right.*  We  hve  omitted making mention here of the dan- 
+ See chap. dii. 5 6. 
geraus consequences of  this system ;  it is suficieltt  at prmt 
to have refuted it by  principles ;  and  ~erhaps  we shall  have 
occasian to take notice of  these consequences another time. 
V.  The oiher two opinions have something in them, that is  2. Nor the  sole excel- 
plausible and  even true,  yet tiley  do not  seem  to  me intirely  l,,,eo,  ,,, 
sufficient.  The primipla they establish  are  too  vague,  and perlotity  nature.  d 
have need to be reduced to a more determinate point. 
I.  And indeed I do not see,  that the sole excellency d  nsi- 
ture is  sufficient  tb found  a right  of  sovereignty.  I will a* 
knowledge,  if  you  please, this  excellency,  and agree tt, it a6  a 
mth, that I  am weH  convinced  of.  This is the whole effect, 
that must  natumlly  arise  gram  this  hypothesis.  But he  I 
make a halt ;  and the knowledge I have of  the excellency of a 
seperior being does not alotre  afford me  a  motive suflicient to 
subject myself to him, and  to induce me  to abandon  my 
will, in order to take his for my rule.  S-o  long as I sm rosrfil* 
ed to these general heads,  and am  informed  of  nothing  more, 
I do not feel myself inclined by an internal  motion to submit; 
and, without any reproach of conscience,  I may sincerely  judge, 
that the intelligent principle within me is sufficient to direct my 
conduct.  So far  we  confine ourselves  to mwe  speculation. 
But,  if you  should attempt  to require any thing more  of  me, 
the question would then be reduced to this point ;  how and in 
what manner does this being, whom you duppose to  6urpws mn 
in excellence,  intend to  conduct  himself with  regard to me 4 
and by  what etfects  will this  superiority  or excellence be di- 
played ?  Is 11c  wiliing to do me good, or harm,  or is  he,  in ree- 
pect to me, in  a state of  indifference ?  To  these intmogatim 
there must be abso!utely  some answer giwm ;  and acmrding$o 
the sidc,  that is  chosen,  I shall agree  perhaps,  that &is  be@ 
has a right to oomrnljnd me,  and that I  am  under  m  oblip 
tion of  obeying.  But these reflections me,  if I urn  not mi* 
ken, a  demonstrative proof,  that  it is  not sufficient to  alledge 
merely and simply  the excellence of  a superior being in  der 
to establish the foundation of  sovereignty. 
V'I.  Perhaps there .is something more &act  in  &dlhy-  3.  Nortle 
potheais.  " God, say they,  is the Creator .of m  ;  4t is fiom ~1~~,"~ 
him he has  received and holds his life, his reawn, and all his 'I'HE  PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURAL  LAW.  G$ 
fi faculties ;  he  is  therefore  master of  his  work,  and  can d 
course prescribe what rules he pleases.  Hence our depend- 
"  ence, hence the absolute  empire of  God over us naturally  a- 
<'  rises ;  and this is the very foundation of  all authority." 
The sum of what  is  here alledged  to  found the  empire of 
God over man is reduced  to his supreme power.  But does it 
follow from this only, and by an immediate and necessary con- 
sequence, that  he has  a  right  to prescribe  laws to us ?  That 
is  the question.  The sovereign power  of  God enables him to 
dispose of  man, as he has a mind,  to  require of  him whatever 
he pleases, and to lay him under an absolute necessity of  com- 
plying ;  for the creature cannot resist  the Creator ;  and  by its 
nature and state it finds itself  in so absolute a dependence, that 
the Creator,  may, if  he please,  even annihilate and destroy it. 
This, we own, is certain ;  arid yet it does not seem sufficient to 
establish the right of  the Creator.  There is  something more 
than this requisite to form  a moral quality of  a simple power, 
and to convert it  into right.*  In a word,  it  is  necessary,  as 
we have more than once observed,  that the power  be such,  as 
will be approved by reason ;  to the end,  that man may  submit 
to it willingly,  and by that inward sense,  which produces obli- 
gation. 
Here I beg  leave  to  make a  supposition,  that will  set  the 
thing in  a much clearer  light.  Had the Creator  given  exist- 
ence to the  creature only to render  it unhappy,  the relation of 
Creator and creature  would still subsist, and yet we could  nat 
possibly conceive, in this supposition, either right or obligation. 
The irreiistlble  power  of  the  Creator  might  indeed  constrain 
*he creature ;  but this constraint would  never  form a reasona- 
ble obligation, a moral tie ;  because an obligation of this nature 
always supposes the  concurrence of  the'  will,  and an approba- 
Gon or at1 acquiescence on the part  of  man, from which volun- 
tary submission  arises.  Now this acquiescence could never be 
given to a being, that  would exert his supreme  power only  to 
oppress his creature,  and render it unhappy. 
The quality therefore of Creator  is  not alone  and of  itself 
sufficient to  establish  the  right  of  commaod,  and the  oblir 
gation of  obeying. 
* See chap.  vii. 5 3.  - 
VIZ.  But if  to the idea of  the Creator we join  (which Bar-  *e  foun- 
dation of  beyrac probably supposed though he has not distinctly express-  ,o,e,eig,_ 
ed  it) the idea of  being  perfectly  wise and sovereignly good,  ty ;  power, 
w~sdon~,  &  who has no desire of  exercising his power,  but for the good and goodnesE, 
advantage of  his creatures ;  then we have every thing necessa-  ~olned  to- 
ry to found a legitimate authority.  gether.  - 
Let us only  consult ourselves, and suppose that we not only 
derive our existence,  life, and all our faculties, from a Being in- 
finitely  superior  to us in  power ;  but  moreover,  that  we are 
perfectly convinced,  that this Being, no less wise than powerful, 
had no other aim  in creating  us, than to render us happy, and 
that with this view he is willing to subject us to  iaws ;  certain 
it is,  that under these circumstances, we could not avoid approv-  - - 
ing of such a power,  and the exercise thereof  in respect  to us. 
Now this approbation is acknowledging the right of the superi- 
or ;  and consequently the fist counsel,  that reason  gives us,  is 
ro  resign ourselves to the direction of such a  master,  to subject 
ourselves to him,  and to  conform all  our nctions  to what we 
know in relation to his will.  And why so ?  Because  it is ev- 
ident  to us,  from  the  very nature  of  things  that this  is the 
surest and shortest way to arrive at happiness,  the end,  to which 
all  mankind  aspire.  And  from  the  manner we are formed, 
this knowledge will  be  necessarily  attended with  the  concur- 
rence of  our will, with our acquiescence,  and submission ;  in- 
somuch that if  we should act contrary to those principles,  and 
any misfortune  should afterwards befal us, we could  not avoid 
condemning ourselves, and acknowledging, that  we have justly 
drawn upon ourselves the evil we  suffer.  Now  this  is  what 
constitutes the true ch~r~ter  of  obligation,  properly so called. 
VIII.  If  we have therefore a mind  to embrace and take  in Explim 
tion of ow  the whole,  in order to form a complete definition, we must sap  op;n,ol. 
that  the  right  of  sovereignty  arises  from superiority of pow- 
er, accompanied with wisdom and goodness. 
I  say,  in  the first place,  a  ~uperzority  of power,  because  an 
equality of  power,  as we have observed in the very beginning, 
excludes all empire,  all  natural  and necessary  subordin.tion.; 
and besides  sovereignty  and command  would  become  useless 
and of no manner of  effect, were they not supported by a suffi- 
cient power.  What would it akail a person to Le  a sovereign, THE  PKINCPLW  OF 
mkss he were passeaed of &ectual  methods to enfmce hi or- 
dere and make himself obeyed ? 
But this is not yet sufficient  3  wherefore I say, in the second 
place, that  this power  ought  to be  wise nsd  benewieat ;  wi~c 
to know and  to choose the properest  means to make us happy ; 
and  benevolent, to be  generally inclinable to  use  those  mans, 
&at  tend to promote our felicity. 
h order to be convinced of this,  it will be  sufficient  to re- 
mark three  cases,  which  are  the  only ones,  thdt  can be  here 
supposed.  Either he is,, with respect to us,+an  indiffere~t  pow- 
er, that is,  a power willing to do us neither  good nor harm,  as 
no ways interesting himself  in what coneerns US ;  or  he is a 
malignant power ;  or,  in fine,  he  is  a propitious and benevo- 
fa  power. 
In the first case our question  cannot take  place.  How su- 
perior soever a being is in regard to me,  so long as he does not 
concern himself about  me,  but  leaves me  intirelg  to myself  3 
J remain in as complete a  liberty, in respect  to him,  as  if  he 
were not known to me,  or as if he did not at all exist."  Whew- 
fore there is no authority on his side, nor obligation on mine. 
But if we suppose a malignant power j  reason,  far from ap- 
pwring, revolts against him,  as against an  enemy  so much the 
rnore dangerous, as he is invested with great power.  Man can- 
not acknowledge such a power has a  right ;  on  the contrary, 
he  6nds himself  autlmrized to leave no  measure untried to get 
?;a  of m formidable a master, in order fo be sheltered from the 
evils, with which he might otherwise be unjustly afflicted. 
Btlt kt ws suppose a being equally wise and beneficent.  Man, in- 
stead of being able to refuse him his approbation, will feel himself 
inwardly and  natural!^ inclined to submit and aequiwce intirely in 
the  will of such a being,who is posscssrdof all the qualities neces- 
mry to conduct him to his ultimate end.  By hispower he is perfect- 
ly able to procure the good of  thos-,  who are subject to him, and 
And therefore, though that notion of the Epicureans was moat senseless and 
hnpmus, in which thcy described the gndr, as enjoying their own happiness with 
the iiqhest  peace and tranquill;ty, far removed from the troublesome care of hu- 
man business, and oe~ther  s;-.lli,ig  at the good, nor frowning at the wicked deed6 
of men ;  yet they rightly mr,uph inferred, that unon this supposition, all religion, 
sad  all fear of  d~vine  powers, was viin and useless.  PuEcndorf  Law of Natw 
md  Nations, book i. chap. vi. 5  rr.  See Clcero de Ndt Deor. lib, i. cap. 3. 
to remove w!lltevc;  m;iy  r ?s,ibTj~  I:?jure ?:!em.  Bp kis .ic*zshr:t 
h:,  is tll~r~u~hl~  acqadiiit;ci  with  t!1(-  n~trne  anti constitution of 
those, on ~:;i:~m hc  imposes laws ; nr:J  k!lo..vs  their  f~cdnici: 
and strzngt!,,  'tr2d  i,~  \,-hat tl12ir r'7,:l  intcreit~  consist.  JIe can.. 
not therefore b7  ni~ltakpn,  cithcr in the  designs,  he  proposes 
for their bcneli:,  cr in the lreaus, h:  employs,  it1  ordc:  1.1  21- 
tain them.  In h.-,  gocd:~i8  i11cl;n-s such a $orereign to  r: 
ally wiiling t3 render his s~,.l~jec:s  lizypy,  ant1 co!:dl~~fl;r  di- 
rect to this sr,d tl12 ope:~fons  of 1,:s  \visdom ant'  ~OLV-JP~.  ?%U: 
the assemblage of these qualitic~,  by  uiliting  in thc rcry highest 
degree all, that is capable  of  deserving die  approbation of rca- 
son, comprises cvhatsoever can  determine man, and 1:y  hirrl un- 
der an internal as well,  as external obligation of  submission and 
obedience.  Here  therefore  lies  the  true  foundation  of  the 
right of  sovereignty. 
IX. In ordcr to bind and subject free and rational creatures,  we ,,,, 
there is no tiecessity, properly speaking, for  more than an em-  not  ate the  se~ar- 
pire or authorit?, whose  wisdol?l and lenity  would forcibly en- 
gag? the :~~,prob:.tion  of reason,  i~~dependent  of  the motives, ex-  form  which  the 
cited by  the apprehension of  power.  But, as it easily happens,  of 
from rll-  manner,  that  men  are  formed,  that  either through  solrereign- 
1evi:y  .ind neglect,  or passion  and malice, thcy  are not  so nluc!~ 
struck, as  they ought, with the wisdom  of the Legislator,  and 
with the escellcncy of his laws ;  it was  therefore proper there 
should  be an c.ficacious motive,  such as  the  apprehension  of 
punishment, in order to hzvc a stronger influence over the will. 
For which rea.;oil  it  is necessary,  that the sovereign should bc 
armed with powtxr  dnd force,  to be better  able to maintain his 
authority.  Let us not separate therefore these diserent qualities, 
which form, by  their concurrence,  the  right of  the sovereign. 
As pourer alone,  uuaccompanicd with benevolence,  cannot con- 
~titlltc7  any right ;  SO benevolence,  destitute  of  power and wis- 
{ion?, is likewise insufficient for this effect.  For, from this on- 
:y,  that a person wishes anothcr well,  it  does not  follow,  that 
h- is his illaster ;  neither are  a  few particular acts  of  benevo- 
i?.:cc:  suGcient for that  purpose.  A benefit requires no more, 
!rititude  and  ack~~owledgi~ciit  ; for,  in  ordcr to testify 
o::r  1~:.iti!11d-,  it  ;~i  not: ~iecessa-v  v.? z!-.cl~!d  srtbjcct om;rlvc~, to &6  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURAL  LAW.  67 
tile poner of cur  benefactor.  But let us join  t5ese ideas,  and 
suppose,  zt one and the same time a sovereign power,  on  which 
wy  one  actually and  really  depend; ;  a  sovereign  wisdom, 
tht  directs this power ;  and a supreme goodness,  by whic:~  it is 
animated.  What  can  we desire more to establish, on the one 
side, the most  eminent authority, and, on the other, the  great- 
est subordication ?  We  are compelled then, as  it were,  by our 
own reason, which will not so much as suffer us to  deny, that 
such a  superior is invested with a true right to command, and 
that we are under a real obligation  to obey." 
Definition  X.  The notions of sovereign and sovereignty being once sct- 
of  subjec- 
tinn.  tled,  it is easy to fix those of  subjection and dependcncc. 
Found~tion  SuT~jects  therefore are persons,  who are under  an obligation 
of  of obeying.  And as it is  power,  wisdom,  anti  benevolence,  ancc. 
that constitute sovereignty ;  we must suppose, on the contrary, 
in subjects,  the weakness aiid wants,  from which  dependence 
axises. 
It is therefore right in Puffendorf to remark,t thlt what re:i- 
ders man susceptible of  an obiigation, produced by  an  extcrn~l 
principle,  is that he nrturally depends on  a superior,  and that 
moreover,  as a free and intelligent being,  he is capablc of know- 
ing the rules given him, and of chcosing to conform his actions 
to them.  But these are rather co~lditions  necessarily  supposed 
and of  themselves  understood,  than  tl~  cxact and immetfiate 
causcs of  subjection.  More important it is to observe, that  as 
the power of  obliging a rational creature is founilcc~  on the abil- 
ity and will of  making  him  happy,  if  he obeys ;  unliappy,  if 
he disobeys ;  this supposes,  that this crcature is cdpable of  good 
and evil,  sensible  of  pleasure and  pain,  and  bcsides,  that  his 
* It may indeed be said, that the foundation of external obligation is the  will 
a superior (see  above, chap.  vi.  5 xii.) provided this  general  proposition  be 
afterwards explained by the particulars into which we have entered.  But when 
some  add, that force  has  nothing  to do with the foundation  of  thi5  obliga- 
tion, and that it only serves to enable the superior to exert his right (Ste Bdrbey- 
1st note on the 9th section of  Puffendorf's larze work, boolr i. chap. 6.) this 
notion ibes not appear to me to be exact ;  and methinks that this abstrazt man- 
rer of considering the thing subverts the very foundation of  the obligation here 
in  There can be no externalobligation without a superior, nor a snpe- 
rior  force,or, which is the same thin?;, without power ;  force therefore 
or power  Is 3 necessary part of  thn foundaticn of  obligation. 
t See the Duties of  Man and a Citizen, book i. chap, 2. $4. and the Lavi of M&- 
ttwe and Nations, book i.  chap. 6.  6, 8. 
etate  of happiness or misery may be either incre3sed  or dimin- 
ished.  Otherwise, he  might bc forced iodced,  by a  superior 
power, to act after 3 certain manner, but he could not be prop 
erly obliged. 
XI.  Such is the true foundation  of  sovereignty and depend- Thq obli- 
ence ;  a foundrtion,  that  might be still better  established  by  :z:::~cd 
applying these  general  principles  to the particular  species  of  by law, is 
known sovereignty  or empire,  such as that of  God over mm, ~~~f~~t 
that of  a  prince over his  subjects,  and  the  powzr  of  fathers rhattnn be 
over their children.  We  should  be  convinced thereby, that a11  imagined. 
these species  of  authority  are originally founded on  the prin- 
ciples above established ;  which would  serve  for a new .proof 
of  thc truth of  those principles.*  But it is sufficient to  have 
hinted here in general at  this remark ;  the particulars  we  re- 
serve fzr another place. 
An authority, est.~blished  on  such  a foundation,  and which 
conlpriws w!~atcvcr can  be  imagined  most eficacious and ca- 
pable oi  bi ~iiing  man,  and of  inclining him to be steadily direct- 
ed  by  c-r:.~in  rulcs of  condilct,  undoubtedly forms the com- 
p;erest  and  stronge~t  obligation.  For there  is no  obligation 
more perfcct  than  that,  which  is  produced  by  the  strongest 
rnotivcs  to  d2tcrinine  the  will,  and  the  most  able,  by  their 
preponderancy,  to  prevail  over  all  other  contrary  reas0ns.t 
Now  every  thing  concurs  here  to  this  effect ; t5e  nature 
of  the  rules  prescribed  by  the  sovereign,  which  of  them- 
selves  are  the  fittcst  to  promote  our perfection  atld  felicity; 
the power  and authority,  with  which he  is invested,  whereby 
he is enabled to decide our happin2ss  or inisery ;  and, in fine, 
the intirc  confidence we have in  him,  because of  his  power, 
wisdom,  and goodness.  What can  we imagine more to capti- 
lr;tc  the will,  to gain the heart,  to oblige man, and to  produce 
within him the highest  degree of  inoral necessity,  which  con- 
stitutes the most perfect obligation  ?  I say, nz11.al necessity ;  for 
wc  arc not !o  destroy  the nature of  man ;  he remains always 
what he is,  a free and intelligent being ;  and as  such, the sov- 
ereign underrakes to direct him by his laws.  Hence i:  is th~t 
=ven  the strictest obligations never  force the will j  but,  rigor- 
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ously speaking man is alwdys at liberty to conlply or not, though, 
as we comn~orly  szy, rt liis risk and peril.  Uu;  if  he ccnsults 
reason, ;md  is willing to follo;~; its tii~t.it~~,  lie wiil t;;lhe  pzrtic- 
ular  cLxe  to avoid exercisixg  this n;ctj~1:)sicai ;owes  in  cp~oi 
sition  to the views of  his  sovcrcij;n ;  an o~~os~tion,  that  must 
terminate in his own misery an(; ruin. 
Ohlipatini:  Xll.  We  have  alrtady olservec:, that iE,cre  are :v;o  !arts of 
is ipternal  %!i  ation ;" tlie one intercal, ur!~icil is the wrol k  c i' rcascn on-  nnu  rxrir-  o-  S 
nd at tire  ly, ard  foundvd on the good  or  evil, we  rerceive  in the very 
time.  narme of  tl.ings ;  the other extelnal, which is prodcced by the 
wiii of  him, whom we  acknowledge  our supcrior and  mzster. 
Now the obligation,  produced by law,  unites these two sorts of 
tics,  u~hich  by their  concurrence  strengthen  each  other,  and 
thus form the completest obligation that can possibly be imagiu- 
ed.  It is probably for this reason,  that most civilians ackr?owl= 
edge 1.0  other obligation,  pro~erly  so called, but that,  wllich is 
the efli.ct:  of  law,  and imposed  by a superior.  This is true, if 
ure  mean only an external obligation,  which indeed is the strong- 
est tie of  man.  But it n~ust  nct be thence inferred,  thzt  we 
ought to admit no othcr sort of  obligation.  The ~riscipl~s  we 
established,  when inquiring into the first origin zr,d the  natute 
of  obligation  considered, and  the pzyticul;.r  rcrr;3rks, 
we have just  now made on the obligaticn arising from  imr, are 
sugcient, if  I mistake not,  to eviacc,  that thele is a prirA;:ivc, 
origilla:,  and internal obligation,  which is insepar~ble  iro~ai  rca- 
son, and ought  necessarily to  concur with the  c>>tcr:ial  r)t,li::a- 
tion,  in order to cominunicate  to  the latter  all  tke  nrcc'ss'iry 
force for  determining and bending the will, and fer influencing 
effectually  the human heart. 
By clistinguishing rightly  these ide~~s,  WC rl>nl! find,  perhaps, 
that this is one way  of  reconcili1:g opinions, v 1:ich  scbem  to br 
wick frcm each other,  only  becsuse  l1:r  )  ?re rr  i: rlrcier~t~  6d.f 
Surc it is at lea:t,  that tile manner, in  which nc  I.::ve  explained 
the fcundaiicn of  sovercigr~ty  alld c:c~cl;cic-rcc,  coil~cidcs,  ill the 
indin, with  Yuffclidorf's  system,  as uill rasjly  appex by  ccrr, 
paring it with what this author says,  whether in his large work 
or in his  abridgment.* 
CHAP.  X. 
I. S  OME prrhaps will complain,  that we have  dwelt  too Ofthe end 
of  laws  Ion!;  on the ilature  and  foundxion of  sovereignty.  But  the ,;,he,  in 
in~por:.!nce ol 1112  subject require;  us to treat it with care, and  regard to 
the sub-  to ur;rL~vcl  prdperly  its  principles.  Besides  we  apprehend, je,,  ,, ;, 
that  nothing  could  contribute  better] to a right  knowledge of  respect to 
the mtuic uf  law ;  znd we shall  presently sae, that whatever 
in f.xt  rcrnains for us  still to say  concerning tliis subject is del 
duccd from the principles just now established. 
111 t!:e  first place,  it may be  asked, what is the end and  de- 
sign of  1.1~~  ? 
?'hi.;  quzstion presents itseli  in two different  lights ;  name- 
ly,  with resyect to  the subject,  and  with regard  to  the sover- 
eign ; a distinction that must be carefully observed. 
'l  iir relation of th:  sovereign  to his subjects formsva kind  of 
socidry between them,  which the sovereign directs by  the  laws 
he  cstnb1ishes.t  But  as  the society  naiur~lly  requires  there 
shbuid be some provision made  for the good  of  all those,  who 
are the constituent parts thereof,  it is by this principle we must 
judge oi  tlic end of  laws ;  and this  end,  consitlered  with  res- 
prct to  tlie s,)vereign, aught to  include nothing in  it opposite 
to tl~cceild  of  these very laws considered wit!i  regard to the sub- 
ject. 
11.  The end of  the law in regard  to the subject  is,  that he 
sho~~ld  conlorm  his actkns to it,  and  by  this means  acquire 
happi~ess.  rls  for what concerns the sovereignty,  the end he 
aims at for hirnsclf,  by  giving laws to his subjects, is the satis- 
faction  and  glary arising  flurn t'..  eserution of  the wise  de- 
sign~~  he ~rop~!ses,  for the preservation of  those,  wi~o  are  sub- 
*  See cllap. vi, § 13. 
f  See part the second cbap. vi. 
See the L3w of Nature and Nations, b~ok  j.  chap. vi  5  5,6,3,  and 9, And 
the Duties of  Man and a C~tizcn,  book i. chap. ii  5  3,4, 5. 
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jeet  to his authority.  These two ends of  the law should  IEV- 
er be  se?ara:c:i,  one being  naturally  concected with the other ; 
{or it is the ]lappiness  of  the subject,  that forms the  satisfac- 
tion and glory  of  the so:  et-cign. 
The endof  111.  TVe  should therefore take care not to imagine, that laws 
law'  is not  arc properly  made h  o;iler  to  bring  men  undor  a yike.  So 
to  lay a re- 
straint Up  id12  an end  woi~lil  ba  quite  ui~worihy  of  1 sovereign,  whose 
On  goocinesi ought to be equal to his power and  wisdom,  and who 
but to dl- 
rect itin a  should always act up  to these  perfections.  Let us say  ratl~er, 
Proper  that laws are made to 051ige  the subject  to pursi~e  his real  in- 
manner. 
terest,  and to choose the surest and best nay to attain the end 
he is  designed  for,  which  is  happiness.  Wi:5  this view the 
sovereig;l is willillg to direct his people better,  than they  could 
themselves,  ancl givzs a  check to their liberty, lest they should 
makc a b.1~1  use of  it contrary to their own aid  the public good. 
It1 sfiort,  the sove;cign  cornnlands rational  beings ;  it is on this 
footing ?<c trentj. with them;  all his ordin,lnccs have the stamp 
of reaso:1 ;  h::  is -,viliing to reign over our hearts ;  and if  at any 
time he  e~nplcys  force,  it  is in order  to hring  back  to reason 
thosc., who hzve unhappily strayed from it, contrary to their own 
gcod and that  of  society. 
Examen of  I\'.  Wherefore  Puffendorf,  methinks,  spc2ks  some~vhat 
what  fendorf  loosely in tbe comparison he draws  between law and  counsel, 
says con-  where llc says,  "  'That  coonsel tends to the ends  proposed  by 
cerning 
this sub-  "  those, to whom it is given, and that they theinsclves can judge 
jcct.  of  those ends,  in  order  tc prove  or  disagprove  them.- 
cc  Whereas law aims only  at the end of  the persotl,  rho  estab- 
cc lishes it, and, if  sometimes it has views in regard to those, for 
whom it was made,  it is not their business to examine them 
rt dhis  depends intirely 011  the  determination of  the  legisla- 
tor."*  It would be a mucl1 juster  w3y,  methinks,  of express- 
ing the thing to say,  thrt laws  have  a donble end, re1a:ive  to 
the sovereign antl the subject ;  that the illtent of  the sovereign, 
in establishing them, is to consult his own satisfaction and glo- 
ly, by rendering his suSjects happy ;  that these two things  are 
hwparable ;  and thxt  it would be doing injustlcc to the sove- 
See the law of  Nature and Nationr, book i.  chap, vi.  1. 
rtig~l  to i-nagiae he thinks only of hismsclf,  wit!lout  any regard 
to the good  of  thosc,  who  are  his  dcpendhts.  Pcffendorf 
e+le too  seers hcre,  as well  as in some other places,  to givc a li.. 
mnch into HobSea's pri~iciples. 
V.  We  dcfined  law, a rule,  which lays an obligztion on sub.  of  the 
jectr  of  doiq or omitting  certlin  things,  and leaves them at z:.ti::- 
liberty to act or not to act  in other  matters,  according 2s  they  to obliga- 
judge proper,  &c.  This is what we must explain here a in more that  t"v¶  of  and  sim- 
p'~rticuiar manner.  ple pennic- 
A sovereign  has undoubtedly a  right to dircct the actions of  sion- 
those,  who 2rz subject to him,  accortling to the ends he  has in 
vi.;.w.  In coils-qu-ncc  of  this right,  he ii~lposes  a ~ecessity  on 
them of acting or not acting after a particular  manner in certain 
cases ; antl this 05ligdti3n is the first effect of the law.  Thence 
it follows, that d1  actions,  not positively commanded or forbid- 
dzn, are left within the sphere of our natural liberty ;  and that 
the sovereign is hereby supposed to grant  every body  a permis- 
sion to act in this respect,  a<  they think proper ;  and  this  per- 
mission is a second effect of  the law.  We may therefore dis- 
tingui~h  the law, taken in its full extent, into an obligatory law, 
and  .I  law of simple permission. 
it  is true Grotius,"and  after hi:n  Puffe~idorf,  are of opinion,  The opin- 
that p:rmission  is not properly,  and of  itself,  and affect or con-  ion of Gro- 
tius and 
sequence  of  the  law,  but a mere icaction of  the  legislator.+  PuTendorf 
Hrhntever  things,  says  Puffendorf, the  Inw permits,  those it nei-  ject.  Onthissub- 
they cs7nrnands nor foubirls,  at:d thel- re it really do~h  nothing  con- 
cerning them. 
Cut thougl~  this  different rnaixler of  considering  the  thing 
be not perhaps of  any great consequence,  yet Barbeyrac's opin- 
ion, such as he  has explained it in  his notes  on  the  forecited 
passages,  appears to be much more exact.  A permission, aris- 
ing from the :egislator's  silence,  cannot be considered as a sim- 
ple inaction.  'rhe lecisldtor dees nothing but with deliberation 
and wisdom.  If he is satisfied with  imposing,  only  in  some 
* See the Rights of  War  and Peace,  book i. chap. i. 5  g. 
See the law of  Nature and Ndtions, book i. chap. vi. 5  15. THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURAL  LAW. 
Cases,  an indispensable necessity of  acting after a certain  man- 
ner,  and does nor extend this necessity  further, it is because he 
thinks it agreeable to the end, he proposes, to leave his subjects 
at liberty in some cases to do  as  they please.  TVhercforc  the 
silence of  the legislator  imports a positive  though tacit perinis- 
sion of  whatsoever he has not forbidden or commanded,  though 
he might  have  done  it, and  would certainly have done it,  h'td 
he though:  proper.  Insomuch  that  as the forbidden  or com- 
manded actions are positively regulated by tlie la\v, actions per- 
mitted  are  lil;e~vise positively  determined  by  the  sane lnw, 
though  after  their  manner and according to the naturc of  the 
thing.  In fine, whoever determines  ccrtai~l  limits,  which  he 
declares ure ought not to exceed, does hereby point out how far 
he permits and  consents wc should go.  Yernlission  therefore 
is as positive an effxt of the law, as obligation. 
The rights,  VII. 'This will appear still  more evident, if  wc consider, that, 
which men 
in  having once supposed that we all  depend on a superior, 
society are  will ought to  be the  universal  rule  of our  conduct,  the rights 
On  attributed to n13n  in this state, bp vircue  of  which he may act  this per- 
mission.  safely and with  impunity, are  founded on the express  or  tacit 
permission, received from the sovereign or the law.  Besides, ev- 
ery body agrees that the pcrmissio!l,  granted by  the law, and the 
right thence resulting, lay other men under an obligation not to 
resist  the person  who uses his right, but r~ther  to assist him in 
this respect, than  do him a:ly  prejudice.  Obligation  therefore 
and permission  are natardly  connected  with each other ;  and 
this is the effect of the law, which likewise authorizes those, who 
are disturbed in the exercise of  their rights,  to employ force,  or 
to have recourse to the sovereign, in orclcr to rcrnove these im- 
pedimcllti.  Henct:  it  is,  th'it,  after having  mentioned  in  the 
definition of  law, that it  leaves us in certairl  cases at liberty to 
act or  not to  act, we added, that it secures the subjects in the  ~  - 
full enjoymerlt of  their rights." 
lhe ,,,  VIII.  The nature and  end of  laws show  us  their matter or 
ter oflaws. abiect.  The matter of  laws in general are all human actions ; 
internal  an~l  externzl;  tllougllts and worcls,  ns  well as deeds; 
J 
those which rcl'ite to another, a11d those which terminate in the 
person himself;  SO  far a least as the direction of  tllose actions 
may essentially contribute to the particular  of each person, 
to that of society  in general,  and to the glory of the sovereign. 
TX  This supposes naturally  the three following  conditions. 
I. That the things,  ordained by the  law,  be ~ossible  to fulfil ; 
for it would be folly, and even cruelty to require of any person, 
under the least commination of ~unishment,  whatever is and al- 
ways has been above his strength.  2.  The  law must be of some 
utility ;  for reason will  never  allow any restraint to be laid on 
the liberty of  the subject,  merely  for the sake of the restraint, 
and without any benefit or advantage arising to him.  3. In  fine, 
the law must be in itself just ;  that is conformable to the order 
and nature of  things,  as well as the constitution of  man ;  this 
is what the very idea of rule  requires,  which,  as  we  have al- 
ready observed,  is the same,  as that of  law. 
X.  To  these three conditions,  which we may call  the inter-  External 
conditions  nal characteristics of law,  namely,  that it be possible, just,  and of  law ; 
useful,  we may add two other conditions,  which in some meas-  that it 
ure are external ;  one, that the law be made sufficiently known j 
the other, that it be attended with a proper sanction.  and accom- 
I.  It is necessary,  that the laws be sufficiently notified  to the 2:; 
subject ;"  for how could he regulate his actions and motions by  oanction. 
those laws,  if  he  had  never  any  knowledge  of  them ?  The 
sovereign ought therefore to publish his laws in a solemn, clear, 
and distinct manner.  But after that it is the subject's  business 
to be acquainted with the will of the sovereign ;  and the igno- 
rance or error, he may  lie under in this  respect,  cannot, gene- 
rally speaking,  be  a legitimate  excuse  in  his  favor.  This is 
what  the civilians  mean, when they lay  down  as  a  inaxim,t 
that ignorance or  error in regard to the law is blatlteable  and hurt- 
ful.  Were it not so, the laws would be of  no effect, but might 
always,  under  a  pretext  of  ignorance,  be eluded  with impu- 
nity. 
XI.  2.  The next  thing requisite is that the law be  attended 
with a proper sanction. 
*  See chap. viii. sect. 4.  +  Keguld est, juris quidem ignorantiani cnique nncrrc,  Digest. lib, za. tit. 6. 
* See chap. viii. ,:  3. 
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Sandon is that part  of the iaw,  which includes the  pedty 
enacted against those,  who  transgress it.  With  regard  to the 
penalty, it is  an evil,  with which the  sovereign  menaces those 
suhpcts, who should presume to violate his laws, and which he 
actually inKits,  whenever  they Biolate them ;  and this with a 
design of procuring  some good ;  such as to correct  the  cuhp- 
Me,  and to admonish the rest ;  but  ultimately,  that,  his laws 
being respected  and observed,  society  should  enjoy  a state of 
eecurity, quiet, and happiness. 
All laws have therefore two essential parts ;  the first is the 
dispositivn of the law, which expresseth the command or prohi- 
bition ;  the  second  is  the  sanction,  which  pronounces  the 
penolty, and it  is  the sanction,  that  gives  it the  proper  and 
particular force of law.  For,  were tl~  sovereign  contented 
with merely ordaining or forbidding certain things, without adc 
dig  any kind of  menace, this  would  be no longer a law, pre- 
~ribed  by authority, but merely a prudent counsel. 
It is not however  absolutely  necessary,  that  the  nature or 
quality of the punishment be formally  specified in the law ;  it 
is sufficient, that the sovereign  declares  he will punish, reserv- 
ing to himself the species and degree of chastisement according 
to his prudeace.*  We must also observe, that the evil,  which 
constitutes the punishment praperIy  so called, ought  not to be 
3  natural production or a necessary  consequence oi the action, 
intended to be  punished.  It should be,  as  it  were,  an occa- 
bioml  evil,  and inflicted by the will  of  the  sovereign.  For 
whatevm the action may  have bad of  itself and dpngerous in its 
effects and inevitable consequences, cannot be reckoned, as pro- 
ceeding from the law, since it would equally happen without it. 
The  3nemccs therefore af  the sowxeign must,  in arder to h~e 
me  weight, be i~lflictive  af such punishments,  as  differ from 
the evil, that aecessarily arises fram the nature of the thing.t 
Ex  guo etiam intelli~itur  omni legi  civili annexam  esse pocnam, vel explici- 
a,  vel lmplicit4 ;  nam ubi pcena  neque scripta, neque exenlplo alicujus, put pa- 
nas legis jam transgress= dedit  definitur,  ibi  subintelligitur  pcmam  acbltrarlana 
tw, nimirum ex arbitrio pendere legislatoris.  Hobbes de Clve, cap. 14.5 8. 
# See  Locke's Essay on Hun,n Understanding, book a, chap. 38,s 6. 
XII.  It may be asked in  fine  whether the  sanction  of laws Whether 
may not as well  consist in the promise of  a  recompense,  as in the prom-  ise of rec- 
the commination of  punishment  ?  I answer, that this depends ompense is 
in general on the will of  the sovereign,  who my  use either of :l;:zr 
these ways ;  or even employ  them both,  according as  his pru- the com- 
dence directs.  But,  since the question is m know which is the 
most effectual method, the  sovereign  can use,  in  order to en- rnent, m 
force the observance  of his laws ;  a.nd  since  it is certain, that ::':::: 
man is naturally  more  sensibly  affected  by  evil than  good, it  of 
seems more proper to establish the sanction of law in  the corn law- 
mination of  punistrment,  than in the promise  of  recompense, 
People are seldom induced to violate the law,  unless it be with 
the hope of  procuring  at least some apparent god.  'f'he  best 
way  therefore to prevent  this  deception  is  to vemove the bait, 
that allures them, and to annex, on the contrary, a real and in- 
evitable evil to disobedience.  Suppose, for i~stance,  two legis. 
lators, willing to establish the same law, proposed, one of  them 
great rewards,and  the other severe punishments, the latter would 
undoubtedly dispose men  more  effectually to complidnce, than 
the former.  The most  specious  promises  da not  always de- 
termine the will t  but the view of  a rigorous punishment stag- 
gers and  in:imidates  it."  Eut if  the sovereign, by  a particular 
effect of  his bounty  and wisdom,  is willing to join  these two 
means, and to enforce  the law  by a dosble  motive  of  oherv- 
ance ;  there is then nothing wanting ta complete its force, since 
in every respect it is a perfect  sanction. 
XIII.  The obligation, which  the laws impose, have as great  W~O  the 
an extent,  as rhe right  of  the sovereign ;  and consequently it 
Inay  be  said in general, that all those, who are dependent on the  obliges. 
legislator, are subject to this obligation.  But each law in par- :i2~ 
bic~llar  obliges those subjects  only, to whom the subject matter 
may  be applied ;  and this is easily known from the very nature 
of  each law,  by  which the intention of  the  legislator is  sus- 
ciently expressed. 
Nevertheless it  someti~nes  Imppens, that  particular  persons 
me  exempted  from the  obliption  of  observing  the law ;  and 
See  Pufindorf,  Lhna  of  Nature  and W-tionh  Look  i. chap. vi.  $  14. with 
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this is  what we call  dispensation, on which we have a few re 
marks to make. 
I.  If  the  legislator can  entirely abrogate a law, by a much 
stronger reason he can suspend  the effect  thereof, with regard 
to any particular person. 
2.  But we must likewise acknowledge,  that none but the le- 
gislator himself is invested with this power. 
3.  He never ought to use it without very good reasons, and 
then he should act with moderation, and according to the rules 
of equity and  prudence.  For  were  he  without  discretion or 
choice, to favor too great a number of  people with dispensations, 
he would enervate the authority of the law ;  or, were he to re- 
fuse it  in  cases  perfectly  alike,  so  unreasonable  a  partialitr 
would certainly be attended with jealousy and discontent. 
of the du-  XIV.  As for  what  concerns  the duration  of  laws, and the 
ration of 
laws, and  manner, in which they are abolished, we are to  observe the fol- 
how they  bwing principles. 
are abol-  I.  111 general the duration of  law, as well as its first  estab-  ished. 
lishment, depends on the free will and pleasure of the sovereign, 
who cannot reasonably tie up his own hands in this respect. 
IS suppos-  2.  And yet every law, of  itself and by its nature, ' 
ed perpetual  when it contains nothing  in  its disposition, or in 
the circumstances  attending it,  that evidently denotes a contra- 
ry intention of  the legislator, or that may induce  us reasonably 
to presume that it was only a temporary ordinance.  The  law is 
a rule ;  now  every rule  is of  itself perpetual ;  and,  generally 
speaking,  when the sovereign establishes a law, it is not with a 
design to repeal  it. 
3.  But  as the state of things may happen to  alter in such a 
manner,  that  the law,  grown useless or hurtful, can no longer 
be gut into execution ;  the sovereign can,  and  ought,  in  that 
case, to repeal and  abolish it.  It would be  absurd and  perni- 
cious to society to pretend, that laws once enacted ought to sub- 
sist forever, let what inconveniency soever arise. 
4.  This repeal may be made in two diffdrent manners, either 
expressly or tacitly.  For when  the  sovereign, well acquainted 
vith  the state of things, neglects for a long time to enforce the 
observance of the laws, or formally permits, that affairs relating 
thereto be regulated in a manner contrary to his disposition ;  a 
strong presumption arises of  the  abrogation of  this law, which 
falls thus of  itself,  though the legislator has not expressly abol? 
iahed it. 
It is plain,we  have only glanced here upon the pneral prin- 
ciples.  AS for the application, that ought to be made of them, 
to each species of  laws, it requires some modification, pursuant 
to their  different  nature.  But  it is not  our  business  to enter 
here into those particulars. 
XV.  Law may be divided,  I. into divine or human,  accord- Howman) 
ing as it has God or man for its author.  sorts of 
laws. 
2.  Divine law may be subdivided  into  two  sorts,  namely, 
natural,  anc!  positive or revealed. 
Natural law is that, which so necessarily  agrees with the na- 
ture and state of man, that  without  observing its  maxims, the 
peace and happiness of society  can  never  be  preserved.  As 
this law has an essential agreeableness with the  constitution of 
human nature,  the  kn~wledge  thereof may be  attained merely 
by  the light of  reason ;  and hence it is called natural. 
Positive or revealed law is that,  which is not founded on the 
general constitution  of  human  nature,  but only on the will of 
God ;  though in other  respects  this law is  established on very 
good reasons,  and  procures  the  advantage of  those, who  re- 
ceive it. 
We  meet with examples of  these two sorts of laws in theor- 
dinances, which God gave formerly to the Jews.  It is easy to 
distinguish such, as were natural, from those that, being merely 
ceremonial or political, had  :io  other foundation, than  the par- 
ticular will  of  God, accommodated to the  actual state of  that 
people. 
With regard to human laws, coilsidered strictly as such, viz. 
as originally proceeding from a sovereign, who presides over so- 
ciety, they are all positive.  For, though some natural laws are 
made the subject of human laws,  they do not derive their obli- 
gatory force from the human legislator ;  since  they would ob- 
lige all the same  without any  intervention on his pdrt,.because 
they come from God. 
Before we leave these  definitions, we must not forget to ob- 18  THE  PRIXIPLES OF 
sane, &it  the science or art 05  mkng and  explaining laws, 
ad  d  applying them fo  hrham actiom6, goes By  the  general 
mm of: Jurisprudcme. 
CHAP.  XI. 
Of  tbe  m,rality  of human a#ions.* 
Jn  what  I.  AW  being the rule of  human acriuns,  in a camp9t.a 
ty  of  ac-  L  *'  the view,  we absetvr, &at the  latter are  either conformable or 
tiona coo-  opposite to the former ;  arld this Sort of qualification  of  our ac- 
Jab  tions ih respect tb law  is called  mrdlitj. 
The term of  morality  comes frm tnorc~l  or manners.  Man- 
ners, as we have alredy observed, we the free' actions  of man, 
msidered a$ susceptible of di~ectian  atid rule.  Thus we call 
morality  the  rehtim bi  hu~an  action3  to  the law,  by  which 
they are &*t?cted  8  add we give the nalne of moral  philosophy 
to the collection of those rules, by  *hid1  we  are to square our 
actions. 
11.  fie ~orality  of  afions.may be emsidered  in tw  differ- 
me, r.  ent lights;  I. in regard  to the manner,  in  which the law disi 
poses of  them  3  ad  2.  in relation to the conformity or opposi-  command- 
ed, or  for-  tion of  those same actions to the law. 
bidden, Or  In  the first consideration, human actions are either command-  B"3ittcd. 
ed, or fabidden, or permitted. 
As we are  indispetlsably obliged to do what is cbmmanded, 
ad  to abstain from what is forbidden by a lawful superior, civ- 
ilians  consider  commanded actions as necessary, and forbidden 
actions as impossibIe.  Not that man is deprived  of  a  physical 
power of acting contrary to law, and incapable, if  he has a mind, 
crf exercising this power.  But ince his acting after this man- 
ner would be opposite to right reason, and inconsistent with hi 
actual state of  dependence, it is to be presumed, that a ream- 
able anct virtuous man, cbntinuing and acting as such, could not 
make so bad a use d  his liberty ;  and this presumption  is is  it- 
elf tw  reasonable,  and  honorable  ro  humanity,  not  to meet 
8ee the Law  of  Nature and Nations, book i,  chap, rii. and the Dutiec of Min 
and a Cidim, bwk  i.  chap. ii. )  xx. &C. 
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with approbation.  Whatmev (say the Romnn lawyers*) ir irr- 
juriou~  to Piety, vegutdiot2,  or mdsty, ad  in genewal to good  mu* 
W, wght to be presumed impos.rib{e. 
111.  With regard to permitted actions, they are such, as the  Remark8 
law leaves us at liberty to do, if  we think proper.+  Upon whiih 
we must make two or three remarks. 
I.  We  may  distinguish two  sorts  of  permission ;  one  full 
and absolute, which not only gives us a right to do certain things 
with impunity, but moreover is attended  with a positive appro- 
bation of  the legislator.  The other is an imperfect permission, 
or a kind of toleration, which implies no approbation but a sim- 
ple impunity. 
2.  The permission of  naturd laws dlways denotes a positive 
approbation of  the legislator ;  and whatever happens in conse- 
quence thereof is innocently done, and without any violation of 
our duty.  For it is  evident that God could not positively per- 
mit the Ieast thing, that is bad in its nature. 
3.  It  is  otherwise  in  respect to the  permission of  human 
laws.  We  may indeed justly  and with  certainty  infer, that a 
sovereign has not thought proper to forbid or  punish some par- 
ticular  things;  but  it does  not always thence follow,  that  he 
really approves those things,  and much less, that they  may be 
innoce~ltl~  done, and without any breach of  duty. 
IY.  The other manner,  in which we may view the  morali-  ~ai~n, 
ty of  human actions,  is with regard  to their conformity or op-  aregoodor 
just, bad or  position to the law.  In this respect  actions  are  divided  into ,jUst,,d 
good or just,  bad or unjust, and  indifferent.  inddferentc 
An action moraI!y  good or just,  is that, which in itseIf is ex- 
actly conformable to some obligatory  law, and  moreover is at? 
tended  with the circumstances and conditions, required  by the 
legislator.  - 
I said  I.  a  good  or just  action ;  for there  is  properly  no 
difference  between  the  goodness and  justice of  actions;  and 
there is no necessity to deviate here from the common language 
which confounds these two ideas.  The  distinction, which Puf- 
F  Nam quze facta lodunt  pietatem, existirnationem, verecundiarn  ~ltram,  et 
(ut  general~ter  dlxenm) contra bonos mores fiunt, nec facere nos p~sg  aeda- 
&c  L.  15. D. de cond~t.  Inst~tut,  t See chap, X.  5 S. THE PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURAL  LAW. 
fendorf  makes between  these  two qualities is quite  arbitrary, 
and even he himself  afterwards confounds them.* 
2.  I said  an  action  morally  good;  because we do not con- 
sider  here the intrinsic and natural goodness of actions,  by vir- 
tue of  which they redound  to the physical good of  man ;  but 
only the relation  of agreeableness  they have to the law,  which 
constitutes their moral goodness.  And, though these two sorts 
of goodness are  always found inseparably  united in things,  or- 
dained by natural law, yet we must not confound these two dif- 
ferent relations. 
Conditions  V.  In fine,  to distinguish the general conditions, whose con- 
requisite to 
render  an  currence is necessary in order to render an action morally good 
action  mo- with respect to the agent;  I have added,  that  this action oughf 
d'y  good' to be  in itself exactly cotfirmable to the law, and accompanied movr- 
over with the circu~fistances  and conditd~ns,  vequired by  the legisfator. 
And first it is necessary, that this action should comply exactly, 
and  through  all  its parts,  with  the tenor of  what the law or- 
dains.  For as a right line is that, whose points correspond to 
the rule without the least deviation;  in like  manner,  an action 
rigorously  speaking,  cannot  be  just,  good,  or  right, unless  it 
agrees exactly,  and in every respect  with the  law.  But even 
this is not sufficient ;  the action must be performed  also pursu- 
ant to the manner, required and intended by the legislator.  And 
in the first place it is necessary,  it be done  with a  competent 
knowledge, thst is, we must know, that what we do is conforma- 
ble to the law 3  otherwise the legislator would have  no regard 
for the action, and our labour would be entiiely lost.  In the 
next place,  we  must act with  an  upright intention,  and for a 
good end, namely to fulIil the views of the legislator, and to pay 
a due obedience to the law ;  for,  if the agent's  intention be bad, 
the action, instead of being deemed good Inay be imputed to him 
as vicioos.  In fine, we should act through  a good motive ;  I 
mean a principle of  respect for the sovereign, of  submission to 
the law, and from a love of  our duty ; for plain  it is,  that all 
these conditions are required by the legislator. 
* Compare what he sags in the Law or Nature and Nations, book i. chap-vii, 
3 7. in the beginning, with  4. of  the tune chapter. 
VI. What has been above affirmed concerning good  actions of the na- 
ture of bad  sufficiently shows us the nature of  those,  which are bad or un- ,,  unjust 
just.  These are in  general such, as of themselves,  or by  their actions. 
concomitant circumstances,  are contrary to the disposition of an 
obligatory  law,  or to the intention of the legislator. 
There are therefore  two general springs  of  injustice in hu- 
man actions ;  one proceeds from the action,  conqidered in itself, 
and from its manifest opposition  to what is commanded or pro- 
hibited by the law.  Such  as,  for  example,  the murder of  an 
innocent person.  And all  these kinds of  actions  intrinsically 
bad can never  become good,  whatever  rnay be in other respects 
the intention or  motive of  the agent.  We  cannot  employ  a 
criminal action,  as a lawful mean to attain an end in itself good ; 
and thus we are  to  understand  the common  maxim, evil must 
not  be  done, that good  nzay  come fit.  But an action,  intrinsically 
and as to its substance  good, may become bad,  if  it be accom- 
panied  with  circumstances directly contrary  to  the  legislator's 
intention ; as for instance if  it  be done  with a bad  view,  and 
through a vicious motive.  'fo  be  &era1  and generous towards 
our fellow citizens is a good and commendabl8 thing in  itself; 
but if this generosity  is practised merely with ambitious views, 
in order to become insensibly master of the commonwealth, and 
to oppress the  liberty,  the perversity cf  the motive,  and 
the injustice of  the design, render this action criminal. 
VII.  All just actions arc, properly  speaking, equally just ;  by +l  just  ac- 
tlons are  reason  that they have all an exact conformity to the law.  It is 
not the same with unjust or bad  actions ;  which,  according as juq!  ;  but 
they are more or less opposite to the law,  are more or lest  vic- ::Just:y 
ious;  similar  in this respect to  curve lines, which are more or more or 
less so,  in proportion as  they deviate from the rule.  We  may less UDJUS~~ 
therefore be in several ways wanting in our duty.  Sometimes 
people violate  the law  deliberately,  and  with  nralire prepense ; 
which is  undoubtedly the very highest degrcle of  iniquity,  be- 
cause this kind  of  conduct manifestly  indicates a formal and re- 
flective contempt of  the legislator and his orders ;  but sometimes 
we are  apt to sin through neglect  and inadvertency, which  is 
rather a fault than a crime.  Besides,  it is plain that this neglect 
hits its degrees,  and may be greater  or less,  and  dc;erv,~~  of 
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more or less censure.  And,  as in every thing, unsus~eptiMeof  - 
an  exact  and mathematical measure,  we may  always  distin- 
guish at least three degrees,  namely two extremes and a middle j 
so civilians distinguish three degrees of  fault or negligence ;  a 
gross fault, a slight one, and a very slight one.  It is sufficient 
to have  mentioned these principles, the explication and distinct 
account whereof  will  natuially take  place,  whea  we come to 
the  particular  questions, relating to them. 
Essential  VIII.  Bit we must  carefully  observe, that what essentially 
chdrarter  constitutes the nature of an unjust  action is its direct opposition  of  unJust 
rtions.  or contrariety to the disposition of  the hw,  or to the intention 
of  the legislator ;  which produces an inwinsic defect in the mat- 
ter or form of  that action.  For, though in order to render an 
action morally good it is necessary, as we  have already observ- 
ed,  that it be  entirely conformable to the law,  with  respect  as 
well to the substance, as to the manner and circumstances ;  yet 
we must not thence conclude, that the defect of some  of those 
conditions always  renders  an action  positively bad or criminal. 
To  produce  this  eget, there must  be a direct  opposition, or 
formal comriety between the  action and the  law ;  a simple 
defect of  conformity being insufficient  for that purpose.  This 
defect  is  indeed sufficient  to render  an action  not  positively 
good or just ; however it does not  become therefore bad, but 
only indifferent.  For  example,  if  we perform an action good 
in itself, without  knowing  for  what  reason,  or even  that it is 
commanded by the law ; or if  we act through a different mo- 
tive from that, prescribed by  the law, but in itself innocent and 
not vicious ;.  the action is  reputed neither good  nor  bad,  but 
merely indifferent. 
~f  indiffe-  IX.  There  is  therefore such a thing,  as indifferent actions, 
rent act-  which hold a middle rank, as it were, between just  and unjust. 
ims.  These are such, as are neither  coinmanded nor prohibited, but 
which the law  leaves us at liberty to  do or  to emit, according 
as we think  proper.  That  is,  those actions are referred to a 
law of  simple permission, and not to an obligatory law. 
Now that such actions there are is what no one can reasonably 
question.  For what a number of  things are there,  which, be- 
ing,neither commanded nor forbidden by any law, whethr  di- 
6ne  or human, have consequently nothing obligatory in their na- 
ture,  but  are left  to  our  liberty to  do or  to omit, just  as  we 
think proper ?  It is therefore an idle subtlety in  schoolmen  to 
pretend,  that an action cannot be indifferent, unless  it be is  an 
abstract Consideration,  as  sttipt of  all  the  particular  circum- 
dtances  of  person,  time,  place,  intention,  and  manner.  An 
action, divested of  all these circumstances, is a  mere  Ens  ra- 
tionis ;  and,  if  there be  really any  indifferent  actions, as uli- 
doubtedly there are,  they must be relative to particular circum- 
etances of  person, time, and place,  &c. 
X.  Gmd or bad actions may be ranged nnda different clas-  Divicion d  good and 
ses,  according W the object, to which  they  teelate.  Good  ac-  bad nc- 
tions, referred to God, are comprised under the name of  Piety.  tiom. 
Those,  which  relate  to  owselves,  are  dietinguished  by  the 
tlrotds JVisdom,  Tempermce,  Mdration.  Thee, which  con- 
cern other men,  are included under the term  of  Justice  and 
Benevolenca.  We  only anticipate here the mentioning  af this 
distinction, because we must return to it again,  wheo  we come 
to treat of  natural law.  The same distinction is applicable to 
bad actions, which belong either to Impiety,  Intemperance, or In- 
justice. 
XI.  It is common to propose swerd  divivions of  justice.  and  Of justiae  it, did- 
That we may  not be silent on this article,  we shall  observe, 
I.  That  justice  may, in general, be  divided  into perfect  or  kioda. 
rigorous.  The former  is  that, by  which we  petform  towards 
our neighbour whatever is due to him in virtue of  a perfeet 
rigorous right,  that is, the execution of which he may demand by 
forcible means,  unless we satisfy him  freely, and with  a  good 
will ;  and it is in this strict  sense, that the word Jurttce  is gen- 
erally understood.  The second is that,  which we  perform 
towards another  the duties owing to him  only in virtue  of  an 
imperfect and nonrigmous obligation,  which  tannot be  insist- 
ed on by violent methods ;  but the fulfilling of  them is left to 
each person's  honour and conscience.*  These kinds of  duties 
are generally cotnprehended under the appellations of  hummi- 
ty, charity, or benevolence, in oppoiiion to tigotous justice,  or 
*.Set  chap.  Vii. S  8. THE PRINCIPLES OF  NATURAL  LAW. 
justice properly so called.  This division  of  justice  coincides 
with th:~t  of  Grotius into expletive and otiributive. 
2.  We  might subdivide  rigorous  justice into  that, which it 
exercised between  equals,  and that, which takes place  between 
superior and inferior.*  The former contains as many different 
species, as there are duties, which  one man  may in rigour  re- 
quire of every otl~er  man, considerd as such, and one citizen of 
every idlow citizen. The latter inciudes as many species, as there 
are dilLrent societies, where some comlnand and others  obey.+ 
7 
_:  lhere  are other  divisions of  jusiice,  bct  such,  as  seen 
uscl:ss,  and far from being  exact.  For exzmple,  that  of  uni- 
vt .;:I  and particuldr justice,  taken  in the manner as Puffecdorf 
explains it,  appears incorrect, inasmuch as one of  the  members 
05  the i,ivisian is inc!uded  in the 0ther.f  The subdivision  of 
particul'~r  justice  i:ito  distributive  and  commutative  is  incom- 
piece ;  because  it includes only what is due to another by  vir- 
tue of  some  pact  or  engag-lnent,  notwitl~st~nding  thcre  are 
many things, which our neighbo,~r  Inay require of  us in rigour, 
without  any  regard to pact  or csnvention.  And we rray ob- 
serve in general, by  reading what Grotius and  Puffendorf  have 
written conccrnil~g  this subject, tl:at  they are at a loss then~selves 
to g:ve  a clear and exact idea of  these dlti2re:lt kinds of justice. 
I-1ci:ce  it is manifest,  that we had Setter wave all these sholas- 
tic divisions,  contrived in  imitation of  those  oi Aristotle,  and 
abide by our iirst division.  And indeed it  is only out of  res- 
pect to the cornilloil  opinion,  that  we  have taken any  notice 
thereof.  11 
Oftherela-  XIl.  Besides  what we  may  call the quality of  moral ac- 
tire  mimz- 
tions of  tions, they have  likewise  a  kind  of  quantity,  which,  by cm- 
morri  p'lring the good actions to  one another,  as also the had in the 
actions.  salxe manxr, leads us to a sort of  rehtive estination, in order 
to mark the greater or less degree of  evil to be found  in each. 
* Thin amounts to the s;mr  thing very  near, as  the 'jh  rcctorium  and  #gw- 
torbm of Grot~us.  Book i. chap. I.  3. num. 3. 
t.  See Biddmus, 21cmen:a philos. prdct, pxt  ii. cap. ii. g 46. 
t  Law of  Nature and Nations, book i, chap. viil. Q 8. And the Duties of Man 
and a C:tizen,  book i. chdp, ii.  14,  with Barbeyrhc's notes 
11  See Grotius,  Rizhts of  War  and  Peace, book  i. chap.  i.  8.  Puffendorf, 
Law of  Nature and Nations, book i. chap.  vii.  g, xo,x~,  12, with Barbegrac's 
noteh 
Te  shall give here the principles necessary for this estimation. 
I. These actions may be considered with regard  to their ob- 
ject.  'rhe nobler the object  the  higher  the excellence of  the 
good action,  done towards this object ;  and  a  bad action,  on 
the contrary,  becomes more criminal. 
a.  In rzspect  to thz quality and slate of  the  agent.  Thus 
a favor or benefit,  rdceived of  an enemy, excels that,  which  is 
conferred upon  ua  by  a  friend.  And,  on  the  contrary,  an 
injury done us by n friend, is more sensible, and more attrocious, 
than that,  which is  conllnitted by  an enemy. 
3.  In reference to the very nature of  the  action,  according 
ps  there is more or less trouble to perform.  The more a good 
action is diiIicult,  supposing every thing  else  equal,  the more 
worthy it is of praise and  admiration.  But  the easier it is to 
abstain from  a bad  actios, the more it is blameable  and enor- 
mous in comparison to anoth-r of  the same species. 
4.  In relation  to the eflects and consequences of the action. 
An action is  so much the better ar worse,  in proportion, as we 
foresee, t'r:::t  its cons?quences must be more or loss adva~tageous 
or hurtful. 
5.  w~  nlay add the circumstances of time,  place, &c. which 
nre also capable of  ma8ing  the good or bad actions surpass one 
another in excellence or badness.  We  have borrowed these re- 
marks from otie cf  Garbeyrac's  notes on Puffendorf." 
XIII,  Let us ohs-rve in  fi~le,  that  morality  is  attributed to Mora1i:y 
persons as well as actions ;  and,  as actions are  good  or  bad,  ~1~~~~~~- 
just  or unjust,  WC  SJ~  likewise of men,  that  they are  good or  sonsasweu 
bad, virtuous or vici~us.  ar, actions, 
A  virtuous man  is h,  who has a habit  of  acting conforma- 
bly to the laws of  his duty.  A vicious man is one,  who has 
the opposite  habit. 
Vil tue therefore coilsists in a habit of acting according to  the 
laws ;  and vice in the contrary habit. 
I said that virtue and vice are habits.  Hence to judge prop- 
erly of  these two characters, we should not stop at some partic- 
ular action ;  we ought to consider the  whole series of the life 
*  See the Law  of Nature and Natienr, book i, chap. viii. acct. 5.  note I. $6  THE PRINCIPLES OF 
and ordinary  conduct of man.  We  should not therefore rank 
among  the number of  vicious  men  those,  who  through weak- 
ness, or otherwise,  have  been  sometimes induced  to commit a 
bad action ;  as on the other hand those, who have done a few 
acts of  virtue, do not  merit the title of  honest men.  There is 
no such thing to be found in this world,  as virtue in every res- 
pect complete ;  and the weakness inseparable from man require8 
we should not judge him with full rigour.  Since it is allowed, 
that  a virtuous man may,  through weakness and surprise, cam+ 
mit some unjust action ;  so  it is but  tight we should likewise 
*lbw, that  a man, who  has contracted  several  vicious  habits, 
hay notwithstanding,  in particular cases, do some good  action, 
acknowledged  and  performed  ae  such.  Let  us  not  suppose 
men Worse,  than they really are, but  take care to distinguish the 
several degrees of iniquity and vice,  as  well M those of probity 
and virtue. 
END  OF THE  FIRST PART. 
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PRINCIPLES 
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PART 11. 
OF THE LAW OF NATURE. 
CHAP.  I. 
In what the Law of  Nature con~istr,  and that there ir ~uch  a thing. 
Krst cvzsiderations,  drawn from  the existence  of  God and  hi^ 
authority over ur. 
I. A  FTER having settled  the  general principles of  law,  abject or 
our business is now to apply them to naturai law in particular.  thisxcond 
The questions, we have to examine in this second part, are of no PUG 
less importance, than to know whether man,  by his nature ad 
constitution,  is really subject to laws properly so called ?  What 
are these laws ?  Who is the superior, that imposes them  ?  By 
what method  or means is  it possible to know  them ?  Whence 
results the obligation of  observing them  ?  What  consequence 
may follow from our negligence in this respect  ?  And, in fine, 
what advantage on the contrary may arise from  the observance 
of  these laws ? 
11.  Let us begin with a proper definition of the terms.  By 
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and which they are able to discover  and know by  thc sole light 
of  reason, and by  attentively cons~dering  their state and nature. 
Natural law  is likewise taken for th~  system,  assemblage,  or 
body of  the laws of  nature. 
Natural  jurisprudence is the art of  attaining  to the  knowl- 
edge of the laws of nature,  of  explaining and applying  them to 
human actions. 
Whether  111.  But whether there be really any natural laws is the first 
S, 
there are  question, that presents itself  here to our inquiry.  In order to 
laws.  make a proper answer,  we must  ascend  to  the  principles  of  -  - 
natural  theology,  as  being the first  and true  foundation  of 
the law of  nature.  For, when we are asked whether there are 
any natural  laws,  this  question cannot  be resolved, but by ex. 
amining  the  three following  articles.  I.  Whether there is a 
God ?  2.  If there is a  God, whether he has a right to impose 
laws on man ?  3.  Whether God actually exercises his righ: in 
this respect,  by  really giving us laws,  and requiring we should 
square thereby our actions  ?  These three points will furnish the 
subject of  this  and the following chapters. 
of  the ex-  IV.  The existence of God, that is of  a first, intelligent, and 
of  selkexistent being,  on whom all things depend,  as  on their first  God. 
cause,  and  who depends himself  on no  one ;  the  existence, 
I  say,  of  such  a  being  is  one  of  those  truths,  that  show 
themselves  to us at the first glance.  We  have  only to attend 
to the evident and sensible  proofs, that  present themselves  to 
us,  as it were,  from aU  parts. 
The chain and  subordination of  causes  among  themselves, 
which necessarily requires we should fix  on a first cause, the 
necessity  of acknowledging a first  mover, the  admirable struc- 
ture and order of  the universe,  are all so many demonstrations 
of  the existence  of  God, within the  reach of  every  capacity. 
Let us unfold  them in a few words. 
First proof.  V.  I We  behold an infinite number of objects, which, being 
The  united,  form the assemblage, we call the universe.  Something  sity of  a 
aelferist-  therefore must have  always existed.  For,  were we  to suppose 
:hii?y  a time,  in which there was absolutely nothing,  it is evident that 
being.  nothing couid have ever existed ;  because,  whatsoever has a be- 
ginning must have a cause of  its existence ;  since  nothing can 
produce  nothing.  It  must be  therefore  acknowledged,  that 
there is some eternal being, who exists necessarily and of him- 
self ;  for he can be indebted to no one else for his origin ;  and 
it implies a contradiction,  th~t  such a being does not exist. 
Moreover this eternal being,  who necessarily and of  himself 
subsists,  is endued  with  reason  and understanding.  For, to 
pursue the same manner  of  arguing, were  we  to  suppose  a 
time, in which there was nothing but inanimate beings, it would 
have  been  impossible  for intelligent beings,  such as we now 
behold,ever  to exist.  Intellection can no more proceed from a 
blind and nnintelligent cause, than a being,  of any kind whatso- 
ever, can come from nothing.  There must therefore have always 
existed a father of  spiritual beings, an eternal mind, the source, 
whence  all  others derive  their  existence.  Let  what  system 
soever be adopted concerning the nature and origin of the soul, 
our proof  subsists still  in its fuil  force.  Were it  even  to be 
supposed, that the  cogitative part of  man is no more,  than the 
effect of  a certain motion  or  modification  of  matter,  yet  we 
should still want  to kr~ow  how  matter acquired  this activity, 
which is not essential to  it, and this particular and so much ad- 
mired  organization,  which  it  cannot  impdrt  to  itself.  We 
should inquire,  who is it,  that has  modified the body in such a 
manner proper to produce such wonderful operations,  as those 
of  intellection, which reflects, which acts on the very body itself 
with command, which surveys the earth,  and measures the hea- 
vens, recollects past transactions,  and extends its views to futu- 
rity.  Such a masterpeice must come from the hands of an intel- 
ligent cause ; wherefore  it is absolutely necessary to acBnow1- 
edge a first,  eternal, and intelligent 13eing 
VI.  An eternal S?irit,  who has within himself the principle We must 
not seek  of  llis own  existence,  and of  all his faculties,  can  be neither for this be- 
changed  nor  destroyed ;  neither  dependant nor  limited ;  he ing in  thu 
should even  be invested  with  infinite  perfection,  sufficient to  univereC~ 
render him the sole arid  first cause of all,  so that we my  have 
no occasion to seek for any other. 
But does not (some will ask)  this quality of  an  eternal  and 
intelligent being belong to  matter itself,  to the  visible  u~orld, 
or to some  of the parts thereof? 
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I answer that this supposition is absolutely contrary to all our 
ideas.  Matter  is  not  essentially  and  of  itself  intelligent; 
nor can it be supposed to acquire intellection but  by a particu- 
lar modification,  received  from a cause  supremely  intelligent. 
Now this first  cause  cannot  have  such a  modification  from 
any  other  being ;  for  he  thinks  essentially and  of  himself ; 
wherefore he cannot be a  material being.  Besides, as  all the 
parts of  the universe are variable and dependant, how is it pos- 
sible to recolicile  this with the idea  of an  infinite and all per- 
fect being  ? 
As for what relates  to man,  his dcpendance  and  weakness 
are much more sensible, than those  OF other creatures.  Since 
he  has ho life  of  himself,  he  cannot  be the  efficient cause 
of the existence of others.  He  is unacquainted with the struc- 
ture of  his own body,  and with  the principle of life ;  incapa- 
ble ~f  discovering in what manner motions are connected with 
ideas, and which is the proper spring of  the empire of  the will. 
We  must therefore look out for an efficient, primitive, and orig- 
inal cause of mankind,  beyond the human chain, be it supposed 
ever so long;  we  must trace  the  cause  of  each  part of  the 
world beyond this material and visible world. 
Second  VII.  2.  After this first proof,  drawn from  the necessity  of 
proof. The 
neces3i:y  a first, eternal,  and intelligent being, distinct from matter ;  we 
of  a first  proceed  to a second,  which shows us the Deity in a more scn- 
mover.  sible manner ;  and more within the reach of common capacities. 
Thc proof  I mean is the contemplation of  this  visible  world, 
wherein  we perceive a motion and order, which matter has not 
of  itself, and must therefore receive from some other being. 
Motion or  active force  is not  an essential  quality of  body. 
Extension is of  itself  rather  a passive being ;  it is easily  con- 
ceived at rest ;  and, if it has any motion, we may well conceive 
it may loose it without being stript of its existence ;  it is a quali- 
ty or state,  that passes  and is accidentally communicated  from 
one body  to another.  The first impression  must therefore pro- 
ceed from all  intrinsic  cause ;  and,  as  Aristotle  has well ex- 
pressed it,"  The  JlvJt mover  of  bodies  must not be  moveoble  him- 
re&  mu~t  not be  a body.  This has been also agreed to by Hob- 
bes."  But the nchnowledging, says he,  oJ.'  one  God eternal, injn- 
ite, and omnipotent, may  more easily be  derived from  the desire men 
have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their several virtues 
and operations, than  from  the fear  of  what was to bcfalthem in time 
to come.  For he, who, from  at9 gect he  sceth conle topass, should 
reaJon to the  ?text and  inlmediate cause  thereof, and thence  to  the 
cuuse of that  cause, and plutlge him~eEfprofoorindly  in the  pursuit  of 
causes, sholl nt last  come  to  this, that  there must  be  (os even the 
heathen philosophers  co~@ssedJ  onejirst mover;  that is, n jirst  nnd 
etevrlal c~iuse  of all things ;  which  is tbat, which men mean  by  the 
tzurne of  ~od.- 
VIII.  3.  But, if  matter hls not been able to move of itself,  Third  proof.  The 
much lcss was it  able to move  to the  exact  degree,  and  with ,,,,,,,,,, 
all the  determinations necessary  to form such  a  world,  as we  order,  and  be.,rty of 
behold, mther than  a confused chaos.  the uni- 
In fact, let us  on!~  cast our eyes  on this  universe,  and we  verse, 
shall every where discover, even at the first glance, an admirable 
beauty, regularity, and order ;  and this admiration will increase 
in proportion as, in searching m3re closely into  nature, we en- 
ter into the particulars of  the structorc, proportion,  alid use of 
each part.  For then we  shall clearly see,  that every thing  is 
relative to a certain end, and that these particular  ends,  though 
infinitely varied  among themselves,  are so dexterously managed 
and combinecl, as to conspire a11  to a general design.  Notwith- 
st'1nding this amazing diversity of  creatures, there is no confu- 
sion ;  ;ve  !)e!lold  several thousand  difbrent species, which Fre- 
servz their distinct form and  qllalities.  'The  parts of  the uni- 
ver3e are proportioned and balanced, in order to preserve a gen- 
eral harmony ;  and each of  those parts 113s  exactly its  proper 
~~LITC,  proportions, situation, anct  motion,  either to  produce its 
particu1,lr eifect, or to form a beautiful whole. 
It is evident therefore, that there is a de;ign,  a choice,  a vis- 
ible reason in all the works of  nature ;  and  consequently there 
are marks of  wiqdom and understand!ng,  obvious,  as  it were,, 
even to our  very senses. 
* Levithan, chzp, vii. p, 53. edit. 1651. ga  THE PRINCIPLES  OF 
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The world  IX.  Though there have been  some philosoph~rs,  who have 
is not the  attributed all thesc phznomcna to chatice, yet this is so ridicu- 
chance.  lous a thought,  shat I question whether a more extravagant chi, 
inera ever entered into the mind of man.  Is  it possible for a- 
ny onc to persuzdc himself seriously, tll.lt  the diff'erent parts  of 
matter, having been  set in some unaccountable manner in mo- 
tion, produced of themselves the heavens, the  stars,  the earth, 
the plants, and even animals  and men,  and  whatever  is  most 
regular in the 0rganizatio:l  ?  A man, that would pass the like 
judgment  on the  least edifice, on  a book  or picture,  would be 
looked upon,  as a mad, extravagant person.  How much more 
shocking is it to common sense to attribute to ch~ace  so vast a 
work,  and so wonderful a composition, as this u:livcrse  ? 
~t  is not  X.  It would  be equally  frivolous to alledge the eternity  of 
eternal-  the world,  in  order to exclude  a first ii~telligcnt  cause.  For, 
besides  the marks of  novelty,  we meet  with  in  th:  history 
of  mankind,  as the origin of  nations and empires, and the  in- 
vention  of  arts  and  sciences,  &c.  besides  the  assurance 
we have from the most general and most ancicnt tradition, that 
the world has had a begicning (a tradition,  which  is of  great 
weight  in  regard  to  a  matter of  fact,  like  this,)  besidse  I 
say all this,  the very nature of  the thing does not  allow us  to 
admit of  this hypothesis  any more than that  of  chance.  For 
the question  is  still,  whence  comcs  this  beautiful  order,  this 
regular  structure and design,  in a word,  whcnce proceed  those 
marks of  reason and wisdom,  that arc SO visibly displayed in all 
parts of  the universe  ?  To say that  it has been  always  60, 
without the intervention  of  an intelligent cause,  does  not ex- 
plain the thing,  but leaves  us in the same embarrassment, and 
advances the same  absurdity,  as those, who  awhile  ago were 
speaking to us of  chance.  For  this is in reality telling us, that 
whatever  we behold  throughout the universe  Is  blindly ranged, 
without design,  choice, cause, reason, or understanding.  Hence 
the principal absurdity of  the hypothesis of  chance occurs like- 
wise in this system ; with this difference only,  that, by estab- 
lishing  the eternity  of the world,  they suppose  a  chance,  that 
from all eternity hit upon order ;  whereas those, who attribute 
the formation of the world to the fortuitous junction  of its parts, 
suppose that chance did not succeed till a certain time,  when it 
fell in at length with order,  after  an  infinite number  of  trials 
and fruitless  combinations.  Both  acknowledge  therefore  no 
other cause than chance,  or properly speaking they acknowledge 
none at all ;  for chance  is no  real  cause ;  it  is  a  word,  that 
cannot account for a real effect, such as the arrangement of  the 
universe. 
It would not be 3  difficult  matter to  carry these proofs to a 
much greater length,  and even to  increase them with an addi- 
tional number.  But this may  suffice for a work of this  kind ; 
and the little we have  said  intitles us  methinks to establish the 
existence of  a First Cause,  or  of  a Creator,  as an incontestable 
truth, that inay serve henceforward for the basis of all our reason- 
ings. 
XI.  As soon as we have acknowledged  a Creator,  it is evi-  Gad.  hu 
a right to  dent,  that he has a supreme right to lay his commands on man,  prescribe 
to prescribe  rules  of  conduct to  him,  and  to  subject him to  laws to 
laws ;  and it is no less evident,  that man on his side finds him-  man. 
sclf, by his natural constitution,  under an obligation  of  subject- 
ing his actions to the will of  this supreme Being. 
We  ha$c already  s!lown,'  that the true foundation  of  sove- 
reignty,  in the 2crson  of  the sovereign, is power  united  with 
a~isdoln  and goodn:ss  ;  and that,  011  the other hand, weakness 
and wants in the subjects are the natural cause of  dependance. 
We  have oniy therefore to  sce,  whether  all  these  qu?lities of 
sovcreig;~  are to bc found in  God ;  and whether men,  on their 
side, are in a stdte of infirmity  and wants,  so as to  depend ne- 
cessarily on him for their Iiappiness. 
XII.  It is beyond  doubt,  that he,  who exists necessarily and  This 
on himself, and has created the universe,  must be invested with  ~u:~~~* 
infinite power.  As he has given existence to 111  things by his  his power, 
own will,  he may likewise preserve, annihilate,  or change them,  and good- 
as he pleases.  new 
But his wisdom is equal to his power.  Having made  every 
thing, he must  know  every thing,  a6  well  the causes,  as the 
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effects thence resulting.  We sec besides  in all his  works the 
most excellent ends, and a choice of  the most  proper  means to 
attain them ;  in  short, they all bear,  as  it were,  the stamp of 
wisdom. 
XIII.  Reason  informs  us,  that God is  a  being  essentially 
good ;  a perfection,  which sc2ms  to  flow  naturally from his 
wisdom and power.  For how is  it possible  for a being,  who 
of  his nature is  infinitely  wise and  powerful,  to havc any in- 
clination to hurt ?  Surely no sort of reason can  ever determine 
him to it.  Malicq cruelty,  and injustice,  are  always a conse- 
quence of  ignorance or weakness.  1,et  man therefore consid- 
er but never so little the things,  which surround him,  and  re- 
flect on his own constitution, he will discover,  both within and 
without himself,  the benevolent  hand of  his Creator, who treats 
him like a father.  It is from God  we hold our  life and  rea- 
son ;  it is he, that suppiies most abundantly our wants, adding 
the useful  to the necesszry,  and  the  agreeable to  the useful. 
Philosophers observe, that m:lateve:  contributes to our preserva- 
tion,  has been arrayed  with  some agreeable quality.  *  Nour- 
ishment, repose,  action, heat,  co!d,  in short whatever  is useful 
to us, pleases us in i:s  turn, and so long as it is useful.  Should 
it cease to be so, because things are carried to a dangerous ex- 
cess,  we have notice therefore by an opposite  sensation.  'Fhe 
allurement of  pleasure  invites  us to  use them,  when  they are 
necessary  for our wants;  disrelish and  lassitude induce us  to 
abstain from them, when they are  likely to hurt us.  Such is 
the happy  and  sweet  economy  of  nature,  which  annexes  a 
pleasure  to the moderate  exercise  of  our senses and faculties, 
insomuch that whatever surrounds us becomes  a source of  sat- 
isfaction,  when we know  how to use it with  discretion.  What 
can be more magnificent,  for  example,  than  this great theatre 
of the world,  in which we live, and  this  glittering  decoration 
of heaven and earth,  exhibiting a thousand agreeable objects to 
our view  ?  What satisfaction does not  the mind  receive from 
the sciences, by which it is exercised, enlarged, and improved  ? 
* See an excellent treatise lately published  at Geneva, for Barillot and Son, in 
xzmo, 1747,  intitled, Tbr Theory ofagreczble Sensations ;  where:after  pointing out 
the rules,  that nature follows in  the distribution  of  pleasure, the  principles of 
natural theology and ethics are established. 
What conveniences  do not  we draw  from human  industry  ? 
What advantage do not  we  derive from  an  intercourse  with 
our equals ;  what charms in their conversation ! what sweet- 
ness in  friendship,  and  the  otEcr  connevions of  the  lieart  ! 
When we avoid  the  excess and  abuse of  things,  the greatest 
part of life abounds with agreeable sensations.  And if to this 
we add, that  the laws,  which God  gives us,  tend,  as hereafter 
we ~1~111  see, to perfcct our nature,  to prevent all kind of  abuse, 
and to confine us to a  moderate use of  the good things of life, 
on which the preservation,  cxcelience,  and happpiness, as  well 
public as private,  of man depend,  what more  is there wanting 
to coavince us,  that thc goodncss of God is not  inferior either 
to his wisdom or power ? 
We  have therefore a superior undoubtedly invested with  all 
the  qualities  necessary to found the most legitimate  and  most 
extensive mthority.  And since on our side  experience  shows 
us, that we are weak and  subject  to divers wants ; and since 
every thing we have,  we have from him,  and he is able  either 
to augment or  diminish  our  e-oyments  ; it is  evident,  that 
nothing is wanting here to establish on  the one side  the abso- 
lute sovereignty of God,  and on the other hand our  unlimited 
dependance. 
CHAP 11. 
Tbat God, in consequence ofhis authority over UJ, hasactually tbqbt 
pr~pev  to prescribe  to  us laws or   rule^  of  conddct. 
I. TO  prove the existence of  God, and  our  dependance ad 
in respect  to him,  is establishing the  right he has  of  ~rescrib-  cises his 
authority  ing laws to man.  But this  is not sufficient ;  the question  is,  over 
whether hc has actually thought proper  to exercise this right  ?  prescribing 
He can  undoubtedly  impose  laws  on us ; but has he  really laws 
done it ?  And though we depcnd on him for our life,  and for 
our physical faculties, has hc not left us in a state of  independ- 
ence  in  respect  to the moral use, to  which we  are to apply g'5  THE PRINCIPLES OF  NATURAL  LAW*  97 
them ?  'This is  a third  and capital point,  we have  still left to 
examine. 
nrat proof  11.  I. We  have made same progress  already in this research, 
drawn  by discovering all the circumstances,  necessary to  establish  an 
from the 
very rela-  actual legislature.  On the one side we find a superior, who by 
tions* of  his nature is possessed in the very highest  degree of  all the con- 
which we 
have bee.,  ditions requisite to establish a legitimate authority ;  and on the 
s~eak'ig- other we behold  man,  who  is God's  creature,  endowed with 
understanding  and  liberty, capable of  acting  with knowledge 
and choice,  sensible  of  pleasure and pain,  susceptible  of  good 
and evil, of rewards and  punishments.  Such  an  aptitude  of 
giving and receiving laws cannot be useless.  This concurrence 
of relations and circumstances undoubtedly denotes an end, and 
must have some effect ;  just  as the  particular  organization of 
the eye shows we are destined  to see the light.  Why should 
God have made us exactly fit  to receive  laws,  if  lie  intended 
none  for  us  ?  This  would  be  creating  so  many  idle  and 
useless faculties. It is therefore not only possible, but very prob- 
able,  that our destination  in  general  is  such,  unless  the con- 
trary  should  appear  from  much  stronger  reasons.  Now in- 
stead of  there being any reason to destroy this first presumption, 
we shall see,  that every thing tends to confirm it. 
Second  111.  2.  When we consider  the beautiful order, which t5e su- 
proof  preme wisdom has established  in the physical world,  it  is  iin- 
drawn 
from ,he  possible to persuade  ourselves, that he  has abandoned the spir- 
end, which  itual or moral world to chance  and disorder.  Reason,  on the 
God pro-  contrary, tells us,  that a wise being  proposes to  himself  a re* 
himself  sonable end in every thing he does, and that he uses all the nec- 
with rec 
pecttomm,  essary means to attain it.  'The  end,  which  God had  in view 
and from  with regard to his  creatures, and  pariicularly  with  respect  to 
the necessi-  tr of mord  man,  cannot be any other, on the one bide,  than his glory ;  and 
laws, to ac-  On  the other, the perfection and happiness of liis creatures, so far 
aOmp'ish  as their nature  or constitution will admit.  'These  two views, 
this end. 
so worthy of  the Creator,  are  perfectly  c~mbin-d.  For  the 
glory of God consists in manifesting his perfections,  his power, 
his goodness, urisdon~,  and justice ;  and these virtues are  noth- 
ing else but the love of  order  and of  the good of  th-  whole. 
'Thus a beicg absolutely perfect and supremely happy, willing to 
aonduct man to that state of  order  and happiness,  which suits 
his nature, cinnot but be willing  at  the same time  to  employ 
whatever is necessary for  such  an  end ;  and  consequently  he 
must approve  of  those means,  that  are proper, and disapprove 
of  such, as  are  improper for attaining it.  Had  the constitu- 
tion of  man b-en  merely  physical or mec'ianir  1,  God himself 
would have  done whatever is expedi~nt  for his work ;  but man 
being a free  and  ii.telligent  creature,  capable  of  disccrnmect 
and choice, the means,  which the Deity uses to conduct him to 
his end, ought to be  proportioned to his nature, that is, such as 
man may  engage in, and concur with, by  his own actions. 
Now,  as all  means  are  not equally fit  to  conduct  us to :! 
certain end,  all human actions  cannot therefore be  indifferent. 
Plain it is,  that every action,  contrary to the ends,  which God 
has proposed,  is not  agreeable to the divine  Mdjesty ;  and that 
he approves, on  the contlary,  those,  which  of  themselves ?re 
proper to promote his ends.  Since there is a choice to Le  made, 
who can question but our Creator is willing  we should take the 
right road ;  and that, instead of  acting fortuitously and rashly, 
we should behave like rational  creatures, by exercising our lib- 
erty and the other faculties he has given us,  in the manner inoit 
agreeable to our itate and  dc'it:nation,  in  order to promote  his 
views, and to advance our own happiness,  together with that of 
our fellow  creatures  ? 
IT.  These considerations assume a new force,  when we at-  Confirm+ 
tend to the n,~tural  consequences of  the opposite system.  What precen~nq  clon of the 
would become of  man and society, wcre every one to be so far prbof. 
master of  his actions,  as to do evcry thing he listed, without hav- 
ing any other principle of conduct thdn caprice or passion  ?  Lct 
us suppose,  that God, abandoning u5 to ourselves,  Lad  not ac- 
tually  prescribed  any rules  of  life,  or  subjected  us to laws ; 
most of our talents and faculties urould be of  no manner of use 
to us.  To  what purpose would it be for man to have the lig!lt 
of reason, were he to follow only the impulse of insti~ct,  with- 
out watching over his conduct  ?  Whzt  urould  it  avall him to 
have the power of  suspending  his  judgment,  were he to yield 
stupidly to  the first impressiol~s  ?  And of  what  eelvice would 
reflection be,  were hc  neitller  to choose  nor delibera;? ;  And 
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were he, instead of  listeniqg to t!le  counsels of prudence,  to be 
hurried awly by blind inc!in,ltions  ? These  faculties, 1vh1ch form 
the excellence and dignity  of  our nature,  would  not  only be 
rendered hereby entirely frivolous,  but inoreovcr wouid  become 
prejudicial even by their excellence ;  for the higher and nobler 
tile faculty is, th? more the abuse of  it proves dangero~s. 
'I'his  wou'ct not only b,  a great misfortune for m ,n,  co:~sid- 
crcd alo1le, and in res,)ect  to him>elf ;  but would still  piog.  a 
greater evil to him, \vhen  view2d  in the state  of  society.  For 
this more  thn any  0th-r  state requires laws, to the end, that 
cac'l  pxson inay  set liinits to his pretensions,  without invading 
another mm's I ight. 
Were it otherwise, licentiousness  must  be the consequence 
of  indepei;dence.  To leave men  abandoned  to themselv~s  is 
leaving an open field to the passions, and paving the way for in- 
justice,  violznce, per6  dy, and cruelty.  Take aw'ly n~tur~ll~~ws, 
and tlut  mordl  tie,  wh~ch  supports justice  and  honcsty in a 
whole nation, and establishes  also particuldr duti~s  either in fam- 
ilies, or in the  other relations of life ;  man would be then the 
most savage and ferocious of ail animals.  The more dexterous  - 
and artful  he  is,  the more  dangerous he  would  prove  to his 
equals ;  his d~xterity  uroulc!  degenerate  into craft, and his art 
into malice.  Then we shou!d  be divested of all the advantzg- 
es aid s\vccts of society ;  and thrown  into a state of  war and 
libertinism. 
Third  V. 3.  Were any one to say, that man himself  would  not fd 
proof  to remedy these ciisordcrs, by establishing laws in society ;  (be- 
drawn 
fro,n the  side tl~nt  human laws would  have very!ittle  force were they not 
800dncs.  f~unded  on tlie  principles  of  conicience ;)  this  remark  shows 
of  God. 
there is a  necessity  for 1~ws  in general, whereby  we  gain our 
cause.  For, if it be agreeable to the order of reason,  that men 
should est.iblis11 2 rule of  life  among themselves,  in order to bc 
acreened from the evils, tllcy  might apprehend from one anoth- 
er, and to procure  thoco advantzgcs,  ?hat are c.rpnble of forming 
their private  311d  public happiness ;  this alone ought to convince 
us,  that the Creator, infinitely wiser and  better than ourselves, 
must Aave  ~tndoubtcdly  pu~sued  the  same method.  A good 
parent,  who rakes care to direct  his  children  by  his  authority 
and counsels, is  able to preserve  peace and order in his family. 
Is it then to be imagined,  that  the comn;on  father  of mankind 
should neglect  to give us  the like  assistance  ?  And if a wise 
sovereign has nothing so much at heart, as to prevent licentious- 
ness by  salutary  regulations ; how  can any  one  believe, that 
God, who is a mucll greater  friend to man,  than  man is to his 
equdls,  has left all mankind  without  direction  and guide, cveti 
on the most important matters,  on  which  our  whole happilless 
depends ?  Such a system would be no less contrdry to the good- 
ness, than to the wisdom of  God.  We must  ther-fore  havc 
recourse to  other ideas,  and conclude, that the  Creator having, 
through a pure effect of his bounty,  created man for happiness, 
and having implanted  in him an  insuperable inclination to feli- 
city,  subjectitig him at the same time to live in society, he must; 
have given him also such principles,  as  are capable of inspiring 
him with 3 love of order,  and  rules  to point out the means of 
procuring  and attaining it. 
VI. 4.  But let us enter into ourselves, and  we shall actually  Fourth 
find, that what we ought to expect  in this respect frcm the di- 
vine wisd~rn  and goodness, is dictated by  right  reason,  and by  from tb 
the principles  engraved in our hearts. 
principles 
of coldilct 
If there be any speculative truths, that are evident, or if there  W~IC~  we 
be any certain axioms,  that serve as a basis  to  the  sciences ; 
there is no less certainty in  some  principles,  that are laid down ourselver 
in order to direct our conduct, and to serve as the foyndation of 
morality.  For example ;  that the aliwise and  allb~ut~iijil  Crea- 
tor merits  the  reSpects  cf the  creature ;  that  man  ought  to ~eek 
hi$ o~orz  happiness ;  that  we shsuld  prefer  the greater  to ihe /ess 
evil ;  th~t  a  bent@  deservts LI  grairful acHnozuktdgment ;  thot the 
Jtate of  order excels thai of  disorder,  WC. Those maxims,  and 
others of  the same sort, differ very little in evidence from these, 
The whole is greater  than its part ;  or the cause preredes the fict, 
WC.  Both are dictated by pure reason ;  and hence we feel our- 
selves forced,  as it were, to give our assent to tliem.  These gen- 
ern1 principles are seldcm contested ; if  there  be any  dispute, 
it relates only  to their application  ai?d  consequences.  But so 
soon 3s the truth of these principles  is ci;scovered, their conse- 
quences,  whether immediate or  remote,  are entirely as certain THE  NATURAL  LAW.  10% 
provided they be well connected ;  the whole  business being te 
deduce than by a train  of  close and conclusive argumentations. 
These  VII.  In order  to be  scnsible of  the influence,  which  such 
principles  principles,  with their  legitimat?  consequences,  ougl~t  to hdve 
are obliga- 
tory of  cvcr our conduct,  ure have only  to recollect  what has b-et1  al- 
themselves. ready said, in tllc first part  of  this work,*  concerning the obli- 
gation we are under of  followirig the dictztes of  re:.son.  As it 
would be zbsurd in speculativc matters to speak and judge oth- 
erwise, than  according  to that  light, which  makes  us  discern 
truth from falsehood ; so it wou\d be no less  preposterous to 
deviate in our conciuct from those certain maxims, which enable 
us to distinguish good  fro111 evil.  When  once  it is  manifest, 
that a particular manner of acting is suitab!e  to our nature, and 
to the great end we have in view ; and that anlther, on the con- 
trary, does not  suit our constitution or  liappiness ; it follows, 
that man,  as a free and rdtiondl creature,  ought to  be very at- 
tentive to this diff'erence, and to take his  resolutions according- 
ly.  He is obligcd to it by  the very'nature  of  the thing ;  b:- 
cause it is absolutely necessary, when a person is desirous of  the 
end, to be desirous also of  the means ;  and he  is obliged for it 
moreover because he cannot  rnistdke the  illterltion a:id  will of 
his superior in this respect. 
 hey are  VI1I.  In fact God being the author  of  the nature of things 
and of  our constitution, if,  in consequence of  this  nature and 
yine will,  ~o~stitution,  we are reasonably determinud to judge after a cer- 
and thus  tain manner,  and to act according to ogr jud,ment,  the Creator  become 
red  ~WS.  s*.~fficiently  manifests his intention, so that we can no longer be 
ignorant of  his will.  The language thtrefore of  reason is thnt 
of  God himself.  When our  reason  tells  so  clearly,  that we 
must ?lot return evil f~r  grid, it is God  himself,  who ~y this in- 
ternal oracle gives us to understand  what is good 2nd just,  whdt 
is agreeable to him and suitable  to ourselves.  We  said that it 
is not at all probable, that t!le  good and wise Creator should have 
abandoned man to himself,  wiihout a guid~  and direction for his 
conduct.  We have here  a  dirccrion,  that  comes  from him ; 
and since he is invested in the very highest  degree,  as we have 
*  Chap. vi. 
already observed,  wit11  the  perfections,  on  which  a legitimate 
superiority is founded,  who can  pretend  to  that the 
urill of  such a superior is law to us  ?  The redder 1  suppose hds 
not forgot  the conditions requisite  to constitute a law ;  condi 
tions,  that are all to be  inet with in  the pfesent case.  I. Thcre 
is a ruie.  2.  This rule is just and useful.  3. It co~nes  from a 
superior, on whom we  entirely depend.  4.  In fine, it is SUB- 
ciently made I;:~own  to us by principles,  cngravcd in our hearts, 
and even by  our own reason.  It is therefore  a law properiy so 
called,  which we are really obliged to observe.  But let us inquire 
a little further, by what  means this natural  law  is  discovered, 
or, which  amounts  to  thc  s.:me  thing,  from  wlint source we 
must derive it.  What we have hitherto proved only in a gen- 
eral manner  mill  be further  illustrated  and  confirmed  by  the 
particulars, on which we are cow going to enl~rge. For noth- 
ing can be a stronger proof of our having hit upon thc true prin- 
ciples, than, when unfolJing and considering them ill their dif- 
ferent branches,  we find they are always conformable to the na- 
turt of  things. 
01-  the   tons,  by  w/j;ch  we d,~iii*;;  rt35n~  i~ just  and uwt, 
of-  whot  i~.  rljLtf~i~J  ij  trai:/,,ui  ir*ici ;  ?mm+,  I.  morrrl  in- 
~tinct,  anti  2. r.~,zisr~. 
I. W  HAT has been  said  in  the preceding  chapter al-  F;, 
ready shows, that  God has invested us with two means of  per-  means of 
discerning  ceiving or discerning  moral  good and evil ;  the  first is only a morl~goo~ 
kind of instinct ;  the second is reason or judgment.  and evil, 
namely,  Moral instinct I call that natural  bent or  inclination,  which instinct or 
prompts us to approve of certain things as good and commend- inward 
able,  and to condemn othzrs as bad and blameable, independent 
of reflection.  Or if  any one has a mind to  distinguish this in- 
U 
stinct by  the name of moral sense, as Rlr.  Hutchinson has done, 
I shall then say,  :h3t  it is a facu1:y  of  the mind, which instant- 
ly discerns,  ir, cer:,.i::  cases, moral  good and evil, by  a kind of 
kensation aiid taste,  indcpelldent of  rcasori and reflection. NATURAL  LAW.  'C"3 
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Bxmplea  11.  Thus, at the sight of  a man in misery  or pain,  we  feel 
immediately a sense of compassion, which prompts us to relieve 
him.  The first e,no:ion,  that strikes us,  after receiving a ben- 
efit, is to acknowledge  the  favor,  and to thank our benefactor. 
The  first dispositim  of  one  man  towards anot:ler,  abstracting 
from any particular reason he may hlve of  hatred or  fear, is a 
sense of benevolence, as towards his fellow creature, with wnom 
he G:lcls  !!irnself  connected by a c~nformity  of nature and wants. 
We  ii!;evrise  observe,  tht, ivithout  any  great thought  or rea- 
soning, a cl~il~l,  or untutored peasant,  is sensible that ingratitude 
is a vice,  art4 exclaims against perfidy, as a bllck 211d  unjust ac- 
tion, n-:iic:1  1ii~'ily  shocks him,  and  is  absolutely repugnant to 
his nature.  On the contrary, to keep one's  word,  to bc grate- 
ful [or  a benefit,  to pay every body their due, to honor our pa- 
rents, to comfort thos~,  who are in distress or misery,  are all so 
many actions,  which we cannot but approve and esteem as just, 
good, honest,  beileficent,  and useful  to manlcind.  Hence the 
mind  is p1eas:d  to see  or hear  such  acts of equity,  sinceri- 
ty, humanit? and  beneficence ;  the heart is touc!ied  and mov- 
ed ;  and reading them in history we are siezed with admiration, 
and extol the hdppiness  of  the  age,  nation,  or  f~mily.  distin- 
guished by such noble examples.  As for  criminal  instances, 
we  cannot see or hear them mentioned without contempt or in- 
dignation. 
111.  If any one  should  ask,  whence  comes this emotion of 
these sen-  the heart,  which prompts us,  a!most  without any  ieasoning or  -  - 
mtions  inquiry, to love some  actions,  and  to detest others ?  The only 
answer,  I am able to give, is, that it  proceeds from the author 
of our being, who has formed  us after this manner,  and whom 
it  has pleased that our nature or  constitution  should be such, 
that the diffcrence of  moral  good and evil should,  in some cas- 
es,  affect us exactly in the same manner,  as physical  good and 
evil.  It  is therefore a kind of instinct, like several others, which 
nature has given us,  in order to determine us with more espe- 
dition and  vigour,  where reflection would be too  slow.  It is 
thus we are informed of  our corporeal  wants  by  our  inward 
sense ;  while our outward  senses acquaint us with the quality 
of  the objects, that may be useful or prejudicial to us, in order to 
lead U?,  as it were, mechanicdlly to whatever is requisite for our 
preserv~tion. S:lch  is also the instinct,  th~t  attaches US to life, 
and the desire  of happiness,  the  p-i.xum  mobile of  all our %C- 
tions.  S~ch  iq  likewise the almosr b!id,  but necessary t-nder- 
ness of parents towards t3eir chi1Jr.n.  The pr:ssing  inrlis- 
pensable wants of  1n;n  reqgired th,t E-P  S~DU!~  b7 di:-ct~d 591 
the nray of  sense,  w:iic!l  is allv~ys  qukker a;id  rezdier,  than t!ut 
of reason. 
IV.  God has therefore  t'lought  ri-opcr ta  use this m,etbod  of  what 
in respect to the moral  co:duct  of  111.13,  by  i::qx-;::ting  n  ithirl  the' 
are to ur 
us a  sense or taste of  virtu:  and justice,  which  a~lticip.~:,-s,  in 
some measure, our reason,  decides oar first  mstions,  a:ltl  h~p- 
pily s~tpp!ies, in  most men, the want of  attention or reflection. 
For what numbzrs  of pcopln  would  never trouble their heads 
with reflecting  ?  Wi~t  mu;titudes there are of stupid wretches, 
who lead a mere aiiitn.11 lif:,,  and are scarce able to disti:iguish 
three or four ideas, in  order  to  f )rm w'lat  is  call-d  ratiocina- 
tion ?  It was therefore our  particular  advantage,  that the Cre- 
ator should give us a disc~r~lrnent  of  good and evil,  with a love 
for the one, and an aversion for the other, by means of  a quick 
and lively  kind  of  fnculty,  which  has no necessity  to wait for 
the speculatior.5  ~i  the mind. 
V.  If an) o..e  should dispute the reality of  these sensations,  ObjectioL 
by saying they are not to be found in all men, because there are  These 
sations are  savage people,  who seem to have none at all ;  and even among not found 
civilized nations we meet with such perverse and stubborn minds,  in all men. 
Answer.  as do not appear to  have any notion or sense of  virtue ;  I an-  ,.We find 
swer,  I. that the most savage people  have nevertheless the first  some tracer 
of them  ideas above  mentioned ;  .md,  if  there  are some,  who seem to  the 
give no outward signs  or  demonstrations thereof,  this is owing most Ear- 
to our not being sufficiently acquainted with their  manners ;  or age people. 
bccause they are  intirely  stupified, and  have  stifled almost all 
sentiments of  humanity ;  or in fine by reason, that in some re- 
spects they fall into an  abuse  contrary  to those principles,  not 
by rejecting them positively,  but  through  some prejudice,  that 
has prevailed  over their  good sense and natural rectitude,  and 
inclines them  to  make  a  bad  app!ication  of  these  principles. 
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they have made prisoners,  imagining it to be the right of war, 
and,  since they have liberty to kill  them, nothing ot:ght  to hin- 
der them from benefitting by  their flesh, as their  proper  spoils. 
But those very  savAges  would  not  treat  in  that manner their 
friends  or  countrymen.  They have  laws  and  ru!es  among 
themselves ;  sincerity  and a $sin  dealing  are esteemed theLe, 
as in other  places,  and  a  grateful  heart  meets wit11  as much 
conimend,~tion  among the-,  as with us. 
S. Wemust  V1.  With rcgard  to those,  who,  in  the most  enlightened 
dis~in~uish 
between  and civilized countries, seem to be void of  all shame, humanity, 
thenatural  or justice,  we must take care to distinguish between the natural 
of  state  of  man,  alld the  depravation,  into w!lich  he may 1.111  by 
man, and 
that of his  abuse,  and  in  consequence of  irregularity  and deb~uch.  For 
deprava-  &on.  example, what cm  be more natural,  than pnternal tenderness  ? 
And yet  we  have  $eel1  men,  who  sce17ed to  have  stifled  it, 
through violence of passion, or by force of  a presellt temptation, 
which suspendetl for  a while this  natural  aff~ction.  Whdt can 
be stronger than the love of ourselves and of  our own preserva- 
tion  ?  It happens nevertheless,  that whether through anger,  or 
some other m~tion,  which throws the soul out of  its natur~l  po- 
sition,  n man tears his own limbs,  squandgre his  substance,  or 
does  himself  some grcat  ~rejudice,  as if  he  were bent on his 
own misery  and destruction. 
3. Ifthere  VII. 3. In fine, if  there are people,  who  cooly  and without 
any  any agit~tion  of mind seen) to have  divested  thelnselves  of  all 
monsters in 
the moral  affection and esteem for virtue,  (besides that monsters like these 
ordfl,tlke~  are as rare. I hoDp, in the moral, as in  the phykal WOI-Id,)  we 
a?e  very 
A 
m,  and  olily see thereby  the  effects of an  exquisite  and  inveterate de- 
no  pravation.  For man is not born  thus  corrupted ;  but  the in- 
qoerce can 
be drawn  tereit he has  in excusing  and  prllirting his vices, the habit he 
fcombw. has contracted,  and the sophijtical argume~lts,  to which - he  -.  has  - 
recourse, may stifle in fine, or corrupt the moral sense, of whicli 
we have been speaking ;  as we  see th~t  every other faculty of 
the soul or body may,  by long abuse,  b- zltered  or corrupted. 
The principle  is  almost  always  presprvcd ;  it  is  a fire, that, 
when it seems to be even eltinct, mJy kind!e  ag~in  and throw 
out scme glimmering?, of light, as we have seen examplesin  ve- 
ry profiiyate men,  under particdar conjunctures. 
VITI.  But notwithstancling  God has implanted in us this in-  Secon6 
rtinct of sense, as the first means of  discerni~~g  moral good and 
evil, yet he has not stopt here ; he  113s  a1~0  tho~gl~t  proper,  moralgood 
that the same light, which serves to direct us in every thing elst.,  and ev11 ; 
u  hlch is 
that is reason, should come to  our  assistance,  in order to ena-  reason. 
b!e  us  the better  to discerrl  and comprehend the true rules of 
conduct. 
Reason 1  call the f'tculty of comparing ideas, of investigating 
the mutual r~lations  of  things,  and thence inferring just  conse- 
quences.  This  noble  faculty, which  is  the  directress of  the 
mind,  serves  to illustrate,  to prove,  to extend,  and apply what 
our natural sense already gave us  to understand,  in relation  to 
justice  and injustice.  As reflection, instead of diminishing pa- 
ternal tenderness, tends to strengthen it,  by making  us observe 
how agreeable it is to the relation of  father and son, to the ad- 
vantage not only of  a family,  but of  the whole species ;  in like 
manner the natural sense, we have of the beauty and excellence 
of virtue,  is  considerably improved  by  the  reflections,  we are 
taught by reason,  in regard  to the foundations,  motives,  rela- 
tions,  and the general as well as particular uses of this same vir- 
tue, which seemed so beautiful to US  at first sight. 
IX.  \Ve  may even affirm,  that the light of reason  has three  F;,,, 
advantages in respect to this instinct or sense. 
vantage  reason in  of 
I.  It contributes  to prove  its truth  and  exactness ;  in the re,pect to 
same manner as we observe in other things, that study and rules  instinco ; 
it serves to  serve to verify  the exactness of  taste, by  showing  us it is nei-  v,,xy  i, 
ther blind nor arbitrary,  but  founded on reason,  and  directed 
by principles ; or  as those,  who are quick sighted, judge  with 
greater  certainty of  the distance or  figure  of  an object,  after 
having compared, examined, and measured it quite at their leis- 
ure,  than if they had depended itltirely  on the first sight.  We 
find likewise, that there are opinions and' custorns, which  make 
so strong and so general  in impression  on  our  minds,  that  to 
judge  of  them  only  by the sentiment, they  excite,  we should 
be in  danger of  mistaking  prejudice  for  tr~th. It is reason's 
province to rectify this erroneous  judgment,  and to counterbal- 
ance this effect of  education, by setting before us the true prin- 
ciples,  on which we ought to judge of things. 
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Second ad-  X.  2.  A second advantage, which  reason  has  in respect to 
vantage .  simple instinct,  is,  that it unfolds the ides better,  by consider- 
the princi-  ing them in all their relations 3r.d  consequences.  For we fre- 
plc=, and 
thence in-  quently see that those,  who have had only the first notion,  find 
fers prop-  themse!ves  embarrassad and  mistaken, vil?en  they are to apply 
er conse- 
quences.  it to a case of  the least delicate or  complicated nature.  They 
are  sensible indeed of  the  general  principles, but  they do not 
know how to follow  them through  their  different branches,  to 
make the  necessary  distinctions  or  exceptions,  or  to  modify 
them according to time and place.  This is the business of rea- 
son,  which  it discharges so  much the better,  in  proportion  as 
there is care taken to exercise and improve it. 
ad-  XI.  3.  Keason not only carries its views farther than instinct, 
vantage :  with respect to the unfolding and  application of principles,  but 
reason is 
an univer-  has  also a more extensive sphere,  in regard  to  the very princi- 
sal means  ples it discovers, and the objects it embraces.  For instinct has 
and appli-  been  given us only  for a small number of  simple cases, relative 
cable to all 
easel.  t.3 our natural state, and which require a quick determination. But 
besides those simple  cases,  where it is proper, that man should 
be drawn and determined by a first motion ;  there are cases of 
a more composite nature,  which  arise from the  different states 
of man,  from the combination  of  certain  circumstances,  and 
from the particular situation of each person ;  on a11  which it is 
impossible to form any rules but  by reflection,  and by an atten- 
tive observation of  the relations and agreements of each  thing. 
Such are the two faculties, with which God has invested us, 
in order to enable us to discern between good and evil.  These 
faculties happily joined,  and subordinate one to the other,  con- 
cur to the same effect.  One gives the  first  notice,  the other 
verifies acd proves it ;  one acquaints us with the principles,  the 
other applies and unfolds them ;  one serves for a guide in the 
most pressing  and necessary  cases,  the  other  distinguishes all 
sorts of affinity or relation,  and lays down  rules  for the  most 
particular cases. 
It is thus we are enabled to discern what  is good  and  just, 
or, which amounts  to  the same thing, to know what is the di- 
vine will, in respect to the  moral conduct we are  to  observe. 
Let us unite  at present  these two means,  in order to find  the 
principles of  the law of nature, 
CHAP.  IV. 
Of the prinriplr~,f./orn  which reason  deduce the law of  nature." 
1.  IF  we should be afterwards asked, what  ought  whence 
reason to m-k?  us? of,  in order to judgz of what relates to the  are we to 
deduce the 
lam of  nature,  and to deduce and unfold it ?  Our answer is iil  principles 
gener~!,  that we have only to attend to the nature of man,  and  of thefalv 
of  nature ?  to his states or reiations ;  and,  as these relations  are  different, 
there may b-  likewise ditferent  principles,  that lead  us to the 
knourledge  of our duties. 
But before me  entcr upon  this point,  it will  be  proper  to 
ma'ke some preii~i~i!lnr~  remarlts  on  what  we  call  principles f 
natural lam ;  in ord-r to prevent the ambiguity or equivocation, 
that has often entnngled this subject. 
11.  I.  When we i!?quire  here which are the first principles  P'elimb-  ry re- 
of  natural law, the question is,  which are those truths or prim-  ,,k, 
itive rules,  whereby we may effectu,llly know the divine will in  What we 
understand  regard  to man ; and thus arrive, by just  consequences, to the  by princi- 
knowledge of  the particuiur  laws and duties, which God impo-  ples of rat- 
ural law.  ses on us by right reason ? 
2.  We  must  not therefore  confound the  principles here in 
question, with the eficient and productive cause of natural laws, 
or  with their obligatory  principle.  It is unquestionable,  that 
the will of  t!le  Supreme Being is the efticient  cause of  the law 
of  nature,  and  the  source  of  the  obligation,  thence  arising. 
But, t!iis  being taker, for granted, we hzve  still to enquire how 
man may att:in  to the  knowledge  of  this will, and to the dis- 
csvcry of  tl>clse priilcip!-s,  which,  acquainting  us with the di- 
vin- iu:e;~tion, en~ble  11;  t~ rdace fra:n it all our particular  du- 
tie;,  so far as tli~y  ara discov2rable by reason  only.  A perso:) 
asks, for example, whether t'le  Iiw oE  inture requires us to re- 
pair  iajuries, or to be fditiifal to our engagements ?  If W:  are 
satisfied with ans~r;ering him, that th, t:~i!~g  is inco~itestable,  be- 
cause  S:,  it i3  ordered by the divine will ; it is pldic,  that  this 
*  Sz-,  011 this, an,l the  fo!!o;vin=  chlpter,  P~ficndorl's Law  of  Natur,  and 
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is not a sufficient answer to his question ;  and that he may rea- 
sonably insist to have a principle pointed out, which should re- 
ally convince  him,  that such in fact is  the will  of  the Deity j 
for this is the point he is in  search of. 
Character  111.  Let us  afterwards observe, that  the  first  principles  of 
of those  natural laws, ought  to be  not only  true,  but  likewise  simple, 
principles.  clear,  sufficient, and proper for those laws. 
They ought to be true ; that is,  they should,be taken  from 
the very rature and state of  the thing.  False or hypocriticdl 
principles must produce consequences of  the same nature ;  for 
a  solid  edifice  can  never  be  raised  on  a  rotten  foundation. 
They  ought  to be simple and clear of  their own  nature, or at 
least easy  to apprehend  and unfold.  For, the laws of  nature 
being obligatory for all mankind,  their first principles  should be 
within  every  body's  reach,  so that  whatsoever  has  common 
sense may be easily acquainted  with them.  It would be very 
reasonable therefore  to mistrust principles,  that are farfetched, 
or of too subtle and metaphysical a natnrt.. 
I add,  that  these  principles  ought to be sufficient and uni- 
versal.  They should be such, that one may deduce from them, 
by immediate and natural consequences, all the  I~ws  of  nature, 
and the severdl duties the~ce  reaultinp ;  insomuch that the ex- 
position  of  particulars  be properly  only  an explication of  the 
principles ;  in the  same manner, very  nearly as the production 
or iricredse of  a  p!ant  is only an unfoldir~g  of  the seed. 
And, as most natuial la\vs are subject to divers exceptions, it 
Is  likewise  necessary,  that  the principles  be  such,  as  include 
~rle  rcasons of the vcry esceptidns ; and that we may  not only 
draw from them all the conlmon  rules  of  morality,  but  that 
they also si.nrc  to rescrain  these rule?, according as place, time, 
and  occasion require. 
In fine, t!lose  first principles  ought to be estab!ished  in such 
a manner, as to be really the proper and direct foundation of all 
the duties of naturdl law ; insomucb that whether we  descend 
from the principle to dcduce the consequences,  or whether  we 
ascend  from the consequences to the principle,  our  reasoning3 
ought aIways to be immediately  connected,  and  their thread as 
it were never interrupted. 
IV.  But, generally speaking, it is a matter of  mere indifirence Whether 
whether we reduce the whole to one  single principle,  or estab 
lish a variety of them.  We must consult and follow iq this re- the whole 
spect  a  judicious  and exact method.  All that  can be  mid on :nO$'t 
this head is,  that it  is not at all necessary to the solidity or per- principle, 
fection  of  the system,  that  all natural laws  be deduced  fr~qi 
one single and fundamental maxim ;  nay,  perhaps the  thing is 
impossible.  Be that  as it may,  it is idle to endeavor to reduce 
the whole to this unity. 
Such are the  general remarks  we had to propose.  If they 
prove just  we shall reap this double advantage  from them,  that 
they will instruct  us  in the method we are  to follow,  in order 
to establish the true principles of natural law ;  and at the same 
time they will enable us to pass a solid judgment  on the differ- 
ent systems concerning  this  subject.  But  it is time  now  to 
come to the point. 
V.  The only way to attain to the knowedge of natural law is  ~~lncu- 
to consider attentively the nature and  constitution  of  man,  the 
relations he has to the beings,  that surround him, and the states knowledge 
thence resulting.  In fact the very  term natural low,  and  the :':;if 
notion we have  given of  it,  show,  that  the  principles of  this  by examin, 
science must be t&en  from the very nature and constitution  of  ~~e~o~~ 
mm.  We  shall therefcre law down two general propositions,  stitution, 
as the foundation of  the whole system of  the law 01 nlture.  andstate* 
Fil-~t  Pi$ositio!l. 
Whatever is in the  nature and original constitution  of  mao, 
and appears a necess.ary  consequence of  this nature'and consti- 
tution, certainly iildicates  the intention or will of God with re- 
spect to man,  and consequently acquaints us  with the  law of 
nature. 
Second Proposition. 
But, in order to have a  complete system ~f  t!ie  law of  na- 
ture, we must not only consider the nature of  man,  such as  it 
is in itself;  it is also necessary to attend to the relations he has 
to other beings,  and to different states thence arising.  Other- 
wise it is evidcnt we should h31.e  only an imperfect and dcfec- 
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We  may therefore affirm, that the general foundation of the 
system of  natural  law  is  the  nature of  man, considered un- 
der the several circumstances, that attelld  it,  and in which God 
himself has placed  him  for  particular  ends;  inasmuch  as  by 
this means we  may  be acquainted with the will of  God.  In 
short since man  holds from the hncd ol God himself  whltev- 
er he possesses, as well  wit11 regard  to his existence,  as  to his 
manner of  existing, it is the study of  human nature only, that 
can fully instruct us  concerning  the views, which  God propos- 
ed to himself  in giving us  our being;  and consequently with 
the rules we ought to follocv, in order to acco~nplish  tlie designs 
of  the Creator. 
%CC  VI,  For this purpose we must  recollect whnt  has been  al-  *  ready said of  the manner,  in  which Inan be considered  under  man. 
three different respects or states, which embrace all his particu- 
lar relations,  In the first ~Iace  we mny consider him as God's 
creature,  from whom he hns rcccivcd  his  I'IC,  kis rdason,  and 
all the advantages Le  enjoys.  Secondly man illay be consider- 
ed in himself  as a being, composzd of  body and soul,  and  cn- 
dowed with many difTerent facilities;  as  a bcing, that  aaturzl- 
1y loves himself, and  necessarily  d,s;r-s  his  o;vil fcliciiy.  111 
fine we may  consider him,  as formin:  a p;.rt  of  the species,  as 
placed on the earth near several ot;lcr beings of  a si:nilar nat we, 
and with whom he is  inclined,  nay,  by  ilis  natur~l  condition, 
obliged to live in society.  Sucll in  fact is  tE.2  systecl cf  hu- 
manity, from wllich  results the most  commoll  and nzturnl ciis- 
tinction of  our  duties,  tzl;~)n  from  the  tliree  different  states 
here-mentioned ;  duties towards God,  towards ourselves,  and 
towards the rest of  mankind.* 
0:  VI1.  In the  first  place,  since rrsson brings  us  acquainted 
prlnclpleof 
be  with God, as a  selfexistent  being,  and  sovereign  Lord of  all 
h  things,  an3 in particular as our creator, preserver,  and benefac-  i,,"rhzd  tor;  it follows,  that  we ought necessarily  to  aclnowledge the 
ebject.  sovereign  perfection of  this supreme Being,  and  our absolute 
We meet with this division in Cicero.  Philosophy,  slys he, teaches us in 
the  first place the worship of  the deity ;  secondly,  the  mutual duties  of  men, 
founded  on human society ;  and in fine moderation and greatness of boul. '' Haec 
"  (philosophla)  nos prlnlum  ad  ~llotum  (deorum) cultun~,  deinde  ad )US  homin- 
U urn, quod sltum est in generls hun~ani  soc~etlte,  tun1  ad  modestim magnlta- 
dhemque animi erudivit, fir.  lulr.  qus~t.  lrb.  I  rap. 26. 
dependance on him ;  which by a natural  consequence  inspires 
us with sentinients of  respect, love, and fear, and  with an  en- 
tire submission to his will.  For why  should  God have  thus 
manifested himself  to  mankincl,  were it not,  that  their  reason 
should teach them to entertain sentiments,  propoftioned  to the 
excellence of his nature,  that is,  they should honor, love, adore, 
and obey him ? 
VIII.  Infinite  respect is the natural consequence of  the im-  Conse- 
quences d  pression,  we receive from  a  prospect of  all the divine  perfec-  this prin,+ 
tions.  We  cannot refuse  love  and gratitude  to a  being  su-  ple. 
premely beneficent.  The fear of  displeasing  or offending him 
is a natural effect of  the idea  we  entertain of  his  justice  and 
power, and  obedience cannot but follow from  the  knowledge 
of  his legitimate authority over us,  of  his bounty and supreme 
wisdom, which are sure to conduct us by the road most agrera- 
ble to our  nature  and  happiness.  The assemblage  of  these 
sentiments, deeply engraved in the heart is called  Piety. 
Piety, if  it be real, will show itself externally  two different 
ways;  by our morals,  and by outward worship.  I say,  I.  by 
our morals,  because a pious man, sincerely penetrated with  the 
abovementioned  sentiments, will  find himself  naturally  inclin- 
ed to speak and  act  after  the manner,  he  knows to  be  most 
collformable to  the divine  will and perfections.  This  is  his 
rule and model ;  from which the practice of the most excellent 
virtues arises. 
2.  But besides this manner of  honouring God, which is un- 
doubtedly the most necessary and most real, a religious man will 
consider  it as a pleasure and duty to strengthen himself  in these 
sentiments of  piety,  and to excite them in others.  Hence ex- 
ternal  worship,  as  well  p.~blic  as  private,  is  derived.  For, 
whether we consider this worship, as the first aud almost only 
means of  exciting,  entertaining, and improving  religious  and 
pious sentiments in the mind ;  or whether we look  upon  it  as 
an  homage, which men, united by particular or private societies, 
pay in  common to the Deity ;  or  whether  in  fine  both these 
views are joined,  reason represents it to us,  as a  duty of  indis- 
pensable necessity. THE PRINCIPLES  OF 
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&ere is a natural principle, which determines its essence, and pre- 
serves it from all frivolous and superstitious practices ;  viz. that 
it consists in instructing mankind, in rendering them  pious  and 
drtuous, and in giving them  just ideas of  the nature  of  God, 
rs also what he requires from his creatures. 
The different duties,  here  pointed out, constitute  what  we 
distingdish by the name of  Religion. We  may define it a connex- 
iorl,  which attaches man to God, and to the observance of  his 
laws,  by those sentiments of  respect,  love, submission, and fear 
which the perfections of  a  supreme Being,  and. our  intire de- 
pendance on him, as an allwise and allbountiful Cleator, are apt 
m excite in the human mind. 
Thus by studying our nature and state, we find,  in the rela- 
tion we have to the Deity,  the proper  principle,  from  which 
those duties of natural. law,  that have God for their object, are 
immediatdy derived. 
Jelf-love,  IX.  If  we  search  afterwards  for  the principle  of  those 
the princi- 
pleoftbose duties,  that regard ourselves, it will  be easy  to discover  them, 
natural  by  examining the internal constitution  of  man,  and  inquiring 
lawswhich  into the Creator's  views in regard to him, in order to know for  concern 
eur~lves. what end he has endowed him with those faculties of mind and 
body,  that constitute his nature. 
NQW  it is evident, that God, by  creating  us,  proposed  our 
preservation,  perfection, and  happiness.  This  is what  mani- 
festly appears,  as well by the faculties, with which man is invest- 
ed, which all tend to the same end ;  as by the  strong  inclina- 
tion, that pmmps us  to pursue good,  and shun  evil.  God is 
therefore wiIling, that every one should labor for his own pres- 
ervation and perfection, in order to acquire all  the happiness,  of 
which he is capable  according to his nature 2nd state. 
This being  premised,  we may affirm, that self-love  (I mean 
an enlightened and rational love of  ourselves)  may serve for the 
first principle  with  regard to  the duties,  which  concern man 
himself ;  inasmuch as this sensation being inseparable from hu- 
man nature, and having God for  its author, gives us clearly t~ 
understand in this respect the will of  the supreme Being. 
Yet we should take  particular  notice that  the love  of our- 
$elves canilo: serve us as a pri:iriple  ancl rule,  but  inasmuch as 
it is  directed  by right  r~nso:~,  according to the  exigencies  or 
necessities  af our  nature and state. 
I(or thus it o~ily  becoincs an ir~tcr~re~fr  of the Creator's  will in 
respect to us ;  that is,  it ought to be  managed in  such a man- 
ner,  a6  not to  orend the laws of  religion  or society.  Other- 
wise this self-love would become :hc  soufcc  of a tllousand iniqui- 
ties ;  and,  so far  from  being of  any service,  would  prove a 
snare to us,  by  thc prejodicc  we  should certainly receive f~om 
those very iniquities. 
X.  From this principle,  thus established,  it is easy to deduce  Natural 
the natural laws and duties,  that directly concern  U:.  The de-  lJwsderiv- 
ed fre~n 
sire of  happiness is attended,  in the Grst place,  with  the  care  this princi- 
of  our preservation.  It  requires next,  that  (every  thing  else ple. 
being  equal) the care of  the soul  should be preferred  to  that 
of the body.  We  oug!zt  not to 1:egiect  to improve our re-son,  by 
learning to discern txth fron? falsehood,  the  useful  from  the 
hurtful,  in order to acquire  a  just  knowledge  of  things,  that 
concern us,  and to fonn a right  judgment  of  tllen~.  It  is  in 
this that the perfection of  the cnderst3ndi::g,  cr wisdom,  con- 
sis:s.  We  shoc!J  afterwards be determined,  and act constant- 
14'  ..xording to this light,  in spite of al!  contrary scggestion and. 
p~ssioc.  For it is properly this vigour  or perseverance of the 
soul, in following the counsels of wisdom, tl~at  constitutes virtue, 
and forms the  perfection of  the mlil,  without  which the ligl~r 
of  the u:ldersta~iding  would be of  no manner of  use. 
From this principle all the particular ruies arise.  You  ask, 
for example, wlicther the moderation of the passions be a duty, 
imposed upon  113  by the  law of  nature ?  In order tr! give you 
ail answer, I inquire, i:~  my turn,  whether it is necessary to our 
p~~eservation,  perfection ad  happiness  ?  If it be,  as undoubtcd- 
ly it is,  the questioii is dccidcd.  You  have  a mind  to  know 
whether the lovc of  occupatioil,  the discerning between permit- 
ted 2nd forbidden ple.~sures,  and moderation in the use of such, 
;;S  are permitted,  wi:cthcr,  in  fine,  patience,  constancy,  resoiu. 
iion, &c.  are naturnl duties ;  I sha!I  always answer,  by  rnaki~t~ 
use c;f  the  same princip!e ;  and, provided I apply it  well,  my 
nns-xcr cannot  h:~t be  right  2nd exact ;  btcduse  the principle 
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conducts me certainly to the  end,  by acquainting me  with the 
wiil of  God. 
Man :S  XI.  There remains still another point to investigate,  namely. 
made for  the principle, from which we are to deducethose natural laws, thal 
regard our mutual  duties,  and  have  society  for their  object. 
Let us see whether we cannot discover this principle, by pursu- 
ing the same method.  We  ought always to coilsult the actual 
state of  things,  in order to take their result. 
I am not the only person upon earth ;  I find  myself  in  the 
middle of  an infinite number  of  other men, who resemble me 
in every respect ;  and I.am subject to this state, even from my na- 
tivity,  bp the very  act of  providencc.  This induces me natur- 
ally to think,  it was not the intcntion  of  God,  that each  inan 
sbouid live single and separate from the rest ;  but that, on  die 
contrary, it lras his will they should live together,  and be join- 
ed in society.  The  Creator might certainly have formed all men 
at thc same time,  though  separated  from  one  another,  by in- 
vesting each of  them  with the  proper  and suficient  qualities 
for this kind of  solitary life.  If he has not followed this plan, 
it is probably because it  was his will,  that the ties  of  consan- 
guinity and birth should begin to form a more extensive union, 
which lie was pleased to establish amongst  men. 
'rhe  more  I examine,  the more  I am  confirmed  in  this 
thought.  Most of the faculties of  man,  his natural inclinations, 
his weakness,  and wants,  are all  so many indubitable proofs  of 
this intention of  the Creator. 
r. Society  XII.  Such in effect is the nature  and  constitution of  man, 
js  that out of  society  he could  neither  preserve his life,  nor dis-  ly necessa- 
ry forman. pl~y  and perfect his faculties and talents,  nor attain any real and 
ssiici happiness.  What would become of  an infant, were there 
not some  benevolent  and  assisting  hand  to  provide  for  his  - 
wants ?  He must  perish,  if  no one  takes care of  him ; ancl 
this state o:  weakncss  and ignorance requires even a long and 
continued assistance.  View him when grown up to manhood, 
you  iind i~othing  but rudeness, ignorance, and  confused  ideas, 
which  he  is scarce able  to corivey ;  abandon him  to himself, 
2nd you behold a savage, and perhaps a ferocious animal ;  igno- 
rant of  all the conveiliences of  life,  sunk  in idleness,  a prey te 
spleen  and  melancholy,  and  almost  incapable  of  providing 
against the first wants of  nature.  If he attains to old  age, be- 
hold hin~  relapsed  into infirmities,  that  lender  hinl  almost 25 
dependant on external aid, as he was in his infancy.  This de- 
peild~nce  shows itself in  a  more sensible  manner in accidents 
and maladies.  What would then  become of man,  were he to 
be in a  state of  solitude2  There is nothitlg but  the assistance 
of  our fellow creatures, that is able to preserve us from the di- 
vers evils, or to redress them and  render  us easy  and  happy, 
in whatsoever stage or situation of  life. 
We  hxc  an  excellent picture of  the use of  society,  drawn 
by Seneca.*  On  .zuhat, says he,  hes  our security d~end,  Gzrt on 
the  se?-vices  .rue relider one  another ?  It is  this  commerce of brnc- 
&,  that  nzcki.s lfc  ensjl,  and enables us to  dgend ourselves agairlsf 
any suddcn insulis or.  att~cks.  Wlmt would be  the  fafe  of  maf:ki?~d 
Toere  every one to live spot-t  ?  17 jn~ltzy men,  SO  mnny  victims  *- 
otbcr- animals, a;z  easy prey,  in short, fpe!,knt,ss itsclfi  Inj%ct, otfi- 
e1-  a~zimals have  stl-errgth  enough  .rc@cient  13  dy5nd  themre!~ies. 
Thsr that are  .zi~ild  and .zunnde~*i~i~,  nnr!  .zuhgse feuccii?  do21  120.' 
pej-nzit  them  to herd  togethrr,  are born,  ns it  7urrr, .zuith  arm  ; 
~vhereas  mon is on  all .rides emcctnpassed with weakness, l?:zai?:g  :I:;- 
ther amns,  nor teeth,  n~i-  claws tg  rendrr- bintj;t-m'dnblc.  But  t$r 
strength he  wants by  himself, hejnds w3en  rcnited with hir eqr(rrl~.. 
hT~ltuve,  to make amends,  has end~wed  him'  zuith  izuo  things, 
.zuhich give him a considerailefrce  nrzd sr~periorit~,  .ruhe~-e  atFrcui,.i.  he 
7u7:~ltl Ge  much infirior ;  l  fnran reason and sociability, .zuha-ebj  Le, 
7uh7  alone coukd mnke 11s  resistance, btco~itd.  ?i~clstrr  zf  the whole.  S$- 
ciety gives  him an empire over other animals ;  society  is the carts!, 
that,  not  satisJiLd with  the element on  zu!.icB  be  7uas  bcl-TI, he  E:;- 
* Quo alio tuti summus,, quim qubd mutuis juvanlur officiis ?  Hoc uno invrnc- 
tior vita contraque  incursiones subitas  munitior  est,  beneficiorunl  commercio. 
FAC  nos singulos, quid sun~us  ? Preda aninlalium et victimle, ac beilissin~us  et  facilli- 
nlus snnguis.  Quoniam rreteris qnimalibus in tutel.xm sui satis virium est : qus- 
cunque vaga nascuntur, et actura vit.ui~~  sugregem, arnlats sunt.  Homi~em  im- 
becilitas cingit ;  non unguium vis, non dentium, terribllcm czteris  feci:.  Nu- 
dum et infirmum societas munit.  Duas res dedit  qu;e illurn, obiloxiurn rmterio, 
vaiidissimum  facerent, rationem et  societatenl.  Itdque, qui pdr  ~CSC  ndli potc- 
rat, si scduceretur, rerum potitur.  Societas  illi domir:ium  ornniv :I  a,linialiun~ 
dedit.  Societas terris genituln in aiiene naturx transmisit in~periu:~l,  et  domi- 
nari etiam in rnari juss~t.  HPC morboru~n  impetus arcult, vnectuti adminicnla 
prospexit,  solatia  aontra dolores dedit.  i1.w  fmtes nos hilt,  quod Iicet con- 
tra fbrtunam advocare.  Hanc societatenl tolle, et unltatem ge!lrr;s  hun~ini,  quff 
ri  ta oustinetur, scilldes.  9mw. dc  B~fl  fib, 4. gap.  I  8. NA'I'URAL  LAW. 
tends hir c~mmnlzd  ozvr the .recl.  It is  this same  uni~n,  thn:  sq.. 
plies  hiin .roiih  1-~lnedirs  ;!I  hi.r  ~~!J!SPCISPS,  assisfance  in  his old urge, 
and cclnfirt  in his pains  atid ntixieti~s  ;  it is this, tllal ~nab1e.s  bin:, 
as if TUEI-E,  to bid dejoncc to  forttrne.  ToLe  riwny  sonirty  and gotc 
destroy the  nnicn  of  manklt~d,  on  which the presevwation  nt~d  thc 
whole happiness of  I$5  dqi~nds. 
-2.  Man by  XIII.  As society is so necessary to man,  God has therefore 
his conqti- 
tution is  given him a constitution,  iacuities,  and talents, that render him 
very fit for  very proper for this state.  Such is  for example,  the  faculty 
society.  of  speech, which enables us to convey our thoughts with facil- 
ity and readiness,  and would  bc of  no manner  of  use  out of 
society.  The same may be said with regard to our propensity 
to imitation, and of  that surprising mechanism,  which  renders 
all the pzssioi~s  and impressions of  the soul so easy to be com- 
municated.  It is sufTicient a man appears to be  nioved,  in or- 
der to move and soften  others.*  If a  pcrsoi1  accosts us with 
joy  painted on his counten~nce,  !l?  e:;cit:s  in us the like secti- 
ment of  joy.  The tcars  of  a strallgcr nfikct  us,  even  before 
we know the cause thereof ;f  and the cries of a man related  to 
us only by  the common  tie of  l~unial~itp,  make us  by  to  his 
sticcour by a mechan;cnl movcment prcvious to all dcliberaticn. 
This is not all.  We see that i12tuic has dlought p;cpor  to 
distribute differently lier tzlcnts arcotlg men,  by giving to some 
2n  aptitude to perform certain  thi~igs,  which to others zre :m- 
possible ;  while the latter  Iiavc received, in  their turn,  an in- 
dustry denied to the former.  Whcrebrc if  tile natural  wants 
of  lilcn render thenl  dependant on o:ie  ;ln~thrr,  the  ciiversity 
of  talents, which qualifies  them for  mucual aid, concects  and 
untics them.  These are so many evident signs of  man's being 
designed for society. 
3.  na-  XIV.  Cut, if  we consult cur own inclinztioas, we shz!l  like- 
turallncli-  wise find that  our hearts  are nzturally  bent  to  wish  fsr  the 
cations 
prompt us  company ~f  our equals,  and  to dread an intire  solitude, as nn 
to lookout  irksome and forlorn  state.  And though  there have been  in- 
for society. 
stances of  people,  who have thrown themselves  into a solitary 
* Eomo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.  Ttr.  Hrautor:. 
t Ut ridentibus adxident, ita flentibus adsunt 
Humani vultus .... ,  ........  Hor. dc  artcpoct. v.  151. 
iite, yct we  csnnct consider  this in any other  light, bat as the 
effect of  superstition, or melancholy, or of a singularity extreme- 
ly remote from the state  of  nature.  lvere  we  to investigate 
the cause of this social inclination,  we should find it is wisely be- 
stonred on  us  by the author of  our being;  by reason  that it is 
ia society man finds a relnedy for the greatest part of his wants, 
and an occnsiot~  for  exercising  most of  his faculties ;  it is  in 
society he is capable of feeiing and displaying  those sensations, 
on which nature ha3 intailed so much satisfaction and pleasure ; 
I mean  the sensations of  benevolence,  friendship,  compassion, 
and generosity.  For such  are the charms of  social affections, 
that from them our pilrest  enjoyments arise.  Nothit~g  in  fact 
is so  satisfactory  arid flattering to man, as to  think  he  merits 
thc esteeril and friendship of  others.  Science acquires an ad- 
ditional value,  when  it can display  itself abroad ;  and our joy 
becomes more sensible, when we have  an opportunity of  testi- 
fying it in public,  or of pouririg it into the bosom of  a friend.  It 
is rcdoublcd by being communicated ;  for our own sntisfaction 
is incre-sed  Ly the agreeable idea  we have  of  giving  pleasure 
to cur friends, and  of  fixing them more steadily in our inter- 
est.  Anxiety on  the  contrary  is alleviated  and  softened  by 
:Jlarin::  it with our neighbour;  just  as a burden is eased, n4ien 
a gcoda.ltl;red pcrsoll hzlps us to bear ir. 
rl  lhus evcry  thing  itiviccs us  to tile state  of  society ;  want 
:ende:s  :L  liccessary to us, inclination makcs it a p!e~sure, and tke 
clispositions we n?:ur~ily 1r.ve for it, are a suficient  indicntion 
of  its bcing really inte:~ded  by our Creator. 
XV.  But, as liiiman sc:cie:p  can neither subsist, nor prodace  Sociability. 
tl:e  Ilsppy  effx:s,  for whicl~  God has established it, un!esr,  man- 
of  natural 
Ainci  Ilavi.  scnti~ncnts  of  affection and benevolence for one an- l,,,  ,,la, 
other ;  it iollows illat our Creator and  common Fatlier is u-il-  tivcto 
other  men. 
ling, tlut evcry  boJy should be anim.~ted  with these sentiinents, 
and do w!latcver  lies i.1 their power to maintaiil  this  society in 
n:l  agreeabie and  advmtagcous  st~t~,  and to  tie the  k~:ot  still  - 
ciose:  11y  reciprocal se~vicgs  and benefits. 
This is t$e  true principle of the duties,  w1i;cIi  tlic : -'  o:  na- 
cure prescribes to us in respect to other  men.  Et!lic~1  writers 
have given it the name of  S:ciabii!tj,  by which t!icy  zi~dxstand ~18  THE  PRUNCIPLES  OF 
NATURAL  LAW. 
that disposition, which inclines us to benevolence to our fellow- 
creatures,  to do them all the  good, that lies in  our  power,  to 
reconcile  our own happiness to that  of  others,  and  to render 
our particular advantage subordinate to the ccjmmon and  gene- 
ral good. 
The more we study  our o\rr:l naturc,  the more we  are con- 
vinced,  that this sociability is really agreeable to the will of  God. 
For, beside  the necessity of  this principle,  we find it engraved 
in our heart ;  where, if  the Creator has implantcd on one side 
the love of  ourselves,  the same hand has imprinted on the ot!1- 
er a sentiment of benevolence  for our fellow-creatures.  These 
two inclinations, though distinct from one another, have nothing 
opposite in their  nature ;  and  God, who  has bestowed them 
upon us,  designed they should act in concert,  in order  to help, 
and not to destroy each other.  Hence goodnatured  and gen- 
erous hearts feel a most secsible  satisfaction  in  doing good  to 
mankind,  because in this they fo!low  the inclination, they receiv- 
ed from  nature. 
Natyral  XVI.  From the principle  of sociability, as  from their rea! 
source, all the laws of society,  and all our general and  particu-  flow from 
sociability.  lar duties toward other men,  are derived. 
=.l-he pub-  I.  This union, which  God  h3s est2blisIied among men,  re- 
lic good  quires that,  in every  thing relating  to society,  the  public  good 
ought al- 
ways  to be  should be the supreme rule  of  their conduct, and that, guided 
the su-  by the counsels of prudence,  they should never pursue their pri- 
preme rule. vate advantage to the prejudice of the public ;  for this is what 
their state demands, and is consequently the  will of  their com- 
mon father. 
2- me  rpi-  2.  The spirit of  sociability ought  to be universal.  Human 
rit of socia- 
bility  society embraces all those with whom we can have possibly any 
ought tobe communication ;  because it  is  founded  on the  relations, they 
aniversal.  all bear  to  one another,  in  consequence  of  their  nature  and 
state." 
3. To  ob-  g.  Reason afterwards informs us,  that creatures of  the same 
serve a nat- 
ural equal- rank  and species, b~rn  with  the same faculties to live in socie- 
~SY.  ty,  and to  partake of  the saxe advantages,  have  in general an 
See Puffendotf, Law of Nature and Nztions, book ii, chap, iii, sect.  15. 
equaI and  common  right.  We  are  therefore  obligecl  to con- 
sider ourselves  as naturally equal, and to  behave as such ;  and 
it would be  bidding defiance to nature not to acknowledge this 
principle of  equity (which by  the  civilians is called  leq:lnbilitas 
jrrris)  as  one of  the first  foundations of  society.  It is on this 
the  /ex  tolionis is  founded,  as al~o  that  simple  but  universal 
and  usefill  rule,  that  we  cjug?it  to  have  the  same  dis- 
positions  in regard  to other men,  as we desire they should have 
toward us, and to behave in the  same  manner  towards  them, 
as we are willing  they should behave to us  in the like circum- 
stances. 
4. Sociability being a reciprocal obligation among mea, such,  4.  To pre- 
as tllrough malice or  injustice break the band of  society, cannot :y'ie:P 
re:ls3liably  complain,  if  those,  they  have injured,  do not treat  evento- 
them as frimds,  or even  if  thcy proceed against  them by forci- zeI''?;yr 
ble methods.  Self de- 
Bu:,  though we have a right to su.;?end  the acts  of  benevo-  fence is 
permitted, 
lence in regard to an enemy, yet we are never  allowed to  stifle  revenge is 
its principle.  As  nothing but  necessity  can authorise  us  to not. 
have recoursz to force against an unjust aggressor,  so this same 
neces::iry shculd be the  rule  and measure  of  the harm we do 
him ;  and we ought to  be always disposed to reconcilement so 
sooil,  as he has done us justice,  and we have nothing farther to 
apprehend. 
We  must therefore distinguish carefully between  a  just de- 
fence of one's  own  person,  and revenge.  The first does but 
suspend, through necessity and for a while,  the exercise  of  be- 
nevolence,  and has nothing in it opposite  to sociability.  But 
the other stifling the very principle of  benevolence,  introduces 
in its stead  a sentiment of  hatred and  animosity,  a sentiment 
vicious ill  itself,  contrary  to  the  public  goood,  and expressly 
condemned by  the law of  nature. 
XVII.  These grncral rules are very fertile of  consequences.  Particular 
lire sl~ould  do ilo wrong to any  orie,  either  in word or ac-  consequer 
ces. 
tion ; and we ought to  repair all damages by  us  committed ; 
for socieiy could not  s:~bsist, were acts of  injustice tolerated. 
We ollght to be  sincere ill our discourse,  and steady in our 'I'HE  PRINCIPLES  0:: 
engagements ;  for what trust could men repose in one anothei, 
and wiiat security could  they have in  coin~nercial  life,  were it 
lawful to violate their plighted faith  ? 
We  not only ought  to do every  man  the good  he properly 
deserves, but moreover we should pay him the degree of esteem 
and honour, due to him, according to his estate and rank ;  because 
subordination is the link of  society,  without which there can bc 
no order eitlier in families, or in civil governments. 
But if the public good requkes, that inferiors should obey,  it 
demands also, that superiors should preserve the rights of those, 
who are subject to them,  and should  govern their people only 
in order to render them happy. 
Again ;  men are captivated  by  the heart ant1  by  favours ; 
now nothing is inore agreeable to humanity,  or more useful to 
society,  than compassion,  lenity,  beneficence,  and  generosity. 
This is what induced Cicero to say,"  there is nothing truer than 
thnt excellent rnaxirn  of  Plato,  viz. that  we  are not  born fcr  our- 
selves  alotle, but  likewisefir  our country mzd fried ;  and $  ac- 
rordinz  to  the Stoics, the prodzlctions of the  envth  a1.c  for ~nm,  atzd 
vzen  th?n2~ci~~;  f3r  the pod and assistance of one  another ;  we ought 
certnirzly,  in this I-espect,  to  coinply  with the rlesign  of  nntrtre, and 
proin;te  her  intemtiorz  by  contributing ciw  s6izi.e  to  the gep~eual  itrter- 
est, by  mt~trially  and receivin~  good turns, and cmnplo~ing  all 
care nrzrE  industr;y,  and even  o:cr  szrbshfice,  to  strengthen that 
love clnd~?*i~~tlilship,  whid should nlwnys prevail Jn  hulnan  ~ociety. 
Since therefore the  different sentiments  and  acts  of  justice 
ancl goodness are the  only and  true  bonds,  that knit  men to- 
get!ii.r,  and are c~pablc  of contributing to  the  st::bi:ity,  peace, 
and prosperity of  society ;  we musr  look upon tliose .iiriues,  as 
so many duties,  tii.~t God imposes o:~  us,  far  this reason,  be- 
ciuse wh~tever  is necessary  to his design is of course  conform- 
able to his tilill. 
* Sed quonlznl (ut przclarS scriptuin ast  a  Platone)  non  nobis  so!<::-i~  nati 
sunius,  oltusque no,tri  prtern patria vindicat,  parrem 2n1ic1 ;  atque (nt  plaset 
S:o;c:,)  qilx iii trtris gigantur, ad usuln hoininum cmnia creari, homines autem 
hotl~inun~  cnuaa esse generates, ut ipsi inter se alii  prodesse possent ; in hoc na- 
tura~n  de:~cmus dgcern sequi, et cominunts utilitate.  in mediunl  aEcrrr mutatio- 
nc ofticiorum, dando, cicciprendo ;  turn artibus,  turn epera,  turn fdcultk:~!~aj  de- 
vin-ire hr.:!~iouv irwr hominc:  societatrm,  Ci;,  ?<'Ofic.  lib. i. np  7. 
XVIII.  We  have therefore  three general  ~rinciplea  of the  Theee 
thiee 1";"- 
laws of  nature relative to the abovemerit~c  i.rd thrce~t~te~  of nlafl.  Llties  have 
And these are,  I.  Re!igir  n.  2.  Se;;'-love.  3.  Soci~bi~i~y  or  a  l  :!)c re- 
clt.iaite 
benevolence  towards our fellotv cresitiri.:;.  chxacters. 
'L'hese  principles  lidve all t:ie  chancters above required.  'They 
are true, because  they are taker1 from  the  nature  of  man,  in 
the  constirutiun  and  state,  in  which  God  has  placed  hiin. 
'I'hey  are simjlc and witiiin  every body's  reach, which is an im- 
portant poht ; because,  in  regard  to duties,  there is nothing 
wanting but principles,  that are ubvious ta  every  one ; for a 
subtlety  of  mind, that nets  us  upon  singular and new ways, is 
always daiipeaous.  In fice these principles are su$icient  and ve- 
ry fertile  by raxson thejl embrace all the objects of  our duties, 
and acquaint us with the will of  God  in  the several states and 
relations of  man. 
XIX.  True it is,  that PuEendorf reduces the thing within a  Remarks 
on  Puffen-  less  compass,  by  establishing sociability  alone, as  the founda-  dorf's 
tion of  all natural 13~~s.  Rxt it has been justly  observed,  that system. 
this me:hod  is defective.  For  the principle of  sociability does 
not furnish us with the proper and direct foundation of  ali our 
duties.  Those  which have  God  for  their object,  and  those, 
which  are  relative  to man  himself,  do not flow  directly and 
immediately from this source, but  have their proper and partic- 
ular  principle.  Let  us  suppose  man  in solitude ;  he  would 
still have several duties to discharge,  such as to lore  and  hon- 
our God, to preserve himself, to cultivate his faculties as much 
as possible,  &c.  I  acknowledge,  tliat the  principle  of  socid- 
bility is the most extensive, dnci  that the other two have  ;I  nat- 
ural connection with it ; yet  we  ought not to  confound them, 
as if  they had  not their  own particular  force,  illdependant of 
sociability.  'rhese are three diiTeretlt springs, wh~ch  give mo- 
tion and  action to  the  system of  humanity ;  springs  distinct 
from one another,  but which act all at t!ie  same time  pursuant: 
to the views of the Creator. 
XX.  Re it said  nevertheless,  in  justific;xtion of  Puff~ndorf,  The critics 
h.tvr  car-  and accorciing to a  judicious  observ:ition made  by  .hrbeyrlc, ried their 
that most  oi the  criticisms  on the form:rYs  systcm,  as  defec- censures 
five in its principle, have been pushed too far.  This iUustrious 
too fa 
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against  restorer of  the study of  natural law  declares,  his  design  was 
h~m  in this 
respect.  properly no more than  to explain tlie natural  duties  of  man.* 
Now for this purpose he had occasion only for the principle  of 
sociability.  According to  him,  our duties towards God  forin 
a paxt  of  natural  theology ;  and religion  is  interwoven in  a 
treatise of  natural law, only as it is a  firm  support of  society. 
With regard to the dutiec, that concern man himself, he makes 
them  depend  partly  on  religion,  and  partly  on sociability.f 
Such is  Puffendorf's  system ;  he would  certainly  have  made 
his work more yerfect, if,  embracing  all the states of  man,  he 
had established distinctly the proper principles agreeable to each 
of  those states, in order to deduce afterwards from them all our 
particular  duties.  For such is the just extent we ought to givc 
to natural law. 
Of  thecon-  XXI.  This was so  much the  more  necessary,  as  aotwidi- 
nerion  be- 
tween our  standing our duties are relative to different objects,  and  dedu- 
natural  ced from distinct principles,  yet they have,  as we already hint- 
duties.  ed, a natural connexioil ;  insomuch that they are interwoven,  as 
it were, with one another,  and by mutual assistance the obser- 
vdnce of  some  renders  the practice of  others  more easy  and 
certain.  It is certain, for example, that the fear of  God, join- 
ed to perfect submission to his will, is a very efficacious motive 
to engage men to discharge what directly concerns themselves, 
and to do for their neighbour  and for society whatever  the law 
of  nature  requircs.  It is also certain, that  the duties, which 
relate to ourselves,  contribute not a little to direct us with res- 
pect to other men.  For what good could society expect  from 
a man,  who  would take  no care to improve  his reason,  or to 
form his mind aid heart  to wisdom and virtue ?  On the  con- 
trary,  what may  we  not  promise  ourselves  from those,  who 
spare no pains to  perfect  their  faculties  and  talents,  and  are 
pushed on towards this noble end,  either by  the desire of  ren- 
dering themselves happy, or by that of  procuring the happiness 
of  others ?  Thus whosoever neglects  his duty  towards God, 
and deviates from the rules of  virtue in what concerns himself, 
+  See the Law of  Nature and Nations  book ii. chap. iii. 5 19.  Specim. con- 
trover. cap. s.  sect. 25.  Spicilegium controversiarum, cap.  I. sect. 14. 
t See the Dutter of  Man  and a Citizen, book  i. chap. iu. fect. r;. 
b  3use  colnmits thereby  an injustice in respect to other  men, b-c 
he subtracts so much  from  the  common happiness.  On the 
contrary,  a person,  who is penetrdted  with such  sentiments of 
piety, justice,  and benevolence, as religion and sociability require, 
endeavours to make himself  happy ;  because,  according to the 
plan of  ~rovidence,  the personal felicity of  every man is insep- 
crably connected,  on  the one  side  with  religion,  and  on  the 
other with the general happiness of  the society,  of  which he is 
a member ;  insomuch that  to  take a particular road to  happi- 
ness is mistaking the thing,  and rambling quite out of the way. 
Such is  the admirable harnlony, which  the divine  wisdom  has 
established betwcen the  different  parts  of  the humari  system. 
What could  be wanting to complete the happiness of man,  were 
he always attentive to such salutary directions ? 
XXII. But as the three grand principles of  our duties are thus of  the  01 
connected,  so there is likewise a natural subordination betwecn  ~~~~tf~~e 
them, that helps to decide which of  those duties oucht to have  times ha" 
the preference in particular circumstances or  ~ases.~w~cn  thev  pens be-  . . 
J  tween  have 3 kind of  conflict  or opposition, that does  not permit us these ver 
to discharge them a11  alike.  duties. 
The general principle to j~tdge  rightly of  this subor&natio!l 
is,  that tile stronger obligation ought always  to prevail over the 
weaker.  But to know  afterwards  which  is the stronger olli- 
pion, we havc only to attend to the very nature of  our duties, 
and their different  degrees of  necessity and utility ;  for this  is 
the right way to know in that case the will of  God.  Pursuant 
to these ideas,  we shall giv~  here some general rules concerning 
the cases above mentioned. 
1.  The duties of  man  towards God  should always  prevail 
over any other.  For all obligations, that, which binds us to our 
all-wise  and all-bountif~l  Creator, is without doubt the nearest 
and  strongest.  - 
2.  IC what we  owe to ourselves comes in competition with 
our duty to society in general,  society  ought to have the prefcr- 
cnce.  Orherwise we should  invert the order of  things,  destroy 
the foundations of  society,  and act directly contrary to the  will 
of  Gvd, who by scbordir~ating  the part to the  whole, has laid THE PRINCIPIXS  OF 
m  under  an  indispensable obligation of  never  devinting from 
the supreme 13w of  the conimo~l  good. 
3. But if,  every thing else equal, tbere happens to be an oppo- 
sition between tlre  duties of  self-love  and sociability,  self-love 
ought to prevail.  For, man being directly and  primarily charg- 
ed with  the care of  his own preservation and h~ppiness,  it fol- 
lows ther~.fore  that, in  a  case  of  intire inequality, the care  of 
ourselves ought to prevail over that  OS  othcy~s. 
4.  But if  in fine the op~,o~:t;oi-,  i; benvt.t.n  dutiesrelating to 
ourselves, or  L)etwecn  two ciuticj  of  soc:ability,  urc  ought to 
prefer t!ut,  whicb 1s accompa:lied  with the  grcatest utility,  ac 
being the most im2ortant.' 
Natural  1.  %'hat  we ha:e  hit!~erto csp!ained  properly rcpards 
1a.i oLl!qa-  the natural law called  obii2ato~,  viz.  t!l,~t, -,vhic5 having for its  tory, a.ld 
natural  nbject those  actions,  wherein  we d!scovcr  a  necessary  agreea- 
of s;mi'!e  bleness  or disagreeableness to the nature and state of  man, lays 
pernuasion. 
Gtn:l-al  US  u~der  an indispensable obligation of  zcting or not acting af- 
:~riuciplzaf ter a partic~~llr  rnJnner.  But, in canscquellc- of what has been 
rhe law  of 
permision.  sid  above,t ws must acknowied~e  th*t there is likewire a  law 
of sin~~fepeumission,  which leaves us nt liberty in  prticular ca- 
ses to act or not ;  and, by l~~~ag  othx men CI:I~~C  a necessity 
of  giving us no let nor molestat~on,  secures to US  in this respect 
the exercise and effect of  our liberty. 
The general principle of  this law of  permission is,  that we 
nay  resonably, and  accord;ng as wc  judge  proper,  do or omit 
whatever has not an absolute and essentia!  agreeableness or di:- 
agreeabieness to rhe nature and state of  man ; unless  it  he  a 
thing expressly  ordained or forbidden by  some positi1.e  law, to 
which we are otherwise  subject, 
Thc  truth of  this principle is obvious.  The  Creator having 
invested  inan with several faculties,  and,  among the rest,  with 
tllat of  modifying his actions, as he  thinks proper ;  it  is plain 
that in every thitlg,  in which he has not  re,tr'~it~cd  the use  of 
those faculti?~,  either by an cxTres5 comiiznild  ar a positive pro- 
hibition, he  leaves nlan at liberty to exercis:  rhcm according to his 
" See Barbeyrac's fifth note on sect, 15. of  the third chapter, book ii.  of  the 
Law of  Ndture and N~tions. 
t  Ste part i. chap. X.  5 ad  6. 
owl1 discretion.  It is on this law of permission a!l  those  rights are 
founded, w!:ich  are  of  such a  nature, as to leave us at liberty 
to use  them or not,  to retain  or  renounce  them in the wholt. 
or in part;  and, in consequence of  this  renuncintioil, actions, 
in themselves permitted, happen  sometimes  to ba conlmanded 
or forbidden by  the  authority  of  the  sov-reign,  nnd  beco~ne 
oSligatory bv that  m-ans. 
XYIV.  This is  what right  reacon  discoveri i.1  the  nature Two  spe- 
cies of nat- 
and  constitution  of  man,  in his  original  and pri~nitive  state.  ural law ; 
Hut,  3s  man  himself  Inay  m2ke  divers  modifications  in his  one primi- 
tive, the  primitive state,  and  enter  into several adventitious  o~~cs  ;  the  other sec- 
consideration of  those new stntes fxll  likewise within  the  ob-  ondary. 
jcct of the I,iw of nature, tabell in its full extent ;  ant!  the prin- 
~iplcs,  U'J  h~ve  hid down, ought to serve likewisc fqr a rule is 
rhc states, in which inan engages by his own act anti (iced. 
Hence occasion has !xen taken to distinguish :\v0  species of 
natural Idw ;  the o11c  primary, the other secondary. 
The  primary or primitive natural law is that, which  irn:ne- 
diateiy arises from the prinlitive  const~tution  of  man,  as  God 
himself has established  it, indc-sendant of  any human act. 
Secon(Eary natcral law is  that, wliibl1 supposes some human 
act or e;t~blishment ;  as a civil state, property of  goods, &c. 
It is easy to comprehend, that this secondary natur~l  law is 
only a consequence of the iornier; or rather it is a just applica- 
tion of  the  general  maxims of  nnturnl  law to  the  particular 
states of  mankind, and to the diff~rent  circumstances,  in which 
they find  themselves  by  their own act ;  as it appears -11 fact, 
when we come to examine into particular duties. 
"Some  perhaps will  be surprised,  that  in establishing the 
principles of  natural law, we have taken  no notice of  thz  dif- 
ferent  o~inions  cf  writcrs  concerl~ing  this subject.  Rut we 
judged  it  more adviseable to point  out the true  sourcps,  from 
which the  principles were to be drawn, and to  eJiabli,h  dt'ter- 
wards the princip!es  themselves, than to eiitcr into a discussion, 
which would have carried us too far for a work of  this nature. 
If  we hav? hit up3n the true one, this will be sutxcient to en+ 
See Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, book  i. chap. i. sec. 10.  and Pu&n- 
toif, Law of  N,.til:e  2nd Nariana, book li.  chap. iii. sec. 21. NATURAL  LAW. 
ble us to judge  of  all the rest ;  and,  if  any o:~c  desires a  inore 
ample and more particular instruction,  he may easily find  it by 
consulting Puffendorf,  who relates the differerit opiniolis of  ci- 
vilians, and zccompanies them with very judicious  reflections." 
CEIAP.  V. 
%f  natural laws havt been  ,113ci,ntl, n3t$ed,  fth~i~  p,-;per  iha- 
rncierisiics, the c6ligcztiorz, they PPO(~ZICC, *C. 
God has 
mficiendy  I.  AFTER  what lias bee11 liitl~crtu  said  is relation  to the 
notified  the laws of  principles of natural l:lw,  and the way  we  come  to know &em, 
nature to  there is no need to ask,  whether God has sufficiently  notified 
those laws to  man.  It  is evident  we  can discover  all  their 
principles,  and deduce from  thsm our  several duties,  by  that 
natural light, which to no  man has been ever refused.  It is in 
this sense we  are  to understand what  is commonly  said,  that 
this law is naturally known to a:l  mankind.  For, to think with 
some people, that the law of  nature is innate, as it were,  in our 
minds,  and  actually imprinted in  our souls from the first ao- 
ment of  our existence,  is  supposing a  thing, that is  not at  all 
necessary, and is moreover coritradicted by  experience.  All, that 
can be  said on this subject, is,  that  the most general and  most 
important maxims of the law of  nature are so  clear and mani- 
fest,  and have such a  proportion  to our ideas, and such an  ;I- 
greeableness to our nature,  that so soon,  as they are  proposed 
to us,  we itistantly approve of  them ;  and as we  are  disposed 
and accustomed from our infancy to feel these  tru*i  .. S,  we con- 
sider them as born with us. 
M?'  may  11.  But we must  take  care  to observe,  that, when  we say 
aSast one 
another in  man  may acquire the knowledge of  natural laws, by  using his 
thisrespect,  reason,  we  do not exclude the  succours, he may  receive  clse- 
where.  Some there are, who,  having taken  a particular  care 
to cultivate their  minds,  are qualified to  enlighten others, and 
to supply, by their instructions,  the rudeness and ignorance of 
the common run  of  mankind.  This is agreeable to the  plan 
of  providence.  God  having  designed  man  for  society,  ancl 
See Puffendorf, Law of Nature and Nations,  book ii. chap. iii, acc. I. 14. 
given.him a co~lstitution  relative to t5is c:ld,  the different helps, 
which men receive of  one another,  ought  to be equally  ranli- 
ed among natural  means,  with  those,  which every  one  finds 
within himself, and draws froin his own fund. 
In efict all men  are not of  themselves  capable of  unfolding 
methodically the principles of  natural Inw, and the consequences 
thence resulting.  It is  suflicient,  that middiing capacities are 
able to comprehend at least those principles,  when they are ex- 
plained to them, and to :eel  the truth and  necessity  of  the du- 
ties,  that flow froh them, by co~npnring  then1  with the consti- 
tution of  their own nature.  But if there be some capacities of 
a still inferior order,  they  are gemrally  led by the  impressions 
of example,  custom,  authority,  or some  present  and  sensible 
utiiity.  Be this as  it will,  every thing  rightly  considered, the 
law of  nature is suficiently  notified  to empower us to affirm, 
that no min, at  the age  of  discretion,  and in  his right senses, 
can alledge for a  just excuse  an invincible  ignorance  on this 
article. 
111.  Let us make a reflection,  which presents itself here very Theman- 
naturally.  It is, that whosoever attends seriously to the man-  the 
ner, in which we have established  the principles of the laws of 
nat:;i-2,  will soon  find, that the  method we  have followed is a 
of the laws 
of nature 
fresh proof of the certainty and redity of  those laws.  We  have  have been 
waved ail  abstract  and  metaphysical  specula:ions,  in order to is a fresh 
consult plain  fact, and the nature and  state of  things.  It is proofofthe 
from the natural constitution of man, and from the relations, he those  reality  Iawa.  of 
has  to  other beings,  that  we have  taken our principles ;  and 
the system thence resulting has so strict and so necessary a con- 
nexion with this  nature and state of  man,  that they are abso- 
lutely inseparable.  If to all this we join what has been already 
observed in the foregoing chapters,  we cannot methinks mistake 
the laws of  nature, or doubt of  their  reality, without renounc- 
rng the purest  light of reason,  and running into Pyrrhonism. 
IV.  But as the principles of the laws  of nature are, through 
the wisdotn of  thc Creator, easy to discover, and as the knowl-  laws are 
the effect 
edge  of the duties, they  impose on  us,  is within  the reach of  the 
the most ordinary capacities ; it is also certain,  that these laws  vine good- 
?re far from being impracticable.  On  the contrary, tley bear 
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so manifest  a proportion  to  the light of  right  reason,  and to 
our most natural incltnations ;  they have also such a relation to 
our perfection and  happiness ;  that they cannot  be considered 
otherwise, than as an effect of  the divine goodness towards men, 
Since no other motive,  but that of doing good,  could ever  in- 
duce a being,  who is selfexistent and supreniely happy, to form 
creatures endowed with understanding and sense j  it must have 
been in consequence of  this same goodness,  that he first vouch- 
safed to direct them by laws.  His view was not merely to re- 
strain their liberty, but  he thought fit to  let them  know what 
agreed with them best,  what was  most proper for their perfec- 
tion and happiness ;  and in order to add greater  weight  to the 
reasonable  motives,  that were  to  determine  them,  he  joined 
thereto the authority of  his commands." 
This gives us to understand why the laws of  nature are such 
av  they are.  It was  necessary,  pursuant  to  the views of  the 
Almighty, that the laws, he prescribed  to mankind,  should be 
suitable to their nature and state ;  that they should have a ten- 
dency of themselves to procure the perfection and advantase of 
individmls, as well as of  the  species ;  of  particular people,  as 
well as of  the society.  In short,  the choice of  the end deter- 
mined  the nature of  the means. 
The laws  V.  In fact there are natural and necessary  differences in hu- 
of nature 
do  d,_  man actions,  and  in the effects,  by  them  produced.  Some, 
pend on an  agree of themselves with the nature and state of man, while oth- 
arbitrary 
;nst;tution.  ers disagree and are quite opposite thereto;  some contribute to 
the production  and maintenance of  order, others  tend to sub- 
vert it ;  some procure the perfection and happiness of mankind, 
others are attended with their disgrace and misery.  To  refuse 
to acknowledge these differences would  be  shutting  one's  eyes 
to the light, and confounding it with darkness.  These are dif- 
ferences of  a most sensible nature ;  and, whatever a person may 
say to  the  contrary,  sense  and  experience  will  alw.iys  refute 
those false and idle subtleties. 
Let us not therefore  seek any  where  else,  but in  the very 
llature of human actions,  in thrir essential  diff;.rences and con- 
* See rart i. chap. X.  sect. dt 
sequences, for the true foundation  of  the laws of  nature,  and 
why God  forbids  some  things,  while  he  commands  others. 
These are not arbitrary laws, such as God might not have giv- 
en, or have given others of  a quite ditierent nature.  Supreme 
wisdom can, no more than supreme power,  act ally thing absurd 
and contradictory.  It is the very nature of  things, that always 
serves for  the rule  of  his  determinations.  God was  at lib- 
erty,  without  doubt,  to create  or  not  to  create  man ; to 
create  him  such  as  he  is,  or  to  give  him  a  quite  differ- 
ent nature.  But, having determined to form a rational and so- 
cial being, he could not prescribe any thing unsuitable to such 3 
creature.  We  may even affirm, that the supposition, which makes 
the principles and rules of the law of  nature depend on the ar- 
bitrary will of  God, tends to subvert and destroy even the very 
idea of natural law.  For, if  these laws were not  a  necessary 
consequence  of  the  nature,  constitution, and  state of  man, it 
would be impossible for us to have a certain knowledge of them, 
except by  a very clear  revelation, or by some other tormal pro- 
mulgation on the part of  God.  But  agreed it is,  that the law 
of  nature is,  and ought to be, known by the mere light of  rea- 
son.  To conceive  it  therefore as  depending on an arbitrary 
will mou!d  be attempting to subvert it, or at least would be re- 
ducing the thing to a kind of Pyrrhonism ;  by reason we could 
have no natural means of  being  sure, that  God commands  or 
forbids one thing rather than an other.  Hence,  if  the laws of 
nature  depend originally  on divine institution,  as  there  is  no 
room to question ; we  must  likewise agree, that this is  not a 
mere arbitrary institution, but founded, on one side, on  the very 
nature and constitution of man ;  and, on the other, on the wis- 
dom of  God, who cannot desire an end, without desiring at the 
same time the means,  that alone are fit to obtain it. 
VI.  It is  not  amiss  to  observe  here,  that  the  manner,  in  Ouro~in- 
ion is not  which we establish the foundation of the law of nature, does not  wide 
differ in the main from the principles of Grotius.  Perhaps this  from that 
great  man  might  have  explained  his  thoughts a little better.  of Grotius. 
But we must own,  tl~at  his commentators,  without  excepting 
Puffendorf himself,  have  not rightly  understood his  meaning, 
and consequently have passed a wrong censure on him, by pre- 
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tending, that  the manner, in  which he established the founda- 
tion of the law of nature,  is reduced to a vicious circle.  lfw 
ask, says Fuffendorf,"  whiah are those things, that farm  the matter 
fnatural  law  ?  Thc answer is, that  they  are  $hose, which  are 
honeri or dijhonest of tbeir own nature.  If  we  inquire afterward, 
what are those things, that  art honut or  dijhonest oftbeir mn  m- 
turf ?  There can be  no  other answer given, but  that tbuy  are tharr, 
which firm the matter of  natural lawx.  This is what the criiics 
put into the mouth of  Grotius. 
But let us see whether Grotius says rezlly  any  such  thing. 
The law of  nature, says he,+ ~0njfsd~  in certain princz'pier  of righ 
rearon, which inform UJ,  that an actinn is morally  honed  or  dishon- 
est, according to the neceuary agreeablenerr or disagreeableness it  has 
with a rationaf and socialle aature ;  and conseqrcently that  God, wh 
is the author of ~zature,  cctnmand~  or forbids  such acticns.  Here I can 
see nd circle ;  for putting; the question whence comes the natural 
honesty or turpitude of commanded or forbidden actions ?  Go- 
tius does  not answer in  the manner,  they  make  him ;  on the 
contrary, he says that this honesty or  turpitude proceeds from 
the necessary agreeableness or  disagreeableness of  our  actions 
with a rational and social nature.$ 
The =Eect  VII.  After having seen, that the laws of nature are practica- 
of the laws  ble of  themseh-es, evidently useful,  highly  conformable to the 
of nature is  an obliga-  ideas,  which right reason gives us of God, suitable to the nature 
tion ofcon-  and state of man,  perfectly agreeable  to order, and in fine suf- 
forming 
thereto our  ficiently notified ;  there is no longer room to question, that laws, 
conduct.  invested with all  thew  characteristics, are obligatory,  and  lay 
men under  an  indispensa5le  obligation  of  conforming  theix 
conduct to them.  It is  even certain, that the obligation, which 
God imposes on us by this  mean,  is the  strongest  of  all,  by 
reason of  its being produced  by  the  concurrence  and  union 
of  the  strongest motives,  such as 3re most proper to determine 
the  will.  In hct the counsels and maxims of  reason  oblige 
us,  not  only because  tliey  are  in  themselves  very  agreea- 
ble,  and founded  on  the  nature  and  immutable  rdations  ~f 
* See Puffendorf, Law of nature and Nations, book ii. ch. iii. 5 &  Apol.  r9.  f See Crotius, Rights of War and Peace, book i. chap. i. 5 10. 
t See Barbeyrac's fifth note on the Law of Nature and Nation+,  bo&  ii  chap. 
iii. 9 4, 
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things ;  but moreover by the authority of  the supreme  Being, 
who intervenes here, by  giving us  clearly to understand,  he  is 
willing we should observe them,  became of  his being the  au- 
thor of  this nature of  things,  and of  the mntual relation the). 
have among themselves.  In fine the  law  of  nature binds  US 
bp an internal and external obligation at the same time j  which 
produces  the l+gh-est  degree  of  moral necessity,  and  reduces 
llberty to the very strongest subjection,  without destroying it.* 
Thus the obedience,  due to natural hw,  is  a sincere  obedi- 
ence,  and such as ought to arise from a conscientious principle. 
The first efict of  those  laws  is to  direct the  sentiments  of 
our  minds,,  and  the  motions of  the he&.  We  should  hot 
discharge what they require of us, were we externally to abstain 
from what they condemn, but with regret and against our will. 
And as it is not allowable to desire what we are not permitted to 
enjoy ;  so it is  our duty not only ra practise what we are com- 
manded, but likebise to give it our approbation, and to  acknowl- 
edge its utility arld justice. 
VIII.  Another  essential characteristic of  the  laws of nature  ~,,,,1 
is, that they be  universal,  that  is,  they should oblige  all  men  laws are  obligatoq 
without exception.  For men are not only  equally  subject  to  re,pect 
God's  command, but moreover the laws of  nature having their to all men. 
foundation in the constitution and  state of man,  and being no 
tified to him by reason, it is plain  they have an essential agree 
ableness to all mankind,  and oblige them  without  distinction ; 
whatever difference there may  be  between  them  in fact,  aria 
in whatever state they are supposed.  This is what distinguish- 
es ~latutal  froni positive laws ;  for a positive lav? relates oriy to 
particular persons sr s~cieties. 
IX.  It is  trde that Grotius,t  ahd after him  several divines  Grotiup=s 
and civilians, pretend  that there are divine, positive,  and univer-  with re- 
sal laws, which oblige all  men, from the very lnoMent they Are  gard to di. 
made su@ciently ktiown to them.  But, in the first place,  were vine,  Psi-  tive, and 
there any such law, as they cduld not be di~covered  by  the sole ,n;,,r,,l 
light of reason, thcy must have been very clearly rnanife~cc~i  :o  law. 
all mankind ;  a thing, which cannot be fully proved ;  and if  it 
* See part  i. chap. vi. sect. 13.  + See Rights uf  War and Peace, book i.  chap.  sec. 15. s:th Barbeyr~c's NATURAL  LAW.  433  13a  THE PRINCIPLES  OF 
should be said, that they  cblige only those,  to  whom they are 
made known ;  this destroys the idea of  universality,  attributed 
to them,  by supposing that those laws were made for  all men. 
Secondly the divine,  positive,  and universal  laws,  ought to be 
moreover of  themselves beneficial to  all mankind,  at all times, 
and in all places ;  and  this  the wisdom  and goodness of  God 
require.  But for this purpose  these laws  should  have  been 
founded on the constitution  of  human nature in  general,  and 
then they would  be true natural  laws." 
Katural  X.  U'e  have already observed, that the laws of nature, though 
laws are 
imrnuta-  established by the divine will,  are not the eKect  of  an  arbitra- 
ble, and  ry disposition,  but have their found~tion  in the very nature and 
mutual relations of things.  Hence it follows, that natural laws 
sation.  are imniutable, and  admit of  no dispensation.  'rhis is  also a 
proFer characteristic  of  these  laws,  which disting~iishes them 
from all positive law, whether divine or humau. 
This i~nmutabilit~  of  the  laws of  ndture has nothing in  it 
repugnant to the independence, supreme power, or liberty of an 
allperfect Being.  Since he himself  is  the author of  our  con- 
stitution, he  cannot hut  prescribe or  prohibit  such things,  as 
have a necessary  agreeableness  or disagreehleness to this very 
constitution ;  and consequently he cannot make any change, or 
give any dis2cnsation in regard to the laws of  11ature.t  It is a 
glorious necessity in him not to con:radict  himself;  it is a kind 
of  impotency falsely so called, which, far from limiting  or di- 
minishing his perfections,  adds to their  external character,  and 
points out all their excellency. 
of  the e-  X. Considering the thing, as has been  now explained,  we 
ternity  may  say, if we will, that the laws of  nature are eternal ;though, 
natural 
lay,  to tell  the truth, this expression  is very incorrect of  itself, and 
more adapted to throw obscurity,  than clearness upon our ideas. 
Those, who first took notice of the eternity of  the laws of na- 
ture, did  it very  probably  out  of  opposition  to  the  novelty 
and frequent  mutations of civil  laws.  They meant only,  that 
the law of  rlature  is  antecedent,  for  example,  to  the  laws of 
See Barbeyrac's sixth note  on  Puffendorf's  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations 
book i. chap. xi. sec. I 8. 
f Puffendorf, Law of Ndture and Nations, book  ii. chap iii.  6. and Groti~s, 
Rights of War and Peace, boolr i. chap, i. 5  10. 
Moses, of Solon, or of any other  legislator, in  that it is coeval 
with mankind;  and so far they were in the  right.  But to af- 
firm, as  a great  many  divines  and  moralists  have  done,  that 
the law of  nature is coeternal with God, is advancing a proposi- 
tion,  which reduced to its  just  value is  not  exactly  true ;  by 
reason that, the  law  of  nature  being made for man,  its actual 
existence supposcth  that  of  mankind.  But if  we are only to 
understand  hereby, that God had the ideas thereof from all dter- 
nity,  then we attribute nothing to the laws of  nature but what 
is equally common to every thing, that exists.* 
We  cannot finish this article better than with a beautiful Das- 
sage of Cicero, preserved  by  Lactar1tius.t  Right  reason,  says 
this philosopher,  is indeed a true law, +agreeable to  nature, com?non 
to aN  men, constant, immutable, eternal.  It  prompts  men to  their 
duty by  i~s  commands, and deters them  fronz  evil by  its prohibitions.- 
It  ir not alfowed to  retrench any part  of this law, nor  to  make any 
~lterations  therein, much less to abolish it entirely.  Neither the stn- 
ote trcr  pe3ple  can  dispense wit%  it ;  nor  does  it require pny  intrr.- 
pretation,  being char  of  itself  and  intelligible.  It  is the Jame  at 
Rome and Athrns ;  the same today and tomorrow.  Ir is the spmt 
fternal  and invari.aBle law, given at all times a~~dplaces,  to  aN na- 
tiorrs ;  because  God, who isthe nuthcr thereof, and has publishrd it 
himsetf, is always thr sole  tnaster and sovereign of  mankind.  Whc- 
soever viclutes this law renozlnces his own nature, divests hitnsrCfcf 
humanity, and will be  rigorously cba~tisedfor  his disobrdience, thcugh 
be  zvrre to acrrpe what is corninonly di:!i?~~rrished  by  tAe 913rne  ofputr, 
ishmerrt. 
* The immutnbility of the laws of  nature is aclrnowledged by all those, who 
reason with any exactness.  See  Instit. lib. r.  tit z. sert. 11.  Noodt.  Frobabil. 
Juris, lib.  %.  cap. IT. 
t Ft  quidem vcra lex recta ratio, naturz congruens, diffura in omnes, constans, 
sempiterna ;  qus vocet ad  oficium jubendo,  vetandoa fraude  deterreat ;  quo 
tamen neque probos frustr~  jubet, out vetat ;  nec improbos jubendo  aut vetando 
nlovet.  Huic legi mec  obrogari fas est, neque derogari ex llac  aliquid licet ;  ne 
que tota abrogari potest.  Nec verb aut per senatum, aut per populum eolvi hac 
lege posbumus ;  neque est querendus  explanator aut interprrs ejus  alius.  h'ec 
erit  rlia lex  Rome, alia  Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac ;  bed  omnes  gentes, et 
omni tempore, una  1ex  et sempiterna  et imnlutabilis  continebit ; uncsqve  erir 
conmmunis quasi nlagister et imperator omnium Deus.  Ille legis iLi.jus  inveotor, 
disceptator, lator ;  cui qui non parebit ipse  se  fugiet, ac namranl homiois asper- 
nabitur ;  atque hoc  ipso luet maximas penas, etiamsi cater1 supplicia, qua: pu- 
tantur,  effugerit.  Cicero dt Rrpubl. lib. 3.  2pud Lacrapt  butit. Qiv&. Irk. $. 
cap. 8. NATURGL  LAW. 
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But Jet this suffice in regard to the law of  nature considered, 
ss a rule to  individaals.  In 6rdw  to embrace  the entire sys- 
tem of mm,  ad  to urrfald our ptiaciples in their full extent, It 
is necessary we  say  something  likewise  concerning  the rules, 
which natim ought to observe  berween  each  other,  and  art! 
commur~ly  called tk kaw  of natioti~. 
CHAP.  VI. 
Of  the  law  of  ndtions. 
civil  I.  MmG  the v*irms  establishments of  man,  the most 
wcieties  A  consid&able without doubt b that of  civil society, or  the  body 
politic,  which is  justly  esteemed the most  perfect of  societies, 
and has obtained die name of  State by  mf of preference. 
Human society is simply of  itself, and with tegard to those, 
who cbmpbse it, a state of  equality  and  independence.  It is 
subject to God alone ;  no one has a natural and primithe right 
tb  command ;  but each  person may dispose of  himself, and of 
wha  he-pcrssesses, as he rhinks proper, with this only restriction, 
that he  keep within the bounds of  the law of nature,  and do no 
prejudice  or inju y  to any man. 
The civii state makes a great alteration in this primitive one. 
The establishing a sovereignty subverts this independence, where- 
in men were originally with regatd to one another ;  and subor- 
diation is substituted in its  stead.  The sovereign  becoming 
the  depository as it were of  the will  and strength of each indi- 
vidual,  which are united in his person,  all the other members of 
the society become subjects, and find themselves under an obli- 
gation of  obeying  and  conducting  themselves pursuant to the 
laws, imposed up  them by the sovereign. 
11.  But  how great soever the change may be,  uthich govern- 
*tedal  ment and wereigntp make in the state of  nature, yet *  must 
not der 
?v,  but  not imagine, that the civil state properly subverts all natural so- 
gPw:  d ciety,  or that it destroys the essential relations, which men have 
among themselves, or  those between God and man.  This woold 
be  neither physically nor  morally possible;  on  the  contrary, 
the civil slate supposes the nhtaR of  man  such, as the Creator 
has formed it ;  it supposes the primitive state of union and so- 
ciety, with  all the relations this state includes ; it  supposes in 
fine the natural dependence of man with regard to God and his 
laws.  Government  is so far from subverting  this  first  order, 
that,it  has been rather  established with a view to give it a new 
degree of force and consistency.  It was intended to enable us 
the better to discharge  the duties,  prescribed by  natural  laws, 
and to attain more certainly the  end,  for  which  we were cre 
ated. 
111.  In order  to form  a  just  idea of  civil  society, we must True  idw 
of  civil ro.  qy, that it is  no more than  narural  society itself  modified in 
such a manner, as to have a sovereign, that commands, and on 
whose will whatever concerns the happiness of society ultimate 
ly depends;  tu  the end that,  uoder his protection and  through 
his  care, mankind  may surely attain tk  felicity, to which they 
natilrally aspire. 
IV.  -~ll-societies  are formed by fie concurrence or union of  Stasc~  m 
considaed  the wills of several perwns,  with a view of  acquiring some ad- 
vantage.  Hence it is that societies are cansidered as Bodies, and  notlon of 
receive the appellation of  mm1  persons ;  by reason  that  those r~~p 
bodies  are in effect animated with one sole will, which regulates 
all their movements.  This  agrees particularly  with the body 
yohtic or state.  The sovereign  is the chief or head,  and the 
9ubjects the members ; all their  actions, that have any relation 
to society,  are  directed by  the will of  the chief.  Hence,  so 
soon as states are formed, they acquire a kind of  personal prop- 
erties j  and we may consequently, with  due proportion,  attri- 
bute to them whatever agrees in particular with man ;  such as 
certain actions and rights,  that properly belong to them, certain 
duties,  they are obliged to fuifil,  &C. 
V.  This being supposed, the establishment of states introdu-  What ia 
car a kind  of  society amongst  them, similar to that,  which is ~~~~5 
naturally  between men ;  and the same  reasons, which  induce 
men to maintain union amoog themselves, ought likewise to en- 
gage nations or their sowreigns to  keep up a good understand- 
ing with ane another. 
It is necessary therefore there should be some law amoog na- 
tions, to serve as a rule for mutual  commerce.  Noty  this 12w THE  PRINCIPLES  OP  NA'l'UR AL  L ATV. 
cm  be nothing else but the law of nature  itself, which  is then 
distinguished by the name of the law of  nations.  Natural Iaw, 
svs  Hobbes very justly,*  is divided into the natural law of  tnan, 
and the natural law ofstates;  and the latter is what we call law 
fnaiionr.  Thus natural law and the law of  nations are in re- 
ality one acd the same thing, and differ only by an external de- 
nomination.  We  must therefore say,  that the law of  nations, 
properly  so  called,  and considered as a law proceeding from a 
superior, is nothing else but  the law of  nature itself,  not appli- 
ed to men,  considered simply as such, but to nations, states, or 
their chiefs, in the  relations they have together, and the several 
interests they have to manage between each other. 
Certainy  VI.  There is no room to  question the  reality and certainty 
law  of  such a law of nations obligatory  of  its  own  nature,  and to 
which nations, or the sovereigns, that rule  them, ought to sub- 
mit.  For if  God, by means of  right  reason,  imposes  certain 
duties  betwzen  individuals, it is evident he is  likewise willing 
that nations, which are only human societies, should observe the 
same duties between themselves.* 
Generd  VII.  But in order to say something more particular concern- 
pr~nciple  ing this subject, let us observe, that the natural state of nations, 
of  the law  in respect to each other,  is  that of  society and peace.  This 
of  nations ; 
whatpolity  society is likewise a state of  equality and  independence, which 
in.  establishes a parity of  right between them ;  and engages them 
to have the same regard and respect  for one another.  Hence 
the general principle  of  the  latv of  nations is  nothing  more, 
than the general law of  sociability,  which obliges all  nations, 
that have any intercourse with one another, to practise those du- 
ties,  to which individuals are naturally subject. 
'rhese reinarks may serve to give us a just  idea of  that  art, 
so necessary to the directors of  states,  and  distinguislled com- 
monly by the name of  Pciiiy.  Polity,  considered with regard 
to foreign states, is that ability and address, by which a sovereign 
provides  for  the preservation,  safety, prosperity,  and  glory of 
the nation he governs,  by  respecting the  laws  of  justice  and 
humanity;  that is,  without  doing any  injury  to other  states, 
De  Cive,  cap. 14.  4. 
See chap, v.  sect.  8. 
but rat!~er by procuring their advantnge,  so  much as in rt.3son 
can be expected.  Thus t!;?  ~o!it~  of sovereigns is thc sane, as 
prudence amcng privdtc  people ; and,  as we cond:mn  in  the 
latter any art or cunning, that mdkcs them pursue their own ad- 
vantage to the prejutlice of others, so the l~ke  art would be cen- 
surable  in princes,  were they bcnt xpcn  procuring  the  adv.1::- 
tage of their own people  by injuring other nntions.  The f?*c- 
JOII of  state,  so often  alledgecl to  justify  the proce~t1i:lgs or en- 
terprises of princes,  cannot really  be admitted for this e!;d, but 
inasmuch as it is reconcileabic with the comnlon intcr,ist  of na- 
tions, or, which amounts to the same thing,  with  the unaltera- 
ble rules of  sincerity, justice,  and humanity. 
VIII.  Grotius indeed acknowl~d~cs,  that the law  of  naturc Inquiry in- 
is common to all nations ; yet  he establishes a podbe  law  of  :~u~~&in- 
nations contradistinct from the law cf nature ;  and reduces this !on  con- 
law of  nations to a sort of  hurn~n  law, which  has  acq~iiretl  a ~~~~~~ cf 
power of  obliging it1 consequence of  the will and consent of  a!l  nations. 
or of a great many nations."  He  adds, that the maxims of this 
law of  nations are proved  by  the  perpetual practice of  peo?le, 
and the testimony of  histori-ns. 
Eut it has  been justly  observed  that  this  pretended  lzv~  of 
nations,  contradistinct from the law of nature, and invested nev- 
ertheless with a force of  obliging,  whether  the peo?lc  consent 
to it or not,  is a supposition destitute of  all foundation.+ 
For I.  All nations are with regard to one another in a natu- 
ral independence and equality.  If there be therefore any com- 
mon law between them,  it must proceed  from  God their com- 
mon sovereign. 
2.  AS for what relates to customs,  estzblished  by  an express 
or tacit consent  among  nations,  these  custcms,  are  neither  of 
themselves,  nor universally,  ncr always  obligatory.  For,  from 
this only, that  several  nations have acted towards one  another 
for a long time after  a  particular manner  in particular  cases, it 
does not follow, that they have laid themselves  under a neces- 
sity of acting always in the same rnanner for the time to come, 
*  See Grotius, Rights of  War and  Peace ; preliminary  discourse, 5  18, and 
book  1.  chap. i. 5 14. 
t See Puffendorf law  of  Nature  aria  Nations,  book ii. chap.  iii.  E)  23, vith 
Barbeyrac's  naes. 
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2nd much less, that other nations are obliged to  conform to those 
customs. 
3.  Again,  those customs are so much less capable of  being 
an obligatory rule of  themselves, as they may happen to be bad 
or unjust.  The profession  af a corsair or pirate was, by a kind 
of consent,  esteemed a long while  lawful between nations,  that 
were not united  by alliance or treaty.  It seems likewise,  that 
some nations allowed themselves the  use  of  poisoned  arms in 
time of  war."  Shall we say,  that these were customs author- 
ised by  the law of  nations,  and  really  obligatory  in respect to 
different people ?  Or shall we not rather consider them as  bar- 
barous practices ; from which every just and well-governed  na- 
tion ought to refrain ?  We  cannot therefore avoid appealing al- 
ways to the law of nature,  the only one,  that is really universal, 
whenever we want to iudge whether the customs established be- 
<  - 
tween nations, have any obligatory effect. 
4.  All that can  be  said on &is  subject  is, that when  cus- 
toms of  an innocent nature are introduced among nations, each 
of them is reasonably  supposed  to submit to those customs,  so  -  -- 
long as they  have  not made  any declaration  to  the  contrary. 
This is all the force or effect, that can be given to received cus- 
toms ;  but a very different effect from that of a law properly so 
called. 
TWO  sorts  IX.  These remarks give us room to conclude, that the whole 
of  laws of  might perhaps be  reconciled,  by  distinguishing  two  species of  nations ; 
one of  ne-  laws of nations.  There  is certainly an universal,  necessary, and 
cessit~  and self-obligntory law of nations,  which differs in nothing from the  obligatory 
by itself,  law of  nature,  and is  conseq;ently  immutable,  insomuch  that 
the  the people or  sovereigns  cannot dispense with it, even by com-  arbitrary 
and con-  mon consent,  without  transgressing their duty.  Tliere is be- 
~entional.  sides another  law of  nations,  which we may call arbitrary  and 
free, as founded  only  on ail  express or tacit convention ;  the  . 
efi'ect of  which is not of itself universal;  being obligatory  only iu 
regard to those, who have voluntarily submitted thereto, andon- 
ly so long,  as they please,  because  they are always at liberty to 
c11ange  or  repeal  it.  To this we must likewise add,  that the 
* See Virgil, Bueid, book  X,  ver. 139, with the 15th note ef  the Abbe8 den 
Fontainec. 
whole force of  this sort of law of nations ultimately depends on 
the law  of  nature, which  coinmands us to be  true to our en- 
gagements.  Whatever  really  belongs to the law  of  nations 
may be reduced to one or other of  these two species ;  and the 
use of this  distinction will  easily appear  by applying it to par- 
ticular questions, which  relate  either  to war,  for  example,  to 
ambassadors,  or  to  public treaties,  and to  the deciding of dis- 
putes,  which sometimes arise concermng these matters between 
sovereigns." 
X.  It is a point of  importance to attend to the origin and nn-  us:  of  thr 
foregoing 
till-e of the law of nations,  such as we have now explained them. remsrrb 
For, besldes that it is always advantageous to form just ideas of 
things, this  is  still  more  necessary  in matters of  practice  and 
mordlity.  It is ou?ing perhaps to our distinguishiog the law of 
nations  from natural  IJW,  that we have  insensibly  accostomed 
ourselves to form quite a different judgment between the actions 
of  sovereigns and those of  private  people.  Nothi~lg  is  more 
usual  than  to see men condemned in common for things, which 
we praise,  or at least  excuse in the  persons of  princes.  And 
yet it  is certain,  as we have  already shown,  that the maxims of 
the law of nations have an equal authority with those of the law 
of nc3:tirc, and are equ~lly  respectable and sacred,  because they 
* Let us remark here by the way, that the ideas of  the ancient  Roman law- 
yers, concerning the law of  nations,are not always uniform  5  which creates some 
confu,ion.  Some there are, wi~o  qnderstand by the LAW a?  NATIONS  thoserules 
of  right, thnt are common to all men, and est~blinhed  amongst themselves pursu- 
ant to the light of reason ;  in opposition to the particular  laws of  each  people. 
(See the 9th law in the D~gest.  de Justitia & Jure, book i.  tit. I)  And then the 
law of nations  signified also the lrw of  nature.  Others distinguished  between 
these two species, as Ulpian has done in law I. of the title now mentioned.  They 
gave the name of  law of  natrons to that, which agrees with  man as such ;  in op- 
position to that which suits him as an animal.  (See Puffendorf, Law of  Nature 
and Nations, book ii. chap. 3. 5  3. note 10.)  Some, in fine, contprised  the  one 
and the other under the idea ofnutuxal  law.  (See  law XI.  Digest de Justitia & 
Jure.)  And hence it comes, that the better  sort  of  Latin writers give indiffrr- 
ently the name of  natural Ilw, or the law of  nations, to that whicli relates to ei- 
ther.  'This we find in the fbllowing passage of  Cicero, where  he  saga,  that  by 
the law of  nature, that is, by :he  law of nations one man  is  not  allowed to pur- 
sue  his  advantage  at the expense of  another.  Nelue vero hoc solum  NA  IPJRA, 
id eet,  JVBF GEXTIUM-constitutum  est, lit non liceat sui coinmodi causa, al- 
teri nocere.  De OAc. 11b. 3. cap. 5. See Mr. Noedt's  commentary on t:lt Digest 
book i.  tit.  I. where this able lawyer explains very well  the  ambiguity  of  the 
distinction 3f  natural law, and the law of  n~tions,  ~icording  to :h:.  different lam 
asage of  r\ncie~it  civilians. 146  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURAL LAW,  141 
have  God alike for their nuthor.  In sEo::,  there is only one sole 
and the same rule nfjustice for all manki:;d.  Priilres, who infringe 
the 1.i~  of  nltions, commit as great  a  crime as private  people, 
who  violate the law of nature ;  and, if  here h:!  any  diiterence 
in the two cases,  it  must be  charged to the prir.ce's  account,* 
whose unjust actions arz alway;  attended  with  more dreadful 
ccilsequences, than those of private  peop1e.t 
CHAP.  VII. 
V'hti'h~r  there  be  nrly  ,nol*nlit~ of  actions, ay  dligation ar  driiy, 
ANTECEDENT TO  THE LAWS  OF  NATURE, and indqendenr 
of  the  iden  of  n  legislator ? 
et  1.  THE  morality of  human actions being founded in gen- 
opinions of 
ethicwri-  era1 oil the  relatiofis  of  agreeableness  or  disagreeableness  be- 
tprs  with  tween those  actions and  the law, accvrding as we have shewn 
respect to 
,  fist  iil thc c1eve:lth  chapter of  the first part ;  there is no difficulty, 
p'incipie  when once we acknowledge the laws  of  nature, to affirm,  that 
of moraliip  the mnra!itg  of  actions depends on their conformity  or  opposi- 
tion to those very 1.it;'s.  This is a point, on whic11 all civilians and 
ethic writers are agreed.  But thcy arc not  so u:lani,nous in rc- 
gard  to  the first principle, or original  cause of  obligation  and 
morality. 
A  great  inany are of  opinion,  that there is no other princi- 
ple of  morality,  but the divine  will manifested by  the  laws of 
nature.  The idea of uz)ralitj,  they say, necessarily includes that 
of obligation ;  obligation supposes law ;  and law, a legislator.  If 
therefore we abstract from all  law,  and  consequently  from  a 
" See  part  i, chap.  xi.  5  IZ. 
t It is Monsieur Bernard, that furnishes us with these reflections.  If a private 
person,  sny~  be,  offends without car?se a person of  the same station, his action is 
termed an injustice ;  but if a prince attacks another prince without  cause, if  he 
invades his territories, dnd ravages has towns and provinces, this is called waging 
war, and it would be temerity to think it unjust.  To  break or violate contracts 
or agreements is esteemed a crime  among  private  people ;  hut, among princes, 
to infringe  the most solemn treaties is prudence, is understanding the art of gov- 
ernment.  True itis, that some  pretext  is  always sought for, but those, who 
trump up these pretexts, give themselves  very  little  trouble  whether  they  arr 
thought just or not,  &c.  Nouvrlles, 26  Ia  rcpubligue  c'.:  Iettres  Mars  1704  page 
legislator,  we  shall  have  no  such thing as  right,  obligation, 
duty, or morality,  properly  so called.* 
Others  there are,  who acknowledge indeed,  that the divine 
will is really a principle of obligation,  and consequently a prin- 
ciple of the inorality of  human actions;  but they do not  stop 
here.  They pretend,  that antecedent to all law,  and indepen- 
dent of  a legislator,  therc are things,  which of  themselves,  and 
by their own nature, are honest or dishonest ;  that, reason hav- 
ing once discovered  this essential arid specific difference of  hu- 
man actions,  it imposcs  on nlan a necessity  of  perfarming the 
one and omitting the  other;  and  that this is the first founda-, 
oion  of obligation, or the original source of morality  and duty. 
11.  What we have ,already said concerning the primitive rule  Prin~i~la 
relating tr.  of  hunian ~ctions,  and the nature and origin of obligntion,t may  ,hi, P" 
help to throw some light on the present  question.  But in or- 
der to illustrate it better,  let us turn back and resume the thing 
froin its first principles,  by  endeavouring  to  assemble  here,  in 
a natural order,  the principal ideas,  that may lead us to a  just 
conclusion. 
I.  I obs~ri~c  111 the first  pl'lce,  that every action,  considered 
~urely  and simply  in itself,  as a natural  motion  of  the inind or 
body,  is a:~st.!utely i:ldifirent,  and cannot in this respect claim 
any share cf  i?icrality. 
This is whit evidently appears ;  for as n~uch  as the same rlatural 
action is estce;ned soln-limes l~wful  and  even good, and at oth- 
er times unla\vful  or batl.  To  kill a man, for instance, is a bad 
action in a robber ;  but it is lawful or good  in an executioner, 
or in a citizen or soldier,  who defends  his  life or country,  un- 
justly  attacked ;  a p1ai:i  cteinonstration, that this action,  consid- 
ered in itself, and as a simple operation of  the natural faculties, 
is absolutely indift'erent, and destitute of all morality. 
2.  We  must take care to distinguish here between the phys- 
ical and inoral consideration.  There  is undoubtedly a kind of 
natural  goodness or m3lignity  in  actions,  which, by tllcir owl1 
proper and internal virtue,  are beneficial  or  hurtful ;  alld pro- 
duce the physical good or evil of  man.  But this relation be. 
*  See Puffendorf, Law of Nature and Nationn, book i.  chap. ii. 5 6 
g  See  part  i,  chap, v,  and  vi. THE  PRINCIPLES OF  NATURAL  LAW. 
tween the  action and its efict  is only physical ;  and, if we stop 
here,  we are not  yet arrived  at  morality.  It  is pity  we  are 
frequently obliged to use the  same expressions for the physical 
and  moral  ideas,  which  is  apt to create some  confusiun.  It 
were  to be wished, thzt languages had  a  greater  exactness in 
didnguishing  the nature and different relations of things by dif- 
ferent names. 
3.  If  we proceed  further, and  suppose  that  there  is some 
rule of  human  actions, and  compare  afterwards  these actions 
with  the rule;  the relation,  resulting  from this comparison,  is 
what properly and esselltially constitutes morality.* 
4.  Thence it lollows,  that,  in  order  to  know  which is the 
principal or efficient cause of  the morality of human actlons,  we 
must previously  be acquainted with thir rule. 
5.  Finally let us add, that this rule of human actions may ill 
general be of two sorts, either internal  or external ; that  is, it 
may  be either found in man  himself,  or it must be  sought for 
somewhere else.  Let us  now  make  an application of  these 
principles. 
~hrec  111.  We have  already seen,+ that man  finds within  himself  .  - 
rules of 
hum  several principles to discern good from evil, and that these prin- 
Lions.  ciples are so many rules of  his  conduct.  The first  directive 
principle, we find  within ourselves, is a kind  of  instinct, com- 
n Reason. monly called moral sense ;  which, pointing  out readily,  though 
confusedly and  without reflection,  the  most sensible and most 
striking  part of  the difference between good and evil, malies us 
love the one, and gives us an aversion for the other,  by a kind 
of  natural  sentiment. 
The second principle is reason,  or the reflection  we make oq 
the nature,  relations,  and consequences of  things ;  which gives 
us a more distinct knowledge, by principles and rules,  of the dis- 
tinction between pod  and evil in all possible cases. 
But tothese two internal principles we must join athird,name- 
Iy the divine will.  For man being  the handy work of  God, 
md  deriving from the Creator his existence,  his reason, and all 
his faculties;  he finds himself  thereby  in  an  absqlute  depen- 
See  part  i. chap.  xi.  9  1. 
Parr i. chap. v.  & ~"t  ii. chap. iii 
dence on that supreme  being, and tannot  help acknowledging 
him as his lord and sovereign.  Therefore, as soon as he is ac- 
quainted  with the  intention  of  God in regard to his creature, 
this will  of  his master becomes his supreme rule, and ought ab- 
solutely to determine his conduct. 
IV.  Let us not  separate these three  principles.  They  are These 
indeed distinct from one another, and have each their particular  $::s~rh* 
force ;  but in the actual state of  man they are necessarily unit-  ought to k 
ed.  It is sense, that gives us the first notice ; our reason adds 
more light ;  and the will of  God, who is rectitude itself,  gives 
it a new degree  of  certainty ;  adding withal the weight of  his 
authority.  It is 011  all  these  foundations united,  we ought to 
raise  the edifice  of  natural law,  or the system of morality. 
Hence it follows,  that,  Inan being a creature of  God, form- 
ed with design  and wisdom, and  endowed with sense and rea- 
son ;  the rule of  human actions,  or the true foundation of mo- 
rality,  is properly the will of the supreme being, manifested and 
interpreted either by  moral  sense  or by  reason.  These  two 
natural means,  by teachiilg us to distinguish the relation,  which 
lluman actions have to our constitution,  or,  which  is the same 
thing, to the ends of  the Creator,  inform  us  what  is  morally 
gootl or evil,  honest or dishonest, commanded or forbidden. 
V.  It is already a grmt matt-r to feel and to know good and of  the pri- 
evil ;  but this is not enough ;  we must likewise join to this sense mitive 
cause of  and  knowledge an obligation of  doing  thc one,  and abstaining obligati-. 
from the ~ther. It  is  this  obligation,  that  constitutes  duty, 
without which there would be no moral practice, but the whole 
would terminate  i:l  mere speculation.  But which is the cause 
and principle of  obligation  and duty  ?  Is it the  very nature of 
things, discovcred  by reason  ?  Or is it  the divine will ?  This is 
what we must endeavour here to determine. 
VI.  '.C'h,o  first reflection, that occurs to us liere, and to which Allrules 
very few methinks  are sufficiently attentive,  is,  that  every rule  are 
themselves  whatsoever of  human actions carries  with it a  moral necessity obligatory. 
oi conforming thereto,  and produces consequently a sort of  ob- 
ligation.  Let us illustrate this  remark. 
The general notion of  rule is the idea of  a sure and expedi- 
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therefore  a design, or the  will of  attaining  to a certain  end, 
as the effect we want to produce,  or the object  we  intend to 
procure.  And  it is perfectly evident,  that,  were  a person to 
act merely for the sake of  acting, without any  articular design 
or determina~e  e1.d  ;  he ought not to trouble his head about di- 
recting his actions one way more than another; he should never 
mind either counsel or rule.  This being premised, I afirm, that 
every man,  who proposes to himself a particular end, and knows 
the means or rule,  which alone cat1 conduct  him to it,  and put 
him in possession of  what he desires, finds himself  under a ne- 
cessity of  following this rule, 2nd  conforming his actions to it. 
Otherwise he would contradict himself ;  he would and he would 
not;  he  would  desire  the  end,  and neglect the  only  means, 
which, by  his own  confession,  are  able to  conduct him to  it. 
Hence I conclude, that every  rule,  acknowledged as such,  that 
is,  as a sure  and  only mean of  attaining to the end  proposed, 
carries with  it a sort of  obligation  of  being  thereby  directed. 
For, so soon as there is a rrasonnGlr  necessity to prefer one man- 
ner of acting  to another,  every  reasonable  man,  who  intends 
to behave as such,  fillds himself thereby englged and tied  as  it 
were to this manner,  being  hindered by his reason  from acting 
otherwise.  That is,  in other tsrms,  he is really obliged ; be- 
cause obligation, in its original ide.,  is nothing more than a re- 
striction of liberty produced by reason,  inasmuch as the colinsels, 
which reason gives us,  are motives, that determine us to a partic- 
ularmanner of actifig, preferable to ony cther.  It is therefore 
true,  that all rules are obligatory. 
Obligati08  VII.  This obligation  indeed  may  be  more or  less  strong, 
may  be  more of less strict, according as the reasons, on which it is found-  more or 
less jtrong.  ed, are  more or  less  numerous,  ant1  have more or less power 
and efficacy  of themselves  to deterniine the will. 
If a particular manner of acting appears to me evidently fitter 
than any other for my preservation and perfection, fittcr to pro- 
cure my bodily health and the welfare of  my  soill ;  this motive 
alone obliges me to act in conformity to it.  Arid thus we have 
the first degree of obligation.  If I find afterwards, that, besides 
the advantage now  mentiowd,  such a conduct will  secure the 
respcct and approbation  of those, with whom I converse ;  this 
is a  new motive,  which  strengthens  the  preceding  obligation, 
and adds stiil more to my engagement.  But if, by ~ushing  my 
reflections  still farther, I find at length,  that this manner of act- 
ing is perfectly  agreeable to the intention of my Creator,  who is 
willing  and intends I should follow  the counsels,  which reason 
gives me,  3s  SO many  real  laws he prescribes to me himself;  it 
is visible, that this new  consideration  strengthens  my  engage- 
ments,  ties the knot stilI faster, and lays me under an indispen- 
sable necessity  of  acting after such or  such  a  manner.  For 
what is there more proper to determine finally a rational being, 
than the assurance he has of procuring  the approbation and be- 
nevolence of  his  superior,  by  acting in  conformity to his will 
and orders ;  arid of escaping his indignation,  which must infal- 
liblp pursue a rebellious creature. 
GIII.  Let us  follow  now the  thread  of  the  consequences,  Reason a-  .  lone is sui- 
arising from these principles.  ficient  to 
If it be  true, that  every rule is of  itsclf  obli~atorv,  and that impose  -, 
reason is the  rul;  of  hurnan actions ; it follows,  th~t  ~~~~~~- 
reason only, inzependent of thc law, is sufficient to impose some man. 
obligation on man,  ar,d consequently to furnish room for moral- 
ity and duty, commendation and censure. 
There will remain no manner of  doubt on this subject, if, ab- 
stracting for a moment from  superiority  and  law, we examine 
at first th  state of  m7.n  alohe,  considered merely as a rational 
being.  Man  proposes  to himself  his own  good,  that  is,  the 
welfare of his body and soul.  He searches afterwards for  the 
means of  procuring  those advantages ;  and so soon, as he has 
discovered  them, he  approves of  some  particular  actions,  and 
condemns others ;  and consequently he  approves or condemns 
himself,  according as he acts after a manner collformable or op- 
posite  to the dictates of his reason.  Does not all this evidently 
demonstrate,  that reason puts a restnint on liberty, and lays us 
therefore under an obligation of doing or abstaining from partic- 
ular things ? 
Let us proceed.  Suppose that  man in the  forementioned 
Etate,  becomes the father of a family, and has a mind to act rea- 
sonably ;  would it be an  indifferent thing to him to take care of, 
or to neglect his  children,  to provide  for their  subsistence  and 
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educatio?,  or do  neither  one  nor  the other ?  Is it not,  on the 
contrany, evident,  that, as this different conduct necessarily pro- 
cures either the good or evil of  his family,  the  approbation  or 
censure, which reason gives it,  renders  it  morally  good or bad, 
worthy of praise or blame ? 
It would be an easy matter to pursue this way of arguing, and 
apply it to all the states of  man.  But what  we have  already 
said shows it is suficient  to  consider  man,  as a rational being, 
to be convinced, that reason,  pointing out the road, which alone 
can lead him to the end he aims at, lays  him under a necessity 
of  following this road, and  of  regulating  thereby his conduct j 
that consequently reason alone is  sufficient to establish a system 
of  morality,  obligation,  and  duties ; because  when  once  we 
suppose it is reason~ble  to do or  to abstain from certain things, 
this is really owning our obligation. 
Object on.  IX.  " But the idea of obligation, some will say,  imports ne- 
NOI,O+  "  cessarily a being,  that obliges ;  and who ought to be distinct 
can Oblige  from the person obliged.  To  suppose that he,  who obliges,  himself.  "  and  he, who is obliged,  are one and the same person is sup- 
posing,  that a man may make a contract with himself;  which 
cc is quite absurd.  Right reason is,  in reality,  nothing but an 
G attribute of  the person obliged ;  it cannot be therefore a prin- 
a  ciple of obligation ;  nobody being capable of imposing on him- 
self  an indespensable necessity of  acting  or  not acting  after 
a  such or such a manner.  For supposing a  necessity,  it must 
not be removable at the will and plezsure of  the person sub- 
"  ject  to it ;  otherwise  it would  be void of  effect.  If  there- 
"  fore tile person,  on whom  the  obligation  is  imposed,  is the 
a  same as he,  who  imposes  it,  he can disengage himself from 
it whenever he pleases ;  or rather,  there is no obligation ;  as, 
cc when a c?ebtor inherits the estate  and rights of  %is creditor, 
'c  the debt is void.  Now duty is a debt,  and neither of  them 
can be admitted but between different persons."* 
.h~swer.  X. This objection is more specious, than solid.  In fact. those, 
who pretend that there is properly neither obligatioil nor moral- 
ity without a superior and law, ought necessarily to suppose one 
* Nemo  fibi debet (says Seneca de Benef. 1ib.s.erp. 8.) hocvcrbu~~  dgbcr6 nos 
l~abct,  difi inter duos, locum. 
af these two things ;  I, either that there is no other rule of hu- 
plan actions besides  law ;  2. or, if  there be any other,  none but 
law is an obligatory rule. 
The first of these suppositions is evidently unsupportable ;  and 
after all,  that has been  said, concerning  this subject,  we think 
it quite useless to stop here to refute it.  Eitherreason has been 
idly and without a design bestowed upon man, or we must allow 
it to be  the general and  primitive rule of  his actions  and con- 
duct.  And what is there more natural than to think, that a  ra- 
tional being ought to be directed by reason ?  If we should en- 
deavour to  evade this argument by  saying, that, though reason 
be the rule of human actions,  yet there is nothing but law, that 
can be an obligatory rule ;  this proposition cannot be maintain- 
ed, unless we consent  to  give the name of  obligation to some 
ot!ler  restriction  of  liberty, as weli as to that,  which is produc- 
ed by the will and order of  a superior;  and then it would  be a 
inere  dispute  about  worcls.  Or else we must  suppose, that 
there neither actually  is,  nor  can  even be  conceived,  any obli- 
gation at all, without the intervention of the will of  a superior; 
which is far from being exactly true. 
The source of  the whole mistake,  or the cause of  the ambi- 
guity, is our not ascending to the first principles, in order to de- 
termine the original idea of  obligation.  We  have already said, 
and again we say it, that ever): restriction of  liberty, produced or 
approved by right rcason,  forms a real obligation.  That, which 
properly  and formally  o'Jliges,  is the dictate  of  conscienc?,  or 
the internal  judgment we  pass on such or such a rule,  the ob- 
servance whereof appears to us  just,  that is conformable to the 
light  of right  reason. 
XI.  But does not this  manner of reasoning, some will re-  A fresh 
ply, contradict the clearest notions,  and subvert the ideas gen-  Objectiopa 
erally  received,  which make  obligation  and  duty depend  on 
the intervention of  a superior, whose will manifests  itself by 
"  the Idw  ?  What sort of thing, is  an  obligation,  imposed by 
rcason,  or which a man iinposeth on himself  ?  Cannot 11s  zl- 
a  ways get rid of  it, when he has a mind ;  and if  the cred;tsr 
and debtor, as ure have already observed, be onc and the Fame 
rr  person, can it be properly  said, that there  ii any such thing 
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Answer.  This reply  is grounded  on  an ambiguity,  or  supposes  tb 
thing in question.  It supposes all along, that there neither  is, 
nor can be,  any other obligation than that, which proceeds from 
a superior or law.  I agree, that such is the common language of 
civilians ;  but this makes no manner of  alterati~n  in the nature 
of the thing.  What comes afterwards  proves nothing at all. 
It is  true  that  man may,  if  he has a mind, withdraw himself 
from the obligations, which reason  imposes on him ;  but,  if  he 
does, it is at his peril, and he is forced himseif to acknowledge, 
that such a conduct is  quite  unredson.~ble.  But to conclude 
from this, that reason alone cannot oblige  us, is going too far ; 
because this consequence would cqnally inv~liddte  th~  obligatioil, 
imposed by a superior.  For i.1  Gae  the obligation,  produced 
by law,  is not subversive of  liberty ;  we have always a power to 
submit to it or  not,  and run  the hazard  of  the consequence. 
In short the question is not concerning force or constraint, it is 
only iil relation to a mord tie, which, in what manner soever it 
be considered, is always the work  of reason. 
~uty  mdy  XII.  True it is,  that duty, pursuant  to  its proper and strict 
be talren in 
a loore or  signification,  is a debt ;  and that,  when we consider it thus, it 
strict sense.  presents the  idea of  an  action,  which  somebody has a right ta 
require of  us.  I  agree likewise, that this manner of  consider- 
ing duty is just in itself.  Man coilstitutes part of a system or 
whole ; in consequence  whereof he  has necessary relations to 
other beings ; and the  actions  of  man, viewed  ill  this light, 
having always some relation to another person,  the idea of  duty, 
commonly speaking, includes this relation.  And yet,  as it fre- 
quently happens  in morality,  that  we  give  sometimes a more 
extensive,  and at  other times a more limited sense, to the same 
term, nothing hinders us from bestowing  the more ample signi- 
fication on the word dutj, by taking  it in general for an action 
csnformable to right  reason.  And  then it may be very well 
said, that man,  considcrcd  eve11  alone, and as a  separate being, 
has pzrticuldr  duties to fulfil.  It is sufficient for this end, that 
there  be  some  actions,  which  reason  approves,  and  others, 
which it condemns.  These  different ideas  have  nothing  in 
them, that is opposite ; m the contrary they  are  perfectly re- 
conciled,  ant1 receive mutujl strength and assistance from each 
other. 
XIII.  The result  of what we  have  been now  saviner is as  Re6ult of 
6  V 
follows.  what has 
been  hith. 
I.  Reason be in^ the first rule of man, it is also the first prin-  erto &d. 
ciple of morality,  and the immediate cause of all primitive obli- 
gation. 
2.  Man  being, by  his  nature  and state,  in a necessary  de- 
pendance on t!re  Creator, who has formed him with design and 
wisdom,  and proposed some particular views to himself in cred- 
ting him ; the  will  of  God is another rule of  human  actions, 
another principle of morality, obligation, and duty. 
3.  We may  therefore  say there are in general two sorts of 
morality  or  obligations;  one  antecedent  to the  law,  and the 
work 01 reason  ?  the other subsequent to the law,  and properly 
the eifect thereof;  it is on this,  that the forementioned distinc- 
tion of intern~l  and external obligation is founded." 
4.  Trye it is,  that those different  species of  obligation have 
not all the  same force.  That, which  arises  from  the law,  js 
without doubt the most perfect ;  it lays the strongest restriction 
on liberty, and merits  therefore the name of  obligation  by way 
of  preference.  But we must not thence infer, that it is the on- 
ly one,  and that there c.ln be  none of  any  other  kind.  One 
obiigdtbn  mny  be  real, though it Le  diEercnt from,  and eveu 
weaker tlizn .inother. 
5. It is so much the more :lecejsary  to admit these two sorts 
of  ob1iga:;on  dnd  morality,  as that, which readers the obligation 
of  law the  most pcrfect,  is its u.~iting  the two species;  being 
internal and external both at the same time.+  For were there 
no attention given to the very nature  of the  laws, and were the 
things they  conanland  or  prohibit  not to  merit  the  approba- 
tion  or  censure  of  reasov ; the  authority  of  the  legislator 
would  have  no  other  foundation,  but  that  of  power ; and 
laws being then no more  than  the  effect  of an arbitrary  will, 
they would  produce rather a constraint, properly so called, than 
any real obligation. 
These remarks are especially and in the exactest manner ap 
plicable  to the laws of  nature.  The obligation, these produce, 
* See  palt  i. chap. vi. 4  13. 
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is of all others the mo3t efficacious and extensive;  bzcause,  OR 
one side, the disposition of  these laws is in itself very reasonable, 
being founded  on the nature of  the actions,  their specific dif- 
ferences, and the relation or opposition  they have to particular 
ends.  On the other side, the  divine  authority, which enjoins 
us to observe these rules,  as laws he prescribes to us, adds a new 
force to the obligation they produce of  themselves,  and lays  US 
under  an  indispensable  necessity of conforming our actions to 
them. 
7.  From these remarks it follows, that those two ways of es- 
tablishing morality,  whereof  one sets  up  reason and  the other 
the will of God for its principle,  hught not to bc placed in  op- 
position,  as two incompatible systems, neither of  which can sub- 
sist  without destroying or  excluding the other.  On the con- 
trary,  we should  join  these  two  methods,  and unite  the two 
principles,  in order to havc a comp1:te  system of  morality,  really 
founded on the nature and state of  man.  For man, as a rational 
being, is subject to reason ;  and as a creature of  God, to the will 
of the supreme  Being.  As these  two  qualities have nothing 
opposite or incompatible in their nature, these two rules,  reason 
and the divine will, are perfectly reconciled ;  they are even nat- 
urally connected, and strengthened  by their junction.  And in- 
deed it could not be otherwise;  for in fine God himself  is the 
author of  the nature and mutual relations of things ;  and par- 
ticularly of the nature  of  man,  of  his  constitution,  state, rea- 
son,  and faculties ; the whole  is  the work of  God, and ul:i- 
mately depends on his vill and institution. 
This m-  XIV. This manner of ests'olishing the foundation of  obliga- 
ns  ofesta- tion and duty is so far from weakening the system of natural law 
bLishilg  morality  or morality,  that we affirm, it  rather gives it a  greater solidity 
does nor  and force.  This is tracing the thing to  the very source ;  it is 
weakenthe laying the foundation of  the edifice.  I grant that, in order to 
ay*em  of 
natn,l  reason well on morality,  we  ought  to take things as they  are, 
jaw.  without making  abstractions ; that is,  we should attend to the 
nature and actual  state  of  man,  by uniting and  combicing all 
the circumstances, that essentially enter into the system  of hu- 
ma?ity.  But this does not hinder us from considering likewise 
the system of man in  its particulars,  and as  it  were  by  parts, 
to the end, that an exact knowledge of  each of  thosc parts may 
help us to understand better th,o whole.  It  is the only method 
we can take  in order to attain the end. 
XV.  What has been hitherto  set forth may help  to explain GrotiUS'B 
and jus~ify  at the same time a thought of  Grotius in his prelim-  ~~inioneb 
amined  inary discourse,  $  I I.  This author having established, after his 
manner,  the principles  and  foundation of  natural law,  on  the 
constitution of  human nature,  adds,  that all he  has  been saying 
would in some  measure takeplace, were we even to pant there  was 
no God;  or that he did  not concern himseJfabout ht~rnafz  affairs.  It 
is obvious,  by his  very  m4nner  of  expressing  himself, that he 
does not intend  to exclude the divine will  from the system  of 
natural law.  This would  be mistaking his meaning ;  because 
he himself establishes this will of  the Creator, as another source 
of right.  All he means is,  that, independent of  the interven- 
tion  of  God, considered as  a legislator,  the maxims of  natural 
law  having their foundation in the nature of things,  and in the 
human constitution ;  reason alone imposes already on man a ne- 
cessity of following those  maxims,  arid  lays him under an obli- 
gation of conforming his conduct to them.  In fact  it  cannot 
bc denied bus that the ideas of order, agreeableness,  honesty and 
conformity  to right reason, have at all times made an impressioli 
on man, at least to s  certain degree,  and among  nations some- 
what civilized.  The  human mind is formed in such a manner, 
that even those, who do not comprehend these ideas in their fi~11 
exactness and extent have aeverthe!ess  a confused notion there- 
of,  which  inclines  them  to  accluicscellce  so soon,  as they are 
proposed. 
XVI.  But while we acknowledge the reality and certainty of  ~n  order ts 
those principles,  we ought likewise to own, that if  we proceed have a per- 
fect system  no farther, we are got but half way our journey ;  this would be of  morali- 
unreasonably attempting to  establish a system of morality inde- fyl We 
should jo4  pendent of  religion.  For were we even to  grant, that such a it  re- 
system is not destitute  of all foundation ; yet  it  is  certain  it ligion. 
could never produce of itself so effectual an obligation,  as when 
it is joined with the divine  will.  Since  the  authority  of  the 
supreme Being  gives the force of  laws,  properly  so  called, to 
the mqxims of reason, these maxims acquire thereby the highest 
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will,  arrd to lay us under the strictest obligation.  But (once more 
me repeat it)  to  pretend  therefore,  that the maxims  and coun- 
sels of reason considered in themselves,  711d  detached as it were, 
ftomGod's command,are not at all oblig~tory,  is carrying the thing 
too far ;  it is concluding beyond our premise% and admitting only 
one species of  obligation.  Now  this is not only uncoilformable to 
the nature uf  things,  but as  we  have  already  observed,  it  is 
weakening  even the obligation, resulting from t!le  will  of  the 
legislator.  For the  divine ordinailces  make  a  much  stronger 
impression  on  the  mind,  and  are  followed  with  a  greater 
subjection  in the v~ill,  in  proportion  as :hey  are approved by 
reason,  as being in themselves perfectly agreeable to our  nature 
and extremely conformable to  our constitutiox~  ancl state. 
CHAP.  VIII. 
Consequences  of  the preceding chapter ;  rgections  on  the dhtinc- 
tions  of jujt,  honest,  and  rrseful. 
m 
Thete is a 
great  deal  1.  1  HE reflections,  contained  in  the foregoing chapter, 
of ambigu-  give us to understand,  that there is a vast deal of  ambiguity and 
ityandmis-  mistake in the different sentiments of writers, in relation to mo-  take con- 
cerningthis  rality or the foundation of natural laws.  They do not always as- 
abject.  cend to t!le  first principles,  neither do they define and distinguish 
exactly;  they  suppose an opposition  between  ideas,  that  are 
reconciled,  and ought even to be  joined  together.  Some rez- 
son in too abstract a manner on  the human system ; and,  fol- 
lowing only  their  own  metaphysical speculations, never attend 
sufficiently to the actual state of things,  and  to the natural de- 
pendance of  man.  Others, considering principally this  depen- 
dance, reduce the whole to the will and orders of  the sovereign 
master, and seem thus to lose sight of the very nature and internal 
constitution of  man, from which it cannot however Le  separat- 
ed.  These different ideas are just in themselves ; yet we must 
not establish the one by excluding tlie other,  or by explaining it 
to the other's  prejudice.  Reason, on the contrary,  requires us 
to unite them, in order to find the true principles of the human 
system,  whose fou:~dations  must be sought for in the nature and 
state of man. 
11.  It is very common to use the words utility,  jtrstice,  hsn- of  just, 
my,  order,  and &esi  ;  but  these different notions are seldom &"'$:- 
defined in an exxt manner,  and some  of  them  are frequently and fitnesa 
confounded.  This want of  exactness must necessarily  create 
ambiguity  and  confusion ; wherefore,  if  we intend  to make 
things clear, we must take care  to define and distinguish prog- 
erly. 
An useful action may methinks be defined  that, which of it- 
self tends to t!le  preservation and perfection of man. 
A just action thnt, which is considered as  conform~ble  to the 
will of a superior, who commnnds. 
An action  is cc~lled  hones:,  when it is considered as confor- 
mable to the maxims of  right reason,  agreeable to the dignity of 
our  nature,  deserving  of  t!le  approbaticn  of  man,  and  conse- 
quently procuring respect and honor to the person,  who does it. 
By ord:r  we can understand nothing else, but the disposition 
of several things,  relative to 3  certain end,  and proportioned  to 
the effect we intend to produce. 
Finally, as to fitness or agreeableness,  it bears a very great af- 
finity with order.  It is a relation of  conformity between sev- 
eral things,  one of  which is of  itself proper for the preservation 
and perfection of  the  other,  and contributes to maintain it in a 
good  and advantageous state. 
111.  We  must not therefore confound the words just, r~seful,  JUS~,  hen- 
and honut;  for they are three distinct ideas.  But, though dis- ',"~;~;d_ 
tinct froin one anothcr, they have no opposition ;  they are three distinct 
relations,  which may all agree,  and be applied to one single ac-  and 
must not 
tion,  considered under different respects.  And, if  we  ascend  be con- 
so high as the first origin,  we shall find, that they are all derived foundeh 
from one common sollrce, or from one and the same principle, 
as three branches from the sanle stock.  This general principle 
is the approbation of  reason.  Reason necessarily approves what- 
ever conducts us to real happiness ;  and as that, which is agree- 
able to the  preservation  and  perfection of  man,  that,  which is 
conformable to the will of  the sovereizn master,  on  whom he 
depends, and that,  which  procures him the esteem al~d  respect 
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of his equals ; as all this,  I say,  contributes  to  his Iiappinc S S, 
reason  cannot  but  approve  of  each of  these tilings  separately  .  - 
considered, much less ca:i  it help approving, under different res- 
pects, an action, in which all these properties  are found united. 
Butthough  IV.  For such is the  statc of  things,  that the ideas  of  just, 
theyare  honest, and useful, are naturally connected, and ss  it were i~isep-  stinct, yet 
they are  arable ;  at lez~st  if  we attend, as we ought to do, to red, general, 
naturally  and lasting utility.  We  may say,  that such an utility becomes a  connected. 
kind of  characteristic to distinguish what is truly just,  or honest, 
from what is so only in the erroneous opirlions of men.  This is 
a beautiful  and judicious reinark of  Ciccro.*  The l~m~guage  and 
opinions of  men arc very wide,  says he,  fi,oin trrrth  and rkht yea.. 
son, itr sepa,-ating  the hcnest  from the *IS&LI,  at:& in P~t~s~!a~~g  them- 
selzjes,  that  ssnze  bonrji rhings are IJ;~  zrsej5fitl, and other ihillgs are 
z~spfUl  G14t  77~t  honest.  This is a dange~ous  tlotio~r  to hunzczn l$+.- 
Hence zve see,  that Socrutes ddested  those  sop.pr5-ists, who .first  sepa- 
rnttd  those tzv3 things in opinicn,  which iiz  ~zutur-e  are rezllj  joined. 
Iil fact, the more we investigate $2 plan of cikine providence, 
the more we find the Deity has thought propcr to connect  the 
moral good and evil  with the  physicai,  or,  which  is the samc 
-. 
thing, the just with the useful.  And though in somc particu- 
lar cases the thing seems  otherwise, this is  only  an accidental 
U 
disorder,  which  is much less a natural consequence of the  sys- 
tem, than an eEect of the ignorance or  malice of man.  Where-  - 
to we must add, that,  in case we do not stop at  the  first  ap- 
pearances,  but proceed to  consider  the  human system in  its 
full estent, we shall find, that, every thing well considered, and 
all  coil~pensltions  madc, these irregularities  will be one day or 
other redressed, as W-e  sli;ll  more fully show,  when we come to 
treat of the sdllctions of  natural laws. 
Whether  V.  &re  a  qucst~on  is solnetimes proposed, mIiether II  thing 
an action  be just because God com~nands  it, or whether God  commailds 
is just be- 
Eause~o~  it  because  it  is  just ? 
commands 
it.  In quo lapsa consuetudo deflexit de via, sensimque eh deducta est,,ut hones- 
tatern ab utilitate secernens, et constituerit honestum esse aliqnod, quod utile non 
esset, et utile,  quod  non  honestum :  qui nulla  pernicies  major  honiilium  vita: 
potuit adfererri.  Cic. dc  Ofic.I16. 2. cnp 3.  Itaque accepimus, Socratenl rxsecrari 
solitum eos,  qui  prinlum  hxc naturd  collerentia  opinione  distrauissent.  Idcm. 
lib. 3. cap. 13,  See likewise Grotius, Rights of  U'ar  and  Peace, preliminary  dis- 
course S  17. and fol1ow;ng ;  and Puffendorf, law of Nature and Nations, book,ii. 
chap.  iii. 5 ro, 11. 
Pursuant to our principles,  the question is not  at all difficult. 
A thing is just 1)I:cause  God com1n:cds  it ;  this  is implied by 
the definition we gave of justice.  Bat God commar.ds such or 
such things,  because these things are reasonable in themselves, 
conformable to  the order and ends  he  proposed  to  himself in 
creating mackind, and agreeable to the nature and state of man. 
Thcse ideas,  though distitlct in themselves,  are necessarily  con- 
nected,  and can Le separated only by a metaphysical abstraction. 
VI.  Let us in fine observe, that this  h;~rinony  or surprising  what 
the beauty 
agreemelit,  which ncturally  occurs  between  thc  ideas of  just,  of virtue 
honest,  and useful, constitutes the whole  beauty of  virtue, and and  perfection  the 
informs us at thc same time in what the perfection of man con-  of  man 
sists.  consiet. 
In consequence of  the different  systems  above  mentioned, 
inxC:lists are divided  with  regard  to the latter point.  Some 
place the perfection of man in such a use of  his faculties,  as is 
agree~b!~  to the nature of his being.  Others in the use of  our 
faculties and the i1:tention  of  our Creator.  Some in fine pre- 
tend,  that man is perfect, only as  his manner  of  thinking and 
acting is proper to conduct him to the  end  he aims at,  namely 
his 11;ippi:iess. 
13ut what we have above said sufliciently shows, that these three 
methods or' considering the perfection of man are very little dif- 
ferent, and ought not to be  set in oaposition.  As they are in- 
terwoven with  o!~c another,  WC  ought  rather to combine  and 
unite t!wm.  The perfection  of  n;an  consists really in the pos- 
ses5ion oi  nntural or ~quircd  fdculties,  which en~ble  us to ob- 
t.~in,  and actually pat us in possession  of solid felicity ;  and this 
in coniorrni:~  to the intention of  our  Crcator,  engraved in our 
nature, ancl  clearly  inanifcsted  by  the  state,  wherein  he hzs 
l>luccd us." 
A mo:lern  writer has judiciously said, that toobey  o?dy throrrgb 
fi:':tsr  of  au:h;rity,  o-jr  the Aipe  oj' recotitpensc,  witborrt esteeming or 
bving 71irtrle )r  the sske of its own txcell~ncy,  is ;nrmi and mercr- 
rrnry.  On rbr conimry, to prrrrtise virtrlc~  with atr ubstract view cf 
iis jit~zess a/~d  tzaturul  bruuty,  witbolrt  hr~ving  ~rui)  thli/,;  tf  t1L~ 
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Creator and Conductor of  the universe,  is failing  in our duty to  the 
jrst and greatest g  Beings.  Hc  only,  ovAo  acts jointly  tAr'righ  a 
princjple  ofreann, through  n motive ofpicty,  and  with  a view  of 
his prillcipal  interest,  is an  honest,  wise,  aud  piotrs  marl ;  which 
constitutes,  withst~t  com~ariso~z,  the wrthiest and comp!etest  f  char- 
acters. 
CI-IAP.  IX. 
Of  the npplicatior, of  r~atural  Inwrs  to  htllnan   action^ ;  and f;~~d 
of  cmscie?rre.t 
What  is  I. A  S soon as we have discovered the foundation and rule 
by  of  our duties, we have only  to recollect what has been  already 
applying 
the lawsto said in the eleventh chaper of  the first part of  this work,  con- 
human  ac-  ccrning the  morality of  actions,  to se? in what manner natural  tions. 
laws are  applied  to human actions,  and what effect ought from 
thence  to  result. 
The application of the laws to human actions is nothing else, 
but the judgment u7e  pass cn their morality,  by  comparing them 
with the law ;  a judgment whereby we pronounce,  that those ac- 
tions being either good, bad,  or indifferent,  we are obliged either 
to perform or oi~it  them, or that we may use our liberty in this 
respect, and that,  accordiilg  to the side  we have taken, we are 
worthy of praise or blame,  approbation  or censure. 
This is done in two different n:anners.  For either we judgc 
on this footing of  our own actions,  or of  those of  another per- 
son.  In the first case, our judgment  is called conscience ;  but 
the judgment we pass on other men's  actions is termed imputa- 
tion.  These are undoubtedly  subjects of  great importance, and 
of universal  use in morality,  which deserve therefore to be treat- 
ed with some care and circumspection. 
What  is  11.  Conscier~ce  is properly  no morz than reason itself,  con-  conscience. 
sidered as instructed  in  rcg3rd to the rule we ought to follow, 
or to the law cf nature ;  and  judging  of  the morality of  our 
own actions, 2nd  of  the  obligations we are under  in  this res- 
pect, by conparing them to this rule, pursuant to  the ideas we 
entertain  thereof. 
Conscience is also very frequently taken for t!e  very judgment 
we pass on the morality  of  actions;  a judgment,  which is the 
result  of  perfect  reasoning,  or  the  consequence  we  infer 
from  two  express or tacit premises.  A person compares two 
propositions,  one of  which includes the law,  and  the other the 
action ;  and from them he deduces a third, which is the  judg-  . 
ment he makes of the quality of his action.  Such was the rea- 
soning of  Judas.  Whosseuer  delivers  up  an  innocet~t  person  to 
death  commits a crime;  here is the law.  Xow  this  is  what I 
have  done;  here is  the  action.  I hove  therefore  committed  a 
crime;  this is the  consequence, or judgment,  which  his  con- 
science passed on the action he committed. 
111.  Conscience supposes therefore a knowledge of  the law;  Contcienco 
supposes a  and particularly of  the law of nature, which, being the primitive  kllowledga 
source  of  justice,  is  likewise  the  supreme  rule  of  conduct.  of  thelaw. 
And as the laws cannot serve us for rules, but inasmuch as they 
are known, it follows  therefore,  that  conscience  becomes thus 
the immediate rule of  our actions ; for it is evident we cannot 
conform to the law, but so far,  as we have notice thereof. 
1V.  This being premised,  the fit  rule, we have to lay down Firat role. 
concerning ::;is  matter, is, that we must enlighten our conscience, 
as well  as consult it,  and follow its counsels. 
We  must  enlighten  our conscience ; that is we must spare 
no care or pains to be exactly instructed with regard to the will 
of the legislator,  and  to  the disposition of  his laws, in order to 
acquire just ideas of  whatever is commanded, forbidden,  or per- 
mitted.  For  lain it is, that,  were we in  ignorance or error in 
this respect, the judgment  we should form of  our actions would 
be necessarily  vicious, and  consequently lead us astray.  But 
this is not enough.  We must join  to this first knowledge the 
knowledge  also of  the action.  And for this purpose it is not 
oilly necessary to  examine this action in itself;  but we ought 
likewise to be attentive to the particular circumstances,  that ac- 
company it,  and the consequences, that may follow it.  Other- 
wise we should  run a risk of  mistake in  the application of th? 
+ See the Law of Nature and  Natione, book i. chap.  iii, 5  4, and foliowing i 
and the  Duties of  Man and  a Citizen,book i. chap i, sect.  5, 6. THE  PRINCIPLES 01:  NATURAL  LAW. 
laws, whose genr.ra1 decisions admit of  scverrl nlodific~tioas,  ac- 
cording tothe diserent circumst~nces,  th~~taccompany  our actions ; 
which necessarily  in8  uences  their ~nor'~Iity,  anci  of  course  our 
duties.  Thus it is not suf1icient for a judge to be well acquainted 
with the tenor and purport of the law, before he pronaunces sen- 
tence;  he should likewise have  zn exact knowledge of  the fact, 
2nd all its different  circumstances. 
But it is not merely  with a  view of  e:liiglltenin2  our re2soi1, 
that we ought to acquire a11  this knowledge;  it is p~inciplly  in 
order to apply it occasiollally  to the direction  of  our col~duct. 
We  sIlould  therefore,  whenever  it  conc2rns us to  act,  consult 
previously  our  conscience,  and  be  directed  by  its  coun,e!s. 
This is properly  an indispensable  obiig~eon.  For in fine coil- 
science being,  as it were, the miilistcr and interpreter oi the will 
oi the  legislator,  the cou:lsels  it gives us, have all the force and 
authority of  a law,  and ought  to  produce the  same effect up- 
on  us. 
jecadand  V.  It is  only therefore by  enlightening our coliscience,  that 
third  it becomes a sure rule of  conduct,  whose dictarc.~  may  he  fol- 
lowed with a perfcct confidence of  eadctly  iclfiiling our  duty. 
For we should be grossly mistaka~,  if, under a xiorion  that con- 
science is the immediate rule of  our actio:ls,  we werd  to believc, 
>ines  th:  13~  that every  man  LII~Y  lawfdly do whatever  he imab' 
commands or permits.  We  ought, first to know  wllether this 
notion or persu;ision is justly  founrled.  For, as Pufisndorf- ob- 
serves,  coriscience  has 110  share  in  the  direction  of  human 
actions,  but  inasmuch  a;  it  is  instructed  concerning  the 
law,  whose  office it  properiy  is  to direct our actions.  If we 
have therefore a mind to determine '~nd  act with safety, we must 
on every particular occasion observe  the  two  followi~~g  rules, 
which are vcry simple of  themselves,  easy to practice, and nat- 
urally  follow our  first  rule,  of  wLich  they are  only a kind of 
elucidation.+ 
Second  rule.  Before we  determine  to follow  the dictates of 
conscience,  we should  examine  thoroughly,  whether  we have 
* See the  Law of  Nature  and  Nations, book i. chap. iii. 5  4. 
.f  See Parbeyrac's first note on the Duties of Man and a Citizun, book i. chap. 
i. 5  5. 
the necessary light sand helps to  judge  of the things before us.  If 
we  happen to want these lig!lts  and llelps, we can neither decide, 
nor much less undertake any thing,  without an inexcusable anti 
dangerous temerity.  And  yet  not!ling  is more conlinon than to 
transgress against  this rule.  What  multhudes,  for example, 
determine on religious disputes, or di5cult questions conccrlling 
~xorality  or politics, t!lough  they are no way capabls of judging 
or reasoning about them ? 
Third rule. Supposing that in general we have neces;nry lights 
and helps to judge  of  the  affair before us,  we  must alterwards 
see whether we have act~~zliy  made use of  them ;  insomuch that, 
without a new inquiry, we may fo!!ow  what our conscience sug- 
gests.  It hap?ens  every day, that, for want oi attending to this 
rule, we let ourselves be quietly  prevailed upon to do a great ma- 
ny things, which we might easily discover to Le  unjust, had we 
given  heed to certain clear principles,  the justice  and necessity 
cf which is  universally  acl;~lowlcdged. 
When  we  have  made use  of  the rules here laid down, we 
have done whatever we could and ought ;  and it is morally  cer- 
tain,  that,  by  thus proceeding  we can  neither mistake  ix~  our 
jr~c'ynent,  nor be wrong in our determinations.  But if, cotwith- 
:  L.i:~ding  all  these  pr@cautions,  we  should  happen  to mistake, 
which is not  absolutely impossible ;  this would  be  an infirmity 
inseparable  from  human  nature,  and  would  carry  its excuse 
along' with it in the eye of  the supreme legislator. 
VI. We judge  of  our  actions either  before,  or  after  we  ht,,,d,  -  - 
have  done them ;  ~vherefore  there is an antecedent and a sub-  ent and 
subsequent  sequent conqcicnce.  conscience. 
This distinction gives us an opportunity to lay down a-fjrrrfi Fourth 
rule.  rule;  which  is, that a  pruc!cnt  man ought to consult  his con- 
science before and after he has acted. 
To  determine to  act without having  previously  examined, 
whether what we are a going to do be good or evil,  inanifestly 
indicates an itld;iFi.rencc for our duty, which is  a most danger- 
ous state in respect to m.un ;  a state capable  of  throwing him 
into the most f,ital excesses.  Cut as, in this first judgment, we 
may happen to be determined by  passion,  and to  proceeci with 
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cessary to reflect again on  what we have done,  either in  order 
to be confirmed  in the right side, if  we have embraced it ;  or 
to correct our mistake if  possible, and to guard against the like 
faults for the future.  This is so much the more important, as 
experience shows us,  that we frequently judge quite  digerently 
between a past and  a future transaction ;  and that the prejudices 
or  passions,  which may lead us  astray,  whcn we  are  to  take 
our  resolution, oftentimcs disappear either in the whole or  part, 
when the action is over;  and leave us thcn more  at liberty  to 
judge  rightly of  the nature and consequences  cf  the action. 
The habit of  making  this  double  examen  is  the  essential 
character of  an honest man ;  and indeed nothing can be a bet- 
ter proof  of our being seriously inclined to discharge  our sev- 
eral  duties. 
Subsequent  VII.  The effect resulting from this revisal of  our conduct is 
conscience 
is either  very different,  according  as the judgment,  we pass  on  it, ab- 
quiet, or  solves or condemns us.  In the first case, we find ourselves in 
a state of  satisfaction  and tranquillity,  which is the surest  and 
sweetest recompense  of virtue.  A pure and untainted pleasure 
accompanies always those actions,  that are approved by reason j 
and  reflection renews  the  sweets  we  have  tasted,  together 
with their remembrance,  And indeed what greater happiness 
is there, than to  be inwardly satisfied, and be able with a  just 
confidence to  promise  ourselves  the approbation and benevo- 
lence of  the sovereign Lord, on whom we depend  ?  If  on the 
contrary, conscience  condemns us, this condemnation  must be 
accompanied  with  inquietude,  trouble,  reproaches,  fear,  and 
remorse ;  a state so  dismal, that the ancients have compared it 
to that of  a man tormented by the  furies.  Eve?-y  crime, says 
the satirist,  is disapproved by  the very person  who corn~nits  it ;  and 
theJirsf punishment the criminal feels  is, that he cannct  avoid being 
sey-condemned,  were  he even to jind  means of being  ncqi~itted  be- 
fore  the prdtor's  tribunal. 
Exenqlo quodcrrngue tnalo committitzrr, $$ 
Dispiicet auciori ;  prima  ha  est  ultio, qusd, se 
Judice,  netnj nocens absol.uifzrr, impr~ba  qrralnvis 
I;r..rtiaf;~//fici  pretoris vicrrif t~t-nd, 
Jurr.  Sat.  rg. rer. I- 
He that ccr;;mits a sin, shall quickIyjFnd 
The pressing guilt lie heavy on  his mind ; 
Though bribes orfavsr shall assert his causr, 
Pronsunce him guiltless, and elude the lazvs ; 
None quits himsef ;  his o7un  inrpartial tlioz~ght 
Will  damn, an& conscience will record the fault. 
Creech. 
Hence the subsequent conscience is said  to be quiet or uneasy, 
good or bad. 
VIII.  The judgment we pass on the morllity of our actions  Decisive& 
dubious  is likewise  susceptible of  several different  modifications,  that ,,,,,;,,,,, 
produce new distinctions of  conscience,  which we  sli~uld  here  Pifth,sixth, 
and seventh  point out.  These distinctions may, in general,  be equa!ly  ap- ,,,,, 
plied to the two first species  of  conscience above  mentioned ; 
but they  seem more frequently  and  particularly to agree with 
the antecedent conscience. 
Conscience is therefore either decisive or dubious, according 
to the degree of  persuasion  a  person may  have concerning the 
quality of  the action. 
When we pronounce  decisively and  without any hesitation, 
that an action is conformable or opposite to the law,  or that it is 
permitted,  and consequently we ought to do or omit it, or else 
that we are at: liberty in  .;his  respect ;  this  is  called a decisive 
conscience.  If, on the contrary,  the mind remains in suspense, 
through the conflict of reasons we see on both sides, and which 
appear to us of  equal  weight,  insomuch that we  cannot tell to 
which  side  we ought  to  incline,  this is called a dubious con- 
science.  Such was the doubt of  the Corinthians,  who  did not 
know,  whether  they  could  eat  things  sacrificed  to  idols,  or 
whether they  ought to abstain from them.  On the one side, 
the evangelical liberty  seemed to perinit it;  on the other,  they 
were restrained through apprehension of  seeming to give there- 
by a kind  of  consent to idolatrous  acts.  Not  knowing  what 
resolution to take, they wrote to St. Paul to remove their doubt. 
This distinction makes room  also for some rules. 
Fijh rrrle.  We  do not entirely discharge our duty, by  doing 
with a kind of  difficulty and reluctance what  the decisive con- 
science ordains ;  we ought to set about it readily,  wilIingly, aid 
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with pleasure.+  On the contrary,  to  determine  without hes. 
itation or repugnance agaizst the motions of such a  conscience 
is showing  the highest degree of  depravation and  malice,  and 
renders a person incomparably  more criminal, than if  he were 
impelled by a violent passion or temptation.+ 
Sixth rule.  With regard to a dubious conscicnce, we ought to 
use all endeavours to get rid of our uncertainty,  and to forbear 
acting so long, as we do not know whether we do good or evil. 
To behave otherwise would indicate an indirect contempt of the 
law, by exposing one's self voluntarily to the hazard of violating 
it,  which  is a very  bad  conduct.  The rule  now  mentioned 
ought to be attended  to,  especially  in matters of  great impor- 
tance. 
Seventh  rule.  But if  we find ouselves in  such circurnstance~, 
3s necessarily oblige us to determine to act, we must then, by a 
new attention, endeavour to distinguish the safest and most prob- 
able  side, and  whose  consequences  are  the  least  dangerous. 
Such is generally the opposite side to passion ;  it being the saf- 
est way not to listen ton much to our inclinations.  In  like man- 
ner, we run very little risk of committing a mistake in a dubious 
case,  by following rather the dictates  of  charity, than the sug- 
gestion of  self love. 
scr~q~~ous  IX.  Beside the  dubious  conscience, properly so called, and 
conscience.  which we may likewise  distinguish  by the  name of  irresolute, 
Eighth 
rule.  there is a scrupulous conscience, produced by  slight  and  frivo- 
lous difficulties that arise in the mind, without seeing any solid 
reason for doubting. 
Eighth  rule.  Such scruples  as these ought not  to hinder us 
from acting, if it be necessary ;  and, as they generally arise ei- 
ther from a false delicacy of  conscience, or from gross supersti- 
tion, we should soon get rid of  them, were we to  examine the 
thing with attention. 
~i~h~  and  X. Let us afterwards  observe,  that the decisive conscience, 
erroneous  according as it determines good or  evil, is either  right or erro- 
conscience. 
Ninth rule.  neous- 
Those  for  example, who imagine we ought to abstain from 
* See  part  ii. chap.  v.  7. 
t See Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, book ii. chap XX.  19. 
sdct revenge,  though  the  law of  nature permits a legitimate 
defence, have a right conscience.  On the other hand those, who 
think that the law,  which requires us to be  faithful to our en- 
gagements,  is  not  obligatory  towards  heretics,  and  that  we 
may lawfully break through it in respect to them, have an erro- 
neous conscience. 
But what must we do in cnse of  an erroneous conscience ? 
iiTinth rule.  I  answer, that  we  ought always  to follow the 
dictates of conscience, even when it is erroneous, and  whether 
the error be vincible or invincible. 
This rule may appear strange at fint sight, since it seems to 
prescribe evil ;  because there is no manner of  question, but that 
a man, who acts according to an erroneous conscience, espouses 
a bad cause.  Yet  this is not so bad, as if we were to  deter- 
mine to do a thing with a firm persuasion of its being contrary 
to the decision of  the lav ;  for this  would denote a direct con- 
tempt of  the legisktor and his order>, which is a most criminal 
disposition.  Whereas the first resolu~ion,  though bad in itself, 
is nevertheless the  effect  of  a laudable  disposition to obey the 
legislator, and conform to his will. 
But it does not  thence follow, that we are always excusable 
in being guided  by  the  dictates  of  an  erroneous  conscience; 
this is true only, when the error  happens to be invincible.  If 
on the contrary it is surmountable, and we mistake with respect 
to what is commanded or forbidden, we sin either way, whet5- 
er  we  act according to, or  against the decisions of  conscience. 
This shows (to mention it once more) what an important con- 
cern it is  to enlighten our conscien~e,  because, in the case just 
now mentiond, the person with an erroneous conscience is actu- 
ally under a melancholy  necessity of  doing ill,  whichever side 
he takes.  But  if  we should happen to mistake with regard to an 
indifferent  thing,  which we are erroneously persuaded  is corn- 
manded or forbidden, we do not  sin in that case, but when we 
act contrary to the light of  our own conscience. 
XI.  In fine  there are tn70 sorts of right conscience ;  the one oemon- 
strAtive  clear and dcmonstrative, and  the  other  merely probable. 
and prob-  Thc clear and  dcmonstrative  conscience  is  that,  which  is able con- 
founded on  cwtain  principlt-s,  ancl  on  de~nonstrative  reason,  so science. 
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far as the nature of inoral things will prcinit ;  insomuch that one 
may clearly  and distinctly prove  the rectitude  of  a  judgment, 
made 011.  such or such an action.  011  the contrary, thougin we 
are convinced of the truth of  a  judgment,  yet if it be founded 
only on vcrisimilitude,  and we cannot demonstrate its certainty 
in a methodical  manner,  and  by incontestable principles,  it is 
then only a probable conscience. 
The  foundations of probable conscience are in general author- 
ity and example, supported by a confused  notion of  a  natural 
iitness, aiid sometimes  by popular reasons, which  seem drawn 
from the very nature of things.  It  is by this kind of  conscience, 
that the greatest  part  of  mankind  are  conducted, there being 
very few, who are capable of knowing  the indes~ensable  neces- 
sity of  their duties,  by deducing them  from their  first  sources 
by regular  consequenccs ; especially when the paint relates to 
maxim3 of  morality,  which, being  somewhat  remote from the 
first principles, require a longer chin  of rc,?sonings.  This con- 
duct is far from being unreasonab!e.  For those,  who have not 
sufficient light of  thelnselves to judge  propcrly  of the nature of 
things,  cannot do better, than recur to the judgment  of  enlight- 
ened persons ;  this being the only resource left them to act with 
safety.  We  might  in this  respect compare  the persons above 
mentioned to young  people,  whose  judgment  has  not yet ac- 
quired  its  full maturity, and who ought to listen  and conforln 
to the counsels of  their superiors.  The authority therefore and 
example of  sage and enlightened men may in some cases, in dc- 
fault of our own lights, prove a reasonable  principle of deter~ni- 
nation and conduct. 
But in fine,  since those  foundations of  probqble  conscience 
are not so solid,  as to permit us absolutely to build upon them, 
we must establish,  as a Tenth Rule, that we ought to use  all oar 
endeavours to increase thc degree of verisimilitude ill our opin- 
ions,  in order to approach as  near as possible  to the  clear and 
demonstrative conscience ; and  we  must not be satisfied with 
probability, but when ure can do no better. 
CHAP.  X. 
Of  the  merit  and  demerit  cjf  hrrman  actions;  and  cf their i?n- 
prrfatiorz  relative  to tJe  IOWS  Of nature.* 
I. 1  N  explaining t!ie  nature cf  human actions,  considered  Distinction 
of  imp1 ta-  with  regard to right,?  we  observed, that an essential quality of  gility ,id 
these actions  is to be  susceptible  of  imputation;  that  is, tIie  ifnputa- 
Of  agent may be  reasonably looked upon,  as the real author there-  ~~,"'n,ture 
of, may have  it chargcd  to his account, and be made answerable  of  a mord 
for it ;  insomuc!i  that the good or bad effects, thence arising, may  cause' 
b:  justly attributed and rcferred to him, as to the cfiicient cause, 
coscerning which we 'ruve laid down  this principle, that every 
voluntary action is of  an imputable nature. 
We  give in general the name of moral cause of an action to 
the  person, who produc~d  it, either wholly or in part, by a do 
termination of  his will ;  whether he executes it himself  physi- 
cally  and immediately, so as t:,  be  author thereof;  or whether 
he procure it by the act of some other person, and becomes there- 
by  its  cause.  Thus whether we wound a man with  our own 
hands,  or set assassins to waylay him, we are equally the moral 
cause of  the evil thence resulting. 
It was observed  likewise  that we must not confound the im- 
put~bility  of human actio:ls  wirh  their actual imputation.  The 
former, as has been just now mentioned,  is a quality of the ac- 
tion ;  the latter is an act of the legislator, or judge,  who lays to 
a person's  charge an action,  that is of  an imputable nature.  " 
11.  Implltation is properly therefore  a  judgment,  by  which 
Of the na-  we declare, that a person being the author or moral cause of an  tur2 Of inl- 
action commanded  or  forbidden by the laws,  the good  or bad  putation. 
eiTects,  that result from this  action,  ought to be actually attrib- r::,~sjes 
utect to him ;  that he is consequently answerable for them,  and  edge of  the 
as such is worthy of praise  or bhme, of recumpcnse or punlh- 
ment.  fact. 
* See on this and the fo!lowing  chapter, PufTendori's Law of N-tuie  and Na- 
tion:,  book i, chap. v. and chap. il. 
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This  judgment of imputation,  as well as that  of  conscience, 
is made by  applying  the law to the action,  and comparing one 
with the other,  in order  to decide afterwards  the merit of  the 
fact, and to make the author consequently feel the good or evil, 
the punishment or recompense,  which  the  law has thereto an- 
nexed.  All this necessarily supposes an exact knowledge of the 
law and  of  its  right sense, as well as of  the fact and such cir- 
cumstances thereof, as may any way relate to the determination 
of  the law.  A  want of this knowledge must render the appli- 
cation false,  and the judgment  erroneous. 
mples.  111.  Let us produce a  few examples.  One  of  the Horniii, 
who remained  conqueror in the. combat between the brothers of 
this  name and the  three  Cuvintii, inflamed  with anger against 
his sister,  for bewailing the  death of  one  of  the  Curiatii,  her 
lover,  and for bitterly reproaching him therewith, instead of  con- 
gratulating him  for his  victory,  slew  her  with  his  own hand. 
He  was accused  before the Duumvirs ;  and  the question was, 
whether the law agzinst  murderers ought to be  applied in  the 
present case, in ~rder  to make him  undergo the punishment  ? 
This was the opinion of the judges,  who in fact condemned the 
young Roman.  But an appeal being made to the people,  they 
judged  quite otherwise.  Their notion was, that the law ought 
not  to  be  applied  to the  fact ;  bec3u;e  a Roman lady,  who 
seemed to be more concerned about her own particular interest, 
than sensible of  the good of  her country,  might in some meas- 
ure be considered  and  treated,  as  an  enemy ;  wherefore they 
pronounced  the young man innocent.  Let us add another ex- 
ample of an advantageous  imputation, or of  a judgment of re- 
compense.  Cicero, in the beginning of  his consulate, discover- 
ed the conspiracy of Cataline, which menaced the republic  with 
ruin.  In this  delicate  conjuncture he behaved  with so much 
prudence and  address,  that  the conspiracy was stifled without 
any noise or sedition,  by  the death of  a  few of  the criminals. 
And yet J.  Czsar,  and  some other enemies of  Cicero,  accused 
him before the people for having put citizens to death contrary 
to rule,  and  before the  senate or  people  had passed  judgment 
against them.  But the people,  attending to the circumstances 
of the fact,  to the danger the republic had  escaped,  and  to the 
important service Cicero had done, so far from condemning h;m 
as an infringer of the laws, decreed him the glorious titleof  fa- 
ther of his country. 
IV.  In order to settle the principles  and  foundations of this Principles 
matter,  we  must  observe,  I. That we ought  not to conclude 
the actual imputation of an action merely from its imputability.  to infer 
An action, to merit actual imputation, must necessarily have the ;:!hrnd 
concurrence of these two conditions ;  first that it be of an im-  from in,- 
putable nature,  and secondly that the agent be  under some ob-  putabiliq 
only.  ligation of doing or omitting it.  An example will clear up the 
thing.  Let us suppose two young men with the same abilities 
and conveniencies,  but under no obligation of  knowing algebra ; 
one of them applies himcelf  to this science, and the other does 
not ;  though the action of the one and the other's  omission are 
by themselves of an imputable nature,  yet in this case they can 
be neither good  nor bad.  But were we to suppose,  that these 
two young men were designed by their prince,  the one for some 
office of state, and the other for a military employment ;  in this 
case their application  or neglect in instructing themselves in ju- 
risprudence,  for example, or in the mathematics, would be just- 
ly imputed to them.  The reason is,  they are both indispensa- 
bly obliged to acquire such knowledge, as  is necessary for dis- 
charging properly  the offices or employments,  to which  they 
are called.  Hence  it is  evident,  that,  as imputability suppos- 
eth the power of  acting or not acting, actual imputation requires 
moreover,  that a person  be under an obligation  of  doing either 
one or the other. 
V. 2.  When we impute an  action to  a person,  we  render 2.  Imputa. 
him,  as has been already  observed,  answerable for the good or tionWPp@. 
ses some  bad consequences of  what he  has  done.  Hence  it  follows, ,onne,io~ 
that, in order to make a just imputation, there must be some ne- between 
the action  cessary or accidental connexion between the thing done or omit- ,,d  ;, 
ted, and the good  or bad  consequences of  the action or omis- consequen- 
sion ;  and besides, the  agent  must have had some  knowledge ces' 
of this connexion,  or at least he must  have been able to have a 
probable foresight of the effects of  his action.  Otherwise the 
imputation cannot take  place,  as will  appear by  a  few exam- 
ples.  A gunsmith  sells arms to a  man,  who has the appear4 THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURAL  LAW.  1~9 
ance of a sensible, sedate person,  and  does  not  Seein  to have 
any bad  design.  And yet  this  man goes instantly to hake an 
unjust attack on another person,  and kills him.  IIere the gun- 
smith is not at all chargeable,  having done nothing, but what he 
has a right to do ;  and  besides he neither  could  nor ought to 
have foreseen what happened.  But if a person carelessly leave 
a pair of pistols charged on the table,  in  a place exposed to ev- 
ery body, and a child, insensible of  the dmger, happens to wound 
or  kill himself ;  the former is certainly answerable for the mis- 
fortune ;  by reason this  is a clear and immediate  consequence 
of what he has done, and he could and ought to have foreseen it. 
We  must reason in the same  manner with respect  to an ac- 
tion productive of  some good.  This good  cannot be attributed 
to a person,  who has  bgen the  cause of  it without  knowledge 
or thought thereof.  But, in order to merit thinks and acknowl- 
edgment, there is no necessity  of our being  entirely sure of suc- 
cess ;  it is sufficient there was room to reasonably  presume it, 
and, were the effect absolutely  to fail, the  intention would not 
be the less commendable. 
3.  Founda-  VI. 3. But,  in order to ascend to the first  principles of  this 
tions of 
merit and  theory, we must observe, that, as man is supposed to be obliged 
demerit.  by his nature and  state to follow certain rules  of  conduct,  the 
observance of those rules constitutes the perfection of his nature 
and state ;  and, on  the contrary,  the infringing of  them forms 
the degradation of both.  Now we are made after such a man- 
ner, that perfection and order  please  us of  themselves ;  while 
imperfection  and  disorder,  and  whatever relates thereto,  natu- 
rally displease  us.  Consequently we acknowledge,  &at  those, 
who,  answering the end they were designed for,  perform  their 
duty, and contribute thus to the good and perfcctior.  of  the hu- 
man system, are  deserving of  our approbation,  esteem,  and be- 
nevolence ;  that  they may  reasonably  expect  thex scntinen:~ 
in their  favor, and have some sort of right to the advantageous 
which narurally  arise  from them.  We  canno;,  on the 
contrary, avoid condemning  those,  who,  through  a bad  use of 
their faculties,  degrade their own state and nature ;  we confess 
they are worthy of  disapprobation and blame, and that it is agree- 
able to reason, the bad effects of  their conduct should fa11 upon 
themselves.  Such are the foundations of  merit and demerit. 
VII.  Merit therefore is a quality, which entitles us to the ap-  m what 
merit and  probation,  esteem,  and benevolence  of  our superiors or equals, demerit 
and to the advantages thence resulting.  Demerit is an opposite consi~t.  - - 
quality, which,  rendering  us worthy  of the censure and blame 
of  those,  with whom we  converse, obliges us as it were  to ac- 
knowledge,  that it is reasonable they should entertain those sen- 
timents towards us ;  and that we are under a  melancholy obli- 
gation of bearing  the bad  effects, that flow  froin them. 
These notions of merit and demerit have therefore, it is plain, 
their foundation in the very nature of things ;  and are perfect- 
ly agreeable to common sense and the notions  generally receiv- 
ed.  Praise and blame,  where people  judge reasonably, always 
follow the quality of actions,  according as they are morally good 
or bacl.  This is clear  with respect to  the legislator ;  he must 
contradict himself in the grossest manner, were he not to approve 
what is conformable,  and  to condemn what  is  opposite to his 
laws.  And as for those, that depend on him, this very depend- 
ance obliges them to regulate their judgment  on this subject. 
VIII. 4. We  have already  observed,'  that some actions are  4. Merit 
better than others, and that bad  ones  nlay likewise be more or demerit  have their 
less so,  according  to the  different  circumstances,  that attend  degrees; 
and so has  them,  and the disposition of the person,  that does them.  Mer- impnuue,,, 
it and demerit have therefore their degrees ;  they may be great- 
er or less.  Wherefore when we are to determine exactly f.0~ 
f;v an action ought  to be imputed to 3 person,  we should have 
regard to these differences ;  and the praise or blame, the recom- 
pense or  punishment,  ought likewise to have  their  degrees it1 
proportioli to the  merit  or demerit.  Thus,  according  as the 
good or evil proceeding from an action is more or less consider- 
able ;  according as  there was more or less facility or difficulty 
to perform or to abstain  from this  action ;  according as it was 
done  with more  or less reflection and liberty ;  and finally ac- 
cording as tile reasons, that ought to have determined us there- 
to, or diverted us from it,  were more or less strong,  and the in- 
tention and motives were more or less noble and generous ;  the 
imputation is made after a more or less efficacious manner,  and 
its effects are more or less profitable  or pernicious. 
* Part i, chap. xi. sea  12. 
X $ rym.  IX.  5.  Imputation, as we have already hinted, may be made 
uon is 81-  simple by diRerent persons ;  and it  is  easy to  comprehend,  that,  in 
or effioa-  tliose different  cases,  the effects  thereof  are  not  alwa~s  the 
cious.  same ;  but thdt  they must be more  or less important, accord- 
ing to the quaIity of  the parsons,  and the  different right  they 
have in this respect.  Sometimes  imputation  is corifined  sim- 
ply  to praise or bldme ;  and  at  other  times  it goes  further. 
This gives us foom to distinguish two sorts of  imputatih, one 
simple, ad  the other efficacious.  The first consists only in ap- 
proving M disapprovirig the  action ;  insomuch  that  no  other 
effect arises from it with regard to the agent.  But the second 
k not coonfined to blame or praise ;  it produces moreover some 
good or bad effect with regard to the agent ;  that is,  some real 
and positititre  good or evil,  that befals him. 
6. Effects  X 6.  Simple imputatiod may  be  made  indiffereritly by  all, 
of one anci 
,h oher.  whether they have or have n6t a particular  and personal infer- 
est in the doing or omitting of  the action ;  it is sufficient they 
have a general &~d  icdirect  interest.  And as we  may  aflirm, 
that 311  the members of  society are: interested in the due obberv- 
aace of the laws of nature, hertce they have all a right to praise 
or condemtr another man's  actions, acc~ding  as they are  con- 
formable or cuntraq to those laws.  They have even a kind of 
obligation in this respect.  The regard,  they owe to the Iegisla- 
tor arid his laws, requires it of them ;  and they would be want- 
ing in their duty to society and to individuals, were they not to 
testify, at least bp their approbation or censure, the esteem they 
have for probity and virtue, and their aversion, on the contrary, 
to iniquity and vice. 
But with regard ro efficaldous imputation, in order to render 
it lawful,  we should have a particular and direct intetest in the 
perfotming  or omitting of  the action.  Now those, who have 
such an interest,  are firstly persons, whom it concerns to rep 
hte  the actions ;  secohdly sneh, as are the object thereof, name 
ly  those,  towards  whom  we  act, and to whose advantage or 
prejudice the thing may turn.  Thus a sovereign,  who has en- 
xted laws,  who commands  certain  things with  a  pronlise  of 
recompense, and prohibits others under a commination of  pun- 
ishrnetit, ought witlwut doubt to concern himself about the ob- 
servance of his laws, and has consequently a right to impute the 
actions of his subjects after an efficacious manner, that is,  to re- 
ward or punish them.  The same may be said of  a person, who 
has received some  injury or damage by another man's  action; 
this  very  thing gives him a right to  impute  the action  effica- 
ciously to its author,  in  order to obtain a just satisfaction, and 
a reasonable indemnification. 
XI.  7.  It may therefore happen,  tllat several persons have a  7. 'If  an 
those, who  right to impute, each on his side, the same action to tlie person, ,,  ,on_ 
who did it ;  becduse this action may interest them in different  cerned, do 
respects.  And, in that case, if  anj  of the  persons  concerned zt:xe 
has a mind to relinquish his right,  by not  imputing  the action  itissuppos- 
7  - 
to the agent, so far as it concerns himself ;  this does not in any  ed noi io 
have been  shape prejudice  the right of  the rest,  which is  no  way in  his  dsne. 
power.  When a man does me an injury, I may indeed forgive 
him,  as to what concerns myself;  but  this does not  diminish 
the right the sovereign may  have to take cognizance of the in- 
jury,  and to punish the author,  ns  an infringer of  the  law,  and 
a disturber of  the civil order and government.  But if all those, 
who are interested  in the action, are  willing not to impute  it, 
and jointly forgive the injury  and the crime ;  in this  case the 
action ought to be  morally  esteemed, as never committed,  be- 
cause it is not attended with any moral etiect. 
XII.  8.  Let us in fine observe, that there is  some difference 8. Differ- 
between  the imputation of  good and bad actions.  When the  ence 
tween the  legisiator has established a certain recompense for a good action,  imputation 
he obliges himself to give this recompense, and he grants a right  of good & 
of  demanding it to those, who have rendered  themselves worthy badn&m 
thereof by their submission  and obedience,  But  with respect 
to penalties, enacted against bad actions,  the legislator may  ac- 
tually inflict them,  if he  has a  mind,  and has an  incontestable 
right to do it ;  insomuch that  the  criminal  cannot reasonably 
complain  of the  evil, he  is made to undergo,  because  he has 
drawn it upon himself through his disobedience.  But it does not 
thence  ensue,  that the sovereign is obliged to punish to thc full 
rigour;  he is always master  to exercise  his right, or  to show 
grace ;  to entirely remit,  or to diminish the punishment j  awt 
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CHAP.  XI. 
Application f  those pui~ciple~  to dflermt sprcie~  of actisn~,  in or& 
to judge  irr what molztzer  they orcght  to  be  imputed. 
What ac-  I. W  E might  be satisfied with the  general  principles 
tlons are  above laid  down, were it not useful to make  an application  of 
in~puted  ?  them, and to point out particularly those actions sr  events, for 
which we are, or are not answerable. 
I.  And in  the first  place  it follows,  from  what  has been 
hitherto said,  that we may impute to  a person every action or 
omission,  of  which he is  the  author  or cause,  and whicll  he 
could or ought to have done or omitted. 
Actions of  2.  The actions of  those,  who have  not  the use of  reason, 
such, as 
have not  such as infants, foo!s,  2nd madmen, ought not  to be  imputed 
the use of  to them.  The wdnt of  knowledge hinders, in such cases, im- 
reason.  putation.  For  these  persons  being  incapable  of  knowing 
what they are  doing,  or of  comparing it with t!>.,:  laxvs ;  their 
actions are not properly human actions, nor do t':lcy  ificlude any 
morality.  If  we  scold  or  bear  a child,  it is not by uray of 
punishment ;  it is only a simple correction,  by which we pro- 
pose principally to hinder him from contracting a bad habit. 
Of what is  3.  With regard to what  is done in drunkenness, this stdte, 
done in 
drunken-  voluntarily contracted,  does not hinder the imputation of  a bad 
.  ness.  action. 
of  thingr,  11.  4.  We  do not impute things, that are really above a per- 
that  are  son's  strength ;  no  more than  the  omission  of  a thing  com. 
impoasible. 
of  the  manded,  if  there has been  no  opportunity  of  doing it.  For 
wantofop-  the imputation of  an omission  manifestly supposes  these  two 
portunlty.  things ;  first that a person has had sufficient strength and means 
to act ;  and  secondly  that he  could  have made use of  those 
means, without prejudice to any other more indispensable duty, 
or without drawing upon himself  a considerable  evil, to which 
there was no obligation of  being exposed.  It must be under- 
stood however,  that the  person  has not  brought himself  into 
an incapacity  of  acting through  his  own  fault ;  for then the 
legislator might  as  lawfully  punish those,  who have  reduced 
themselves to  this  incapacity,  as  if they  had  refused  to act, 
when they were capable of  complying.  Such was  at  Rome 
the case of  those,  who cut off  their thumbs,  in order  to disa- 
ble themselves from handling  arms, and be exempted from the 
service.  In like  manner  a debtor  is not  excusable,  when, 
through his own misconduct, he has rendered himself  unable to 
discharge his debts.  And we even become deservedly respon- 
sible for a thing in itself  impossible,  if  we have undertaken to 
do it when we knew,  or might easily  have known,  that it sur- 
passed  our strength ; in case any body happens by this means 
to be injured. 
111.  5. Thc natural  qunlities of  body or  mind  cannot  of  ofnatural 
themselves be imputed,  either as good or evil.  But a person is  qualities 
deserving of  praise  when,  by  his application  and  care,  these 
qualities  are perfected,  or these defects  are mended ;  and,  on 
the contrary, one is justly accountable for the imperfections and 
infirmities, that arise from bad conduct or neglect. 
6.  The effects of  external causes and events,  of  what  kind  of  event, 
soever, cannot be attributed to a person either  as  good or evil,  produced 
by external  but inasmuch as he could  and ought to procure,  hinder,  or di-  ,,,,,, 
rect them ;  and as he has been either careful or negligent in this 
respect.  Thus we charge a good or bad  harvest to a husband- 
man's  account,  according as he has tilled well or ill the ground, 
whose culture was committed to his care. 
IV.  7.  AS for  things  done through error or ignorance, we  Of what 
is done  may affirm in general, that a person is not answerable for what 
he has done through invincible ignorance,  especially as it is in-  ignorance 
voluntary  in its origin and cause.  If a prince travels through  or error. 
his own dominions disguised and incognito,  his subjects are not 
to blame for not paying him the respect- and honor due to him. 
But we should reasonably impute an unjust sentence to a judge, 
who, neglecting to instruct himself either  in the fact  or the law, 
should happen to want the knowledge necessary to decide with 
equity.  But the possibility of getting instruction,  and the care 
we ought to take for this purpose,  are not strictly  considered in 
the common run of  life ;  we only look upon what is possible or 
imppossible in a moral sense, and with a due regard  to the ac4 
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Ignorance or error in point of laws and duties generally pz6.3e5 
for voluntary,  and does not obstruct  the imputation  of  actions 
cx omissions thence arising.  This is a consequence of  the prin- 
ciples,*  already established.  But there may happen sowe particuc 
llar cases, wherein the nature of the thing, which of  itself is difi- 
cult to investigate, joined to the ckaractzr  and state of the per? 
an, whose faculties, being naturally limited, have likewise been 
uncultivated for want of  education and  assistance, renders  the 
error unsurmountable,  2nd consequently worthy of excuse.  It 
concerns the prudence  of the legislator to weigh these circum- 
stances ;  and to modify the imputation on this footing. 
bfh  d*  V.  8.  Though temperament,  habits, and  passions,  have  of 
fat  of tall- themselves a great force to  determine some  actions ;  yet  this 
hbitss  01  force is  not such,  as absolutely  hinders  the use of  reason and 
pMsion'  liberty, at least in  respect to  the execution of  the bad  designs 
they inspire.  That is what all legislators suppose ;  and a very 
good  reason  they have to suppose it.+  Natural  dispositions, 
habits, and passions,  do not determine men invincibly to violate 
the laws of oature.  These disorders of  the soul are not incur- 
able ;  with  some  pains  and assiduity one may contrive to re- 
move thcm, according  to Cicero's observation,  who alledges to 
this purpose the example of Socra:es$. 
But if, instead of endeavouring to correct those  vicious dis- 
positions,  we strengthen them by habit, this does not render us 
inexcusable.  The power of habit is indeed very great ;  it even 
seems to impel us by a kind of necessity.  And yet experience 
shows it is not  impossible to master  it,  when we are seriously 
resolved to make the attempt.  And were it even true,  that in- 
veterate habits had  a  greater  command  over us  than  reason j 
yet,  as it was in our power not to contract them, they do not at 
oli diminish  the  immorality  of  bad  actions,  and consequently 
they cannot hinder them from being imputed.  On the cantra- 
ry,  as a  virtuous habit renders  actions more commendable ;  so 
the habit of vice  cannot  but  augment its blame  and  demerit. 
In short, if  inclinations, passions, or habits, could frustrate the 
effect of  laws, it would be needless to trobule Our heads about 
'  See pm  i. chap. i. 5  1%.  t See part i. chap, ii. S 16. 
3 Tuscul quzst. lib.  4 cap,  37% 
ally direction  of human actions;  for  the  principal  object  of 
laws in general is to correct bad inclinations, to prevent vicious 
habits, to hinder their effects, and to eradicate the passions ;  or 
at least to contain them within their proper limits. 
VI.  9.  The different cases, hitherto exposed,  contain ~th-  Of forced 
ing very difficult or puzzling.  There are some others a little 
more embarrassing, which require a particular  discussio~. 
The first question is,  what we are to think of forced actions ; 
whether they are of an imputable nature,  and ought actually to 
be imputed  ? 
I answer,  I.  That a physical violence,  and such as absolute- 
ly cannot be resisted, produces an involuntary action, which, so 
far from meriting to be actually imputed, is not even of an im- 
putable nature."  In this  case the author of  the violence  is 
the true and  only cause  of  the action, and as such  is the only 
person answerzble for it ; whilst  the  immediate  agent  being 
merely passive,  the fact caq be loo  more attributed to him,  than 
to the sword, to the stick, or to any other weapon, with which 
the blow or wound was given. 
2.  But if the constraint arises from the apprehension or fear 
of  some great evil,  with which we  are  menaced  by  a person 
more powerful than ourselves,  and who  is able instantly  to in- 
flict it ;  it must  be allowed,  that  the action,  done  in  conse- 
quence of  this fear,  does not cease to be voluntary,  and  there- 
fore, generally speaking, is of an imputable nature.+ 
In order to know afterwards whether it ought actually to be 
imputed,  it  is necessary  to inquire,  whether the  person,  oh 
whom the coilstraint is laid,  is  under a  rigorous  obligation of 
doing or abstaining from a thing, at the hazard of suffering the 
evil, with which he is  menaced.  If  so,  and  he  determines 
contrary to his duty,  the constraint  is not a sufficient reason to 
screen him  absolutely from imputation.  For, generally speak- 
ing, it cannot be questioned but a  lawful supe~ior  can  lay  us 
under an indispensable obligati011  of  obeying his orders, at the 
hazard of bodily pain,  and even at the risk of our lives. 
VII.  Pursuant to these principles, we  must distinguish  be-  Forced ac- 
tionsare ea-  tween indiff~rent  actions, and those that are n~orallp  necessary. ther good, 
Q
  Sce sect3 I.  .f.  See pact  i, chap, ii, ~ect,  XA  bad, er in 
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An action  indifferent  in its  nature,  extorted by  n~aih  forte, 
cannot be imputed to the person constrained ;  because, not be- 
ing under any obligation in this respect,  the author of  the vio- 
lence h3s no right to require any thidg of  him.  And,  as  the 
law of nature expressly forbids all manner of violence, it cannot 
authorise it at the same time, by laying the person,  who suffers 
the violence,  under a necessity of  executing a thing, to which 
he has given only a forced consent.  Thus every forced prom- 
ise or convention is null of itself, and has nothing in it obliga- 
tory,  as a promise or convention ;  on the contrary it may and 
ought to be imputed as a crime  to the author  of  the violence. 
But were we to suppose that  the  person,  who  uses  the  con- 
straint, exercises in this respect his  own right, and pursues the 
execution thereof;  the action, though forced,  is still valid and 
attended with all its  moral effects.  Thus a debtor, who,  void 
of any principle of  honesty, satisfies his creditor  only through 
imminent  fear of  imprisonment,  or pf  execution on his goods, 
cannot complain against his payment, as made by constraint and 
violence.  For  being under an  obligation  of  paying  his  just 
debts, he ought to have done it willingly and of  his own accord, 
instead of  being obliged to it by force. 
As for good actions, to which a person is determined by force, 
and, as it were,  through fear of blows or punishment, they pass 
for  nothing,  and  merit neither praise nor  recompense.  The 
reason hereof is obvious.  The obedience, required by the law, 
ought to be sincere ;  and we should discharge our duties through 
a conscientious principle, voluntarily,  and  with our  own con- 
sent and free will. 
Finally,  with regard  to actions manifestly bad or criminal, to 
which a person is forced through fear  of  some great evil,  and 
especially death ;  we must lay down as a general rule,  that the 
unhappy  circumstances,  under  which a person  labours,  may 
indeed diminish the crime of a rnan  unequal to this trial,  who 
commits a bad action in spite of  himself,  and against his own 
inward conviction ;  yet the action  remains intrinsically vicious, 
and worthy of censure ;  wherefore it may be, and actually is im- 
puted,  unless the exception of  necessity can be alledgecl in the 
person's  favor. 
VIII. This last rule is a conseqxence of  the principles, Eith-  \x'hy  4  5x1 
2  011, 
erto established.  A  man,  who  determines  through  fear  oi  that,. h 
some great  evil, but without  scffcring  any physical  vio!ence,  forced, 
may be  to do a thing visibly criminal, concur;  in  some  manner to the 
action, a;ld acts voluntarily, though with regret.  It  does  not 
absoluteIy  sxrplss the  fortitude of  the Iluman mind to rzsolve 
to suffer, nay to die,  rather than b,-  crac:ing  i;l  our duty.  We 
see  a great  many people, who have a courage of  this kind for 
very frivololis subjects, which makes a lively impression on them  5 
and though the thing  be really  difficult, yet it is not  impossi- 
ble.  The legislator may  therefore,  impcse a  rigorous obliga- 
tion of  obeying, and have just  reasons for so doing.  The in- 
terest of  society  frequently requires  evdmples  of  undaunted 
constancy.  It was never  a question  among  civilized nations, 
and those, that had imbibed any principles of  morality, wheth- 
er  for example it was  Idwful to  betr~y  one's  country  for  the 
preservation of  life ?  And it is well known,  that the  opposite 
maxim was a received principle aino:lg the Greelcs nnd  Romans. 
Several heathen moralists have strongly inculcated this doctrine, 
namely, that the dread of  pains  and torments ought not to pre- 
vail upon any man to make him do things contrdry to  religior, 
or juftice.  Ifyou are sutnmjned as a  'LV~~~ESS,  szys a Latin poet, 
in a dubious  and equivocal apr,  teN  the truih,  and  d3  not  be  of- 
mid;  tell it,  were even Phalurrs  to menace ysu  with his 62111  un- 
less yot~  bwe falsz  witness.  Fix it as a rnaxim in pour  mind, that 
it is the greatest of evils to  prpfpV  Ife  to honour ;  and  never at- 
tempt to  preserve it at the expence of  the only  thirig,  that con relz- 
der it desirable. 
.............  Ambigu&ji quando citabere testis 
Incertreque  rei ; Phalaris licet ilrtoerrt,  zct  sis 
Falsus, et  ad~noto  dirtet perjrtria tartr~, 
~ummum  crede ngos aninlain prrefire  pudor-i, 
Et propter  vltam vivendi perdtre  cairsas. 
JUVEN.  sat. viii.  ver.  8s. 
And if  a wirness in n doubful  cause, 
where a brib'd judge meanc to  elude the Iauls ; 
Y 'I'HE  PRINCIPLES 02  NATURAL 
Tho~r~h  Phnkzvis'~  brnzen brdl were therz, 
And be  would dirtLate  what he'd  have jou  snwear, 
Be  not so  trcfli'nt~, but vather choose 
To  Rt~urd  j0'0t~r  htnor, and your II/G to larr, 
Rather thau let  JXC~ '~~irtcre  be  btt~~yed, 
Yirtue, the noblest caztse, for  ufhicb you'r.~. marit.. 
STEPNEY. 
Such is the rule.  It may happen nevertheless,  as we  have al- 
ready hinted,  that the cecessity a person is undcr may furnish o 
Eavorable exceptiol ,  so as  to hinder the action from  being im- 
puted. 'ro explain tI,;a,  we should be obiigcd to enter into some 
particulars,  that belong to another  place.  It is suflicient here 
to observe,  that  the  circumstaiices  a person is  under give  us  - 
frequent room to form a reasonable presumption, that the legis- 
lator himself excuses him from suffering  the  evil,  with which 
he is menaced,  and therefore allows  him to  deviate  from the 
decision of  the lam ;  and this may  be always presumed, when 
the side a person takes,  in older to extricate himself  from  his 
perplexity,  includes a less evil than that,  with which he is me- 
naced. 
Pafien-  IX.  Gut  Pufffndorf s  principles  concerning  this  question 
dorf's 'pin-  seem to be neither just in themselves,  nor well connected.  He  ion. 
lays down as a rulc, that constraint, as well as  physical  and ac- 
tual violence,  excludes all imputation, and that an actioc, ertort- 
cd through fear,  ougl:t  no more to be imputed to the inlmedi- 
ate agent,  than  to the sword, .t~hich  a person  uses in giving a 
wound.  To  which he adds,  that with regard to some very in- 
famous '~ctions,  it is a mzi-k cf  a generous mind to choose rath- 
er to die,  than to serve as an instrument to such fl~gitious  deeds, 
and that cases like these ought to  be  excepted.'  nut  it has 
been justly obsen~ed,  that this  aut5or gives too great an extent 
to the effect of  constraint ;  and that the example of  the ax  cjr 
sword,  which  are  mere passive instruments,  proves  nothing 
at all.  Resides if  the general principle is solid, we do not see 
why he should have  excepted  particular cases ;  or at lcast he 
* See the Duties of  Man and a Citizen, book i. chap. i. 5  24. and the Law of 
Nature and Nations, book i. c113p. v, 5  9, with Barbeyrac's notes. 
ought to haye given  us sane rule  to disting3ish  those  excep- 
tions with certainty. 
X. 10.  But  if the  per;on,  who does a  bad action tlrrougll  of actions  in which 
fear,  is generally ansv~erdble  for it, the author of  the constraint  per- 
is not less so ;  and we may  justly tender  him accoul~table  for one  sons  are  thu~ 
the share he hnq  hnd therein.  concerned. 
?'his  gives  an opi3oi-tunity to  add a few reflections 011  those 
cases, in which several persons concur to the same action ;  and 
to establish some principles,  whereby we may determille in what 
manner the action of  one person is imputable to another. This 
subject, being of great use and importance,  deserve to be treat- 
ed with exactness. 
I.  Every man,  strictly speaking, is answerable  only for his 
own actions, that is for what he himself  113s  done or omitted ; 
for with regard to another perscn's  actions,  they cannot be im- 
pnred to us,  but  inasmuch as we have concurred to them,  and 
as we cou!d  and ocgiit  to have procured,  hindered,  or at least 
directed them &er  n certain manner.  The  thing speaks for it- 
self.  For to  in:?ute  another mall's  actions  to a person is de- 
claring, that the Iztter is the efficient, though not the only cause 
thereof ;  and conseguei~tly  that this action depended  in  some 
measxe on his will, either in its principle, or excc~tion. 
2.  This Seing  premised,  we  may afirm that every man is 
under a  geceral obligation of  doing all he cm  to induce every 
otLer ?ersol1 to discharge  his  duty, and  to prevent  him from 
committirig  a bad  action,  and consequently  not  to  contribut~ 
thereto himse!f  either directly  or indirectly,  with a premedit7.t- 
cd purpose and will. 
3.  By a much stronger reason we are answerable for the ac- 
rions of  those, over whom we have a particular  inspection, and 
whose direction  is committed to our care;  wherefore the good 
or evil done by those persons,  is r.ot  only  imputable to  them- 
selvss, but likewise to  tl~osc,  to whose direction they are  sub- 
ject ;  according as the  latter have taken or neglected the care,  . 
that was nior~lly  necessary ;  such  as the nature ancl extent  05 
:heir  commision and power required.  It is on  this footing we 
impute, for eran~ple,  to tlic fntller of  n family, rile  good or b:td 
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4.  Let us obser-~e  likewise,  that, in  order to  be reasonably 
cstceinctl to !jave  concurred to snother man's  action, it is not at 
:l11  necessary  for us  to  be sure of  procuring or iiindcring it, by 
tloing or ot~~itting  pzirtic~!.lr ;;lill~s  ;  ii is sallicient, in this res- 
pcct,  tli3:.  we h,-~e some  pd~-Lil;t~,  or ver;similirude.  And 
a;,  on th,c OIIC sic::,  th.:  def:~alt  of c-rtainty doss not excuse neg- 
lect ; on tile  othcr if  we  have  dore all,  tIi~t  ure ought,  the 
want of  success catinot be imptlted to us ;  the blame in that case 
fails e!ltirely  upon  the immediate author of thc action. 
;.  111 Lne,  it  is proper also to remark,  that,  in the question 
now bzfore us, we are not enquiriilg illto tlie degree of virtue or 
ina!ice,  which is iocnd ir~  the action itself, and, rendering it bet- 
ter or  worse, augments its praise or censure,  its recompense or 
punishment.  Ali that we wa:;.t,  is to make a proper estimate of 
the degree of  iiiflue!ice  a person ;:as  had over another man's ac- 
tion, in ordcr io Iinow, whether he can be corisidered as the mor- 
al cause thereof,  and whether this cause is more or  less efica- 
cious. To  distingui~h  this properly is a matter of some importance. 
Three  XI.  In order to raeasure as it were this degree of influence, 
sorts of 
moral rau-  which decidcs  the manlier, wherein we cn:l  impute  to any one 
~es;~+~~ci-  another man's  action,  t::ere  are several ci;cun~st;nces 2nd dis- 
tinctions to be observed,  GitIlout n~hicIi  wc shoaid foril; a wrong  tern, ?ad 
collateral.  j~~dgrrient  of  things.  For exnnyle, it is certain that a simple 
app"bati02,  g:;lera!ly  spr.z.i::~g, ilns niuc:i Izss eficacy to induce 
a person to  act, tban a  stror,g persuasion,  or a particular insti- 
gation.  And yet the high opinion we conceive of  a pcrson, and 
the credit therice arising, may  occasion a simple approbation to 
have sometimes as great, and perhaps a gre'lter  influence over a 
man's  acticn, tl~sn  the most  pressing isersuasion, or the strong- 
est instigation f~om  ai~other  quarter. 
TVc 171ay  rxge ul~der  three diEt-r2nt classes the moral caus- 
es, that  influence  another  mac's  action.  Sometimes it  is  a 
principle cause, insomuch t!izit  the person,  who executes,  is oc- 
ly a sul-alter11 agent ;  sometin~es  the  immediate agent,  on the 
contrary,  is the principal cause, while tile other is only tile sub- 
nltcrn ;  and at other  times  they  are  both  collateral  causes, 
which have an equal influence over t!?e  actior?. 
XII.  A  person  ought to be  esteemed the  principal cause, 
who, by  doing  or  omitting  some  things,  influences in such a 
manner  another man's  action or omission,  that, were it not for 
him, this action or omission, would not have happened,  though 
the immediate agent has knowingly contributed to it.  An officer, 
by  express order of  his general  or  prince,  performs an action 
evidently bad.  In this case the prince or general is the princi- 
pal cause, and tlie  oficer only the subaltern.  David was  the 
principal  cause  of  the  death Uriah,  though Joab  contributed 
thereto,  being suflicic:itly apprized of the king's  intention.  In 
like  manner  Jezebel  was the principal  cause  of  the  dtath of 
Nabot:i.* 
I mentioned that the immedizte agent must have contributed 
ktlowingly  to the  action.  For,  suppose  he could  not know 
whether the action be gcmd  or bad,  he can then  be  considered 
only as a simple instruinent ;  but the person,  who gave the or- 
ders, belng in that case the only and absolute  cause of  the ac- 
tion,  is thc on:?  one znswerable for it.  Such in general is the 
case of subjects, who serve by order of their sovereign in an un- 
just wzr. 
But the r2ason why a superior is deemed the principal cause 
of  what i'; done by tllase, who depend on him,  is not  properly 
their dep~qct3iice  ;  it is the order, he gives then?, without which 
it is suly1osc.d t5c.y  would  not of themselves have attempted the 
action.  Froin this it follows, that every other person, who has 
the same influen~c  over the  actions  of  his  equals,  or even of 
his superiors, m2y for the same reason be considered,  as the prin- 
cipal czjse.  'l'llis is what we lnay very well apply to the coun- 
sellors of  princes,  or to ecclesiastics  who  have an  ascendency 
ov-r  their minds,  and who make a wrong use of  it sometimes, 
in order to persuadc them to things, which they would never have 
determined to do of :!lemselves.  In this case, praise or blame 
fans principzlly  on  the author of  the suggestion or counsel.+ 
'  See  o,  Sam.  chap.  ii.  and  I  Kings.  chap.  xsi. 
f  We shall transcrlbc here, with pleasure the judicious reflections of M. Ber- 
nard (Nouvelles de la republique des lettres, August I702  p.  291 )  In England 
it is very con:mon  to  charge the faults of the prince to  the ministers ;  and I own, 
that very often the chge  is just.  Rut the  crimes of  the ministers do nst i\i THE  I'RINCIPLES  OF  NATURAL  LAW.  183 
XIU:  A collateral cause is lie, who, in doing or omitting cer- 
tain things,  concurs suficiently, and as much as in him lies, to 
man's  action ;  insomuch  that he is  supposed to coo?+ 
rate with  him ;  though  one  cannot absolutely  presume,  that 
without his concurrerice the action  would not have  been com- 
mit&&  Such are those,  who fxrnish  succors to the immedi- 
ate agent ;  or those,  who shelter  and protect  him ;  for exarn- 
pie,  he, tvho,  wnile another brats open thc door,  watches  all 
the avenues of  thc house,  it1  order to  iavor the robbery,  &c. 
A conspiracy among eevcrdl people   render^; tllenl  generally all 
guilty alike.  They are a!l  suppo.cd equal and co!latcral  caus- 
es, as being associntcd  for tlic same fact,  and united in interest 
and will.  And thoug!l  each of them 112s not an equal pzri in 
the  execution, pet  their  actims rnay  be  very vrcll  ch,lrgcd to 
one another's  account. 
XIV. Finally -, subaltern  cauw is he, who has  but a small 
influence or  share in anothcr m:in7s aciioil, ant1 is only  a slight 
occasion thereof by  facilitating its cxecction ; i!lsornuch  that 
the agent,  already absoluttly detc~~nined  to act,  and hnving a11 
the necessary  me:ns  for so doing, is only encoilragad to execute 
his resolution ;  as when a  person tell> him the  nvnner of gor 
ing abon:  it, the fzvorable moniant, the  cleans ci' csc?picg, &c. 
or nrli,~n  he commcnds his design, and animates him to pursue it. 
May not we  rank in the same class  the ac:icn  of  a judge, 
who, instead of  opposing  an opinion supported bg a generzliiy 
uf votes,  but by  himself  adjudged  erroneous,  shoulcl acquiescz 
therein,  either through  fcar  or  con~plaisance  ?  B1d  example 
must be also ranked among the subaltern causes.  For general- 
Ig speaking, examples of  this nature make impressions  only  on 
ways  excuse  the faults  of  the sovereign;  for after all they have reason and on- 
derstanding, as  well as other people, md are  masters to do  as  they  please.  ~f 
they let  themselves be too much governed  by those, who have the freest access 
to them, it is their fault.  They ought on several occasions to see with their own 
eyes, and not  to be led by the  nose by a  wicked and avaricious courtier.  But if 
they ate vnable  to  manage matters themselves,  and  to  distinguish good from 
evil, they ought to resign the care of governmentto others who are capable; far 
I db not know why we may not apply to princes, who govern i:l,  the saying of 
Chaties Borromeus, in respect to bishops, who do not feed  properly their flocks. 
IF fnry ARE INCAPABLE  01  SUCH AN EMPLOYXENT,  WHY  SO  MUC~  AMBI- 
m?  IP   HEY  ARE  CAPABLE,  WUY  SO  MUCH  NEOLECT? 
who %re otherwise inclined to etil, or  subject  to be  easily led 
astray ;  insomuch :!rat  tllose,  who set such examples, contnb- 
ute but very weably to the evil,  committed by imitation.  An3 
yet there are some examples so very cfic;cious,  by reason of the 
character of  the  persons,  who si.t them, and the disposition of 
those, who follow thcm, that, if the former had refrained  from 
evil,  the latter  would  never  llave  thong!lt  of  co~ninitting  it. 
Such are the bad examples of superiors, or of men, tvho by their 
knowledge and rep~tntlon  hnve a great ascendency over others; 
these are  particuldrlg cu!pable  of  the  evi!,  which  ensues from 
the  imitation of their actions.  We may  reason  in the same 
manner with respect to several other cases.  According as cir- 
cumstances vary, the samc things I~avc  more or less influence on 
other  men's  actions,  and consequently  those,  who by  so doing 
concur to these  actions,  ought  to  be  considered sometimes as 
principal,  sometimes as collateral,  and  sometimes as  subaltern 
causes. 
XV.  The application of  these distinctio~ls  and principles is  Applica- 
tlon of  obvious.  Supposing  every thing else  equaI, collateral causes these diti 
ought to be judged alike.  But principal causes  merit without tinctions. 
doubt mn:-c praise or blame,  and a higher degree of recompense 
or puniillinent, than subaltern causes.  I said,  supposing every 
thing rlse eqtra/;  for it may happen, through a diversity of cir- 
cumstances,  which  augment  or  diminish the merit or demerit 
of  an  action,  that the suhltern cause  acts  wit11  a greater de- 
gree of  malice than  the  principnl  one,  and the  imputation is 
thcreby aggravated in respect to  the subaltern.  Let us suppose, 
for example,  that a pcrson  in cool blood assassinates a man,  at 
the instigation  of one, who was  animated thereto by some at- 
trocious injury lie had received  from his enemy.  Though the 
instigator is the principal author of  the murder, yet  his action, 
done in a transport of  choler,  will  be esteemed  less  heinous, 
than that of the murderer, who,  calm and  serene himself,  was 
the base instrument of the other's  passion. 
We  shall close  this  chapter with a  few  remarks ; and  I. 
though the distinction of  three classes of  moral causes, in  res- 
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must own nevertheless, that the application thereof to  particu- 
lar cases is sometimes difficult.  2. In dubious cases, we should 
not easily charge, as a principal cause, any  other  person, than 
the  immediate  author  of  the action ; we ought  to  consider 
those, who have concurred  thereto,  rather  as  subnltern,  or at 
the most as  collateral  causes.  3.  I11 fiile it is proper to ob- 
serve, that Puffendorf, whose principles we have fol!owed,  set- 
tles very justly  the  distinction of  moral causes ;  but,  not hav- 
ing exactly defined these different causes,  in the particular  ex- 
amples he alledges, he refers sometimes to one class what prop- 
erly belonged to another.  This has  not  escaped Mons. Bar- 
beyrac,  whose  judicious  remarks have  been  here of  particular 
use to us." 
CHAP.  XII. 
Of tbe authority and sanction  of naruval  law^ ;t  and  I, sfthegood 
or  evil, that naturally andgenerally  follows from  virtue or  vice. 
I. W  E  understand  here,  by  the  authority  of  natural  meant by 
theauthor-  laws,  the force  they receive  from  the  approbation  of rezson, 
ity of na-  and especially from  their  being  acknowiedged  to  have  God  tural law. 
for their author ;  this is what lays  us under a strict obligation 
of conforming our conduct  to them,  because of  the  sovereign 
right, which  God has over his creatures.  What has  been al- 
ready explained, concerning the  origin and nature,  reality and 
certainty of  those  laws, is sufficiei~t  methinks to establish also 
their authority.  Yet  we  have still some  small matter  to  say 
in relation to this subject.  T!le  force of laws, properly so cal- 
led,  depends  principally  on  their  sanction.$  This  is  what 
gives a stamp, as it were,  to  their  authority.  It is  therefore 
a very necessary and important point, to inquire whether there 
be really any such thing,  as a sanction of natural  laws,  that is, 
*  See Barbeyrac's notes on the Dcties of  a Man  and a Citizen, book i chap. 
i.  sect. 27. 
f  See Puffendorf, Law of Na:ure  and Nations, book  ii, chap.  iii.  sect. 31. 
4  See part i. chap,  X. xct, IL. 
whether they are  accompanied with comminations and promis- 
es,  punishments  and rewards. 
11.  The first reflectionj  that presents itself  to our minds, is The &er- 
vance of  that the rules of  co~~duct,  distinguished by the name  of natural  natural 
Iaws,  are proportioned  in  such manner  to our  nature,  to the lawsforms 
the  happi-  original  dispositions  and  natural, desires  of  our  soul,  to our nessofman 
constitution, to our wants and actual situation in life, that it evi-  andsoaety. 
dently appears they were  made  for us.  For in general, and 
every thing well considered, the observance of those laws is the 
only means of procuring a real and solid  happiness to individ- 
uals,  as well as  to the public ;  whereas the  ipfraction thereof 
precipitates  men into disorders prejudicial  alike m  individuals, 
as to the whole species.  This is,  as it were,  the first sanction 
of natural laws. 
111.  I11 order to prove oul point, and to establish rightly the  Eclairciss~ 
State of the question, we must  observe,  I. that  when the ab- zF::a,"enof 
servance of  natural  laws is said to be capable alone of forming  the peg- 
the happiriess of  man and society,  we  do not mean, that this tion* 
happiness can be ever  perfect,  or superior ro  all expectation ; 
humanity having no pretence to any thing of this kind ;  and if 
virtue itself cannot produce  this effect, it is not at a11  probable 
that vice has any advantage over her in this respect. 
2.  As we are inquiring which  is  the proper rule,  that man 
ought to go by,  our question  is properly reduced to this point, 
whether in general, and every thing considered, the observance 
of  natural laws is not the properest a~id  surest means to conduct 
man to his end, and to procure him the purest,  the completest, 
and the most  durable  happiness, that can  possibly be enjoyed 
in this  worl~l  ;  and not only with regard  to some persons, but 
to all  mankind ;  not  only  in  particular  cases,  but  likewise 
through the whole course of life. 
On  this footing,  it  will not be a  difficult task to prove,  2s 
well by reason  as by experience, that  the proper and ordinary 
effect of  virtue is really such,  as has been mefitioned,  and that 
vice,  or the irregularity of  passions, produces a  quite opposite 
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Proofof  IV. We  have already shewn, in discoursing of the nature an& 
above men- 
tronedtruth state  of  humanity, that in  what  manner  and light soever we 
by reason.  consider the system of  humanity, man can neither  answer his 
end, nor perfect  his talents and faculties,  nor acquire any solid 
happiness,  or  reconcile  it with that of his fellow creatures, but 
by the  help of  reason ;  that  it ought to be therefore his  first 
care to improve his reason,  to consult it, and to follow the coun- 
sels  thereof;  that  it  informs  him,  there  are  some  things, 
which are fit,  and others unfit for him ; that the former hake 
not all an equal fitness, nor in the same manner ;  that he ought 
therefore to make a proper distinction between good and evil, in 
order to regulate his conduct ;  that true happiness cannot consist 
in things incon~patible  with his nature and  state ;  and, in fine, 
that since the future ought to be equally the object of his views, 
as the present and  past,  it  is not  sufficient, in  order  to attain 
certain  happiness,  to  consider merely  the present good or evil 
of  each  action;  but  we  should  likewise  recollect  what  is 
past,  and extend our views to futurity, in order to combine the 
whole,  and sea what ought to  be  the  result thereof in the en- 
tire duration of our being.  'These are so many evident and de- 
monstrable truths.  Now the laws of  nature are no more than 
consequences of  these primitive truths ;  whence it appears that 
they have  necessarily,  and  of  themselves,  a great  influence on 
our happiness.  And how is it possible to call this in question, 
after having  seen in the course of this work, that the sole meth- 
od to  discover  the  principles of  those laws, is to set  out with 
the study of the nature and state of  man,  and to enquire after- 
wards into  what is  essentially agreeable to his  perfection  and 
happiness. 
AOOL  by  V. But that,  which appears so clear and so well established 
ekperience. 
I.  is by reason,  is rendered incontestable by experience.  In fact we 
af itself the generally observe, that virtue, that is,  the observance of  the lawe 
pinclple  Of  of  nature, is of  itself  a source of internal  satisfaction,  and that  an inward 
,atisfaction;  it, is infinitely advantageous in its effects, whether  in particular 
vice a  to  individuals, or to human society in general, whereas vice is at-  principle of 
disquietand tended with quite different consequences. 
!'"blc.  \$'hatever  is contrary to the light of  reason  and conscience 
annot  but be accompanied with a secret disapprobation of mind, 
and afford us vexation and shame.  The heart  is afflicted with 
the  idea  of  the crime, and the remembrance thereof  is always 
bitter and  sorrowfiul.  Qn the contrary,  every  conformity  to 
right reason is a state  of  order and perfection, which the mind 
approves ;  and we are framed in such a manner, that a good ac- 
tion becomes the seed as it were of a secret joy ;  and we always 
recollect it with pleasure.  And indeed what can be sweeter or 
more comfortable, than to  be able to bear an inward testimony to 
ourselves, that we are what we ought to be, and that we perform 
what is reasonably  our duty, what fits us best, and is most con- 
formable to  our natural destination ?  Whatever is natural is agree- 
able ;  and whatever is according to order,  is a subject of satisfac- 
tion  and  content. 
VI.  Besides this internal principle  of joy,  which attends the of  external 
practice of natural laws, we find it produces externally all sorts evils,which  goods and 
of good effects.  It tends to preserve our health, and to prolong arethecon- 
sequence of 
our  days ;  it  exercises  and  perfects  the  faculties  of  the  .  v~rtue  and 
mihd ;  it renders us fit for  labour, and for all the functions of  yice. 
domestic and civil life 5  it secures to us the right use and pos- 
session of  211  our goods and property ;  it prevents a great num- 
ber of evils, and softens :hose  it cannot prevent;  it procures us 
the confidence,  esteem,  and affection  of  other men ;  whence 
result the greatest  comforts of  social life, and the most effectual 
helps for the success d  our undertakings. 
Observe on what the public secui.ity, the tranquillity of fan- 
ilies,  the prosperity of states,  and the absolute welf~re  of every 
individual are founded.  Is it not on the grand principles of  ra- 
liglon, temperance,  modesty, beneficence, justice, and sincerity ? 
Whence arise,  on the contrary,  the  greatest part of  the  disor- 
ders and evils,  that trouble society,  and break  in upon the hap- 
piness of  man ?  Whence, but from  the neglect of those very 
principles ?  Besides the  inquietude  and  infamy,  that generally 
accompanies  irregulnrity and debauch, vice is likewise attended 
with a nlultitude of  external evils, such as the enfeebling of the 
body and mind, distempers and untoward accidents, poverty very 
ofierl and misery, violent and d~ngerous  parties, domestic jars, en- 
meties, continual fears, disll~nor,~unishmeuts,  contempt, hatre4 THE PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURAL  LAW.  =a? 
and a thousand crosses and dificulties In every thing we  under" 
talre.  One of the ancients has very elegantly said,"  that malice 
drinks  one  bnlf  her  own poisou. 
These  dif-  VII.  Rut if  such are the natura! consequences of virtue and 
ferent ef 
fectsolvir-  vice in respect  to  the generality  of  mankind,  these effects are 
taea~dvice  still greater  among those,  who by their condition and rank have 
are still 
greater a-  a ~articulzr  influence on the state of  society, and determine the 
thdse fate of  other men.  What calamities might not the subjects ap- 
~~&~~~  prehend,  if  their sovereigns were to imagine  themselves superi- 
power  and or to rule,  and independent of all law ;  if, directing every thing 
to themselves,  they wcre to listen only to their own whims and 
caprice,  and to a5andon themseives to injustice, ambition, ara- 
rice, and cruelty ?  What good, on the contrary, must not arise 
from the government of a wise and virtuous prince ;  who, con- 
s~dering  himself  under a particular obligation  of  never deviating 
from the rulcs  of piety,  justice,  moderation,  and beneficence, 
exercises his power with no other view, but to maintain order 
within, and security without, and places his glory in ruling his 
subjects  uprightly,  that  is,  in  making them wise and happy? 
We  need only h;tve recourse to history, and consult experience, 
to be convinced,  that these are real truths, which  no rezsona- 
ble person can contest. 
VIII.  This is a truth so generally acknowledged, that ali the  tion of this 
truth by  institutions, which men f~rm  among themselves  for their com- 
the  confes-  mon good  and advantlge, are founded on the observance of  the 
sion of all 
nations.  laws of nature ;  and tllat even the precauticns, taken to secure 
the  e&ct  of  these  institutions,  would  be  vdin  and use;ess, 
were it not for the authority of  those very Idws.  This is what 
is manifestly supposed by all human laws in general ;  by the es- 
tablishments  for the education of  youth;  by the political  regu- 
lations,  which  tend  to  promote  the  arts  and  commerce ; 
and by public as well  as  private  treaties.  For  of  what  use 
would all those things  he,  or U-hat benefit  could accrue from 
them, were me not previously to ~st~~blish  them on justice,  prol>- 
ity, shcerity, and the sacred inviolability of  an oath, as on their 
real foundation and basis ? 
EX.  But in order to be  more sensibly  satisfied of this truth,  Confirma. 
let any one try, who pleases,  to form ;  system  of morality on tkl:it& 
orinciples directly opposite to those,  we have now establishd.  by  the  ab.  ,  -- 
Let U;  suppose,  that  ignorance and prejudice take the place of  ~~~~~t~~* 
knowledge and reason ;  that caprice and passion are  substitut-  ry. 
ed instead of  prudence and  virtue,   et-us banish justice and  ' 
benevolence from society, and from the commerce of  mankind, 
to make room for unjust self-love, which, calculating every thing 
for  itself,  takes no  notice  of  other people's  interest,  or of the 
public advantage.  Let us extend and apply these principles to 
the particular conditions of human life,  and we  shall see what 
must be the result of a system of this kind,  were it ever  to be 
received  and pass for  a rule.  Can we  imagine  it would be 
able to produce the happiness of  society, the good of  families, 
the advantdge of  nations,  and the welfare of mankind  ?  No one  - 
has ever yet attempted to maintain such a paradox ;  so evident 
and glaring is the absurdity thereof. 
X.  I am not ignorant,  that injustice and passion are capable Answer 
in particular  cases of  ~rocuring  some  pleasure  or  advantage.  somepar- 
titular ob-  But, not to mention that virtue produces much oftener and with jection, 
greater certainty the  same  effects ;  reason and  experience in- 
form us, that the good, procured by injustice,  is not so real,  so 
durable, nor so pure,  as that, which is the fruit of virtue.  This 
is because the  former,  being  unconformable to the state of a 
rationai and social  b~ing,  is  defective in its  principle,  and has 
only a deceitful  appearance."  It is  a  flower,  which,  having 
no root, withers and falls ahnost as soon as it blassoms. 
With ~egard  to such evils and  misfortunes,  as are annexed 
to humanity,  and to which it may be said,  that virtuous people 
are exposed as well as others ;  certain it is,  that virtue has here 
also a great  many advantages.  111 the  first  place,  it is very 
proper of  itself to prevent or remove several of those erils ;  and 
thus we  observe that  wise and  sober people actually  escape a 
great many  precipices  and snares, into which  the  vicious and 
icconsiderate  are  hurried.  2.  In cases, wherein  wisdam and 
prudence cannot prevent those evils,  yet it gives the soul a suEn 
See par:  in  chap. vi. sect. 3.  * Geneca, ep. 82.  Qucmadmdun~  4tta.h nosfcr  dicere  soleba;, anlih'n $sa  maxi- 
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ficient vigor to support  them,  and  counterbalances  them with 
sweets  and  consolations,  which  contribute  to  abate  in  great 
measure their impression.  Virtue is attended  with an insepa- 
rable contentment, of which nothing can  bereave us ;  and our 
essential happiness  is very little impaired by the transitory and, 
some measure, external accidents,  that sometimes disturb us. 
Surprised I  am,  says Isocrates,"  that any  one  should  imagine, 
that those, who adhere constantly to piety  and justice,  must expect to 
Qe more unhappy than the unrighteous, and have not  a right to prom- 
he themselves greater  advantages  from  the gods  and  men.  Fw  my 
part,  I urn  of  opinion, that the virtuous alone abundant4 et$y  what- 
ewer  is  worthy of our pursuit ;  and  the wicked, on  the contrary, arc 
mtirrly .>norant  oftheir real  interests.  He, that pr+rs  injustice 
to  justict,  and  makes his  sovereign good  consist  in depriving '.nother 
man of  his property,  is like  methitrks  to  those  brute creatures, that 
ere caught by the bait.  The unjist acquisitionjEatters his setrses  at 
first, but he soon $rids himse  involved in very great  evils.  Tho~e 
oi~  the contrary, who take up with  justice  grid  piety,  are not  otzly sift 
16e present,  but #have  likewise  reason  to  cvnceive  good  hopes for 
iht  renraitider of their lives.  I  own indeed, that this does  not  al- 
WUYJ  happen ;  yet  it is gerzemlly  confirmed  by experience.  Now in 
things, whose  success  cannot  be  infailii.ly  forcseen,  it  is the buiilless 
.fa  pruhnt man to einbracr  that  side, which  most generally turns 
out to  his advantage.  But nothing is more unr,.nsonable,  than the 
* ~~u&af  2 2 765  725  6;r;&av  %a;  7;~  )IX~JOC;Y~Y  ~ux~~~s, 
~1  xq7tC& m; &.v  h  r(ru5 Ui~ovra~,  hai:ov  gtuv  7iv wovvc~v*  &A* 
h  iWp!wq xsi  xa; we&  iufleb;rabq TA&  dimear, riv AAA~V.  iyA 
yde e?eyurr  T~TU~  pdrs5, "b  8;  IFAC~YIXT;~, 7&5 2 bhh.5  i%  y'~&rxu~ 
L~Y  ;v  fich~iav  kiv.  ydc  ,uiv rkv  i8ldav ?rga7r,ajv~as,  xar  T\P  ha&& 
r' 7;)  i?.h#rci@#  piY6mov  iP8bv  r.rci@rw,  %dUz0Y7aS  rbr;  a~h6ab- 
&orG  r&  tdafv, xa; uratZ&  $9  &~OA~~OYT~G  ;Y  2" ~ag~urv,  2 :U- 
q.1 Er  m& P'yim~tG  -ojS  ~VT(~~'  rP5 21 P~  tGrtGka5 xai  arxaiauvvr)r @v- 
vs, & ~r  71C5  aae(iui X  $  dvorg  &r@ah& 8r&yav~ag,  w4i  ssc; 7i  U~~%ZVTOS 
rcirjves i2iu5 rhS  ~?cIB~  TXOYTSZ.  X&;  T~U; ;I p; xa7h  TP;I.TUV  ~TUF  68imar 
r~~caiv~r,  &h&  72  y'  i5  jai  7; %oh;  ~Crav  yiyvr~ar  T~V  ~~dlror,  zgi 22  7;s 
8;  $cav~v~a,  i%u8; 7;  ~~AAOV  C%  u~vaiuev  &  xaO~~;~tv,  T> aohh&xis 64ihnv 
dra  Q~~Y~UI~J  rc~a~C~F.;~xC.  ~LYTYY  2 P~a~&rarav  T~X~YB~ULV,  :70(  X~M~OI 
$v  krd&vF  wPt~rnu  gvar, W>  %ap6hb~t~ov  7;" 8ixa60uhnv 7;s  ibri4~* 
xGca8 8 a7u~ai  @~Lusu#~~  ~ah~  xc~pi~v~,  T;V,T~V  rovqt$*9  appyp6vav* 
brcrd. Orat, & Plrautatieac. 
cpinion of  those,  who,  believing  that justice  has  something  in it 
more beautful and more agreeable to  the gods than illjustice, imagine 
nevertAeless that  those, who  embrace  the former,  are  more  happy 
than such as abandon themselves to the latter. 
XI.  Thus, every  thing  duly  considered,  the  advantage  is Theadvan. 
without comparison on  the side of  virtue.  It manifestly ap- ~~~e~:,"~~ 
pears,  that the scheme of  the divine wisdom was to establish a on the side 
natural connexion between physical  and moral evil,  as between of virtue ; 
and  this is  the effect and the cause ;  and, on the contrary, to entail physi-  the first 
cal  good,  or the happiness of  man, on moral good, or the prac- 
the laws oE  tice of virtue ;  insomuch  that, generally  speakicg, and pursu-  nature, 
ant to the original institvtion of  things,  the observance of  nat- 
ural laws is as proper and necessary to advance both the public 
and particular happiness,  as  temperance  and  good regimen  is 
naturally  conducive  to  the  preservation  of  health.  And as 
these natural rewards  and  punishments of  virtue and vice are 
an effect of  the divine institution,  they may be really  consider- 
ed, as a kind of  sanction of  the  laws of  nature,  which adds a 
~onsiderable  authority to the maxims of  right reason. 
XII.  And yet we must acknowledge, that this first sanction  General 
does not  as  yet seem sufficiect to  give  all  the authority  and z:~Fy 
weight  of  real Inws to  the  counsels  of  reason.  For,  if we from the 
consider the thing  strictly,  we shall find, that,  by the constitu-  exception', 
which ren-  tion  of human  things,  and  by  our natural  dependance upon  der this 
one another, the general rule above mentioned is not so fixt and first 
tion  insuf-  invariable, but it admits of divers exceptions, by which the force  ficient. 
and effect thereof  must certainly be weakened. 
X.  Experience in general shows US,  that the degree of  happi-  ~h,  goods 
ness or misery, which every one enjoys in this world,  is not al-  and evils cJf 
nature and  ways exactly proportioned and measured to the degree of virtue  f 
ortune are 
or vice of each particular  person.  Thus health,  the goods of distributed 
unequally,  fortune, education, situation of  life,  and other external  advan-  ,,d 
tages,  generally  depend  on a variety  of  conjunctures,  which carding to 
render their  distribution  very unequal ;  and  these  advantages 
are frequently lost by  accidents, to  which  all  men are equally 
subject.  '.rrue  it is, tliat the difference of  rank or  riches does THE PRINCIFLS OF  NATURAL LAW.  '93 
mt absotutely  determine the happiness  or Aserg of  life ;  ptt 
sgree we must,  that extreme poverty,  the privation of  aH  neces-. 
$ay  means O+  instruction,  excessive  labour,  afaictio~s  of  the 
mind,  and pains of  the body,  are red evils, which a vamty of 
casualties may bring as well vpofi virtuous as other men. 
TL  evib  2.  Besides  this ufiequal  distribution  of  natural  goods 
f$.$  evils,  honest  mm  are no more sheltered,  than others,  from di- 
tie, fan a  vers evils arising from malice, injustice,  violence,  ad  ambition. 
wellupon  Such are the persecutions  of  tyrants, the  horrors of  war,  and 
ttie inno- 
SO may  other  public or private calamities, to which the good 
guilty.  and the bad are indiscriminately  subject.  It  even  frequently 
happens, that the  authors of all  those miseries  are  those, who 
feel least their effects ; either  because  of  their  exeracndinsvrp 
success. and good fortune,  or because their insensibility is arrived 
tb that pitch, as to let them enjoy,  almost without trouble and 
Rmorse, the fruit of  their iniquities. 
%,,,,in,,,  3.  Agah.  It is  not unusual to see innocence exposed to c& 
evenvirtue  umny,  and virtue  itself  bedomes  the  object  td  persecution6 
itself is the 
Ea116e Of  Now in those particular cases, in which the honest man falls, as 
persmw  it-,  a vidtim to his own virtue,  what force can the laws of 
tioh  nature be said to have, and how can their authorarty be  snpport- 
ed ?  Is the internal satisfaction, arising from the teatimny of a 
pood  conscience  able  alone  to deterhtine man  to sacrifice his 
property, his  repose,  his  honor,  and  even  his life 2  And yet 
those delicate conjunctures frequently happen ;  and  the resolaa 
tion then taken may have  very important and extensive  CO- 
quences  in relation ro the happiness and misery of society. 
The mans  XIII.  Such is mdeed the actual state of  rhings.  On the one 
wlhich hu-  side we  see,  that in general the observance of  natural  laws is 
man Em-  atone capable of establishing some order in society, and of  con-  Qnce  em- 
ptopcto ra  stituting the happiness of man ;  but on the other it appears, that 
medy  disorders.  yirtue and vice are not always sufficiently characterised by their 
are like-  effects, and by rheir common and natural consequences, to make 
wiaeimuffi-  this order on all occasions prevail.  cient. 
Hence arises a considerable difficulty against the moral system 
by us established.  All laws, some will say, ought to have a sufd 
ficient sanction to determine a reasonable creature  to  obey,  by 
the prospect of  its own good and interest, which  is always the 
the primum mobile of its actions.  Now though the moral sys- 
tem,  you have spoke  of,  gives  in generdl a great  advdntage to 
its followers over those,  who  neglect it ; yet this sdv~ntage  is 
neither so great, nor so sure, as to be capable of  indemnifying 
us sufficiently in each particular case  for the sacrifices,  we  are 
obl;ged  to make in the discharge  of  our duty.  This system is 
not therefore as yet supported  with all the authority and  force, 
necessary for the end,  that God proposes ;  and the character of 
law,  e~peci~llly  of a law,  proceeding from an allwise being,  re- 
quires still a more distinct,  slner, and more extensive sanction. 
That legislators and politicians have been sensible of  this $e 
ficiency is manifect,  by  their endeavouring to  supply  it  in the 
best manner  they are able.  They have published a civil law, 
which tends to strengthen the  law  of  nature ;  they have  de- 
nounced punishments against vice, promised rewards to virtue, 
and erected tribunals.  This is uiidoqbtedly  a new support of 
justice,  and the best method, that could be contrived to prevent 
the forementioned inconveniencie;.  And yet this mcthod does 
not provide against  every  disorder, but leaves still a great  va- 
cuum in the moral system. 
For I. There are several evil% as well natural as arising from 
human injustice, from which all the powers of man cannot pre- 
serve even the most virtuous.  2.  Human laws are not always 
drawn up in conformity to justice  and equity.  3. Let them be 
supposed never so  just,  they  cannot extend to every case.  4. 
The execution  of  those laws is sometimes committed to weak, 
ignorant, or corrupt men.  5. IIow great soever the  integrity 
of a magistrate msy be,  still there are many things, that est3pe 
his  vigilance.  He cannot  see  and  redress  every  grievance. 
6. It is not an unexampled case, that virtue,  instead of finding 
a  protector  in  its judge,  meets  with  an  implacable  enemy. 
What resource shall  be left  to  innocence  in that  case  ?  To 
whom shall she fly for succor,  ihthe very  person,  who ought 
to  undertake her  protection  and  defence,  is  armed  against 
her. 
A  a 'SHE  PRINCIPLES  OF 
'1  IIP difi-  XIV.  Tllus the difficulty still subsists ;  a great difficulty of 
, I*II\  pro- 
pn..,l  I*  of  very great consequence, because on the one side it makes against 
sl...t  ,-or!-  the plan of  a divine providence,  and  on the other it may  con- 
'clI1lcn'C.  tribute to invalidate what we have  said  in  respect  to the em- 
pire of virtue, and its  necessary connexion  with the  felicity of 
man. 
So weighty  an  objection,  that has been started  in all  ages, 
tiesenres we should carefully endeavour to remove it.  But the 
greater and more real it is,  the more probably we may presume 
it has a proper  solution.  For how  is it to be imagined,  that 
the Divine ~iidom  could have left such an imperfection,  such 
an enigma in the moral order, after having regulated every thing 
so well in the physical world  ? 
Let us therefore  see  whether some  new  reflections on the 
nature and distinction of  man,  will  not direct us to a  different 
place from  the present  life,  for the  solution  we  are here in- 
quiring.  What has been  said  concerning  the  natural conse- 
quellces of  virtue and vice on this earth already shows us a de- 
ini-sanction of the laws of nature.  Let us try whether we can- 
;rot find an entire and proper one,  whose species, degree, time, 
and manner, depend on the good will of  the legislator, and are 
suficient  to make  all  the  compensations,  required  by strict 
justice,  and to place in tliis,  as in every other  respect,  the  sys- 
t-m  of the divine laws much above those of human institution; 
CHAP.  XIII. 
Profs  of  the  immortality  cf the  soul.  Thnt  there  is  o  sanc- 
tion, properb  JO  called,  ;in  t-e~-pect to  natural law. 
r 
.~ratr  nltht-  I. r  HE dificulty, we have been speaking of,  and which 
,r,c?tion.  we attempt here to illustrate, supposes, as  every  one  may  see, 
that the human system is absolutely limited to the present life, 
that there  is no such thing as a future state,  and  consequently 
that there is notling to expect from the Divine Wisdom in fa- 
vour of  the laws of  nature, beyond what is  manifested in thi9 
\ife, 
Were it possible, on the contrary,  to prove  that  th  pre3ent 
state of man is only the commenceffint  of a more c:cter:sive  sys- 
tem ;  and moreover,  that the  supreine  Being  has  really  beers 
pleased to invest the rules of  conduct,  ~rescribed  to us by rea- 
son,  with all the authority of laws, by strengtheni~~g  them with. 
a sanction, properly so called,  we might  in  fine conclude,  tint 
there is nothing wanti~~g  to complete the moral system. 
11.  The learned are divided in their opinions with respect to 1~i~1~i~  of  oyi~lirr,s. 
these important clcestions.  Some there are, who maintain, that  Iilrv  ,L 
reason  alone aifords clear and demonstrative proofs,  not only of  ll,~-.~lllc  rn 
I.nrrn.  thr 
the rewards and punishments of a future life but  likewise  of a  oFGoJ 
state of  immortality.  Others on the contrary pretend,  that, by  in  rrbspect 
consulting reason  alone,  we meet  with nothing  but  obscurity  t"i"i'  ~OIQ~. 
and  uncertainty,  and  that, so far from finding any demonstra- 
tion this way, we have not even a probability of a future life. 
It is carrying the thing too far perhaps on both sides, to rea- 
son after this manner.  Since .the question is cooccrning a point, 
which depends entirely on  the will of  the Deity,  the best way 
undoubtedly to ltnow this will would be an express declar~tion 
on his side.  But,  confining ourselves within the circle of  nat- 
ural knowledge, let  us  try  whether  independently of  this firs 
method, reason  alone can atiord us any sure light in relation t~ 
this subject,  or furnish  us  with conjectvres and  presumptiolls 
sufficiently strong, to infer with any certainty the will  of  God. 
With thh view let us investigate a little closer  the  nature  and 
presect: state of man, let us consult the ideas, which right reason 
gives us of  the perfection of the supreme Being, and of the plan, 
he has formed with respect to mankind ; in  order to know i:i 
fine the necessary consequences of the natural laws, he has been 
pleased  to prescribe. 
111.  With rogd  to the nature of man,  we are first of  all to  7,~ret,l,,r 
lncluirz, whether death be really  the last term of  our existence,  fhc $11(1i  ;b 
11111iiortal. 
and the dissolution of  the body  be  necessarily  followed by  the 
al~nihilation  of  the soul ;  cr whether the soul is immortal,  that 
is,  whether it subsists after the dc~h  of the body? 
Kow the imnlortality  of the soui is so far  from  being in it-  Firsr~roof. 
The nature 
.self Impossible,  that reason supplies us with the  strongest  con-  of the  soul 
jecturcs,  t!iat  this  is  in  rcality the state,  for which it was dc-  smms  en- 
tirely &cic-  signc,(l. THE PRINCIPLES  OF  NATCfRkL LAW. 
tinct from  The observations of the ablest philosophers distinguish aho- 
that of the 
bady.  lu'ely  the soul from the body, as beirig in  its nature essentially 
diff?rent.  r. In fact we do not find, that the facultied of  the 
mind,  the  understanding,  the will, liberty, with all  the o?era- 
tions the-1 produce, have any relation to those of  extension, fig- 
ure,  and motion. which are the properties of  matter.  2. The 
idea we have of  an extended substance, as purely passive, seems 
to be absolutely  inc9mpatible with that proper an3 internal ac- 
tivity, which distinguishes a thinking being.  The body is nor 
pur into motion of  itself, but the mind finds iilwnrdly the prin- 
ciple of its own movements;  it acts, it drinks, it wills, it moves 
the body ;  it turns  its operations, as it pleases 5  it  stops, pro- 
ceeds,  or returns the way  it went.  3. We observe likewise, 
that our thinkin:  part is a sim?lr, singlo,  a!?d  indivisible  beinq ; 
bccause  it collects all our ideas and sensations, as it were, into 
one poigt, by und:rst;nding,  feeling and  coinparing them,  &C. 
which cmnvt be  done by  a being c~mposcd  of  various parts. 
Death  IV.  The soul seems therefore to be of  a  particuhr  nature, 
not there- 
fore  neces-  to have nothing in  common with gross and material beings, but 
8"il~  imp'g  to be a pure spirit, that participates in some measure of the na- 
the an,ilhl- 
lationofthe  turt. of  the supreme Ueing.  This has been very elegantly ex- 
8.d  pressed by  Cicero.  We cnnnot find,  says he,"  on  earth the lemt 
trace of the origin  of the soul.  For  there is n~thing  mixt  or CGm- 
pourrded in the mind;  nbthin,s that sL.ems  t3 prqcecd from the eorth, 
w~ter,  nir, or  jre.  These elements have n9thingproductive  of mem- 
ory, understanding, rejlectisn.c ;  nothi?jg  that  is  able  to  recal  the 
post,  t~ .fortsee the future,  and to  embrace the present.  We  shalt 
nevtr jnd  the source,  whence  man ha$ derived thxe divine qunlitier, 
but  by  fracitzg them  up  to  God.  It  fillows  theree, that the soul 
is endowed with a singular nature, which  has nothing  in it comrnsn 
'  Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potent ;  nihil  enim in  animis mix- 
tum atque concre:um, aut quod ex terrs natuni atque fictum esse videatur ;  nihil 
ne aut humidum quidem aut stabile aut igneum.  HIS  enim in naturie nihil inest, 
quod vim memorise, mentis, cogitationis hibeat ;  quod et praterita teneat, et fu- 
tura provideat,  et complecti  possit prasentia ; qu-e sola divina sunt;  nec inve- 
nietur unquam, unde ad hominem venire possent nisi a Deo.  Singufarlsest igitur 
quadam natura atque vie animi, srjuncta ab his usitatis notisquendturis. Itn quic- 
quid est illud, quod sentit, quod s+t,  quod vivit, quod viget, cceleste et divinum, 
ab eamque tern, actemurn slt necesse est.  Cic.  I#$cuL dirput. li6.  1.  sap.  27. 
witn tAose  kmwn  and falnilia.  el~r.  H-,  lclr tbr 
a king, that  har msation, undzr~tandiag,  will,  and a  of 
lye,  be  what it will, thir being  is ~nrefy  heavenly,  divine,  and  C* 
~e~urntly  irnmrtal, 
This concl~lsion  is very just.  For if  the soul be essentially 
distinct from the body,  the destruction of  the one is not neces- 
rily  followed  by  the  annihilation  of the other ;  and thus fa 
nothing hinders  the soul  from  subsisting, notwithstanding  the 
destruction of  its ruinous habitation. 
V.  Should it be said, that we are not sufficiendy acquainted Obicdoo, 
with the  intrinsic nature  of  substances  to determine, that 6od  -* 
could not commurlicate  thought to some portion  of matter ;  1 
should answer, that we cannot however judge of things, hut ac- 
cording to their appearance  and our ideas ;  otherwise, whatev- 
er is  not founded on a strict demonstration  must be uncertain, 
and this  would  termirate in a kind  of pyrrhonism.  All,  the 
reason requires,  is,  that we distinguish  properly between  what 
is dubious, probable, or  certain ;  and tiince all we know in  re 
lation to matter does  not  seem  to  have any  affinity wit11  the 
faculties of the soul ;  and as we even find in one and the other 
qualities, that  seem  incompatible 5  it  is  not prescribing limits 
to the Divine Power,  but rather following the notions, thatna- 
son has given us,  to affirm it is highly probable, that the thi& 
ing part of man is essentially distinct from the body. 
VI.  But kt  the nature of  the soul be what it will,  and be it btirarr. 
tion of  t&  even, though  contrary  to all appearance,  supposed  corporeal ;  prece* 
still it  would  no ways follow,  that the death of the body  must truth. 
Nothing h  necessarily bring on the annihilation of  the soul.  For we  do naNre i,  not  find  an  instance  of  any  annihilation  properly  so  calk& dikd, 
The body itsself, how inferior soever to the mind,  is not mnihi- 
lated by  death.  It  receives  indeed a great  alteration;  but itr 
substance remains always essentially the same, and admits on9 
a change of modification or form.  Why therefore should the 
soul be annihilated ?  It will undergo if  you please, a pat  mu. 
tation j  it will be detached from the bonds, that unite it to the 
body,  and will  be incapable of operating in conjunction with it. 
But is this  an argument,  that it canuot er& saparatety,  W THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURAL  LAW, 
it loses  its  essential  quality, which  is that of  understanding ? 
This does not at all appear;  for one does not follow from the 
other. 
Were it therefore impossible for us to determine the  intrin- 
sic nature of  the soul, yet it would be carrying the t5ing too far, 
and concluding beyond what we are authorised by fact to main- 
tain, that death  is necessarily  attended with a total destruction 
of the soul.  The question is therefore reducible to this point ; 
is God willing to  annihilate, or to preserve the soul ?  But, if 
what we know in respect to the nature of  the soul dozi not in- 
cline us to think it is destined to perish by  death,  we shall see 
likewise,  that the consideration of  its excellency is a very strong 
uresum~tion  in favor of  its immortality. 
L 
Second  VII.  And indeed it is not at all probable, that an intelligent 
excellency  proof the  being, capable of  knowing such a multitude of  truths, of  mak- 
J the  ing so many  discoveries,  of  reasoning upon an infinite nuinber 
ofthings, of  discerning their proporcions, fitness, and beauties ; 
of  contemplating the works of  the Creator,  of tracing thein up 
to him, of  observing his designs, and penetrating into their caus- 
es ;  of  raising itseif above 21  sensible things to the knowledge 
of spiritual  and divine subjects ; that has a power to act  with 
liberty and discernment, and to array itself with the most beau- 
tiful virtues ;  it is not I s3y at all probable,  that a being adorn- 
ed with  qualities of  so excellent a nature,  and  so  superior  to 
those  of  brute  animals, should have been created  only for the 
short space of  this life.  These  considerations  made  a  lively 
impression  upon  the  ancient  philosophers.  IVhfin I  c2~l~idet*, 
says Cicero,*th~  surptising activity of the mind,  so gveat a memory 
of  what is past, and such an insishi  into futurity ;  when I  behold 
juch a number  of  arts artd sciences,  and srlch a tnultiizrde of  discovr- 
ries ;  I  believe, and atn jrmly persuarird, that a nature,  which cotr- 
tains  so  rnmy  things  withirt  itseEf, cannot  be  wz7r-tal. 
confirms-  VIII.  Again, such is the nature of  the human mind,  that it 
tion. 
Our faeu,-  is  always capable of  improvement, and of perfecting its faculties. 
ties are al- 
ways sus.  * Quid n~ulta  ;  Sic mihi persuasi, sic sentio, cum tanta celeritas animorumsi:, 
ceptible of  tanta memorid praeteritorum futororumque prudentia, tot artes, tantz scientiz, 
p grater  tot inventa, non posse earn naturam, quaz'res  eas contineat,esse  mortalem.  CIC 
degreee of  Scncs. cap.  2. 
perkction. 
Though  our knowledge it actually confined within certain limits, 
yet we see no bounds to that,  which we are capable of  acquir- 
ing, to  the inventions, we are able to make,  to the progress of 
our judgment,  prudence, and virtue.  Man is in this respect al- 
ways susceptible of'  some new degree of perfection and maturity. 
Death overtakes him before he has finished,  as it were,  his pro- 
gress,  and when he was capable of  proceeding a great deal far- 
ther.  How con  it enter,  says a ce!ebrated  English writer,+  into 
the thorcghts of man,  that the smd, which is capable of  such immense 
perfPctions,  and g  receiving nrw impmvements to aN eternity, Ihall 
fall  away  into  nothing alnzsst as soon  nJ  it is created?  Are such 
abilities made for  no  purpose ?  A brute arrives at a point ofpevfec- 
tion,  that he can mver pass.  In a  few  years he has all the endow- 
ments he is capable of; and, were he  to live ten thousand more, would 
be  the same thing he  is at  present.  Wcre a human joul thus at a stand 
in her accomplishments,.were her faculties  to  be full  blown, and inca- 
pable offur.ther  enlargements, I  could imagine it might fall  mcoy in- 
sensiily,  and drop  at  once  into  a ~fflt~  of  an?~ihilation.  But can 
we  believe a thinking bring,  that is in a perpetual progresr  of  im- 
provements, and travelling  on  jLj-om  pevfrrtion to  perfection,  after 
having just  looked abroad illto the works of its crea-  and made a 
jw  discoveries $his  injnit ,  ~3,dne.r.r,  wi~dom,  andpower, mu.rt peg-- 
ish at its  fit setting out, and in the very begirzning of  its il~quiries  ? 
IX.  True it is,  that  most  men debase  themselves in soxe objMila 
measure to an animal life,  and  have very little  concern  about Answer. 
the improvement of their faculties.  But,  if those people volun- 
tarily degrade themselves, this ought to be no prejudice to such, 
as chuse to support the dignity of  their nature ;  neither does it 
invalidate what we have  been saying ill regard  to the cxcellen- 
cy of the soul.  For,  to judge rightly  of tliings,  they ought to 
be considered in themselves,  and in their most perfect state. 
X.  It is undoubtedly  in consequence of  the natur~l  sense of TIGrd 
the dignity of  our being,  and  of the grandeur  of  the end,  we proof* 
drawn  are designed for,  that  we naturally  extend our views to futuri- so, ov 
ty ;  that we concern ourselves about  what  is to  happen after natural 
our death ;  that we seek to perpetuate our name and rncmory  dispositi~ 
9  anddeairoc 
$  S~PCTATOR,  vol.  11,  NO.  IIr, ad  net i~b~sible  to the judgment  of  pssterity.  These 
se&ments  are far f~om  bdng the illusion  of  self-love or preju- 
dice.  The  desire and hope of immortality is an impression, we 
receive froni nature.  And this desire is so very reasonable in 
itself, so useful,  and  so closely connected with the  system  of 
humanity,  that we  may at least infer from it a very probable in- 
dnctim in favor of  a future state.  How great soever the vi- 
vacity  of t?4s desire may be in itself, still it increases in propor- 
tion,  as we take more care  to cultivate our  reason,  and  as we 
advance in the knowledge of  truth and  the practice  of virtue. 
This sentiment becomes the surest principle of noble, generous, 
and public spirited actions ; and we  may affirm,  that, were it 
not for this principle,  all human views  would  be low,  mean, 
and sordid. 
All this seems to point out to us clearly, that, by the institu- 
tion of the Creator, there is  a kind  of  natural proportion  and 
relation between the soul and immortality.  For  it  is  not by 
deceit and illusion,  that the  Supreme Wisdom  conducts us to 
his proposed end.  A principle so reasonable and necessary, a 
principle,  that cannot but  be  productive of  good effects,  that 
raises man above himself,  and renders him not  only capable of 
he  sublimest undertakings,  but superior to  the  most delicate 
temptations,  and such, as are most dangerous to virtue ;  such 
a principle, I say, cannot be chimerical.+ 
Thus every thing  concurs to persude us, t'nat the  soul must 
subsist after death.  The knowledge we have of the nature of 
the mind, its excellence and faculties ever susceptible of  a high- 
er  degree  of  perfection, the  disposition, which  prompts us to 
raise ourseIves above the present life, and to desire immortality, 
are an so many natural inclinations, and form  the strongest pre- 
sumption,  that,such  indeed is the intention of  the Creator. 
Cio  gim  an adminblepicttmof  the influence which the &she .ad hop 
of  immortality has  had  in  all ages,  to excite men to great  an J noble  acGona. 
U Nrmo unquarn,"  says he,'e sine magna ~pe  immortalitatis  se pro patria offerret 
4  mmem.  Licuit ease otiose Themiuocli ;  lid  Epamimndk;  licuit, ne et 
"  retere et extcrna quizram, mihi ;  sed nescio quo modo inhizret in mcntibus 
"  quasi =ulorum  quoddam  auguriom futurorum ;  idque  in  maximis ingeniis 
dcisshnisque animie existit -xime,  et apparet facilfim8.  Quoquidem  dempto. 
"  quis tan esset amens, qui sernper in kborik et ptricuiis riveret."  Tu~cu~. 
Quat.lib. I.  cap.  IS. 
XI.  The  clearing up of  this first ~oint  is of great importance The sane. 
tion of nae  in regard to our principal question,  and  solvks already, in part,  law, 
the difficulty we are  examining.  For, when once the soul is will show 
itself in a  supposed  to  subsist after the  dissolutioii of the body,  nothing fuwr  lik. 
can hinder us from saying, that whatever is wanting in the pres- 
ent state to complete the sanction of  natural law will be execut- 
ed hereafter,  if  so it be agreeable to the Divine Wisdom. 
We come now from considering  man  on the physical side, 
which opens us already a passage towards finding the object o€ 
our present  pursuit.  Let us see now whether, by viewing man 
on the moral  side, that is,  as a being capable of  rule, who acts 
with knowledge and choice, and whether,  raising ourselves af- 
terwards  to  God, we  cannot  discover  new  reasons  and  still 
stronger presumptions of a future life, of a state of rewards and 
punishmects. 
Here we cannot avoid repeating part of  those things, which 
have been already mentioned in this work, because we are upon 
the  point of  considering their  entire result ; the truth, we in- 
tend  here  to establish, being as  it were  the conclusion of the 
whole system.  It is thus a painter, after having worked singly 
upon  each part of  his piece, thinks it necessary to retouch the 
whole, in order to produce what  is  called  the  total  gect  and 
harmony. 
XII.  Man,  we have seen, is a rational  and free  agent, who Fint proof, 
distinguishes justice and honesty, who finds within himself the drawn from  the nature 
principles of  conscience, who is sensible of  his dependance on ofman q- 
the Crearor, and born to fulfil certain duties.  His greatest or- sidered 04  the nonl 
nament is reason' and virtue ;  and his chief task in life is to ad- aide, 
vance in that  path, by embracing all the  occasions, that  offer, 
to improve, to reflect, and to do good.  The more he practises 
and confirms himself in such laudable occupations, the more he 
accomplishes the views of the Creator, and proves himself wor- 
thy of the existence  he has received.  He  is sensible, he can 
be reasonably called to an account for his conduct,  and he ap- 
proves or condemns himself according to his  different  manner 
of  acting. 
From all these circumstances it evidently appears,  that man 
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is not confined, like  other animals, to a mere  physical  econo-  -. 
my,  but  that  ht:  is included in a moral one, which raises him 
much higher, and is attended with greater consequences.  For 
what appearance  or probability is there, that a soul, which ad- 
vances daily in wisdom and virtue,  should tend to annihilation, 
and that God should think proper toextingush thislight in itsgreat- 
est lustre ?  Is it not more reasonable to think,  that the good or 
bad useof our faculties will be attended withfutureconsequences; 
that we shall be accountable to ourcreator, and finally receive the 
just retribution we  have  merited ?  Since  therefore  this judg- 
ment of  God does not display itself sufficiently in this world, it 
is  natural  to  presume,  that  the  plan of  the Divine Wisdom, 
with regard  to us,  embraces a duration of  a  much  greater ex- 
tent. 
Second  XIII.  Let us ascend from man to God, and we shall be still 
prmfJ  further convinced, that such in reality is the plan he formed.  drawn from 
the perfec-  If God is willing (a point we have already proved) that man 
don'  should  obsewe  the  rules of  right reason, in  proportion to his 
W. 
faculties and the circumstances he is under ;  this must be a se- 
rious  and  positive will.  It is the will of  the Creator, of  the 
Governor of  the world, of the sovereign Lord of all things.  It 
is therefore a real command, which lays us under an obligation 
of obeying.  It is moreover the will of  a Being supremely pow- 
erful, wise,  and good ; who,  proposing always, both with res- 
pect  to  himself  and  to his creatures, the most excellent ends, 
cannot fail to establish the means, which in the order of reason, 
and pursuant to the nature and state of  things, are necessary for 
the execution of  his design.  No  one  can reasonably contest 
these  principles;  but  let  US  see  what  consequences may be 
drawn from them. 
I.  If it actually became the Divine Wisdom to give laws to 
man,  this same wisdom requires these laws should be accompa- 
nied with necessary motives to determine rational and free agents 
to cnnform  thereto  in  all  cases.  Otherwise  we  should  be 
obliged to say,  either that God does not really and seriously de- 
sire the  observance  of  the  laws,  he  has  enacted,  or  that he 
wants power or wisdom to procure it, 
2.  If through an effect of his goodness,  he has not  thought 
proper to let men live at  random, or to abandon  them  to the 
capriciousness of  their passions ;  if  he has given them a light to 
direct them ;  this same goodness must undoubtedly induce him 
to annex a perfect3and  durable happiness to the good use, that 
every man makes of  this light. 
3.  Reason  informs us afterwards,  that an all-powerful,  all- 
wise, and all-bountiful Being is infinitely fond of order ;  that the 
same perfections make him desire,  that this order should reign 
among his intelligent and free creatures, and that it was for this 
very reason he subjected them to laws.  The same reasons, that 
induced  him to establish a moral order,  engage him likewise to 
procure their observance.  It must be therefore his satisfaction 
and glory, to render all men sensible of  the difference he makes 
between  those, who  disturb,  and those who conform to otder. 
He  cannot be indifferent in this respect ;  on the contrary, he is 
determined, by the love he has for himself and his  perfections, 
to  invest  his commands with  all the efficacy necessary to ren- 
der his authority respected.  This imports an establishment of 
future rewards and ~unishments  ; either  to  keep  man within 
rule,  as  much  as  possible, in  the present  state,  by  the  p+ 
tent motives of  hope and fear;  or to give afterwards an  exe- 
cution worthy of his justice and wisdom  to his plan,  by reduu- 
ing every thing to the primitive order he has established. 
4.  The same  principle carries us yet further.  For  if God 
be infinitely fond of  the order, he has established in the moral 
world, he cannot but approve of those, who, with a sincere and 
constant  attachment  to this  otder, endeavour  to  pleme  him, 
by  concurring to the accomplishment of his views ;  and he can- 
not but disapprove of such, as  observe  an opposite  conduet,* 
for the former are, a8 it were, his friends, and the latter declare 
themselves his enemies.  But the approbation of  the Deity in 
ports his protection, banevalence, and love ;  whereas his disap- 
probation  cannot  but  be attended  with quite contrary effects. 
If so how can any one imagine, that God's friends and enemies 
will  be  eonfounded, and  no difference made between &m  ? 
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Is it not much more consonant to reason to think,  that the Di- 
vine Justice will manifest  at  length,  some  way  or  other,  the 
extreme difference he places between virtue and vice, by  render- 
ing finally 2nd perfectly happy those, who,  by  a  submission to 
his  will,  are  become  the objects of  his benevolence ;  and, on 
the contrary, by making the wicked feel his just severity and re 
sentment ? 
XIV.  This is what our alearest notions of the perfections of 
the supreme Being  induce  us  to judge  concerning his views, 
and the plan he has formed.  Were not virtue to meet  surely 
and inevitably  with a  final  recompense,  and  vice  with  a  fi- 
nal  punishment,  and  this  in  a  general  and  complete  man- 
ner,  exactly  proportioned  to  the  degree  of  merit  or  de- 
merit  of  each  person,  the  plan of  natural  laws  would  never 
answer  our  expectation  from  a  supreme  Legislator,  whose 
prescience, wisdom, power, and goodness,  are without hounds. 
This would be leaving the laws divested of their principal force, 
and reducing  them ta the quality of  sitnple counsels ;  it would 
be subverting in fine the fundamental part of the system of in- 
telligent creatures,  namely, that of Seing induced to make a rea- 
sonable use  of  their faculties,  with a view and expectation  of 
happiness.  In short, the moral system would fall into a state 
of imperfection, which could be reconciled neither with the na- 
ture of  man,  nor with the state of  society, nor with the moral 
perfections of  the  Deity.  It is otherwise, when we acknowl- 
edge  a  future life.  The moral system is thereby  supported, 
connected,  and finished, so as to leave nothing wanting to ren- 
der it complete.  It is then a plan really worthy of  God,  and 
useful  to  man.  The supreme Being does all he ought to do 
with free and  rational  creatures, to  induce them  to behave as 
they should;  the  laws  of  nature  are thus established on  the 
most solid foundations ;  and nothing is wanting to bind man by 
such motives, as are properest to make an impression. 
Hence if  this plan be without comparison the most beautiful 
and the best ;  if  it be likewise the mcst worthy of  God, and the 
most connected with what we  know of  the nature,  wants, and 
state of man ;  how can any one doubt of  its being that, which 
the Divine Wisdom has actually chosen ? 
XV. I acknowledge indeed, that,  could we find in the pres- The objec. 
cnt life a sufficient sanction of  the laws of nature, in the meas-  7 
ure and plenitude  above mentioned,  we should  have  no right Present 
to press  this argument ; fpr nothing could oblige us to search c~,~ 
into futurity for an entire unravelling of the divine plan.  But urves to 
we have seen in the preceding chapter, that though by the nature z;mz 
of things,  and eveh by the various  establishments of  man,  vir-  it oppom 
tue has already its reward, and vice its punishment ;  yet this ex- 
cellent and just  order is accomplished only in part,  and that we 
find  a great number of  exceptions  to  this rule in history, and 
the  experience  of  human life.  Hence arises a very puzzling 
objection against the authority of  natural laws.  But as soon as 
mention is made of  another life, the difficulty disappears ;  every 
thing is cleared up  and set to right ; the  system appears con- 
nected, finished,  and  supported ;  the  Divine Wisdom  is jus- 
tified.  We find  all  the  necessary  supplements  and  corn. 
pensations to redress the present  irregularities ;  virtue acquires 
a firm and unshaken prop, by furnishing the virtuous man with 
a motive capable of  supporting him in the most dangerous diffi- 
culties, and  to  render  him  triumphant  over the most delicate 
temptations. 
Were this only a simple conjecture, it might  be  considered 
rather as a convenient  than solid  supposition.  But  we have 
seen, that it is founded also on the nature and ezcellence of the 
soul ;  on the instinct, that inclines us to  raise ourselves  above 
the present life ;  and on  the the nature of man,  considered on 
the moral  side, as a creature accountable  for his  actions,  and 
obliged to conform to a certain rule.  When besides all this we 
behold,  that  the same  opinion serves to support, and perfectly 
crowns the whole system of  natural law, it must be allowed to 
be no less probable than it is beautiful and engaging. 
XVI.  Hence  this  same opinion has been received more or  The beltd 
of. futun  less at all times, and by all nations,  according as reason has been  ate  h, 
more  or less cultivated, or  as people have inquired closer into been n- 
the origin of  things.  It  would be an easy matter to alledge di- $2. 
vers historical proofs,  and to produce also several beautiful pae 
Gages  frog tbe ancient phiiosophers, in order to show,  that the THE PRINCIPLES  OF  NA'I'URAL  LAW.  *=v 
reasons, which strike us,  made the like impressions on the  wis- 
est of  the Pagam.  But we shall be satisfied with  observing, 
that these testimonies, which have been collected by  other writ- 
ers, are not indifferent on this subject ) because this shows, either 
the vestiges of  a primitive tradition,  or the voice of reason and 
nature, or both i which adds a considerable weight to our ar- 
gument. 
CHAP.  XIV. 
That the proofr  we  have alledged have such a probability  andjtnesr, 
er venders them  ~uficient  to jix our belief, and to  determint  our 
tenduct. 
The proofm  I.  WE  have seen how far our reason is capable of eon- 
we have  g"n  of  dueting us with regard to the  important  question  of  the im- 
the W-  mortality  of  the soul, and a future  state of  rewards and pun- 
'$Ezat  ishments.  Each of  the proofs, we have alledged, has without 
me 6Ufb'  doubt its particular  force ;  but joining  to the assistance of one 
tienL  another, and acquiring a  greater strength by  their  union, they 
are certainly capqble of  making an impression on  every atten- 
tive and unprejudiced  mind,  and ought  to appeJr suficiect to 
establish the authority and sanction of  natural law in as full an 
extent as we desire. 
0bj.h.  11.  If any one should say,  that all  out  reasonings  on  this 
These  subjects are only probability and conjecture, and properly redu- 
proofs con- 
cible to a plausible reason or fitness, which leaves the thing still 
more than  at a greater distance  from demonstration ;  I shall agree, if  he 
a fit or 
ruitable  pleases,  that we have  not  here a complete  evidence ;  yet  the 
reason.  probability, methinks, is so very strong, and the fitness so great 
and so well established, that this is sufficient to make it prevail 
over the contrary opinion, and  consequently to determine us. 
For we should  be  strangely embarrassed, if  in every  ques- 
tlbn, that arises, we should refuse t~ be determined by any thing 
but a  demonstrative argument.  Most  commonly  we  are O- 
bliged to be satisfied with an assemblage of probabilities, which, 
in a conjuncc consideratioh, very seldom deceive us, and ought 
to supply the  place  of  evidence  in  subjects 'unsusceptible  of 
demonstration.  It is thus that in natural philosophy,  in  phys- 
ic, criticism, history, politics, commerce, and generally in all the 
affairs of life, a prudent man is determined by a concurrence of 
reasons, which,  every thing  considered,  he judges  superior  to 
the opposite arguments. 
111.  In order to render the force of  this kind of  proof  more m,, ; 
obvious, it will  not be  amiss to explain  here at first  what we  meantb~a 
su itable  mean by a plnusibk  reason orfittress ;  to inquire afterwards into ,,. 
the general principle, on which this sort of  reasoning is found- 
ed ;  and to see in  particular  what  constitutes its force,  when 
applied to the  law of  nature.  This will  be the right way to 
know the just  value of  our arguments,  and what weightlthey 
ought to have in our determinations. 
AplausihZe reason orjitness is that,  which  is drawn from the 
necessity of  admitting a point as certain,  for the  perfection of 
a system in other respects solid, useful,  and well connected, but 
which would be  defective  without  this point ;  when there is 
no reason to suppose that it has any essential effect.*  For ex- 
ample, upon beholding a great and  magnificent palace,  we re- 
mark an  admirable  symmetry  and proportion ;  where all  the 
rules of  art,  which form the solidity,  convenience, and beauty 
of a blilding, are strictly observed.  In short all that we see of 
the building denotes  an  able architect.  May it  not therefore 
be reasonably supposed, that the foundation,  which we do not 
see, is equally solid and proportioned to the great mass it bears ? 
Can it be  imagined, that the architect's ability  and knowledge 
should have forsake2 him in so important  a point ?  In order 
to form such a  supposition, we should have certain  proofs  of 
this deficiency, or have seen, that  in fact the foundation is irn- 
perfect ;otherwise  we could not presume so improbable a thing. 
Who is it,  that,  on a mere metaphysical possibility of the archi- 
tect's  having neglected to lay the foundation,  would  venture a 
wager, that the thing is really so  ? 
IV. Such is the nature of  fitness.  The general foundation,  General 
foundation  af  this manner of  reasoning is, that we must consider not on- 
ly what is possible,  but what is  probable j  and that a truth,  of  n~anner  of 
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itself very little known,  acquires  a  probability by  its  natural 
connexion with other truths more obvious.  Thus natural phi- 
losophers  do not question that they  have  discovered the truth, 
when an hypothesis happily  explains all the phenomena ;  and an 
event, very little known in history,  appears no longer doubtful, 
when we see it serves for a key and  basis to many other indu- 
bitable events.  It is on this principle  in a great measure, that 
moral certainty is  founded,"  which  is  so much  used  in most 
sciences, as well  in the conduct of  life,  and in things  of  the 
greatest importance to  individuds,  families,  and to  the whole 
society. 
This kind  V.  But if  this manner of  judging and reasoning takes place 
of  fitness is 
very strong  so frequently in human affairs,  and is in general founded on so 
in respect  solid a principle ;  it is still much surer when we are to reason 
'O  on the works of  God, to discover his plan,  and to judge of  his 
law.  views and designs.  For the whole  universe,  with the several, 
systems, that compose it,  and  ~articularly  the  system of man 
and society, are the work of a supreme understanding.  Noth- 
ing has  been done by chance, nothing depends on a blind, ca- 
pricious, or impotent cause ;  every thing has been calculateci and 
measured with a profound wisdom.  Here therefore, more than 
any where else, we have a right to judge, that so powerful and 
so wise an author, has omitted nothing necessary for the perfec- 
tion of his plan ;  and that consistent with himself he has fitted 
it with all the essential parts, for the design  he proposed.  If 
we ought to presume  reasonably such a care in an able archi- 
tect,  who is nothing  more than a man  subject to error ;  how 
much more ought we to presume it in a  being of  infini:e  wis- 
dam ? 
Thisfitnew  VI.  What we have been now saying shews, that this fitness 
has diger-  ,degrees.is   always of the same weight, but may be more or loss strong 
Principles  in proportion to the greater or less necessity, on which it is es- 
"judge  it.  of tablished.  And to  lay  down  rules on this subject,  we may 
say in general,  1. That the more  we know the  views  and de- 
sign of  the author ;  2. The more we are assured of  his wisdom 
See M. Boullier'r  philomphical essay  on the saul:  of brutes,  &c.  second edi- 
tion ;  to which haa  been joined a treatise of  the true principles, that serve ar  a 
foufubtion to  moral cc&tp  Amt. 1737. 
and power;  3. The more this power and wisdom are perfect; 
4. The more considerable are  the  inconveniences,  that  result 
from  the  opposite  system ;  and the  more  they  border up011 
the absurd ;  the more pressing we find the consequences, drawn 
from this sort of considerations.  For then we have nothing to 
set in opposition to them by way of  counterbalance ;  and con- 
sequently it is on that side, we are determined by right reason. 
VII.  These  principles  are  of  themselves  applicable to our Applica- 
subject, and this in so just and complete a manner, that the re.-  :Fen~zi~~~* 
son,  drawn from  probability  or fitness,  cannot  be carried any  ciples to 
farther.  After what has been said in the preceding chapters, it OwSUbjeQ 
would  be  entering into useless  repetitions  to attempt to prove 
here  all  the particulars ;  the  thing  sufficiently proves  itself. 
Let us  be  satisfied with observing, that the fitness in  favor of 
the sanction of natural  laws is so much the stronger and  more 
pressing, as the contrary opinion throws into the system of  hu- 
manity  an  obscurity  and  confusion,  which  borders  very 
much upon the absurd, if  it does not come quite up to it.  The 
plan of the  Divine  Wisdom becomes in respect to us an inso- 
luble enigma ;  we are no longer able to account for  any thing; 
and we cannot tell why so necessary a thing should be wanting 
in a plan so beautiful  in other respects, so useful, and so  per- 
fectly  connected. 
VIII.  Let  us draw a comparison between the two systems,  Compari- 
to see which is most conformable to order, most suitable to the ~o~p~ 
nature and state of man, and, in short, most reasonable and wor-  site syr- 
thy  of  God.  terns. 
Su?pose,  on one side, that the Creator proposed the perfec- 
tion and felicity of  his creatures, and in particular the  good of 
man and society.  That for this purpose,  having invested man 
with  understanding and  liberty,  and  rendered  him capable of 
knowing his end, of  discovering  and following  the  road, that 
can alone conduct him to it, he lays him under a strict obliga- 
tion of  walking constantly in this road, and of ever following the 
light of  reason, which ought always to direct his steps.  That 
in order to guide him  the better, he has given him all the prin- 
ciples necessary to serve him as a rule.  'rhat this direction and 
these principles,coming from a powerful, wise, and good superior, 
have all the characteristics of a real law.  That this law &m  a& 
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readr along  with  it,  even in  this  life, its rewards  and punish- 
,  n or-  ments ;  but that this  first sanction  being insufficient, God  i 
der to give to a plan SD worthy of  his wisdom and goodness its 
full perfection, and ro furnish mankind in all possible cases with 
necessary  motives  and helps,  has moreover established a prop- 
er  sanction in respect to natural law,  which will be manifested 
in a future lie ;  and that,  attentive to the conduct of man,  he 
proposes to make him give an account af his actioas, to recom- 
pense virtue, and  to  punish  vice, by a retribution exactly prce 
portioned to the merit or demerit of  each person. 
Let US  set  now in opposition to this first system the other, 
whii  supposes that every thing is limited,  in  respect fa  man, 
to the present life,  and that he has nothing to hope or  fear be- 
yond this term ;  that God, after having created man and insti- 
tiuted society, concerns himself no more about them ;  that,  after 
giving us a power  of  discerning good and  evil by the help of 
reason, he takes no ruanner of notice of the use we make there- 
ef,  but leaves us in such a manner to ourselves, that we are ab- 
solutely at  liberty &o do as we please ;  that we  shall  have no 
account  to give  to our Creator, and that,  notwithstanding the 
unequal and irregular distribution of the goods and evils of this 
life,  notwithstanding the disorders caused by  he  malice or in- 
justice of mankind, we have no redress or compensation ever to 
expect from God. 
Thesyara  IX.  Can any one my,  that this last system is comparable to 
~O~~f~:  the first ?  Dws it set the divme perfections in so great a light ? 
uraIlawsis  IS  it SO worthy of  the divine'wisdom,  bounty,  and justice ?  IS 
fgr prefer-  it so proper to stem the torrent of  vice, and to support virtue, 
able to  the 
it  in delicate and dangerous conjunctures? Does it render the struc- 
 stem  ture of  sozieiy as did,  and invest the laws of  nature with such 
an audwnir)., as  the glory  of  the  supreme Legislator and  the 
g;+  of  humanity require  ?  Were we  to choose between  two 
societies,  arre of  which admitted the former system, while the 
other acknowledged only the latter, is there a prudent man, who 
would net highly prefer to live in the first of these societies ? 
There is certainly  no  comparison between those  two  sys- 
tems, in respect to beauty  and  fitness;  the  first is a work of 
the most perfect reason ;  the second is defective, and provides 
no manner of remedy against a great  many disorders,  Now 
even this alone points out sufficiently on which side the truth lies ; 
because the business is to judge and reason of  the  desigm and 
works of the Deity, who does every thing with infinite wisdom. 
X.  Let  no one say,  that,  limited as we are,  it is temerity to Qbjeetion. 
decide after this manner;  and that we have too impwfect ideas 
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of  the divine nature  and perfections,  to  be  able  to  judge of 
his plan and desigfis with any certainty.  This reflection, which 
is  in  some  measure  true,  and  in some cases  just,  proves too 
much, if applied to our subject, and consequentb  has no weight. 
Let us but reflect a little, and  we shall find, that this .thou& 
leads us insensibly to a kind of  pyrrhonism, whieh would be the 
subversion of all order and economy.  For in fine there is m 
medium ;  we must choose one of the two systems, above explain- 
ed.  To  reject the first is admitting the second with all its in- 
coqenienees.  This remark is of some importance, and alone 
is almost sufficient to show us the force of  fitness in this case ; 
because not to acknowledge the solidity of  this reason is to lay 
one's  self under a necessity of  receiving a  defective  system ;  a 
system loaded with inconveniences, and whose conseqaences are 
very far from being reasonable. 
XI.  Such are  the nature  and force of  the fitness, on which of  the im  fluence, 
the proofs of the sanction of  natural laws are established.  All,  which 
that rem'tins now, is to see what impression these proofs united  those  proofs 
ought to make  on our minds, and what  influence  they should  oughtta 
have over our conduct.  This is the capital point,  in whichthe have mrf 
our con- 
whole  ought  to  terminate.  duct. 
I.  In the first place I observe,  that  though  all,  that  can be  We shodd 
said  in  faror  of  the  sanction  of  natural  laws,  were still to 
leave the question undecided, yet it would be reasonxble even in the foun- 
this very  uncertainty to act, as if  it had been determined in the $:;.$ 
affirmative.  For it is evidently the safest side, namely tbat,  in  ofafuture 
which there is less at all events to lose, and more to gain.  Let Etate. 
us state the  thing as hubioue.  If  there be a future state, it 
is not only an error not to believe it, but likewise a  dangerous 
irregularity  to act, as if  there were no such thing.  An error 
of  this kind is attended with pernicious consequences;  where- 
as,  if  there is no such thing, the  mistake  in  believeing  it pto- 
duces in general none but good effects ;  it is not subject to any 
inconveniences hereafter, nor does it, generally speakiag, expose THE  PRINCIPLES OF  NATURAL LAW. 
us to any great difficulties  for the time present.  Be it therefore 
as it  may,  and  let  the  case be ever so  unfavorable  to natural 
laws, a  prudent man will never hesitate which side he is to em- 
brace,  whether the  observance, or  the violation  of those laws. 
Virtue will certainly have the preference of  vice. 
2.  But if  this side  of  the  question is the most prudent and 
eligible, even under a supposition of doubt and uncertainty,  how 
much more will it be so, if  we acknowledge, as we cannot avoid, 
that this opinion  is  at least more  probable than the other ?  A 
first degree of verisimilitude, or a simple though slight probabil- 
ity, becomes a reasonable motive of determination, in respect to 
ewry man,  who calculates and reflects.  And,  if  it be prudent 
to conduct ourselves  by this principle in the ordinary affairs of 
life,  does  prudence  permit  us  to deviate from this very road 
in the most important affairs, such as essentially interest our fe- 
licity ? 
3.  But in  fine if  proceeding still  further, and reducing the 
thing to its true point, it is agreed that we hsve actually, if not 
a strict  demonstration  of  a future  life,  at  least a probability, 
founded on many reasonable presumptions, and  so great a fit- 
ness, as  borders very near upon  certainty ;  it is still more evi- 
dent, that,  in the  present  state  of  things, we  ought  to act on 
this  footing, and are not reasonably allowed to form  any other 
rule of  conduct." 
It is a ne  XII. Nothing indeed is more worthy of a rations1 being, than 
cessary 
,,,,,  to seek for evidence on every subject,  and to be determined on- 
quence of  ly by  clear and  certain  principles.  But since all subjects are 
our  nature  ,,,  not  susceptible  thereof,  and yet we are obliged to determine ; 
what would become of us, if  we were always to wait for a perfect 
demonstration  ?  In failure of  the  highest  degree of  certainty, 
we  must  take up with the next to it;  and a great probability 
becomes  a  sufficient reason of  acting, when  there  is  none of 
equal weight  to oppose it.  If this side of the question be  not 
in itself evidently certain,  it is at least  an  evident  and  certain 
rule,  that,  in  the present  state  of things, it ought to have the 
preference. 
This is a necessary consequence of our nature and condition. 
As we have only a limited knowledge, and yet are under  a ne- 
Sea part  i. chap, vi.  4 
msity of determining and acting ;  were it requisite for this pur- 
pose to have a perfect  certainty, and  were we to refuse to ac- 
cept of probability, as  a principle of determination ;  we should 
be either obliged to determine in favor of the least probable side, 
and contrary to verisimilitude, (which nobody methinks will at- 
tempt to maintain) or we should be forced to spend our days in 
doubt and uncertainty ;  to fluctuate continually in a state of irres- 
olution, and to remain ever  in  suspence, without acting, with- 
out resolving opon any thing, or without having any fixt rule of. 
conduct;  which  would be a total  subversion of the system of 
humanity. 
XIII.  But if  it be reasonable  in general  to admit of  fitness Reawn 
lays ut un.  and probability, as the rule  of  conduct, for want of  evidence ;  de, 
this rule becomes still more necessary and just  in particular cas-  ligation of 
es, in  which,  as hath be~n  already observed, a person runs no  so doing. 
risk in following it.  When there is nothing to  lose if we are 
mistaken,  and a  great deal to  win if  we  are not;  what can 
we desire more for  a rational  motive of  acting  ?  Especially 
when the opposite side exposes us to very great danger,  in case 
of  error ;  and affords us no  manner of  advantage,  supposing 
we are in the  right.  Under  such  circumstances-there is no 
room for  hesitating ;  reason obliges us  to  embrace the  safest 
bide ;  and this obligation  is so much the stronger,  as it arises 
from a concurrence of  motives  of the greatest weight and so- 
lidity. 
In short if it be reasonable to embrace this side, even in case 
of an entire uncertainty,  it is still more so when there is some 
probability in its favor ;  it becomes necessary if these probabil- 
ities are cogent and  numerous ;  and in fine the  necessity still 
increases, if,  at all events, this is  the safest and most advanta- 
geous part.  What can any  one desire more,  in order to pro- 
duce a real obligation,*  according to the principles we have es- 
tablished in regard to the  internal  obligation imposed  by rea- 
son  ? 
XIV.  Again.  This internal and primitive obligation is con- 
firmed by  the Divine Will itself,  and consequently rendered as Eta$7 
strong,  as possible.  In fact,  this manner of  judging and act-  himseuimk 
ing being,  as we have seen, the result of  our constitution, such W  mu* 
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as the Creator has formed it ;  this alone io  certain pmf, 
it is the will of God  we should be directed by those principleg 
and consider it is a point of  duty.  For whatever,  as  we  have 
already observed,+  is inherent in the nature of  man,  whatever 
is a consequence of  his original constitution and state, acquaints 
us dearly and distinctly with the wiil of  the Creator, with the 
use he expects we should make of  our faculties, and the oblip 
tiops,  to which he has thought  proper  to subject us.  This is 
2  point,  that  mesits great  attention.  For  if  we may affirm, 
without fear of  mistake, that the Deity is actually wiliing,  that 
man should conduct  himself  in this life  on the  foundation of 
the belief  of  afuture state, and  as having every thing to hope 
or to sear on his side,  tmsrrting as  he has acted justly or un* 
justly ;  does there not thence arise a more than probable proof 
of the reality of  this state, and of  the certainty of  rewards and 
punishments ?  Otherwise  we  should be  obliged to say, that 
God hiiSelf deceives us,  because this error was necessary for 
the  execution of  his designs, as a principle essential to the plan 
he has  formed in  respect  to humanity.  But  to  speak  after 
this  manner of  the most perfect Being, of  a Being, whose POW- 
er,  wisdom, and goodness, are  infinite, would  be using a law 
guage equally absurd and indecent.  For this very  reason, that 
IS  the zbovementioned article of  belief is necessary to mankiad, 
and enters into  the  views of  the  Creator, it cannot  be false, 
Whatever the Deity sets before us as a duty, or as a reasonablar 
principle of conduct, must be certainly true. 
Conclasion.  XV.  Thus every  thing concurs to estalish the authority  of 
natural laws.  I.  The approbation  they  receive  from reason, 
a.  The express command  of  God.  3.  The real advantages, 
which their  observance procures us in this world ;  and in fine 
the great hopes and just fears,  we ought to have in respect to 
futurity,  according  as we  have  observed  or  despised  those 
laws.  Thus it is that God  bin&  us to the practice of  virtue 
by such strong and so  numerous  connexions, that every man, 
Fvha consults and  listens to reason,  finds himself under an in- 
dispensable obligation of  rendering them the invari abk rule of 
hi cduct. 
z'!dt, 
w~ia  XVI. Some perhaps will object,that we have been  too diffusive 
t See part ii. chap. it. sect. 5. 
in respect to the sanction of natural laws.  True  it is, that most of probable 
those,  who have written concerning the law of nature, are more 2;~; 
concise on  this article,  and  PuRendorf  himself  does  not say  in full evi- 
much  about it.*  This author,  without  absolutely  excluding ~~~~~!& 
the consideration of  a future life from this science, seems nev- 
ertheless to confine the law of  nature within the bounds of the 
present life, as tending only to render us soci2ble.t  And  yet 
he acknowledges, that manis naturally desirous of immortality, 
and that this has induced heathens  to believe the soul  irnmor- 
tal ;  that this belief  is likewise authorised by an  ancient tradi- 
tion  concerning the goddess  of  revenge ;  to  which he adds, 
that in fact it is very probable God  will punish the dtion  of 
the laws of  nature;  but that there is still a  great obscurity in 
this respect, and nothing but revelation  can  put the  thing out 
of  doubt.$ 
But were  it  even true, that  reason  affords us  nothing bt 
probabilities in regard to this question, yet we must not excluds 
from the law  of  nature  all considerations  of  a  f~~ture  state 5 
especially if  these  probabilities are so very  great, as  to border 
upon certainty.  The above article enters necessarily into the sys- 
tem of this science, and forms a part thereof so much the more 
essential, that,  were it not for this,  the authority of natural law 
would be weakened, as we have already demonstrated ;  and it 
would be difficult (to say nothing more) to establish on any sol- 
id  grounds  several  important duties, which oblige us to sacri- 
fice our greatest advantages to the good of society or to the sup- 
port of  equity and  justice.  Necessary therefore it was to ex- 
amine with  some care, how far our natural light may lead us in 
respect  to this  question, and to show the  force of  the proofs, 
that our reason affords us,  and the influence those proofs ought 
to have over our conduct. 
True it is,  as we have already observed, that the best way to 
know the will of  God in this respect, would be  an express dec- 
* The reader may see in a small treatise, intitled Judgmentofan Qnonymaus, &c 
and inserted in the 5th edition of the Duties  of  a man nrrd a citizen,  the remarks, 
that  Mr. Leibnitz, author  of that  treatise, makes against Puffendorf upon  this 
score.  Barbeyrac, who has joined hisown rsmarks toMr. Leibnitz's work, jur- 
tifies  Puffendorf pre:ty  well.  And yet  an  attentive observer  will find thereie 
still something wanting to the entire justification of  this author's system.  + See  Puffendor's Preface on the duties of  Man and a Citizen, sect. 6, 7. 
4  See the Law  of  Nature and Nations, book ii, chav. iii. sect. %I. THE PEQfMPLJB OF 
laration on &is part.  But  if reasoning,  rssl mere philosophers, 
we have  been able to make use of  so decisive a proof, nw 
thing can  hinder  as,  as ckristian  philosophers, from  availing 
wrsbes  of the advantage we have from revelation, in order to 
strengthen our conjectures.  Nothing  indeed  can  be a better 
argument, that  we have reawned  and conjectured  right, than 
the positive declaration of  the  Deity on this  important point. 
For, since it appears.in fact, that Ood is willing to recompense 
virtue and to punish vice in another life, it is m  longer possi- 
ble to doubt of  what we have advanced, namely, that this is ex- 
tremely conformable to his wisdom;goodness,  and justice.  The 
proofs,  we  have drawn from the nature of  man,  from God's 
designs in his favor, from the wisdom and  equity,  with which 
he governs the world,  and from the present state of things, are 
not awork of  the  imagination,  or an illusion of selflove ;  no, 
they are reflections dictated by right reason.  And when reve- 
lation comes up to their assistance, it sets then in full evidence 
what already  had  been rendered probable by the  sole light of 
nature. 
But the reflection,  we have here  made,  regards not only the 
sanction of natural lawhit may also be extended to the other parts 
of this work.  It  is to us a great pleasure to see, that the prin- 
ciples,  we have laid down,  are exactly those, that the christian 
religion adopts for its basis,  and on which the  whole  structure 
of  religion  and morality is raised.  If on one $ide  this remark 
serves to confirm  us  in these  principles,  by  assuring us,  that 
we have hit  upon the true  system of  nature ;  on the other, it 
ought to dispose us to have an infinite esteem for a  revelation, 
which perfectly confirms the law of nature, and converts moral 
@dosophy into a  religious  and  popular doctrine ;  a doctrine, 
founded on  facts, and in  which the authority and promises of 
the D&ty manifestly intervene in the fittest manner to make an 
impression upon man.  This happy agreement between natural 
and revealed light is equally honorable to both. 
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